Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.723 of 2025
Date of Decision: 28.04.2026
_________________________________________________________________________
Vidhyadhar
……...Petitioner
Versus
Khem Singh
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Guna Nand Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Surila Sangam, Advocate.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read
with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays
challenge to judgment dated 30.06.2025 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions
Judge-I,
Mandi,
Himachal
Pradesh,
in
Criminal
Appeal
No.2438/2023, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 04.11.2023, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Karsog, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Complaint No.119 of
2019, whereby the learned Court below, while holding the petitioneraccused
(hereinafter "accused") guilty of having committed offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short
the "Act”), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of two months and pay compensation to the tune of
Rs.3,30,000/- to the respondent-complainant (hereinafter "complainant").
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act
before the competent Court of law, alleging therein that accused
approached him seeking financial help for his personal requirement and
borrowed a sum of Rs.3,20,000/- from the complainant in the presence of
witnesses. He alleged that though with a view to discharge his lawful
liability, accused issued cheque bearing No.513529 dated 10.04.2019
amounting to Rs.3,20,000/-, drawn on SBI, Branch Karsog, but aforesaid
cheque on its presentation was returned back vide memo dated 01.07.2019
with the remarks “Funds Insufficient”. Since accused failed to make the
payment good within the stipulated period despite his having received legal
notice dated 11.07.2019, complainant had no option, but to initiate
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 04.11.2023, held the
accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under Section
138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the
description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog,
District Sirmaur, H.P., accused preferred an appeal before the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi, H.P., but same was dismissed vide
judgment dated 30.06.2025.
In the aforesaid background, accused has
approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his
acquittal after setting-aside the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence recorded by the learned Court below.
5.
Vide order dated 22.12.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below subject to
accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing
personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like
amount within a period of four weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid
order was never complied with. Repeatedly time was granted to the accused
to comply with the aforesaid order, but in vain.
6.
Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel for
the accused submitted that since accused is not coming forward to impart
instructions, this Court may proceed to decide the case on its own merits.
7.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi, H.P.,
whereby judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the
learned trial Court came to be upheld, this Court is not persuaded to agree
with Mr. Guna Nand Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that learned
Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective,
rather this Court finds that both the Courts below have dealt with each and
every aspect of the matter meticulously and there is no scope left for this
Court to interfere. Interestingly, in the instant case, factum with regard to
issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be
disputed at the behest of the accused. In his statement recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C, accused, while admitting that he had approached the
complainant for some financial help, denied that he had borrowed sum of
Rs.3,20,000/-, but stated that he had only borrowed sum of Rs.1,29,000/from the complainant. Since factum with regard to issuance of cheque as
well as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed, no illegality
otherwise can be said to have been committed by learned Courts below,
while invoking Section 118 and 139 of the Act.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence, which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused, besides leading evidence in defence,
can rely on the materials produced by the complainant. Needless to say, if
the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It
would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in
the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing
of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is
usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should
guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and
the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled
position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence
which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by
the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a
notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the
time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the
said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence,
hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have
to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in
view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this
the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment
despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
9.
In the case at hand, complainant, with a view to prove his case,
examined himself as CW-1, who by way of tendering affidavit Ext.CW-1/A,
reiterated the facts as averred in the complaint. He also tendered in
evidence the cheque Ext.CW-1/B, dishonour memo Ext.CW-1/C, legal
notice Ext. CW-1/D, postal receipt Ext.CW-1/E, undelivered notice
Ext.CW-1/G. If the cross-examination conducted upon this witness is
perused in its entirety, it can be safely concluded that opposite party was
unable to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his
examination-in-chief. No suggestion worth credence ever came to be put to
the accused that he had not borrowed sum of Rs.3,20,000/- and had only
borrowed sum of Rs.1,29,000/-. Accused did not put a suggestion to the
complainant that in the month of March, 2015, sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was
given by him to the complainant and remaining amount was given in the
year 2017. As has been observed hereinabove, pattern of cross-examination
conducted upon complainant clearly establishes factum with regard to
issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon. Though accused, with
a view to rebut aforesaid presumption, attempted to carve out a case that
he had only liability of Rs.1,29,000/-, but he was not able to prove such
fact by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Similarly, he was unable to
explain that in case he had returned the entire money, how and for what
reasons cheque in question came in the hands of the complainant.
10.
Accused examined one Pushp Raj as DW-1, who in his cross-
examination, admitted that accused was having transaction with the
complainant. He also admitted that in his presence, complainant had given
money to the accused and that amount was perhaps between Rs.70,000/and Rs.80,000/-. While feigning ignorance that complainant had given
some amount in cash and had issued a cheque of Rs.50,000/-, he denied
that transaction had taken place 2–3 times in his presence, but voluntarily
stated that before him, only once such amount was borrowed.
To the contrary, it was the pleaded case of the complainant
11.
that he had given amount to the accused in presence of witnesses. Though
statement of DW-1 suggests that accused had taken money may be
Rs.70,000/- to Rs.80,000/- in the presence of DW-1 Pushp Raj, but afore
witness nowhere stated aforesaid fact, rather he stated that accused had
returned money to the complainant.
Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
12.
record
by
the
complainant,
this
Court
finds
that
complainant
successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by
the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
13.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in
view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts
below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein
it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine
the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
14.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts
below.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
15.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no reason
to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts below,
which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence
available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
16.
being devoid of any merit. The accused is directed to surrender before the
learned trial Court within 15 days to serve the sentence as awarded by the
learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands
vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Bail bonds, if
any, furnished by the accused are cancelled.
April 28, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review