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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 17th August, 2026
#
CNR No. DLHC012499062017
+
W.P.(C) 5138/2017 & CM APPL. 21912/2017
VIDYA BHARTI SCHOOL
versus
.....Petitioner
RAJNI MEHANDIRATTA & ANR
.....Respondents
With
W.P.(C) 6111/2017, W.P.(C) 6159/2017, W.P.(C) 8208/2017,
W.P.(C) 8231/2017, W.P.(C) 13994/2025
For Petitioners:
Mr. Pragyan Pradip Sharma, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Rustam Chaudhuri and Mr. Rachit Sharma,
Advocate.
Ms. Tripurari Ray, Advocate.
Mr. Atul Bandhu, Advocate in Item No. 14.
For Respondents: Mr. K. P. Gupta, Advocate for R-1 in Item Nos. 10
and 14.
Mr. Kamlesh Kumar and Ms. Tripta Kamta,
Advocates for R-1 in Item No. 12.
Dr. M.Y. Khan, Advocate for Respondent
Employees in Item Nos. 9, 11 & 13.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti Tyagi and
Mr. Sachin Garg, Advocates for in Item Nos. 9 to
14.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
1.
These six petitions arise from events that unfolded outside the gates of
a school over three mornings in August 2013 and have since travelled
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through disciplinary inquiries, statutory appeals and, ultimately, to this
Court. The teachers describe the events as a peaceful protest arising from
unresolved service grievances. The School presents a very different account:
according to it, the teachers engaged in organised indiscipline which
disrupted the functioning of the institution and crossed the limits of
permissible protest.
2.
The common factual setting is relevant, but it does not detract from
the central issue that falls for consideration. Disciplinary liability must
ultimately be assessed individually. Nearly fifty teachers are said to have
been present outside the School, while disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against only a much smaller number. The School’s identified the
Respondents as instigators, organisers or as having played a more active role
in the events. The inquiry, therefore, is not merely whether there was a
protest or whether it caused disruption, but whether the particular
misconduct alleged was established against each Respondent and whether
the Tribunal was justified in disturbing the findings returned in the
respective disciplinary proceedings. Presence in a protesting group cannot,
without more, be treated as proof that every individual committed each act
attributed to the group. That distinction assumes significance here because
the charges extend well beyond absence from duty or participation in a
protest and include allegations of stone pelting, abusive language,
obstruction of the school gates, defacement of property, false complaints to
the police and other acts of serious misconduct.
3.
Five of these petitions challenge orders passed by the Delhi School
Tribunal (“Tribunal”) in 2017. The sixth, concerning Ms. Anjali Chugh,
arises from an order passed by the Tribunal on 7 th March, 2025. In each
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case, the School had removed the employee from service after a domestic
inquiry. The Tribunal set aside the removal and directed reinstatement. The
reasoning employed by the Tribunal is substantially common in the first five
cases and finds its way, in part, into the later decision concerning Ms.
Chugh.
4.
The School assails the Tribunal principally on two fronts. It contends
that the Tribunal assumed an appellate jurisdiction wider than the Delhi
School Education Act, 1973 (“the Act”) confers upon it and reappreciated
the disciplinary evidence as though it were deciding a regular civil appeal. It
also submits that the Tribunal applied technical rules of evidence to
domestic inquiries, discarded statements merely because they had first been
recorded before commencement of the inquiry, insisted upon formal proof of
photographs and electronic material, and thereby displaced findings returned
by independent Inquiry Officers on a standard of preponderance of
probabilities.
5.
There is substance in these objections. The Tribunal has, in places,
stated the law too widely. A domestic inquiry is not a trial governed by the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, nor does natural justice invariably require a
witness who has made an earlier statement to repeat it verbatim before the
Inquiry Officer. At the same time, the relaxation of technical rules of
evidence does not dispense with the requirement of proof. Mere
participation in a group cannot, by itself, establish the specific misconduct
alleged against an individual employee.
6.
The errors in the Tribunal’s reasoning, however, are not
determinative. The question before this Court is whether they are
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sufficiently material to warrant interference in writ jurisdiction and
restoration of the orders of removal.
7.
Having examined the record, this Court finds that they are not. As
discussed below, notwithstanding the infirmities in parts of the Tribunal’s
reasoning, the disciplinary orders do not warrant restoration.
The connected proceedings
8.
W.P.(C) 5138/2017 concerns Ms. Rajni Mehandiratta, a TGT (Art &
Craft). She was proceeded against on eight articles of charge. The Inquiry
Officer held Charges 1, 2, 3, and 5 proved, Charges 4 and 7 partially proved,
and Charges 6 and 8 not proved. Her removal from service followed on 24 th
January, 2015. The Tribunal allowed Appeal No. 29/2015 by its decision
dated 8th March, 2017
9.
W.P.(C) 6111/2017 concerns Mr. Anil Kumar Ahuja, a PGT
(Mathematics). Six articles of charge were framed against him. The Inquiry
Officer held Charges 1, 3 and 6 proved, Charge 4 partly proved and Charges
2 and 5 not proved. His removal followed on 2nd December, 2014 (with
retrospective effect from 1st December, 2014). The Tribunal allowed Appeal
No. 08/2015 on 8th March, 2017.
10.
W.P.(C) 6159/2017 concerns Ms. Rinku Sehgal, a TGT (Social
Science). Of the seven articles of charge framed against her, the Inquiry
Officer held Charges 3 and 5 proved, Charges 1 and 4 partially proved, and
Charges 2, 6, and 7 not proved. The School itself records that the Inquiry
Officer found the School closed on 2nd and 3rd August, 2013, and therefore
confined the finding of unauthorised absence to 1 st August, 2013. Her
removal dated 1st December, 2014 was set aside by the Tribunal in Appeal
No. 13/2015 on 8th March, 2017.
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11.
W.P.(C) 8208/2017 relates to Ms. Neelam Rathore, PGT (Biology).
Eleven articles of charge were framed against her. The Inquiry Officer held
Charges 1 to 7 proved and Charges 8 to 11 not proved. Her removal dated
22nd September, 2015 was set aside in Appeal No. 01/2016 on 19 th April,
2017.
12.
W.P.(C) 8231/2017 concerns Ms. Ranju Sharma, PGT (Commerce).
Eight articles of charge were framed against her. The Inquiry Officer held
them substantially proved. Her removal dated 1 st December, 2014 was set
aside by the Tribunal in Appeal No. 12/2015 on 8th March, 2017.
13.
W.P.(C) 13994/2025, concerning Ms. Anjali Chugh, stands somewhat
apart in chronology and in the nature of some of the charges. Ms. Anjali
Chugh was charge sheeted on 25th August, 2015 on seven articles. The
Inquiry Officer, by report dated 15th November, 2016, held Charges 1, 3, 4,
5 and 6 proved, Charge 2 partly proved and Charge 7 not proved. The
competent authority of the Directorate of Education conveyed approval to
the proposed major penalty and the School thereafter removed her from
service on 18th January, 2018. The Tribunal allowed Appeal No. 12/2018 by
order dated 7th March, 2025 and directed reinstatement.
The background to the disciplinary action
14.
The events of August 2013 did not occur in isolation. Some of
teachers had been pursuing claims concerning implementation of the
recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission and other service
benefits. Those disputes had also reached this Court in W.P.(C) 6804/2013,
wherein this Court directed the School to comply with the Director of
Education circular dated 11th February, 2009 for the payment of salaries in
terms of the report of the 6th Pay Commission. The teachers characterize the
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subsequent proceedings as a retaliatory “counterblast” to this litigation. The
School, on the other hand, maintains that the disciplinary action was
independent of those service disputes and arose from the teachers’ own acts
of misconduct.
15.
The mere proximity in time between the pay dispute and the
disciplinary proceedings is insufficient to conclude that the latter were
retaliatory. Significantly, the record contains contemporaneous material,
including police complaints and witness statements from early August 2013,
identifying the Respondents as having led the agitation. This material
predates the litigation instituted in September 2013 and militates against the
contention that the disciplinary proceedings were merely a retaliatory
response thereto.
16.
On 1st August, 2013, the School informed the Directorate of
Education that it had been “forced to shut down” because of what it
described as mass absenteeism. The communication alleged that most of the
teachers had been induced to agitate by certain teachers and specifically
named Ms. Neelam Rathore, Ms. Ranju Sharma, Ms. Rinku Sehgal, Ms.
Rajni Maindiratta and Mr. Anil Kumar Ahuja, among others. The School
also apprehended that closure might continue for another day or two.
17.
The employees gave a very different account. Their contemporaneous
representations asserted that they had reported for duty but were stopped at
the gate and were not permitted to enter the School. A representation made
in October 2013, for example, states that the teachers had attended on all
three days but had been kept outside the premises.
18.
The present proceedings do not require this Court to adopt a common
factual narrative for every person present outside the School on those dates.
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Indeed, the School itself now accepts that such an approach would not be
appropriate.
19.
During the hearing on 29th July, 2026, the Court was taken through
the statement of School Witness, Ms. Mehak Khanna and other material
suggesting that nearly fifty teachers were outside the School. The Principal
was therefore directed to disclose how many teachers were proceeded
against, why all were not proceeded against and what eventually became of
the proceedings against those who were.
20.
In the affidavit filed pursuant to that direction, the School states that
show cause notices were issued to twelve teachers and charge sheets to
eleven, Ms. Nikita Kapil being the exception. It accepts that approximately
fifty teachers were protesting but explains that proceedings were not
initiated merely because a teacher was present or sympathetic to the
concerns raised. The affidavit says:
“the mere fact that a teacher was present during the protest or was
sympathetic to the concerns being raised by the protesting teachers
was not, by itself, treated as sufficient justification for initiation of
disciplinary proceedings.”
21.
The School states that the eleven were selected because of their
particular roles in organising or disrupting the functioning of the institution.
22.
That explanation is significant. Proceeding against only some
members of a larger group is not, by itself, discriminatory. The School was
well within its right to proceed against those whose individual conduct
warranted disciplinary action. The communication dated 1st August, 2013
lends some contemporaneous support to the School’s case that certain
alleged instigators had been identified at the relevant time.
23.
The School’s explanation, however, also requires the disciplinary
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action against each employee to rest on evidence of their individual role.
Once mere presence at the protest was admittedly not considered sufficient,
the inquiry was required to establish the specific conduct attributed to each
charged employee. It is in this respect that the disciplinary record presents a
recurring difficulty.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal
24.
Before turning to the evidence, the objection to the jurisdiction
exercised by the Tribunal must be settled.
25.
Section 8(3) of the Act provides an appellate remedy against
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Section 11 constitutes the Tribunal.
Section 11(6) expressly provides that, for disposal of an appeal under the
Act, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a court of
appeal by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and may also stay the operation
of the order appealed against. The statutory language is reproduced and
examined by the Supreme Court in Sunil Sikri v. Guru Harkrishan Public
School.1
26.
The School contends that the Tribunal exercises only supervisory
jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the DSEA, 1973, akin to judicial review
by the High Court, and cannot sit in appeal over the factual findings of the
disciplinary authority. That contention, stated so broadly, cannot be
accepted.
27.
Sunil Sikri settles the position. The Supreme Court drew a clear
distinction between the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide the statutory appeal
against the penalty and the power specifically vested in the Managing
Committee under Rule 121 to determine the pay and allowances payable for
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the period of absence and whether that period is to be treated as spent on
duty. In relation to the former, the Court expressly held that the Tribunal is
required to examine the legality and correctness of the penalty and is
“certainly entitled to act as an appellate body”. It may, therefore, examine
the disciplinary action on its merits and conclude, where the record so
warrants, that “no case is made out even on merits” for imposition of the
penalty.
28.
The Tribunal was, therefore, entitled to examine whether the findings
returned in the domestic inquiry were sustainable on the material on record.
Contrary to the School’s contention, its jurisdiction was not merely
supervisory in nature. As a statutory appellate body, it was entitled to
examine the evidentiary basis of the findings and assess their correctness on
the merits.
Evidence in a domestic inquiry
29.
In exercising its appellate jurisdiction, however, the Tribunal was
required to assess the disciplinary proceedings keeping in view the
principles governing domestic inquiries. Two such principles, both well
settled, are sufficient for the present cases. Two principles, both well settled,
are sufficient for the present cases.
30.
First, strict and sophisticated rules of evidence do not govern a
domestic inquiry. State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh,2 remains the classic
statement. Material which is logically probative to a prudent mind may be
received, subject always to fair play, objectivity and a reasonable nexus
between the material and the conclusion. Absence of any evidence in
(2022) 16 SCC 85.
(1977) 2 SCC 491.
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support of a finding, however, remains an error open to correction. The
Supreme Court in its recent judgement in Union of India v. Dalbir Singh,3
reiterated Rattan Singh in those terms.
31.
Second, natural justice does not require that a witness who has made
an earlier statement must repeat its contents word for word in the formal
inquiry. In State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur,4 the
Constitution Bench held that the purpose of examination in the presence of
the charged employee is sufficiently achieved where the witness is recalled,
the previous statement is put to and admitted by the witness, made known to
the charged employee, and the witness is tendered for cross-examination.
Insistence upon repetition of the earlier statement “word by word, and
sentence by sentence” was regarded as a matter of form rather than
substance.
32.
The Tribunal was therefore in error wherever it treated the earlier
statements of the School witnesses as “inadmissible” merely because their
examination-in-chief was not freshly recorded in conventional form. In
several inquiries, the Daily Order Sheets show that the witnesses
acknowledged or adopted their earlier statements and were thereafter crossexamined. Such material could not be discarded en bloc.
33.
The Tribunal was equally in error insofar as it treated the absence of a
certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act as, by itself, fatal to the
electronic material. The requirement of such a certificate as a condition
precedent to the admissibility of a secondary electronic record applies in
proceedings governed by the Evidence Act. A domestic inquiry stands on a
2021 SCC OnLine SC 768.
AIR 1963 SC 375.
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different footing, where the strict rules of admissibility do not apply. The
absence of a Section 65B certificate did not, therefore, without more, require
the photographs or recordings to be excluded from consideration. The
relaxation of the rules of admissibility does not, however, render questions
of authenticity and reliability immaterial. The source of the material and its
connection with the charged employee remain relevant to the weight that
may be attached to it, particularly where its genuineness is specifically
disputed. Such objections had to be examined on the record of each inquiry;
the material could not be discarded merely for want of the statutory
certificate.
34.
The consequence is straightforward. Photographs and recordings
could be considered, but only for what they rationally established.
Identification of an employee may prove presence at the scene; it does not,
without more, prove every act of misconduct attributed to the group. It is on
this footing that the Tribunal’s conclusions must be examined in these
proceedings under Article 226.
35.
In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan,5 the Supreme Court
explained that certiorari does not permit the High Court to reopen findings
of fact on the ground that the evidence was insufficient or inadequate.
Interference remains permissible where the Tribunal’s decision is vitiated by
an error of law, rests on no evidence, or otherwise suffers from a
jurisdictional infirmity. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,6 similarly
reiterates that judicial review is not an appeal on the merits of the decision.
36.
That leaves a narrower question for this Court. The errors in the
AIR 1964 SC 477.
(1995) 6 SCC 749.
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Tribunal’s reasoning have to be corrected, but the result does not follow
automatically. The School must still show that, on the record and applying
the correct principles, the Tribunal could not lawfully have interfered with
the orders of removal. Since the Tribunal was exercising statutory appellate
jurisdiction, it is not enough to say that the Inquiry Officer’s view was also a
possible one.
The evidence common to the August 2013 charges
37.
The principal charge in most of the inquiries was framed on the
footing that 1st, 2nd and 3rd August, 2013 were normal working days and that
the Respondents wilfully remained absent.
38.
The record itself makes such a composite finding difficult to sustain.
39.
The School informed parents on 1st August, 2013 that the School was
being closed owing to unforeseen circumstances. Its own communication to
the education authorities contemplated closure continuing on subsequent
days. In Ms. Rinku Sehgal’s inquiry, the Inquiry Officer expressly accepted
that the School was closed on 2 nd and 3rd August and held that there could
consequently be no question of unauthorised absence on those dates. The
finding against her on absence was confined to 1st August, 2013.
40.
There is a further circumstance which cannot be brushed aside as a
later allegation by the employees.
41.
During Ms. Ranju Sharma’s inquiry, the original teachers’ attendance
register for August, 2013 was produced. The Daily Order Sheet dated 17 th
April, 2014 records her objection that white correction fluid had been
applied against the names of a number of teachers. The Inquiry Officer did
not merely record the objection. He wrote:
“I have personally verified this fact from the original teacher’s
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attendance register…”
42.
The Presenting Officer responded that the fluid had been applied by
the receptionist, Ms. Diksha Kalra.
43.
The Court would not, on this material alone, go so far as to conclude
that the management fabricated the attendance register. The reasons for the
use of correction fluid, and the contents that may have existed beneath it,
remain matters of dispute on the record. Nevertheless, the circumstance
itself cannot be ignored. It emerged during the contemporaneous inquiry
proceedings and was independently verified by the Inquiry Officer upon
inspection of the original register. That fact significantly undermines any
attempt to treat the attendance register as a complete and unimpeachable
answer to the controversy.
44.
The record did not admit of only one possible conclusion on that
issue. There was material supporting the teachers’ assertion that entry had
been restricted, while the inquiry record itself reflects suspension of classes
on 2nd and 3rd August, 2013 and uncertainty concerning the attendance of
teachers on those dates. This Court need not decide which version is
factually preferable. The Tribunal, exercising appellate jurisdiction, was
entitled to assess that material, and its conclusion on the charge of wilful
absence cannot be displaced merely because the School’s witnesses
supported a contrary account. The separate question of what each respondent
is alleged to have done while outside the School must be examined
independently.
45.
In that state of the evidence, the mere fact that some members of the
staff were able to enter could not establish that each charged employee
deliberately remained outside despite being free to report for duty.
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The photographs, CDs and the problem of attribution
46.
Considerable arguments were also advanced in relation to the
photographs and video material concerning the incidents of August 2013.
47.
The affidavit filed by the Principal in August 2026 states that
photographs had been supplied to the charged employees and gives
references to the individual records. In some inquiries the CDs were also
played during the proceedings; in the cases of Ms. Rinku Sehgal and Mr.
Anil Ahuja, the video material was furnished with the Presenting Officer’s
brief.
48.
The fact that some electronic material was introduced at a later stage
was relevant to whether the charged employee had a fair opportunity to
inspect and answer it. It did not, however, render the material incapable of
consideration merely on that account. The Tribunal went too far insofar as it
treated the timing of its introduction as determinative.
49.
The more substantial question is not whether this material could be
looked at, but what it established against each Respondent.
50.
The School’s affidavit filed in August 2026 cannot enlarge the
evidence recorded in the disciplinary proceedings; it can only identify
material which already formed part of them. It points, for instance, to DOS-8
in Mr. Ahuja’s inquiry, where Mr. Gurdeep Manchanda is stated to have
identified Mr. Ahuja and Ms. Rathore in the photographs, and to DOS-15 in
Ms. Rathore’s inquiry, where videographic material was displayed. In Mr.
Ahuja’s case, the Inquiry Report itself records that the photographs showed
him at the protest and that Mr. Gurdeep Manchanda confirmed his
involvement. That material could not simply be ignored. Its significance,
however, must remain confined to what it was capable of establishing
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against the employee concerned.
51.
The position is not uniform across the Respondents. In Ms. Rinku
Sehgal’s case, the Inquiry Officer, while dealing with Charge 3, expressly
recorded that none of the prosecution witnesses had named her as being
involved in the agitation. The charge was nevertheless held proved on the
basis of photographs and the CD which, according to the report, showed her
amongst the agitating teachers. The August 2026 affidavit adds that the
photographs formed part of the charge-sheet and that the CD accompanied
the Presenting Officer’s brief, but identifies no witness who attributed to Ms.
Sehgal the several specific acts comprised in that charge.
52.
The same difficulty is even clearer in relation to the writings alleged
to have been made on the walls of the School. The Court had specifically
required the School to indicate the evidence concerning their authorship.
The affidavit responds by referring to photographs of the writings. A
photograph may establish that a writing appeared on a wall; it does not
establish who put it there. The affidavit identifies no witness or other
material attributing those writings to any particular Respondent.
53.
Nor can that gap be filled by annotations subsequently placed on the
compilation of photographs handed over during the hearing. To the extent
those annotations identify particular Respondents, they may assist in
understanding the School’s present case, but the annotations themselves
were not evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. They cannot supply an
identification or attribution which was not otherwise made there.
54.
This is where the standard of proof assumes importance.
Preponderance of probabilities is undoubtedly lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt, but it does not dispense with proof. There must still be a
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rational evidentiary link between the employee and the misconduct found
against him or her. Presence in a group may prove presence; it does not,
without something further, prove every act attributed to that group. That is
the issue which must now be examined in each case.
The individual cases
Rajni Maindiratta
55.
Ms. Maindiratta faced eight charges. The Inquiry Officer held
Charges 1, 2, 3 and 5 proved; Charges 4 and 7 partly proved; and Charges 6
and 8 not proved. The disciplinary authority thereafter imposed removal
under Rule 117(b)(iii).
56.
The inquiry report itself illustrates the difficulty with some of the
findings.
57.
Charge 6 alleged that Ms. Maindiratta accused the management of
kidnapping Ms. Sarita Singh and called the police. The Inquiry Officer
recorded that the Presenting Officer did not examine the police officer, did
not produce his report and did not examine Ms. Sarita Singh. The material
obtained under the Right to Information Act did not disclose a call made by
Ms. Maindiratta. The charge was consequently held not proved.
58.
Charge 8 also failed for want of documentary or oral evidence.
59.
Charge 7 is particularly instructive. It alleged that Ms. Maindiratta
organised subsequent demonstrations, but no witness was produced in
support of the charge. The Inquiry Officer himself noted that she was not
visible in the photographs and that it was unclear whether she had organised
the protest. Nevertheless, the charge was held partly proved on the reasoning
that she “may have incited others” and that “her involvement cannot be
ruled out”.
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60.
Such reasoning does not establish misconduct even on the standard of
preponderance of probabilities. A finding that an employee’s involvement
“cannot be ruled out” reflects a possibility rather than a conclusion
supported by evidence. The burden of establishing the charge could not be
met by requiring the employee to exclude a merely speculative possibility of
involvement.
61.
Charge 4, concerning alleged defamatory material on social media
and an alleged attempt to bribe the school authority, suffers from a related
difficulty. Regarding the posts, the Inquiry Officer conceded that the actual
author was never identified, but reasoned that because Ms. Maindiratta
appeared in photographs, her involvement “cannot be negated.” The bribery
claim was left with no support after the CD intended to prove it was rejected
for a lack of clarity. The finding thus converted a possibility of involvement
into proof of misconduct, without the evidentiary link necessary to sustain
that conclusion.
62.
Charge 5, however, was broader than the material relied upon to
prove it. There was material showing Ms. Maindiratta’s presence and
participation in the protest: SW-1 placed her outside the School and spoke of
use of loudspeaker, while SW-4 referred to teachers, including her, raising
slogans. The charge, however, went further and alleged stone-pelting, threats
to visitors, defacement of School property and damage to a colleague’s
property. The Inquiry Report does not identify material attributing those acts
to Ms. Maindiratta individually, yet held the charge proved in its entirety.
63.
The Tribunal may have erred in treating parts of the School’s
evidence as inadmissible, but that error does not by itself justify restoration
of the disciplinary decision. Once the material is considered on the correct
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footing, the difficulty identified above remains: the several acts comprised in
Charge 5 were not individually attributed to Ms. Maindiratta. The Tribunal’s
ultimate interference with the order of removal therefore does not call for
correction under Article 226.
Anil Kumar Ahuja
64.
Mr. Ahuja’s inquiry involved six charges. Charges 1, 3 and 6 were
held proved, Charge 4 partly proved, while Charges 2 and 5 failed.
65.
Charges 1 and 3 arise from the events of August 2013 and present the
same difficulty of individual attribution noticed above. The material
establishes Mr. Ahuja’s presence amongst the protesting teachers, but does
not sufficiently connect him with the specific acts of stone-pelting, use of
loudspeakers, damage to property or slogan-shouting alleged under Charge
3. This deficiency was also noticed by the Tribunal. Presence at the protest,
without material connecting him to the particular acts alleged, was
insufficient to sustain those findings. The belated production of the CDs
may not, by itself, render them inadmissible merely because they were not
formally proved in evidence. The fairness of their use, and the weight to be
attached to them, nevertheless had to be assessed in light of the stage at
which they were produced.
66.
Charge 4, concerning subsequent demonstrations and an alleged SMS
campaign, suffers from a similar difficulty. Apart from its objection to the
CDs, the Tribunal noticed that SW5 had not seen Mr. Ahuja organising or
conducting the street march and that the Vice-Principal’s complaint to the
police did not name him. These were relevant deficiencies in the evidence.
67.
Charge 6 is distinct and therefore requires separate attention. It had
two limbs: alleged operation of a chit fund amongst employees and private
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tuition/coaching.
68.
Ms. Sanjana Mehta, a School witness and herself a member of the
financial arrangement, accepted in cross examination that all functions
relating to what was described as the “chit fund” were conducted outside the
School premises and did not affect the education of children. That answer
materially qualifies the charge as framed.
69.
As to private tuition, the Inquiry Officer drew an adverse inference
from the evidence of Mr. Ahuja’s wife. She asserted that she was the person
running a small tuition centre at their residence. The Inquiry Officer found
her answers inconsistent and placed considerable reliance on her failure to
produce the records which she had said she would produce. From this, and
from Mr. Ahuja’s qualification in Mathematics, the report concluded that he
himself was running the tuition centre.
70.
There was perphaps material from which an inference could be
attempted. The Court would therefore not describe Charge 6 as ‘no
evidence’ finding. However, the Tribunal, sitting in statutory appeal, was
not bound to accept the inference merely because the Inquiry Officer had
drawn it. The School’s case on the financial arrangement was substantially
weakened by its own witness, while the private tuition limb rested heavily
upon an adverse inference drawn from the wife’s evidence rather than direct
evidence of Mr. Ahuja teaching students.
71.
The Tribunal’s reasoning therefore requires correction, but not in
every respect. It was wrong to discard the School’s evidence on technical
rules of admissibility. Its examination of the individual charges, however,
disclosed a different difficulty. In relation to Charge 3, for example, it found
that none of the School witnesses attributed to Mr. Ahuja the acts of stone-
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pelting, use of loudspeakers, damage to property or the other aggravated
conduct comprised in that charge. Charge 6 stood on a different footing and
was supported by material specifically concerning Mr. Ahuja; it cannot be
treated as a case of absence of evidence.
72.
That distinction does not, however, warrant restoration of the order of
removal. The Tribunal was exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction over
the disciplinary decision as a whole and was entitled to examine the findings
returned on the several charges. The fact that the material relating to Charge
6 stood on a different footing does not displace the difficulties identified in
relation to the principal charges arising from the August and October
incidents. The School has therefore not shown any ground warranting
interference with the Tribunal’s ultimate decision setting aside the removal.
Rinku Sehgal
73.
Ms. Sehgal’s case illustrates most clearly the distinction between
evidence of a protest and proof of individual misconduct.
74.
Charge 1 was held partly proved. The Inquiry Officer accepted that
the School stood closed on 2nd and 3rd August, 2013 and therefore treated
unauthorised absence only on 1st August as established. The remaining part
of the charge, concerning agitation and obstruction, was sustained from
photographs and CDs.
75.
Charge 2, concerning the alleged kidnapping accusation, was not
proved because none of the material connected Ms. Sehgal with the
complaint.
76.
This concession is important. The photographs may establish her
presence if she is reliably identified in them. Their evidentiary value,
however, must be confined to what they actually depict and cannot extend to
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acts not discernible from them. Thus, even if Ms. Sehgal’s presence at the
protest is accepted, it does not by itself establish that she threw stones,
threatened visitors, damaged property or committed the other specific acts
attributed to the group.
77.
Charge 4 was itself held only partly proved. The Inquiry Officer
recorded that it had not been established that the SMS relied upon by the
School originated from Ms. Sehgal. Charge 5 was held proved on the basis
that the School produced a pre-typed paper and, therefore, the allegation that
teachers had been asked to sign a blank paper was incorrect. No prosecution
witness was examined on that charge. More importantly, the finding did not
address the further question whether Ms. Sehgal’s complaint was knowingly
or recklessly false. The mere failure of an employee to establish a grievance
cannot, without that further element, convert the grievance itself into
misconduct. Charges 6 and 7 were not proved.
78.
Charge 3 presents a more significant difficulty. It alleged, inter alia,
stone-pelting, abusive language, obstruction of entry and damage to
property. The Inquiry Officer expressly recorded that none of the School
witnesses had named Ms. Sehgal in relation to the agitation, but nevertheless
held the charge proved on the basis of photographs and the CD showing her
amongst the protesting teachers. While that material could establish her
presence and participation, it did not connect her individually with the
several acts of serious misconduct alleged in the charge.
79.
The Tribunal’s ultimate decision to interfere with the order of removal
therefore does not warrant correction under Article 226.
Neelam Rathore
80.
Ms. Rathore’s case requires some care because the record contains
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evidence identifying her more directly than in Ms. Sehgal’s case.
81.
Eleven charges were framed. Charges 1 to 7 were held proved.
82.
The first charge, however, again proceeds on the premise that 1 st to 3rd
August were normal working days. That premise cannot be reconciled
without qualification with the School’s own closure communications and the
treatment of those dates in the other inquiry records.
83.
Ms. Rathore also asserted in her defence that, after teachers were
allowed to mark attendance, the register was recalled when they declined to
sign a pre-typed statement and that she later found white correction fluid
applied over the entries where she had marked attendance. Standing alone,
that would remain an assertion by the charged employee. It assumes greater
significance because the application of white fluid on the original attendance
register was independently verified by the Inquiry Officer in Ms. Ranju
Sharma’s proceedings.
84.
Charge 2 included an allegation that Ms. Rathore had accused the
management of kidnapping Ms. Sarita Singh and called the police. The
Inquiry Officer relied on the fact that the police had investigated such an
allegation, but proceeded from there to conclude that Ms. Rathore was
“instrumental” in making it, without identifying the material connecting her
to the allegation. The Tribunal also noticed that Ms. Sarita Singh did not
attribute the complaint to Ms. Rathore and that the police material did not
establish such attribution. The difficulty, therefore, is not one of technical
admissibility, but of the absence of evidence linking Ms. Rathore
individually to the alleged act.
85.
Some later charges stand on firmer evidentiary footing. There was
material regarding the CATS ambulance incident and witnesses who named
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Ms. Rathore. The School’s later affidavit also states that photographic and
videographic material showed her participating in and leading a protest.
Those matters could legitimately be taken into account.
86.
Ms. Rathore’s case is therefore not one where the disciplinary
findings rested entirely upon her presence in a group. There was material
specifically identifying her with aspects of the protest, particularly under
Charge 3. At the same time, other findings rested upon distinctly weaker
links. Charge 2 attributed to her the allegation of kidnapping although the
material relied upon referred generally to a complaint by the protesting
teachers and to Ms. Sarita Singh having been questioned by the police.
Charge 4 proceeded further still, drawing an adverse inference from the
calling of a CATS ambulance and the circumstance that Ms. Rathore’s
husband was employed with CATS.
87.
The significance of these features is that even Charge 3, on which the
School places considerable reliance, was an omnibus charge. The material
noticed by the Inquiry Officer could support findings that Ms. Rathore was
present at the protest and was seen with a loudspeaker. The charge, however,
also attributed to her stone-pelting, threats to visitors, defacement and
damage to property, obstruction of the gates and involvement of political
workers and students. Those allegations were held proved, without a
corresponding identification of the material connecting Ms. Rathore
individually with each of them. Charges 2 and 4 disclose similar
hypothetical inferences. The Tribunal, exercising statutory appellate
jurisdiction, was entitled to examine whether the findings travelled beyond
what the record reasonably established. In these proceedings under Article
226, the Court is not called upon to substitute its own assessment merely
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because parts of the record were capable of supporting some of the findings
returned by the Inquiry Officer. Once the Tribunal’s erroneous approach to
admissibility is corrected, the deficiencies in individual attribution and in the
inferential basis of several findings nevertheless remain. Its ultimate
decision setting aside the order of removal therefore does not warrant
interference.
Ranju Sharma
88.
Ms. Sharma was proceeded against on eight charges. The inquiry
report describes all of them as substantially proved.
89.
Here, the attendance record assumes particular importance. It was in
Ms. Sharma’s inquiry that the original register was produced and the Inquiry
Officer personally verified application of white fluid against the names of
several teachers. The Presenting Officer’s response was not that there was
no correction fluid, but that it had been applied by the receptionist.
90.
More troubling is the reasoning employed in relation to the serious
charge concerning stone pelting, abusive slogans, obstruction, political
involvement and damage. After referring to the presence of teachers and to
the CDs, the inquiry report records that Ms. Sharma had failed to produce
evidence or proof “in her favour to counter the Charge” and then treats the
several acts contained in the article as proved against her.
91.
The charged employee’s inability to establish innocence could not
relieve the School of proving the misconduct alleged. A disciplinary inquiry
applies a preponderance standard, but the evidential burden of establishing
the charge remains with the employer.
92.
Charges 7 present another difficulty. Charge 7 alleged that funds
collected through the Vidya Bharati Teachers Welfare Association were
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being used for anti-School activities and involved financial irregularities.
The Inquiry Officer treated Ms. Sharma’s position as President of the
Association and the documentary material concerning its bank account as
sufficient to hold that she had collected the funds and that their use for antiSchool activities stood ipso facto proved, although no witness was examined
to establish such misuse. Charge 8 concerned Ms. Sharma’s allegation that
the Chairman had threatened her, including with physical harm through
goons. Here too, the Inquiry Officer treated the mere fact that Ms. Sharma
had made the allegation as sufficient to hold the charge proved, without
recording a finding that the allegation itself was false or fabricated.
93.
A grievance made by an employee does not become misconduct
merely because the employee fails subsequently to prove it. To establish a
charge founded on a false accusation, the inquiry must cross the further
distance between “not established” and “knowingly or recklessly false”.
Those are not equivalent propositions.
94.
The Tribunal’s blanket approach to the evidentiary record was again
legally imprecise. But the underlying disciplinary findings contain errors of
a more fundamental nature, including reversal of the evidential burden and
attribution of collective conduct without an adequate individual foundation.
The writ petition concerning Ms. Sharma therefore cannot succeed.
Anjali Chugh
95.
Ms. Chugh’s case must not be disposed of merely by attaching it to
the five earlier cases. Her charge sheet was issued in 2015, her inquiry
continued separately, approval of the proposed penalty was obtained from
the Directorate and the removal order was passed on 18 th January, 2018.
Several of her charges were also personal to her.
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96.
The Tribunal found fault with the changes in the composition of the
Disciplinary Action Committee, observing that they had been made without
approval of the competent authority or corresponding minutes of the
Managing Committee. Rule 118, however, prescribes the composition of the
disciplinary committee; it does not, by itself, require separate approval each
time there is a change in its membership. The relevant question was whether
the Committee, as constituted when it took the material decisions, comprised
the persons contemplated by Rule 118. The Tribunal does not identify any
deficiency in that respect merely from the change in names. This objection
must be distinguished from the statutory approval required for imposition of
the major penalty, which was expressly accorded by the Directorate of
Education on 15th January, 2018 before the order of removal was passed.
The Tribunal’s conclusion cannot, therefore, be sustained on the ground that
the requisite approval was absent.
97.
The Court is also unable to endorse the Tribunal’s reliance on the
absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act as an
infirmity in the photographic material. For the reasons already discussed,
such a technical requirement of admissibility could not be imported into a
domestic inquiry.
98.
Nor is the Tribunal’s finding of double punishment sustainable on the
material presently before the Court. It assumed that Ms. Chugh’s increment
had earlier been stopped. The material shown to this Court does not establish
such an order against her. That part of paragraph 61 of the Tribunal decision
cannot be affirmed.
99.
These corrections, however, do not conclude the writ petition in
favour of the School.
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100. Charges 4, 5 and 6 concern the common events of August and
October 2013. Charge 4 alleged absence from 1st to 3rd August; Charge 5
alleged participation in the illegal strike and use of abusive and
unparliamentary language; Charge 6 concerned the later demonstrations.
They suffer from the same necessity for individual attribution already
discussed in the connected matters.
101. There was some individual material against Ms. Chugh. The School
points to a witness identifying her outside the gate. Presence and
participation may thus be capable of proof. But the charge travelled further
and attributed abusive language and serious misconduct to her. The
disciplinary conclusion again treated the collective occurrence as
establishing the several acts charged against the individual.
102. Charges 1 to 3 require separate treatment. Charge 1 contains
allegations of refusal to accept show cause notices and class observation
reports, remarks written against circulars, withdrawal or cutting of a
signature from an office order and complaints made to educational
authorities. Charge 2 concerned allegations made by Ms. Chugh against the
School, including use of School funds and provident fund contributions, and
was itself held only partly proved.
103. Charge 3 is of an altogether different character. It concerns repeated
errors while writing the gist and objectives of lessons in the teacher’s diary
despite earlier advice from the Principal and Vice Principal. The Inquiry
Officer held it proved.
104. The Court is unable to accept the contention that each of these
findings was devoid of evidentiary support. A school is entitled to enforce
administrative discipline, ensure proper maintenance of records, and require
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compliance with reasonable directions issued in the course of its
functioning.
105. At the same time, the disciplinary action against Ms. Chugh did not
rest only on Charges 1 to 3. The eventual order also relied upon the findings
concerning the common events of August and October 2013 and
characterised her misconduct, inter alia, as participation in an illegal strike,
breach of discipline and absence from School. Those findings suffer from
the difficulties of individual attribution already noticed above.
106. Ms. Chugh’s case therefore stands somewhat differently. Charges 1 to
3 were not founded merely on her association with the protesting group;
they concerned her own dealings with the School authorities and her work as
a teacher, and there was material specifically relating to those allegations.
Nor can the material concerning the later demonstration under Charge 6 be
rejected merely on technical rules of admissibility. The difficulty lies
elsewhere. Charges 4 and 5, which formed a substantial part of the
disciplinary case, arose from the events of 1st to 3rd August, 2013. As regards
those charges, the Tribunal noticed that the School witness relied upon
spoke generally of teachers remaining outside the gate and raising slogans,
without attributing the alleged abusive language or other specific conduct to
Ms. Chugh. The Disciplinary Authority nevertheless proceeded on the
Inquiry Officer’s composite conclusion that Charges 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 stood
proved and Charge 2 stood partly proved, and selected the penalty of
removal “keeping in view the gravity of charges proved” collectively. The
penalty was thus not founded upon a separate determination that any one of
the individualized charges, standing by itself, warranted removal.
107. The legal errors in the Tribunal’s reasoning must therefore be
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corrected, but they do not require restoration of the order of removal. The
School has shown that some of the disciplinary findings had an evidentiary
basis; it has not shown that the Tribunal’s ultimate appellate decision was
thereby rendered perverse or unavailable in law. Its direction setting aside
Ms. Chugh’s removal therefore does not warrant interference.
The earlier stoppage of increments and “double punishment”
108. Since the Tribunal placed considerable reliance upon this aspect in the
first five cases, it requires a separate conclusion.
109. The School Managing Committee had resolved to deduct three days’
salary on the principle of “no work no pay” and to stop the increments of
identified teachers on an ad hoc basis. The Tribunal treated the subsequent
removal as a second punishment for the same misconduct and used this as an
independent reason to set it aside. An illustration appears in the Tribunal
order concerning Mr. Ahuja.
110. The Court is unable to sustain that reasoning in its present form. The
record contains a payment voucher dated 26th March, 2014 showing
payment of arrears consequent upon restoration of the increment for the
period July 2013 to February 2014 to Ms. Maindiratta, Ms. Sehgal, Mr.
Ahuja, Ms. Sharma, Mr. Mukesh Panwar and Ms. Rathore. Once an
increment initially withheld on an ad hoc basis was subsequently restored
with arrears, it could no longer be treated as an earlier subsisting penalty
which continued to operate unchanged. Its later restoration materially alters
the premise on which the Tribunal proceeded and requires the legal effect of
that earlier action to be examined in that light.
111. Similarly, the three days’ deduction was expressly described by the
School as an application of “no work no pay”. The Tribunal did not examine
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why that consequence should, without more, be treated as one of the
disciplinary penalties contemplated under Rule 117 so as to exhaust the
power to proceed against distinct acts of misconduct.
112. The present judgment, therefore, does not sustain the orders of the
Tribunal on the doctrine of double punishment. That conclusion, however,
does not alter the result for the reasons independently recorded above.
The cumulative position
113. At this stage, it is useful to be clear about what has and has not been
decided.
114. The Court has not accepted the Tribunal’s view that the evidence
adduced in the disciplinary inquiries became inadmissible merely because
earlier statements were adopted as examination-in-chief.
115. Nor has the Court accepted that the absence of a certificate under
Section 65B of the Evidence Act, by itself, rendered the electronic material
incapable of consideration in a domestic inquiry.
116. The Court has also not concluded that the earlier punishment of
stoppage of increments, on the record as it presently stands, necessarily
precluded the initiation of subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
117. Equally, the Court has neither held that the Respondents did not
participate in the protests nor questioned the School’s authority to take
disciplinary action against employees whose individual conduct amounted to
abandonment of duty, obstruction of the functioning of the School or breach
of the applicable Code of Conduct.
118. The difficulty lies elsewhere. The School’s own affidavit of August
2026 accepts that approximately fifty teachers participated in the protest, but
states that proceedings were initiated only against those whose individual
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roles were considered more serious. Mere presence or sympathy with the
grievances raised was, by the School’s own account, not sufficient. Its case
therefore required the disciplinary record to establish what distinguished
each charged employee from the larger body of teachers.
119. As the discussion above demonstrates, the evidence does not
consistently make out that distinction. In several instances, presence at the
protest was established without corresponding material attributing the
specific acts alleged. Some findings proceeded on formulations such as
“may have” participated or that involvement “cannot be ruled out”; others
placed upon the employee the burden of disproving the allegation. The
central difficulty is thus not the absence of evidence of a protest, but the gap
between collective participation and proof of the particular misconduct
attributed to the employee concerned.
120. This distinction assumes particular significance because the charges
went considerably beyond participation in a protest and included allegations
of stone-pelting, abusive language, obstruction, damage to property and
other serious misconduct. The allegation of stone-pelting is illustrative. Mr.
Sube Singh, the School bus driver, stated that stones were thrown from the
crowd and that one struck him, but acknowledged in cross-examination that
he had not seen who threw them and could not identify any of the charged
employees as having done so. The occurrence of an incident could not,
without the necessary link, establish the individual responsibility of a
particular employee for it.
121. The record also raised material questions concerning the attendance
register, the closure of the School on dates described in the charge-sheets as
normal working days, and the stage at which parts of the electronic material
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were produced. These matters, together with the deficiencies in individual
attribution noticed above, were relevant to the sustainability of the
disciplinary findings.
122. The Tribunal was entitled, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to
examine the disciplinary findings on these matters. As already noted, aspects
of its reasoning on the treatment of evidence were erroneous and cannot be
endorsed. Those errors, however, do not by themselves displace its ultimate
conclusion where the underlying deficiencies in the disciplinary findings
remain.
123. In exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, this Court is not called upon to
rehear the statutory appeals merely because parts of the Tribunal’s reasoning
require correction. Having examined the record in the manner set out above,
the Court finds no ground warranting interference with the Tribunal’s
ultimate conclusion setting aside the orders of removal.
No Remand or Fresh Inquiry
124. The School has alternatively urged that the matters be remitted to the
Tribunal for a fresh consideration of the disciplinary record. The Court is
unable to accede to that request.
125. The events in question are now more than a decade old. The alleged
misconduct dates back to 2013; the orders of removal in the first five cases
were passed between 2014 and 2015, and the corresponding appeals were
decided by the Tribunal in 2017. These writ petitions have remained
pending before this Court thereafter, during which the inquiry records,
written submissions and additional material have been examined in
considerable detail over successive hearings. Even in the sixth case, the
order of removal was passed in 2018 and the Tribunal rendered its decision
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in 2025.
126. In these circumstances, a remand would serve no useful purpose and
would merely prolong disputes that have already traversed multiple stages of
adjudication and
remained unresolved
for several
years. Having
independently examined the record and found no basis to interfere with the
Tribunal’s conclusions, the Court sees no justification for either restoring the
orders of removal or directing a fresh inquiry at this stage.
127. Nor is this a case in which liberty for a fresh domestic inquiry on the
same allegations should be reserved. Rule 115(4) itself permits a further
inquiry after a penalty is set aside only where the earlier order has been set
aside purely on technical grounds without entering the merits. The Supreme
Court has noticed that limitation in Sunil Sikri.
128. The present decision is not based on a technical defect alone. It
examines the evidentiary foundation of the disciplinary findings. The
proviso to Rule 115(4) therefore has no application.
Consequential relief and Rule 121
129. The remaining question concerns the financial consequences of
reinstatement. Considerable sums are now claimed by the Respondents and,
pursuant to the order dated 29th July, 2026, they have filed computations
extending over the years during which these writ petitions remained
pending.
130. The Tribunal’s directions in the first five appeals were framed in two
distinct parts. The Tribunal directed reinstatement, within one month, and
expressly held that the employee would be entitled to full wages from the
date of its order, together with consequential benefits. It separately left the
claim for wages for the preceding period to the Managing Committee under
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Rule 121 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, requiring the employee
to submit a representation and the School to decide it by a speaking order.
131. That distinction is legally significant. The Tribunal did not subject the
entire monetary consequence of reinstatement to Rule 121. It treated the
period preceding its order as one requiring determination under the Rule,
while granting wages prospectively from the date on which the removal was
set aside and reinstatement was directed.
132. Events thereafter took a different course. The School challenged the
Tribunal’s orders before this Court and reinstatement did not take effect
during the pendency of these petitions. In W.P.(C) 5138/2017, W.P.(C)
6159/2017, W.P.(C) 8208/2017 and W.P.(C) 8231/2017, the respective
Tribunal orders were stayed. In W.P.(C) 6111/2017, the employee undertook
not to press the execution proceedings pursuant to the arrangement recorded
by this Court. In W.P.(C) 13994/2025, the direction for reinstatement was
stayed having regard to the orders operating in the connected matters and the
fact that Ms. Chugh had not resumed duties since her suspension. None of
the Respondents was, therefore, reinstated pursuant to the Tribunal’s orders.
133. The consequence of this intervening litigation must be worked out
having regard both to Rule 121 and to the decisions of this Court.
134. Rule 121 requires the Managing Committee, when an employee
dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired from service is reinstated as a
result of an appeal, to make a specific order as to the salary and allowances
payable for the period of absence, including the preceding period of
suspension, and as to whether that period is to be treated as spent on duty.
Where the employee is found to have been fully exonerated, sub-rule (2)
provides for full salary and allowances, subject to its proviso concerning
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delay directly attributable to the employee.
135. In Sunil Sikri v. Guru Harkrishan Public School & Anr., the
Supreme Court considered the power to award back wages for the period
preceding reinstatement and its interaction with Rule 121. It held that the
authority conferred upon the Managing Committee under Rule 121 is a
“power coupled with duty” and that, once the occasion contemplated by the
Rule arises, the Managing Committee is obliged to undertake that exercise
upon consideration of the relevant material.
136. A distinct question arose in subsequent proceedings emanating from
the same dispute. In The Management of Guru Harkrishan Public School
& Ors. v. Sunil Sikri & Anr.,7 the Division Bench of this Court considered
the entitlement to wages for the intervening period between the Tribunal’s
order directing reinstatement and actual reinstatement, during which its
implementation had remained stayed at the School’s instance. The Division
Bench held that this period falls outside Rule 121 and that the consequences
of the interim order could not be controlled by that provision. It further
observed that an employee could not be denied the benefit of an order of
reinstatement merely because its implementation had remained stalled under
an interim order obtained by the employer, the grant of stay being subject to
the final outcome of the proceedings.
137. The position in the five appeals decided in 2017 is therefore clear. In
the first five appeals, the Tribunal expressly awarded full wages from the
date of its respective orders and left the claim for the preceding period to be
determined by the Managing Committee under Rule 121. Ms. Chugh’s order
2024:DHC:7261-DB. The Special Leave Petition against this decision, SLP(C) No. 27221/2024, was
dismissed by the Supreme Court on 10th February, 2025, while keeping the question of law open for
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was differently worded: it directed reinstatement within one month with
consequential benefits, while separately leaving the claim for back wages to
be considered under Rule 121. This difference does not alter the principle
applicable to the present cases.
138. The School’s challenge to the direction for reinstatement has now
failed. The interim orders and arrangements under which reinstatement
remained in abeyance cannot convert the subsequent period into a fresh
claim under Rule 121 or deprive the Respondents of the monetary
consequence expressly granted by the Tribunal. Accordingly, Rule 121 will
govern the period preceding the respective orders of the Tribunal. The
period thereafter, during which reinstatement remained unimplemented on
account of the proceedings before this Court, falls outside the scope of Rule
121 and the monetary consequences must follow the respective directions of
the Tribunal, as sustained by this judgment.
139. The computations filed by the Respondents pursuant to the order
dated 29th July, 2026 must be understood accordingly. They are claims and
the figures stated therein have not been adjudicated by this Court. For the
period preceding the respective orders of the Tribunal, they shall be
considered by the Managing Committee in accordance with Rule 121. For
the period thereafter, the exercise is one of computation and verification of
the monetary benefits flowing from the reinstatement directions as sustained
by this judgment, subject to proper pay fixation, statutory deductions and
adjustment of amounts, if any, already paid for the same period. Entitlement
for the latter period shall not be reopened in proceedings under Rule 121.
140. The School’s plea that payment of the amounts claimed may impose a
consideration in an appropriate case.
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substantial financial burden upon it, having regard to its fee structure and the
number of students admitted from economically weaker sections, does not
alter the legal position. Financial difficulty cannot enlarge the reach of Rule
121 or diminish an entitlement which flows from a reinstatement order that
has ultimately survived judicial scrutiny. The amounts actually payable will,
of course, depend upon the statutory determination and computation
contemplated above.
Directions
141. In view of the above, the petitions are disposed of in the following
terms:
(a)
The challenge to the orders of the Delhi School Tribunal insofar as
they set aside the respective orders of removal of Ms. Rajni Maindiratta, Mr.
Anil Kumar Ahuja, Ms. Rinku Sehgal, Ms. Neelam Rathore, Ms. Ranju
Sharma and Ms. Anjali Chugh is rejected.
(b)
The directions for reinstatement are affirmed.
(c)
The School shall reinstate each Respondent who has not attained the
age of superannuation within four weeks from today. From the date of actual
reinstatement, the employee shall be paid the salary and allowances lawfully
attached to the post, subject to the applicable pay fixation and service rules.
(d)
Where any Respondent has attained the age of superannuation during
the pendency of these proceedings, actual reinstatement shall not be
required. The monetary and service consequences shall instead be worked
out up to the date of superannuation in accordance with the directions which
follow, and the consequential retiral benefits shall be refixed on that basis.
(e)
The salary and allowances payable for the period preceding the
respective orders of the Tribunal, including the period of suspension
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preceding removal, and the question whether that period is to be treated as
spent on duty, shall be determined by the Managing Committee under Rule
121 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.
(f)
For the period commencing from the date of the respective Tribunal
orders until actual reinstatement, or until superannuation where applicable,
the Respondents shall be entitled to the full wages and consequential
benefits directed by the Tribunal. This period shall not form part of the
determination under Rule 121.
(g)
The computations already filed by the Respondents pursuant to the
order dated 29th July, 2026 shall be treated, insofar as they concern the
period governed by Rule 121, as their representations under that Rule. Each
Respondent may, within two weeks, supplement the same with material
relevant to the Rule 121 determination, including particulars of gainful
employment, if any, during that period.
(h)
The Managing Committee shall give each Respondent a reasonable
opportunity of hearing and pass a separate, reasoned order under Rule
121(1)(a) and (b). The exercise shall be completed within eight weeks from
today.
(i)
The Respondents may, within two weeks, furnish separate
computations for the post-Tribunal period falling outside Rule 121. The
School shall verify the same on the basis of the applicable pay scales,
increments, allowances and other consequential benefits and communicate
the computation so arrived at to the respective Respondent. The amount
payable shall be released within six weeks from today, after statutory
deductions and adjustment of any amount already paid for the same period.
In the event the amount is not released within the aforesaid period, it shall
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carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the expiry of six weeks till
the date of its actual release.
(j)
The interim orders and arrangements pursuant to which reinstatement
remained stayed, or execution of the Tribunal orders remained unpressed,
shall not be treated as extinguishing or reducing the entitlement for the postTribunal period. Those arrangements were subject to the final outcome of
these petitions and shall cease to have effect with their disposal.
(k)
While undertaking the Rule 121 exercise, the Managing Committee
shall treat the findings and conclusions in this judgment as final for the
disciplinary proceedings in question. Rule 121 cannot be used to reopen the
charges or to undertake another adjudication of the validity of the removal
orders.
(l)
Any amount found payable for the period governed by Rule 121 shall
be released within four weeks from the respective speaking order, after
adjustment of subsistence allowance or any other amount already paid for
the same period.
(m)
No fresh inquiry shall be commenced on the charges which formed
the subject matter of the removal orders considered in these petitions.
142. The interim arrangements/ orders operating in the connected petitions
shall stand vacated. All pending applications also stand disposed of.
143. The writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
AUGUST 17, 2026/hc
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