The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
13. The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting aside the order for discharge and has incidentally prayed that the complaint and the consequential proceedings be quashed. However, the summoning order has not been annexed to the record, and it is not known whether the petitioner has approached the Court immediately after passing the summoning order or not. Further, the copies of the order sheets have also not been filed, and the stage of the case is not known. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the complaint merely because of the incidental prayer without any foundational facts.
14. 2026:HHC:3558 Consequently, the present petition fails and it is dismissed.
Full Judgment Text
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2026:HHC:3558
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1280 of 2025
Reserved on: 08.01.2026
Date of Decision: 23.02.2026.
Vijay Laxmi Verma
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and others
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Parav Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondents/State
:
Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition has been filed against the order
dated 13.10.2025, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Nadaun, District Hamirpur (learned Trial Court)
vide which an application for discharging the applicant (the
accused before the learned
Trial Court) was dismissed after
holding that no such jurisdiction is vested in him. (Parties shall
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3558
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2.
Briefly stated, that facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the Drugs Inspector filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused and other persons
asserting that he had inspected the shop being run in the name
and style of M/s Shri Medical Store, Opposite Bus Stand Nadaun,
District
Hamirpur
(HP)
and
obtained
the
samples
of
Chlorpheniramine Maleate Tablets for analysis. These were sent
to the Government analyst CTL Kandaghat, who issued a report
mentioning that the drug was not of standard quality. The
complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court
against the accused after completing the necessary formalities.
3.
The accused appeared before the learned Trial Court
and filed an application seeking her discharge. Learned Trial
Court held that it had no jurisdiction to discharge a person in a
summons case.
4.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the
2026:HHC:3558
application. There was an inordinate delay in sending the
samples for examination. The complaint was filed without
taking any permission from the competent authority, as per the
guidelines of the Director General of Health Services. The
prosecution could not be launched if the quantity of drugs in the
sample is above 70% of the standard laid down. In the present
case, the sample had a ratio of 87.9 %, and the prosecution was
not maintainable. The sample was collected on 08.01.2009, and
the report was issued on 31.10.2009. A petition for quashing of
the complaint was filed by co-accused Anil Mediratta and Ors,
which was registered as Cr.MMO. No. 738 of 2021 and was
allowed on 04.07.2024. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
5.
I have heard Mr Parav Sharma, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
6.
Mr Parav Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the
application. The Coordinate Bench of this Court had allowed the
2026:HHC:3558
petition filed by co-accused Anil Mediratta, and the present
proceedings cannot continue against the present petitioner.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
7.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned
Trial Court had rightly held that there is no provision for
discharging the accused in a summons case. There is no
infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court is trying
the present matter as a summons case. Learned Trial Court had
rightly held that the Magistrate does not have the jurisdiction to
recall the order summoning the accused. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004)
7 SCC 338: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1927: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 949 that the
Magistrate cannot recall the summoning order issued by him
and the remedy of a person aggrieved by the summoning order
2026:HHC:3558
is approaching the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and
not filing a discharge petition. This judgment was followed in
Everest Advertising (P) Ltd. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2007) 5
SCC 54: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 444: (2007) 137 Comp Cas 32: 2007 SCC
OnLine SC 487, wherein it was observed at page 58:
“10. Summons were issued by the learned Magistrate by
reason of an order dated 24-7-1999. He recalled the said
order. He did not have any jurisdiction in that behalf. A
Magistrate does not have and, thus, cannot exercise any
inherent jurisdiction.
11. In Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal [(2004) 7 SCC 338:
2004 SCC (Cri) 1927] a three-Judge Bench of this Court
while overruling an earlier decision of this Court in K.M.
Mathew v. State of Kerala [(1992) 1 SCC 217: 1992 SCC (Cri)
88] stated the law thus: (SCC p. 343, paras 14 & 16)
“14. But after taking cognisance of the complaint and
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if he is
satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with
the complaint, he can issue process by way of
summons under Section 204 of the Code. Therefore,
what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing
a process under Section 204 is the satisfaction of the
Magistrate, either by examination of the complainant
and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated
under Section 202, that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding with the complaint, hence issue the
process under Section 204 of the Code. In none of
these stages the Code has provided for hearing the
summoned accused, for obvious reasons, because this
is only a preliminary stage, and the stage of hearing of
the accused would only arise at a subsequent stage
provided for in the latter provision in the Code. It is
true as held by this Court in Mathew case [(1992) 1 SCC
217: 1992 SCC (Cri) 88] that before issuance of
2026:HHC:3558
summons the Magistrate should be satisfied that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint
but that satisfaction is to be arrived at by the inquiry
conducted by him as contemplated under Sections 200
and 202, and the only stage of dismissal of the
complaint arises under Section 203 of the Code at
which stage the accused has no role to play, therefore,
the question of the accused on receipt of summons
approaching the court and making an application for
dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the
Code on a reconsideration of the material available on
record is impermissible because by then Section 203 is
already over and the Magistrate has proceeded further
to Section 204 stage.
***
16. Therefore, in our opinion the observation of this
Court in the case of Mathew [(1992) 1 SCC 217: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 88] that for recalling an erroneous order of
issuance of process, no specific provision of law is
required, would run counter to the scheme of the Code
which has not provided for review and prohibits
interference at interlocutory stages. Therefore, we are
of the opinion that the view of this Court in the
Mathew case [(1992) 1 SCC 217: 1992 SCC (Cri) 88] that
no specific provision is required for recalling an
erroneous order, amounting to one without
jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law.”
12. The said ratio has been reiterated by another threeJudge
Bench
of
this
Court
in Subramanium
Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra [(2004) 13 SCC 324:
2005 SCC (Cri) 242: JT (2004) 8 SC 220] and N.K.
Sharma v. Abhimanyu [(2005) 13 SCC 213 : (2006) 2 SCC
(Cri) 135].
10.
A similar view was taken in Iris Computers Ltd. v.
Askari Infotech (P) Ltd., (2015) 14 SCC 399 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 389:
2013 SCC OnLine SC 1226, wherein it was observed at page 403:
2026:HHC:3558
9. This Court has dealt with the question of recall of a
process issued under Section 204 of the Code in Adalat
Prasad case [Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC
338: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1927] and opined that the Code does
not contemplate or provide for any provision affording
opportunity to the accused until the issuance of process
to him under Section 204. This Court has observed that
before issuing a summons under Section 204 of the Code,
the Magistrate must be satisfied that there exists
sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint and a
prima facie case is made out against the accused. The said
satisfaction should be arrived at by conducting an inquiry
as contemplated under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code.
The first stage of dismissal of the complaint before the
issuance of process arises under Section 203 of the Code,
at which stage the accused has no role to play. Subsequent
to the issuance of the process, the question of the accused
approaching the court by making an application under
Section 203 of the Code for dismissal of the complaint is
impermissible because by then the stage of Section 203 is
already over and the Magistrate has proceeded further to
the Section 204 stage.
10. Therefore, the crux of the matter rests into the
existence of two different scenarios; the former involving
only the complainant's role and the latter introducing the
accused. The former constitutes cognisance of the offence
on complaint, satisfaction reached by the Magistrate that
a prima facie case is made out and thereafter, issuance of
process to the accused. It is only after the aforesaid stages
are complete that the next stage is triggered, enabling the
accused to actively participate in the proceedings. The
dismissal of the complaint by the Magistrate under
Section 203 evidently falls into the former stages of
proceedings when the Magistrate has to base his opinion
as to the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding
towards the second stage on the statements of the
complainant and the witnesses, along with the result of
the inquiry conducted under Section 202. It is for obvious
reasons that none of the former stages in the Code
2026:HHC:3558
provide for hearing the summoned accused, the said
being only preliminary stages and the stage of hearing of
the accused arising at subsequent stages provided for in
the latter provisions in the Code. (See Bholu Ram v. State
of Punjab [Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 710] .)
11. Having noticed the aforesaid, this Court in Adalat
Prasad case [Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC
338: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1927] held a contrary view in respect of
recalling of erroneous order of issuance of process from
the earlier view taken by this Court in K.M.
Mathew v. State of Kerala [(1992) 1 SCC 217: 1992 SCC (Cri)
88] and opined that the scheme of the Code does not
provide for review of order of issuance of process and
prohibits interference by the accused at the interlocutory
stage under Section 203. This Court, after overruling the
view expressed by this Court in the K.M. Mathew
case [(1992) 1 SCC 217: 1992 SCC (Cri) 88], has stated as
under: (Adalat Prasad case [Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal,
(2004) 7 SCC 338: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1927], SCC p. 343, para 15)
“15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of
an offence, issues process without there being any
allegation against the accused or any material
implicating the accused or in contravention of
provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the
Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an
aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by
invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal
Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an
order. Hence, in the absence of any review power or
inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts,
the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code.”
12. The aforesaid law laid down in Adalat Prasad
case [Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, (2004) 7 SCC 338:
2004 SCC (Cri) 1927] has been followed and reiterated by
this Court in its subsequent decisions in Bholu Ram
case [Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 710], Subramanium Sethuraman v. State
2026:HHC:3558
of Maharashtra [(2004) 13 SCC 324: 2005 SCC (Cri)
242], N.K. Sharma v. Abhimanyu [(2005) 13 SCC 213 : (2006)
2 SCC (Cri) 135] and Everest Advertising (P) Ltd. v. State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2007) 5 SCC 54 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)
444].
11.
No contrary precedent was brought to the notice of
this Court; therefore, there is no infirmity in the view taken by
the learned Trial Court that it had no jurisdiction to recall the
order and discharge the accused.
12.
The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court was dealing
with a quashing petition in Anil Mediratta and others vs. State of
H.P. and others, and not with the discharge of the accused;
hence, the cited judgment will not apply to the present case.
13.
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
setting aside the order for discharge and has incidentally prayed
that the complaint and the consequential proceedings be
quashed. However, the summoning order has not been annexed
to the record, and it is not known whether the petitioner has
approached the Court immediately after passing the summoning
order or not. Further, the copies of the order sheets have also
not been filed, and the stage of the case is not known. Therefore,
it is impermissible to quash the complaint merely because of the
incidental prayer without any foundational facts.
14.
2026:HHC:3558
Consequently, the present petition fails and it is
dismissed.
15.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
23rd February, 2026.
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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