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2026:HHC:39399
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1655 of 2026
Reserved on: 11.9.2026
Decided on: 16.9.2026
Vijay Bihari
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr T.K. Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr. Tarun Pathak, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for grant
of bail in FIR No. 22 of 2026, dated 08.02.2026, registered at
Police Station West, District Shimla, HP, for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
2.
It has been asserted that the petitioner has been
falsely implicated based upon the confessional statement made
by the co-accused. The petitioner has no role in the commission
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:39399
of the offence. The police have filed the chargesheet, and the
petitioner's
custodial
interrogation
is
not
required.
The
petitioner has remained in custody for more than seven months.
The petitioner belongs to a respectable family and has roots in
society. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions
that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police received telephonic information on
08.02.2026 that some boys, sitting in the bus bearing
registration No. HP10A-9536, were concealing something after
tearing the seat. The police went to ISBT and found the bus
parked near the exit gate. The driver, conductor, and two
passengers were found in the bus. The driver identified himself
as Vishal Kumar, the conductor identified himself as Dheeraj
Guleria, the person occupying seat No. 31 identified himself as
Vishal Verma, and the person occupying seat No. 30 identified
himself as Rahul. The police searched the bus and found one
plastic box concealed in the seat cover of seat No. 26. The police
checked the plastic box and recovered a burnt currency note of
₹100/- and beige coloured substance. The police checked the
2026:HHC:39399
substance and found it to be heroin. Its weight was found to be
30.700 grams. The police seized the heroin and the burnt
currency note and arrested Vishal Verma and Rahul. They
revealed during interrogation that they had purchased the heroin
from auto driver David for ₹60,000/-. Vishal Verma also
identified the place where he had purchased the heroin and the
ATM from which currency notes of ₹10,000/- were withdrawn.
The police also arrested Vijay, the present petitioner, who had
sold the heroin to Rahul and Vishal Verma. The petitioner was
also arrested in FIR No. 19 of 2026 registered at Police Station
Theog; FIR No. 10 of 2026 registered at Police Station Kumarsain;
and FIR No. 6 of 2026. The data has not been retrieved from the
mobile phone of the petitioner, and the result of analysis is
awaited. Rahul was released on bail by the learned Sessions
Judge, Shimla, and Vishal Verma was released by this Court. The
matter was listed for consideration of charge on 07.09.2026.
Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent-State.
2026:HHC:39399
5.
Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated based upon the confessional statement made by the
co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. There is no
material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the
crime. The police have filed the chargesheet before the Court, and
the petitioner’s custodial interrogation is not required. The
petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court
may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had
abetted the possession of heroin by co-accused. Heroin is
adversely affecting society, and no leniency should be shown to
the petitioner. The petitioner has criminal antecedents, and he
would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of
his release on bail. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the Bar and have gone through the record carefully.
2026:HHC:39399
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
2026:HHC:39399
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
2026:HHC:39399
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
2026:HHC:39399
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
2026:HHC:39399
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The
status
report
mentions
that
the
police
interrogated Vishal Verma and Rahul, and they revealed that they
2026:HHC:39399
had purchased the heroin from Zirakpur for ₹20,000/-. They had
paid the money in cash at Zirakpur. Vishal identified the place
where he had purchased the heroin and the ATM from which the
money was withdrawn. Thus, the police are relying upon the
statements made by co-accused to connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of
Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine
SC 588 that a statement made by an accused during the
investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. It
was observed at page 568: 44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the
FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can
indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the
police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer
would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the
Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section
24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A
confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala
Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor,
1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47]
and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an
admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This,
however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a
statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a
statement contains an admission, the statement being one
2026:HHC:39399
under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 CrPC.”
12.
Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs
Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC
271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a
substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and
can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus
State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a
police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section
67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by
the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the
co-accused implicating the petitioner.
13.
A similar situation arose before this Court in Dinesh
Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, and it was
held that a confession of the co-accused and the phone calls are
not sufficient to deny bail to a person.
14.
It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of
Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police
have no material except the call details record and the disclosure
2026:HHC:39399
statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in
custody. It was observed: “[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for
implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the confessional
statement made by accused Dabe Ram and secondly the CDR
details of calls exchanged between the petitioner and the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking into consideration the evidence
with respect to the availability of CDR details involving the
phone number of the petitioner and the mobile phone number
of the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered
the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the conditions
of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[17] Since the existence of CDR details of the accused person(s)
has not been considered as a circumstance sufficient to hold a
prima facie case against the accused person(s), in Pallulabid
Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view that the
petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of his
successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his favour.
[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to have
been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure made by
the co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner as per the
mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of
Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1. Further, on the basis of the aforesaid
elucidation, the petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.
15.
The police also relied upon the statement made by the
co-accused Rahul disclosing the place where he had purchased
the heroin and the ATM from which the money was withdrawn. It
is undisputed that no recovery was effected from the places
pointed out by the co-accused. Therefore, the statements made
2026:HHC:39399
by the co-accused will not be admissible under Section 23 of the
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.2
16.
It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he would indulge in the commission of a similar
offence in case of his release on bail. This submission will not
help the prosecution. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763:
2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a reason
to deny bail to the accused when no prima facie case is made out
against him. It was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is
only one of the several considerations for deciding the
prayer for bail made by him. In a given case, if the
accused makes out a strong prima facie case,
depending upon the fact situation and period of
incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be
a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a
Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not
be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court
may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending
upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail
notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.”
Gajrani vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Allahabad 394 and State of Maharashtra Versus Damu Gopinath
Shinde, AIR 2000 S.C. 169
2026:HHC:39399
17.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot be detained in
custody because he has criminal antecedents.
18.
It is undisputed that the co-accused have been
released on bail. The police have filed the chargesheet before the
Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the
petitioner in custody.
19.
The petitioner asserted that he is a permanent
resident of District Ambala. This was not stated to be incorrect. It
means that the petitioner has roots in society and there is no
chance of his absconding.
20.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions: (i)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(ii)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
2026:HHC:39399
21.
(iii)
The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
(iv)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(v)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
22.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Sub Jail, Kaithu,
District Shimla, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
23.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the
merits of the case.
16th September, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Digitally signed
by CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Date: 2026.09.16
14:46:22 +0530
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