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2026:JHHC:27167-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 6862 of 2026
Vijay Kumar Ojha, S/o Late Devi Ram Ojha, R/o Barajamda, POBarajamda, PS-Gua, District-West Singhbhum
...
…
Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary, Department of
Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2. The Director, Mines, Department of Mines and Geology,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The Deputy Commissioner, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa
4. The District Mining Officer, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa
...
…
Respondents
With
W.P.(C) No. 6863 of 2026
Anil Khirwal, S/o Late Biswanath Khirwal, R/o Khirwal Market, Sadar
Bazar, Chaibasa, PO-Chaibasa, PS-Sadar, Chaibasa, District-West
Singhbhum
...
…
Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary, Department of
Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2. The Director, Mines, Department of Mines and Geology,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The Deputy Commissioner, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa
4. The District Mining Officer, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa
...
…
Respondents
----CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
----For the Petitioners
: Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Richa Lal, Advocate
For the Respondents
: Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III
----Reserved on: 03.09.2026
Pronounced on: 10.09.2026
Per: Rajesh Shankar, J.
1.
Both these writ petitions have been preferred for refund of the
amount to the tune of Rs.33,60,863/- and Rs.2,08,39,666/deposited respectively by the petitioners pursuant to the
compensation demand raised by the 4th respondent – the
District Mining Officer, Chaibasa in purported exercise of the
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
power under Section 21(5) of the Mines and Minerals
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to
as “the Act, 1957”). The petitioners have also prayed for
payment of interest @ 7% per annum from the date of deposit
of the said amount till the date of refund of the same.
2.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners are holding mining lease of Manganese and Iron
ore respectively carrying mining activities in accordance with
law. They have also paid rent, royalty etc. on time to the
satisfaction of the competent authorities.
3.
It is further submitted that the respondent no. 4 issued
demand notices vide Letter No. 2033/M dated 20.09.2017
against the petitioner of W.P.(C) No. 6862 of 2026 and vide
Letter No. 1985/M dated 12.09.2017 (revised vide Letter No.
2012/M dated 18.09.2017) against the petitioner of W.P.(C)
No. 6863 of 2026, whereby demands of Rs.33,60,863/- and
Rs.2,08,39,666/- respectively were raised against them as
compensation under Section 21(5) of the Act, 1957 for mining
excess quantity of ore beyond the limit approved in the
environmental clearance/certificates issued to them.
4.
It is also submitted that since the said demand notices
stipulated that in the event of default in making payment of
the said amount till 31.12.2017, the petitioners would be
charged 24% interest per annum on the same, they
immediately paid the alleged compensation amount through
challans and submitted proof thereof to the respondent no. 4
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
vide letters as contained in Ref. Nos. VKO/DMO/48/2017-18
and AK/98/17-18 respectively both dated 30.12.2017.
5.
It is argued that though the compensation amount under
Section 21(5) of the Act of 1957 can be realized by an
authority delegated with such power by the State Government
under Section 26(2) of the said Act, no such power was
delegated to the respondent no. 4 to make the alleged
demand from the petitioners. Thus, the demand raised by
respondent
no.
was
without
authority
and
hence,
unsustainable in the eyes of law.
6.
It is also contended that that a batch of writ petitions led by
W.P.(C) No. 3399 of 2019 was filed by similarly situated
persons which were heard by a Coordinate Bench of this Court
and vide order dated 04.03.2025, the Court set aside the
demand notices issued by the respective District Mining
Officers under Section 21(5) of the Act, 1957 observing that
said demand notices were issued without any delegation of
power by the State Government to the concerned District
Mining Officers. The Court also directed to refund the amount
deposited by the petitioners of the said writ petitions.
7.
The State of Jharkhand moved before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court challenging the order dated 04.03.2025 passed in
W.P.(C) No. 7326 of 2017 and other analogous cases by filing
Special Leave Petitions, however, the same were dismissed
vide order dated 15.12.2025 passed in Special Leave Petition
(Civil) Diary No. 69550/2025 with Special Leave Petition (Civil)
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
Diary No. 67553/2025.
8.
It is urged that the claim of the petitioners is same as was
made in the aforesaid batch of the writ petitions. Once it has
been decided by the Coordinate Bench in identical matters that
the District Mining Officer has no authority or jurisdiction to
make demand in purported exercise of powers under Section
21(5) of the Act, 1957 without delegation of power by the
State Government under Section 26(2) of the Act, 1957, it is
obligatory on the part of the respondents to refund the amount
realized from the petitioners.
9.
It is asserted that the State Litigation Policy also binds the
respondent authorities to take a uniform decision consensually
with respect to all similarly situated lessees. Accordingly, the
petitioners made representations before the respondent no. 4
seeking
refund
of
Rs.33,60,863/-
and
Rs.2,08,39,666/-
respectively in terms with the law laid down by the Coordinate
Bench of this Court vide order 04.03.2025, however, the
respondents did not respond to the same.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners lastly argues that the
action of the respondents in withholding and failing to refund
the said amount realized from the petitioners without the
authority of law is arbitrary, illegal, and unsustainable in the
eyes of law. Hence, the respondents should be directed to
release/refund the said amount to the petitioners with interest.
11. The learned counsel for the respondents, while opposing the
argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
that present writ petitions are liable to be dismissed mainly on
the ground that the same have been filed after an inordinate
delay of about nine years of making payment of the
compensation amount as demanded. It is a well settled
principle of law that the fence sitters are not entitled to get
any relief despite a judgment having been passed in favour of
few similarly situated persons. Moreover, the petitioners have
not even challenged the demand notices before this Court. As
such no relief may be granted to them under extraordinary writ
jurisdiction.
12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
13. The demand notices under Section 21(5) of the Act, 1957 were
issued to the petitioners by the respondent no. 4 vide Letter
No. 2033/M dated 20.09.2017 and Letter No. 1985/M dated
12.09.2017 (revised vide letter no. 2012/M dated 18.09.2017).
The said demand notices were not challenged by the
petitioners, rather they made payment of the demanded
amount. Though the said payment was made by the
petitioners under protest, they thereafter remained idle for
about nine years.
14. In the meantime, some of the mining lease holders challenged
the similar demand notices issued to them by the respondent
no. 4 under Section 21(2) of the Act, 1957 by filing different
writ petitions. Those writ petitions were heard by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court and vide common order dated 04.03.2025,
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
the impugned demand notices were set aside on the ground
that the respondent no. 4 had no jurisdiction to issue the said
demand notices without delegation of power by the State
Government under Section 26(2) of the Act, 1957 and that the
State Government had not issued any such notification
empowering the respondent no. 4 to issue the said demand
notices.
15. Curiously enough, subsequent to passing of the said order, the
petitioners woke up from the deep slumber and started making
representations to the respondents seeking refund of the
payments made by them. The litigants who remain passive and
procrastinate on their claim waiting on the sideline while others
fight their battle and come to the court after others succeed,
are terms as ‘fence sitters’ in Indian law. This behaviour of the
litigants is frowned upon by the courts. The rationale behind
denying the relief to the ‘fence sitters’ is that ‘delay defeats
equity’. The courts are quite reluctant to grant relief to those
who sleeps over their rights. This principle ensures that justice
isn’t held hostage by tardiness.
16. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Vs. R. Sasipriya
& Anr. reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 795, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the fence-sitters cannot be
permitted to challenge the validity of an order after the matter
has been concluded. It is further held that no party can claim
relief as a matter of right, and one of the well-recognised
grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the
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court is guilty of delay and laches.
17. Another reason for denying relief to the ‘fence sitters’ is that
prolonged inaction by the ‘fence sitters’ leads to creation of
third-party rights, making it unfair to grant relief to the ‘fence
sitters’ who wanted to see the outcome of others’ cases.
Denying
reliefs
to
the
‘fence
sitters’
also
discourage
opportunism and encourages vigilant litigants.
18. In the present cases, the petitioners have not even chosen to
challenge the demand notices, and have merely prayed for
extending the benefit granted to the petitioners of W.P.(C) No.
3399 of 2019 and other analogous cases vide order dated
04.03.2025 claiming that they are similarly situated. The
learned counsel for the petitioners has argued before this
Court that the demand notices issued to the petitioners are
void having been passed by a person without any authority of
law and as such, there is no need to challenge the same.
19. We are not at all impressed with such argument of the learned
counsel for the petitioners in view of the settled position of law
that there is nothing like void order. Even a bad order is
required to be challenged before the court of law.
20. In the case of State of Kerala Vs. M.K. Kunhikannan
Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth (Dead) & Ors. reported in
(1996) 1 SCC 435, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
even a void order or decision made against the parties cannot
be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations.
Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes
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until it is successfully challenged before an appropriate forum.
Mere use of the word ‘void’ is not determinative of its legal
impact.
21. Their Lordships in the said case have further held as under:8. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Reissue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31, it is stated, thus:
“If an act or decision, or an order or other
instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be
null and void for all purposes; and it has been
said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even
though such an act is wrong and lacking in
jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully
effective unless and until it is set aside by a court
of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is
challenged, its legality is preserved.”
In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De
Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1995 Edn., at pp. 259-60
the law is stated thus:
“The
erosion
of
the
distinction
between
jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors
has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded
the
distinction
between
void
and
voidable
decisions. The courts have become increasingly
impatient with the distinction, to the extent that
the situation today can be summarised as
follows:
(1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid
until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction.”
Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law,
Seventh Edn., 1994, have stated the law thus at pp.
341-342:
“… every unlawful administrative act, however
invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
than the truism that in most situations the only
way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the
law. In a well-known passage Lord Radcliffe said:
‘An order, even if not made in good faith, is still
an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no
brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the
necessary proceedings are taken at law to
establish the cause of invalidity and to get it
quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as
effective for its ostensible purpose as the most
impeccable of orders.’
This must be equally true even where the brand
of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the
order can effectively be resisted in law only by
obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity
of recourse to the court has been pointed out
repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy
Council without distinction between patent and
latent defects.”
The above statement of the law supports our view
that the order of the Board dated 28-6-1977,
declining to implead Respondents 3 and 4 (which
stood confirmed in revision) concludes the matter
against Respondents 3 and 4.
22. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance
on the judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court
in the case of Kamal Khan Vs. The State of Jharkhand &
Ors. (W.P.C No. 2859 of 2022) with other analogous
cases. In the said cases, the petitioners had challenged the
orders whereby the District Mining Officers of Dumka and
Pakur had imposed penalty on them. However, in the present
cases, the petitioners have failed to challenge the demand
notices. Moreover, the petitioners of those cases were vigilant
2026:JHHC:27167-DB
of their rights and had come to the Court promptly. Thus, the
facts and circumstances of the present cases are entirely
different from those cases. Moreover, in the said cases, the
Court while quashing and setting aside the impugned orders,
had given liberty to the concerned authority to decide the issue
afresh on their own merits in accordance with law. Thus, the
said judgment cannot be applied in the present cases.
23. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the petitioners are not
entitled to get any relief under extraordinary writ jurisdiction of
this Court.
24. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
September 10, 2026
Manish
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 10.09.2026
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