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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 11.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 20.02.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 20.02.2026
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W.P.(C) 13870/2024, CM APPL. 58056/2024 and CM APPL.
58057/2024
VIJAI PRAKASH SHUKLA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. RV Sinha, Ms. AS Singh,
Advs.
versus
UOI & ANR.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Jitendra Kumar Tripathi,
Mr. Sumit Kumar Raj, Ms.
Anjali Dwivedi, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Sushil Kumar Pandey, SPC
with Ms. Sheela Chaudhari AC
AD-5.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1.
Through the present Petition, the Petitioner prays for issuance
of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order dated 31.07.2024
[hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Order‟] passed by the learned
Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi
[hereinafter referred to as „Tribunal‟] in O.A. No.2276/2023 whereby
the Tribunal declined to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the Petitioner and disposed of the Original
Application with a direction to the Competent Authority to ensure that
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the pending inquiry is concluded within a period of six months from
the date of receipt of a certified copy of the said order.
2.
The principal issue which arises for consideration in the present
Petition is whether the learned Tribunal committed any jurisdictional
error in refusing to interfere with the charge memorandum dated
21.05.2021 and the disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant thereto,
particularly on the grounds urged by the Petitioner, namely, (i) alleged
non-compliance with Rule 14(24) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965; and (ii) inordinate
delay in conclusion of the inquiry proceedings.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
3.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present
Petition, the relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.
4.
The Petitioner joined the services of the Respondent No.1 as a
direct recruit Appraiser through the Union Public Service Commission
[„UPSC‟] in the year 1993. In the normal course of service, he was
promoted as Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and
Service Tax in the year 2005; thereafter as Deputy Commissioner in
the year 2011; as Joint Commissioner in the year 2015; and
subsequently as Additional Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise
and Service Tax in the year 2018. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner
continued to hold the post of Additional Commissioner from the year
2018 onwards.
5.
While working as Deputy Commissioner, the Petitioner was
deputed to SEEPZ (Santacruz Electronics Export Processing Zone),
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Special Economic Zone, Mumbai, functioning under the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, Government of India where he was posted as
Deputy Development Commissioner in the year 2015 and was
subsequently selected as Joint Development Commissioner in the year
2016.
6.
SEEPZ functions under the provisions of the Special Economic
Zones Act, 2005 and the Special Economic Zone Authority Rules,
2009. During the tenure of the Petitioner in SEEPZ, he was
additionally assigned the charge of Estate Manager and Secretary to
the Authority by the Development Commissioner.
7.
The Petitioner completed his deputation tenure of four years
and was repatriated to his parent cadre, namely the Ministry of
Finance, in June, 2019.
8.
According to the Petitioner, during the period when he was
serving under the Ministry of Commerce, the Department of
Commerce sought first stage advice from the Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC) in relation to certain alleged irregularities. The
said advice was furnished by the CVC vide communication dated
18.07.2019. The Department of Commerce is stated to have prepared
a draft charge memorandum and forwarded the matter, along with the
first stage advice, to the Ministry of Finance in August, 2019.
9.
Thereafter, the Respondent No.1 issued a charge memorandum
dated 21.05.2021 to the Petitioner proposing initiation of disciplinary
proceedings. The Petitioner asserted that the said charge memorandum
was issued almost two years after the receipt of the first stage advice
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and was based upon a draft prepared by the Ministry of Commerce.
The charge memorandum contained five Articles of Charge against
the Petitioner, relating to his tenure as Deputy Development
Commissioner / Joint Development Commissioner, SEEPZ SEZ and
Secretary / Estate Manager, SEEPZ SEZ Authority, which can be
broadly summarized as follows:
(i) Article I: Appointment of NFCD and downstream contractors for
repair and construction work without due bidding, in violation of CVC
guidelines and General Financial Rules, and without ensuring the best
value or appropriate service providers.
(ii) Article II: Failure to check the terms and conditions of tenders,
and lack of supervision of the selection process, which was allegedly
pre-meditated and not approved by the competent authority.
(iii) Article III: Irregular allocation and splitting of work among
contractors, including awarding work to contractors who did not meet
technical bid requirements, without bringing this to the notice of the
superior authority.
(iv) Article IV: Decision to undertake repairs instead of demolition of
certain buildings, ignoring independent structural assessments, and
relying on reports of selected consultants without proper verification.
(v) Article V: Irregular allotments in SDF Tower VIII to units not
eligible
under
prior
approvals,
contrary
to
structural
and
administrative feasibility, leading to cancellation of allotments.
The memorandum further directed the Petitioner to submit a written
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statement of defense within fifteen days, admit or deny the articles of
charge, and informed him that the inquiry could be held ex parte in
case of non-compliance, while cautioning him against seeking outside
influence as per Rule 20 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
10.
It was the case of the Petitioner that the first stage advice of the
CVC was obtained by the Department of Commerce without approval
of the disciplinary authority, namely the Minister of Finance, who is
stated to be the appointing as well as disciplinary authority of the
Petitioner; and that the draft charge memorandum had been prepared
prior to any decision by the disciplinary authority to initiate
proceedings and that the approval accorded thereafter was mechanical
and without independent application of mind.
11.
The Respondent No.2 was appointed as the Inquiry Officer on
03.09.2021. The Petitioner asserted that the inquiry was not completed
within the time prescribed under Rule 14(24) of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [hereinafter
referred to as „Rules‟], nor was any extension of time obtained in
writing from the disciplinary authority, as contemplated under the said
provision.
12.
It was the further case of the Petitioner that the disciplinary
proceedings remained pending beyond one year, contrary to the
circulars dated 18.01.2016 and 06.10.2021 issued by the CVC, which,
according to him, require expeditious completion of disciplinary
proceedings. The Petitioner superannuated on 31.03.2024. He asserted
that on account of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, he
was not considered for promotion to the grade of Commissioner of
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Customs and Indirect Taxes, whereas his batchmates and certain
juniors were promoted vide order dated 06.07.2023.
13.
In the aforesaid backdrop, the Petitioner instituted O.A. No.
2276/2023 before the Tribunal, challenging the charge memorandum
dated 21.05.2021 as well as the disciplinary proceedings initiated
pursuant thereto. Vide the Impugned Order, the Tribunal declined to
quash the charge memorandum or the disciplinary proceedings and
disposed of the Original Application with a direction to the Competent
Authority to conclude the pending inquiry within a period of six
months.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
14.
Contentions on behalf of the Petitioner:
14.1 Learned counsel for the Petitioner assailed the Impugned Order
on the ground that the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in
it by law despite recording findings which disclose clear violation of
statutory provisions governing departmental inquiries.
14.2 The principal submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner
relates to alleged non-compliance with Rule 14(24) of the Rules. It
was contended that the Inquiring Authority did not conclude the
inquiry within the time-frame stipulated under the said Rule, nor was
any written extension obtained from the Disciplinary Authority in the
manner contemplated therein. According to the Petitioner, the
requirement of recording reasons and seeking written extension is
mandatory in nature, and failure to adhere to the prescribed procedure
renders the continuation of the inquiry proceedings unsustainable in
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law.
14.3 It was further submitted that Rule 14(24) of the Rules was
introduced in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi & Anr.1, wherein
emphasis was placed upon expeditious conclusion of disciplinary
proceedings. It was urged that the object of incorporating a time
prescription in the Rules is to ensure that inquiries are not allowed to
continue indefinitely.
14.4 Placing reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Union of
India v. M.R. Diwan2; and Anish Gupta v. Union of India3, it was
contended that the time stipulation under Rule 14(24) of the Rules is
mandatory in nature and that non-adherence thereto vitiates the
continuation of proceedings. According to the Petitioner, once the
Tribunal recorded that no formal extension had been obtained, it erred
in permitting the inquiry to proceed further.
14.5 It was next contended that the direction issued by the Tribunal
to conclude the inquiry within a further period of six months is
without jurisdiction, inasmuch as once the proceedings had, according
to the Petitioner, lapsed for non-compliance with Rule 14(24) of the
Rules, the Tribunal could not have revived or extended the same by
judicial direction.
14.6 The Petitioner has also assailed the validity of the charge
memorandum dated 21.05.2021 on the ground of alleged non1
(2015) 16 SCC 415
2019 SCC OnLine Del 7711
2022 SCC OnLine Del 1872
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application of mind by the Competent Disciplinary Authority,
purportedly in violation of Rules 14(1) and 14(2) of the Rules.
Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union
of India v. B.V. Gopinath4, to contend that the charge memorandum
was issued without proper approval and independent application of
mind by the disciplinary authority, namely the Minister of Finance. In
this context, it was submitted that the draft charge memorandum was
prepared by the Ministry of Commerce and forwarded to the Ministry
of Finance, and that the approval accorded by the disciplinary
authority was mechanical in nature. It was argued that such alleged
non-application of mind vitiates the very initiation of disciplinary
proceedings.
14.7 It was further contended that the allegations contained in the
charge memorandum, even if taken at face value, do not constitute
misconduct warranting initiation of major penalty proceedings.
According to the Petitioner, the charges pertain to administrative
decisions taken in the course of official functioning and do not
disclose mala fides or personal gain.
14.8 Lastly, it was contended that the proceedings are vitiated for
non-compliance with Rule 20 of the Rules, inasmuch as the decision
to seek CVC advice and prepare the draft charge memorandum was
taken by the Ministry of Commerce, which was the borrowing
department, without obtaining prior approval of the cadre controlling
authority. It was submitted that the Tribunal erred in holding that there
was no violation of Rule 20 of the Rules.
(2014) 1 SCC 351
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15.
Contentions on behalf of the Respondents:
15.1 Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that
the challenge to the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay is
misconceived. According to the Respondents, Rule 14(24) of the
Rules prescribes a general time-frame for conclusion of inquiry
proceedings but does not render the proceedings void upon mere
expiry of the stipulated period. The provision itself contemplates
extension for valid reasons. It was contended that in the present case,
the inquiry could not be concluded within the initial period owing to
administrative exigencies, including change of Presenting Officers,
the nature of allegations involving tendering and financial matters, and
adjournments sought during the course of proceedings. It was further
submitted that CVC circulars are advisory in nature and do not
override statutory rules.
15.2 Placing reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Government of A.P. v. V. Appala Swamy5, it was submitted that
delay, by itself, does not vitiate disciplinary proceedings unless the
delinquent establishes prejudice or mala fides. It was urged that no
such prejudice has been demonstrated by the Petitioner. It was further
submitted that the decisions of this Court in M.R. Diwan (supra) and
Anish Gupta (supra) turned on their own facts and cannot be read as
laying down a universal proposition that proceedings automatically
lapse upon expiry of the stipulated period. According to the
Respondents, the Tribunal adopted a balanced approach by directing
expeditious conclusion of the inquiry rather than terminating it
(2007) 4 SCC 511
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prematurely.
15.3 The Respondents denied the allegation of non-application of
mind by the disciplinary authority. It was submitted that the matter
was examined at various levels, including consultation with the
Central Vigilance Commission, and thereafter the Competent
Authority accorded approval for initiation of major penalty
proceedings. It was urged that the decision in B.V. Gopinath, (supra)
is distinguishable on facts.
15.4 Insofar as the contention regarding violation of Rule 20 of the
Rules is concerned, it was submitted that the alleged misconduct
pertains to the period when the Petitioner was serving on deputation
under the administrative control of the Ministry of Commerce. Rule
20(1) of the Rules, it was contended, empowers the borrowing
department to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of
misconduct committed during the period of deputation. It was further
submitted that although the proposal originated from the Ministry of
Commerce, the charge memorandum was ultimately issued by the
Competent Disciplinary Authority, namely the Ministry of Finance,
after due consideration of the material placed before it.
15.5 It was further submitted that the charges levelled against the
Petitioner are specific and relate to alleged irregularities in tendering
processes, violation of prescribed guidelines and financial norms, and
consequential financial implications. It was contended that whether
the acts alleged constitute „misconduct‟ is a matter to be determined in
the course of the inquiry proceedings and cannot be adjudicated at the
threshold in writ jurisdiction.
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15.6 It was also submitted that the Tribunal has already addressed
the grievance regarding delay by directing conclusion of the inquiry
within a stipulated period. According to the Respondents, such a
direction is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and constitutes a
balanced
approach,
ensuring
expeditious
completion
without
prematurely terminating the proceedings. It was further submitted that
the decision in Prem Nath Bali (supra) turned on facts involving
inordinate delay and is distinguishable.
15.7 It was further contended that the Petitioner‟s retirement during
the pendency of the proceedings does not ipso facto render the inquiry
infructuous, as disciplinary proceedings for major penalty may
continue in accordance with applicable rules, including for the
purpose of determining pensionary consequences.
15.8 Lastly, it was submitted that the writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and equitable in
nature. It was urged that the Petitioner approached the Tribunal after a
considerable lapse of time from the issuance of the charge
memorandum and has participated in the inquiry proceedings. In such
circumstances, no case for interference with the Impugned Order is
made out.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
16.
The following two issues arise for determination in the present
Petition:
I.
Whether failure to conclude the Disciplinary Inquiry within the
period prescribed under Rule 14(24) of the Central Civil Services
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(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 vitiates the
disciplinary proceedings initiated against the Petitioner?
II.
Whether the charge memorandum dated 21.05.2021 is liable to
be quashed on the ground of alleged non-application of mind or
violation of Rules 14(1), 14(2) and 20 of the Rules?
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS:
17.
This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf
of the parties and perused the material on record.
18.
At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of
interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is a settled principle of
service jurisprudence that judicial review, at the stage of issuance of a
charge memorandum or during the pendency of disciplinary
proceedings, is limited to examining whether the proceedings suffer
from jurisdictional error, patent illegality, mala fides, or violation of
statutory provisions of a nature that goes to the root of the matter. The
writ court does not ordinarily embark upon an examination of the
correctness or sufficiency of the material forming the basis of the
charge, nor does it adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact.
Interference at the stage of issuance of a charge memorandum is
warranted only where the same is shown to be wholly without
jurisdiction, vitiated by mala fides, or in patent violation of statutory
provisions going to the root of the matter.
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ISSUE No. I – Rule 14(24) of the Rules:
19.
The first limb of challenge advanced on behalf of the Petitioner
relates to alleged failure to conclude the Disciplinary Inquiry within
the period prescribed in Rule 14(24) of the Rules, which reads as
under:
“(24) (a) The Inquiring Authority should conclude the inquiry and
submit his report within a period of six months from the date of
receipt of order of his appointment as Inquiring Authority.
(b) Where it is not possible to adhere to the time-limit specified in
Clause (a), the Inquiring Authority may record the reasons and seek
extension of time from the Disciplinary Authority in writing, who may
allow an additional time not exceeding six months for completion of
the Inquiry, at a time.
(c) The extension for a period not exceeding six months at a time may
be allowed for any good and sufficient reasons to be recorded in
writing by the Disciplinary Authority or any other Authority
authorized by the Disciplinary Authority on his behalf.”
The said provision, which was inserted subsequent to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Prem Nath Bali (supra), prescribes a timeframe for completion of departmental inquiries. It stipulates that the
Inquiring Authority should ordinarily conclude the inquiry within six
months from the date of receipt of the order of appointment and
submit the report. Where adherence to such time-limit is not possible,
the Rule contemplates that reasons are to be recorded and extension of
time sought from the Disciplinary Authority in writing, which may
allow further time not exceeding six months at a time, for good and
sufficient reasons to be recorded.
20.
It is necessary to examine whether mere expiry of the time-
frame prescribed under Rule 14(24) of the Rules, without more,
results in automatic nullification of the disciplinary proceedings. The
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determination whether a statutory time prescription is mandatory or
directory depends upon the language employed, the object sought to
be achieved, and whether the provision itself prescribes any
consequence of non-compliance. Significantly, Rule 14(24) of the
Rules does not provide that the proceedings shall stand abated or
rendered void upon expiry of the prescribed period. Nor does it
stipulate that failure to obtain extension in writing would ipso facto
invalidate the inquiry.
21.
The Supreme Court in V. Appala Swamy (supra) has held that
delay in disciplinary proceedings, by itself, does not vitiate the
proceedings unless it is shown that such delay is inordinate and
unexplained and has caused prejudice to the delinquent officer or is
actuated by mala fides or is of such magnitude as to render the
proceedings oppressive. The underlying principle is that disciplinary
proceedings are not to be scuttled on mere technicalities unless
substantive injustice is demonstrated.
22.
In the present case, the Petitioner has asserted that the inquiry
was not concluded within the period contemplated under Rule 14(24)
of the Rules and that no written extension was obtained from the
disciplinary authority. Even assuming that there was failure to adhere
to the procedural requirement regarding extension, the question that
arises is whether such non-compliance, in the facts of the present case,
has resulted in demonstrable prejudice so as to warrant quashing of
the entire proceedings at the threshold.
23.
It is not the Petitioner‟s case that the allegations are stale or that
the delay has rendered it impossible for him to defend himself on
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account of loss of records or unavailability of witnesses. The principal
grievance urged is that the pendency of the proceedings affected his
promotional prospects and continued beyond the stipulated timeframe. While such grievance cannot be lightly brushed aside, it
cannot, by itself, be elevated to a ground for nullifying disciplinary
proceedings involving allegations of financial and procedural
irregularities. Consequences which naturally flow from pendency of
disciplinary proceedings, such
as deferred consideration for
promotion, cannot by themselves constitute legal prejudice so as to
nullify the proceedings.
24.
The decisions of this Court in M.R. Diwan (supra) and Anish
Gupta (supra) turned on their own factual matrix. In those cases, this
Court was confronted with circumstances where the time stipulation
under Rule 14(24) of the Rules had not been adhered to and the Court,
upon appreciation of the entire record, found the continuation of
proceedings to be unsustainable. However, the said decisions cannot
be read as laying down an inflexible or universal proposition that in
every case of delay beyond the prescribed period, the proceedings
must necessarily be quashed irrespective of the factual context, the
nature of charges, stage of proceedings, or absence of prejudice.
25.
In the present case, the learned Tribunal has not condoned
indefinite delay but has, instead, directed the Competent Authority to
conclude the inquiry within a fixed time-frame. Such direction
subserves the very objective underlying Rule 14(24) of the Rules,
namely expeditious conclusion of proceedings. This Court does not
find that the Tribunal, by issuing such direction, exercised jurisdiction
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not vested in it.
26.
In absence of an express statutory consequence of abatement
and in absence of demonstrated prejudice, this Court is unable to hold
that the alleged non-compliance with Rule 14(24) of the Rules, in the
facts of the present case, vitiates the disciplinary proceedings or
renders the charge memorandum liable to be quashed at this stage.
This Court, however, expects the disciplinary authority to adhere to
the time prescription in letter and spirit.
ISSUE No. II – Validity of Charge Memorandum:
27.
The next challenge pertains to alleged non-application of mind
by the disciplinary authority in issuing the charge memorandum and
violation of Rules 14(1), 14(2) and 20 of the Rules.
28.
The material on record indicates that the proposal, along with
vigilance advice and relevant file notings, was placed before the
Competent Authority and thereafter approval was accorded for
initiation of major penalty proceedings. Mere allegation that such
approval was “mechanical” cannot, in absence of cogent material
demonstrating total absence of consideration or abdication of statutory
responsibility, be a ground to quash the charge memorandum at the
threshold.
29.
The reliance placed upon B.V. Gopinath (supra) does not
advance the Petitioner‟s case in the facts at hand. In the said decision,
the Supreme Court found that the charge memorandum had been
issued without approval of the Competent Authority. In the present
case, however, the existence of approval by the Competent
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Disciplinary Authority is not in dispute. The Petitioner‟s grievance
relates to the alleged manner or depth of consideration. Such
contention, in absence of demonstrable absence of approval, does not
attract the ratio of B.V. Gopinath (supra).
30.
Insofar as the objection founded upon Rule 20 of the Rules is
concerned, Rule 20(1) of the Rules empowers the borrowing authority
to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of misconduct
committed during the period of deputation. For ready reference, Rule
20 of the Rules is reproduced as under:
“1) Where the services of a Government servant are lent by one
department to another department or to a State Government or an
authority subordinate thereto or to a local or other authority
(hereinafter in this rule referred to as "the borrowing authority"), the
borrowing authority shall have the powers of the appointing authority
for the purpose of placing such Government servant under suspension
and of the disciplinary authority for the purpose of conducting a
disciplinary proceeding against him:
Provided that the borrowing authority shall forthwith inform the
authority which lent the services of the Government servant
(hereinafter in this rule referred to as "the lending authority") of the
circumstances leading to the order of suspension of such Government
servant or the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding, as the
case may be.
(2) In the light of the findings in the disciplinary proceeding
conducted against the Government servant(i) if the borrowing authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties
specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 11 should be imposed on the
Government servant, it may, after consultation with the lending
authority, make such orders on the case as it deems necessary:
Provided that in the event of a difference of opinion between the
borrowing authority and the lending authority, the services of the
Government servant shall be replaced at the disposal of the lending
authority;
(ii) if the borrowing authority is of the opinion that any of the
penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 should be imposed
on the Government servant, it shall replace his services at the disposal
of the lending authority and transmit to it the proceedings of the
inquiry and thereupon the lending authority may, if it is the
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disciplinary authority, pass such order thereon as it may deem
necessary, or, if it is not the disciplinary authority, submit the case to
the disciplinary authority which shall pass such orders on the case as
it may deem necessary:
Provided that before passing any such order the disciplinary authority
shall comply with the provisions of sub-rules (3) and (4) of rule 15.”
In the present case, the alleged acts pertain to the period when the
Petitioner was serving under the Ministry of Commerce. Even if the
initial steps, including seeking vigilance advice, were undertaken by
the borrowing department, the charge memorandum has ultimately
been issued by the Competent Disciplinary Authority of the parent
cadre. Nothing in Rule 20 of the Rules prohibits the borrowing
department from undertaking preliminary fact-finding or seeking
vigilance advice in respect of acts committed during deputation.
Therefore, no jurisdictional error is made out.
31.
The submission that the allegations, even if taken at face value,
do not constitute „misconduct‟ cannot be accepted at this stage. The
charge memorandum alleges irregularities in processing and
recommendation of tenders and deviation from prescribed procedures.
Whether such acts amount to misconduct is a matter to be determined
on the basis of evidence led in the inquiry. It cannot be said that the
charges are ex facie absurd or wholly devoid of substance. The
Articles of Charge are accompanied by a detailed statement of
imputations specifying the factual matrix, documents relied upon, and
witnesses proposed. The charges cannot, therefore, be characterized as
vague or lacking in particulars.
32.
The fact that the Petitioner has superannuated during pendency
of the proceedings does not render the inquiry non est. It is well
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settled that disciplinary proceedings for major penalty may continue
post-retirement subject to the applicable rules for the limited purpose
of determining consequential pensionary implications.
33.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional
error or perversity in declining to quash the charge memorandum and
the disciplinary proceedings. The direction to conclude the inquiry
within a stipulated period strikes a balance between the requirement of
expeditious disposal and the necessity of permitting the disciplinary
process to reach its logical conclusion.
CONCLUSION:
34.
The present Petition, being devoid of merit and substance, is
accordingly dismissed.
35.
The direction issued by the Tribunal for conclusion of the
inquiry within the stipulated period shall be complied with by the
Competent Authority, subject to any subsequent developments in
accordance with law.
36.
The pending applications also stand closed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
FEBRUARY 20, 2026
jai/pal
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