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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
RFA(COMM) 532/2024 & CM APPL. 72308/2024
VICTORIA CROSS INDIA PVT LTD
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rohan Jaitley, Adv. with
Mr. Harsh Pratap Shahi, Mr. Areeb
Amanullah, Mr. Dev Pratap Shahi, Mr.
Varun Pratap Singh, Mr. Yogya Bhatia,
Advs.
versus
VICTRORINOX AG
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shravan Kumar Bansal,
Mr. Rishi Bansal and Ms. Shruti
Manchanda, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
17.02.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
CM APPL. 72307/2024 (delay)
1.
By this application, the appellant in RFA(Comm) 532/2024
seeks condonation of delay of 195 days in filing the present appeal,
which has been preferred under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 against a judgment dated 23 March 2024 passed by the
learned District Judge (Commercial-08), Tis Hazari Courts1.
1 “learned Commercial Court” hereinafter
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2.
As the earlier application filed for condonation of delay did not
contain sufficient particulars, Mr. Jaitley, learned Counsel for the
appellant, sought and was granted permission to file an additional
affidavit explaining the delay of 195 days in preferring the appeal. He
has done so.
3.
We deem it appropriate to reproduce paras 16 to 22 of the
affidavit thus, as the earlier paragraphs deal with the merits of the
matter:
“16. That Defendant No.1 (Late Mr. Dinesh Gupta) would look
after the day to day affairs, take key decisions over vital aspects for
course of business including trademark and copyright related
subject with respect to Appellant Company (Defendant No.3) and
Defendant No.4-Partnerhsip Firm, until his lifetime/date of demise08.07.2022. It was only after such passing of impugned Final Order
and Judgment dated 23.03.2024 being challenged herein under
Appeal, that the Defendant No.2 (Ms. Komal Gupta) was required
to look after the day to day affairs and take such key decisions on
her own i.e. without the able guidance of her late husbandDefendant No. 1 (Late Mr. Dinesh Gupta) who would have
otherwise looked into the day to day affairs, take key decisions
with respect to ‘VICTORIA CROSS’ / ‘VICTORIACROSS’
through the related entities and Defendant No.2 (Ms. Komal
Gupta) would only discharge necessary obligations and fiduciary
duties as being included in the setup as part of business structure
being controlled by family. It is apposite to highlight that Ms.
Komal Gupta was appointed as Partner and Director in concerned
Entities i.e. Partnership Firm (Defendant No.4) and AppellantCompany for the reasons of being a family member i.e. wife of
Defendant no.1 (Late Mr. Dinesh Gupta), and had at all times acted
only in discharge of necessary obligations and fiduciary duties in
consultation with Defendant No.1.
17.
That it is necessary to outline, that even though the demise
of Defendant No.1-Late Mr. Dinesh Gupta occurred on 08.07.2022
but its serious implications and consequences were felt only after
passing of such impugned final order and judgment dated
23.03.2024 as there prevailed exparte ad-interim injunction against
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all the Defendants, including the Appellant from 30.07.2019 till the
date of passing of the impugned final order and judgment dated
23.03.2024. Quite notably, from 30.07.2019 to 23.03.2024 (almost
5 years), no business operations, no usage of the trademark, and no
day-to-day functioning with respect to usage of ‘ Victoria Cross /
VictoriaCross’ took place by any of the related entities in
Defendant No. 1 to 4 to Suit Proceedings, resulting in a prolonged
period of non- operations. However, once the impugned final order
and judgment dated 23.03.2024 was passed, decisions with respect
to deciding upon the affairs of the Appellant and related entities of
‘VICTORIA CROSS’/ ‘VICTORIACROSS?’, had to be made and
this was the very first instance wherein Defendant No.2- Ms.
Komal Gupta was compelled to look into the affairs and take
decisions on her own owing to demise of Late Mr. Dinesh Gupta.
18.
That subsequent to passing of impugned final order and
judgment dated 23.03.2024, the Defendant No.2-Ms. Komal Gupta
on account of lack of exposure towards running of day to day
affairs and no major involvement in any of the key decisions over
vital aspects for course of business, trademark and copyright
related subjects, legal case related decisions with respect to
VICTORIA CROSS/ VICTORIACROSS through its related
entities (prior to demise of Defendant No. 1, all of such day to day
affairs and key decisions were taken by Defendant No.1) and
owing to her mental health upon loosing her husband during the
Suit Proceedings under challenge in present Appeal, the Defendant
No.2 being put in such shoes for the first without complete
knowledge with respect to affairs, documents, etc., was unable to
understand/comprehend the modalities required for challenging the
impugned order from her end.
19.
That Defendant No.2 never being entrusted with the day to
day affairs and decision making and being put in such shoes for the
first time after the passing of impugned final order and judgment
dated 23.03.2024 on account of demise of her husband- Defendant
No.1 during the Suit Proceedings, the Defendant No.2- Ms. Komal
Gupta decided to dissolve the Partnership Firm- Victoria Cross
Incorporation (Defendant No. 4 in the Suit Proceedings) which was
duly dissolved on 29.05.2024. It is pertinent to note that this
decision making solely at the ends of Ms. Komal Gupta and the
process for dissolution of Partnership Firm (Defendant No. 4 in the
Suit Proceedings) consumed around 66 days from the date of
passing of impugned order, resulting as one of the factors for delay
in filing the Appeal.
True Copy of Dissolution Deed dated 29.05.2024 of Partnership
Firm- Victoria Cross Incorporation (Defendant No. 4 in the
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Suit Proceedings) is annexed herewith and marked as
Annexure ‘AA-1’
20.
That subsequently upon express volition of Ms. Komal
Gupta deciding to not continue or be associated with business and
works w.r.t. ‘“VICTORIA CROSS / VICTORIACROSS?’, for the
reasons of not being able to cope and understand the functioning
post the demise of her husband, it was eventually decided around
Mid of July, 2024 that she shall assign all her rights to Appellant
and consequently, Three (3) Assignment Deeds all of them duly
dated 29.07.2024 with respect to all the Registrations and
Applications
pertaining
to
VICTORIA
CROSS/
VICTORIACROSS’ Trademarks and Copyright, of which she was
the owner and proprietor, shall be assigned to Assignee- Victoria
Cross India Pvt. Ltd. (Appellant herein) being acted through its
other Director-Mr. Arun Singh, Authorised Representative and
Deponent herein. The Stamp Papers were purchased on 16.07.2024
and were executed on 29.07.2024. This Assignment of Copyright
and Trademark could only be done by Ms. Komal Gupta
(Defendant No.2 in Suit Proceedings)- Assignor to aforesaid
Assignment Deeds, only after around 125 days from the date of
passing of impugned order, resulting as one of the factors for delay
in filing the Appeal.
True Copy of Assignment Deeds dated 29.07.2024 executed by
Ms. Komal Gupta in favour of Appellant herein are annexed
herewith and marked as Annexure ‘AA-2 (Colly)’
21.
That soon after the aforesaid Assignment, the Defendant
No. 2 left her position as Director and Shareholder in the Appellant
on 19.08.2024 by transferring the entire Shareholding and
Directorship in- Mr. Laxman Singh Negi, joined at the position of
Director on 20.08.2024. However, the administrative modalities. at
the ends of Ministry of Corporate Affairs consumed another around
40 days from the aforesaid date of 20.08.2024 to confirm the
Directorship of Mr. Laxman Singh Negi as the Director of
Appellant substituting Defendant No.2 (Ms. Komal Gupta) and
consequently, the date of appointment as per Form DIR-12 could
only be confirmed on 30.09.2024, only pursuant to which any
decisions by the new Board of Directors of the Appellant could
have been passed inter alia filing of the present Appeal. Therefore,
all such major change with respect to change in Directorship and
Shareholding of Appellant owing to Defendant No.2- Ms. Komal
Gupta, not able to look after the affairs and take key decisions,
consumed around 190 days from the date of passing of impugned
order, resulting as one of the factors for delay in filing the Appeal.
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True Copies of Resolution passed by the Directors of the
Appellant on 19.08.2024, Master Data of Appellant from MCA
Portal reflecting change in Directorship from 20.08.2024 and
Form DIR 12 confirming the change of Directorship on
30.09.2024 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure
‘AA-3 (COLLY)’.
22.
That the Trial Court Record is a voluminous one of more
than 1100 pages and was in the Hard Copy format, which further
acted as a constraint to get the records instantly from the office of
the previous counsels who were duly engaged before the Trial
Court only after around more than 70 days of passing of the
Impugned Order the trial court records could be procured from the
Ld. Counsel engaged before the Trial Court, resulting as one of the
factors for delay in filing the Appeal. The procurement of records
before the Trial Court was pivotal to understanding the case and
engagement of new counsels for preferring the Appeal.”
4.
The application has also placed reliance on para 63 of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra v.
Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.2, specifically with
reference to the enunciation, in the said paragraph, of the proposition
that, in a fit case, if a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a
negligent manner, a short delay beyond the maximum period of 60
days available under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act
may be condoned.
5.
To our mind, it may not be correct to read the said observation
in isolation. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to reproduce para 63 of
the decision in Borse Brothers in extenso thus:
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
2 (2021) 6 SCC 460
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Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a
delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be
condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case
in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a
negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that
the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the
first party's inaction, negligence or laches.”
6.
Clearly, in para 63, the Supreme Court has held that, in
commercial appeals, ordinarily long periods of delay beyond the
period of 60 days available in the Commercial Courts Act should not
be condoned. If the delay is short, and is found to be bona fide and not
negligent, the Court may, in a given case, condone the delay.
7.
This position stands reiterated in the following passages from
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. BHEL3:
19.
At this stage, we must look into some of the relevant
findings recorded by the High Court. The High Court, in para 18 of
its judgment, framed the following question for its consideration.
Para 18 reads thus:
“18. The question for consideration is:
“whether the applicants herein can plead that the period of
limitation for filing the appeal to Commercial Appellate
Division of this Court did not commence at all because the
certified copy of the judgment had not been issued to the
applicants by the Commercial Courts?””
20.
The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the
aforesaid question as under:
“19. In order to answer this question, we cannot lose sight
of the whole purpose of enactment of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 i.e., to provide for speedy disposal of high
value commercial dispute.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 910
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20. No doubt there was a similar provision in Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was considered
by the Supreme Court in the case of Housing Board,
Haryana (1 supra).
The said provision in the Haryana Consumer Protection
Rules, 1988 also provided for communication of the order
of the District forum to the parties free of charge in order to
avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the
burden of expenses that may he incurred for obtaining the
certified copy.
The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Consumer
Protection Act was to provide for better protection of the
interest of the consumers as a measure for economical and
speedy remedy for the settlement of the dispute and the
matters connected therewith and therefore, the said rule
should be understood in a manner so that it would protect
the interest of the parties before the District forum by
making it obligatory on the District forum to provide a copy
of the order duly signed and dated by the members of the
Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed with regard
to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the said Act
therefore, has to be computed as commencing from the date
of communication of the order in the manner laid down in
the rules.
It was in that context that it was Held that mere
pronouncement of an order in the open Conn would not be
enough, but under the scheme of the rules copy of the said
judgment has to be communicated to the parties affected by
the said order so that the parties adversely affected
therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of
knowing the text, reasons and contents thereof so as to
formulate grounds of attack before the appellate or before
the higher forums. In absence of such communication of
signed and dated order, it was held that the parties
adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the
contents of the order so to challenge the same and get it set
aside by the appellate authority or by the higher forums.
21. Normally petitioners before the District forums under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are individuals and not
corporate entities like the appellant/instrumentality of the
State. So, there is justification for taking the view as regards
petitioners in District forums that the provisions in the
Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 which mandated
communication of the order of the said forums to the parties
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free of charge was to save the parties from the burden of
expenses that may be incurred for obtaining the certified
copy.
22. We are afraid that the logic behind the provision
contained in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
framed under the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot be
applied to the litigants before the Commercial Court. For
Commercial entities and in particular litigants like the
applicants herein who are the State Government
Undertakings, the expenses of obtaining a certified copy of
a judgment of the Commercial Court would be very small
compared to the stakes involves in the litigation.
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as a
petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the logic
of counting the period of limitation from the date of
communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot be
applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial
entities are parties.
24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and
made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be treated
as only directory and not mandatory. So notwithstanding
the provision contained in the amended Order XX Rule
1 CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the parties to the
dispute through electronic mail or otherwise), if such copies
are not issued within a reasonable time, the parties to the
dispute have to apply for the same, and after obtaining it,
prefer an appeal within the time prescribed in Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value
commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an
interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and object
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and any interpretation
of the nature advanced by the counsel for the applicants
would defeat the whole purpose of the object of the
Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to provide for speedy
disposal of high value commercial disputes.
26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for
the applicants that the period of limitation for filing the
appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High
Court would not commence unless the judgment of the
Commercial Court in the Commercial suit was
communicated by the said Commercial Court to the parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days in
filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in exercise
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of power conferred on this Court under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 fell for consideration of
the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (2
supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment
in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the
statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and may
result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to why they
should not be strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the
context of the object of speedy resolution of the dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object
sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes, expression
“sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself; and that the
expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea
for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise
of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a
delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which
the appeal could have been filed can be condoned (i.e.,
below 120 days from the date of pronouncement of the
judgment) by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963, but where there is negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides, such power ought not to be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely because
the Government is involved, a different yardstick for
condonation of delay cannot be laid down. (This rule would
thus apply equally to instrumentalities of Government like
the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause has
been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right
in the applicants or the appellants to have the delay
condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
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“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration An and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals pled under section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30
days or 60 days. respectively, is to be condoned by
way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit
case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide
and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, he
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other
side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence
or laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of
Maharashtra (2 supra) permitted condonation of delay
beyond 60 days in a case falling under the Commercial
Courts Act only by way of exception and not by way of
rule. If the applicants for condonation of delay had not
acted bona fide and had acted in a negligent manner as in
the instant case, the delay is not liable to be condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal is 301
days - way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days permitted
by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be condoned in
exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by
negligence of the applicants is not liable to be condoned.
32. We may also point out that the applicants were
represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by
counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced in the
presence of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it appears
that the application for issuance of certified copy was made
on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on 07.09.2024, and the
appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy of
its judgment to the applicants within the reasonable time, it
was incumbent on the part of the counsel for the applicants
or the employees in the Legal Department of the applicants
to apply for issuance of certified copy from the Commercial
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Court, but they have failed in their duty to apply for it when
they did not receive it within a reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301
days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not
communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal and
for not making any demand of payment in terms of the
decree of the Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of
the counsel engaged by them in not informing the
applicants about the judgment of the Commercial Court.
This is because the applicants have a Legal Department and
employees engaged by the applicants in that department
have a duty to monitor what is happening in the cases to
which the applicants are parties, keep track of the progress
of the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure that
applications for issuance of certified copy are made to the
concerned court so that the appeals, if required, can be
preferred within the period of limitation prescribed by law.”
21.
We are in complete agreement with the line of reasoning
assigned by the High Court.
8.
In the present case, the delay is of as much as 195 days from the
date by which the appeal was required to be filed.
9.
We have perused the contents of the additional affidavit filed by
the appellant and heard Mr. Rohan Jaitley, learned Counsel for the
appellant, at length.
10.
Mr. Jaitley submits that the delay was occasioned because
Defendant 2 in the suit, Ms. Komal Gupta, the wife of Mr. Dinesh
Gupta, was traumatised owing to her husband’s death and, as there
was a stay operating, the appellant was also non-operational till the
passing of the impugned judgment dated 23 March 2024. It was only
after the impugned judgment was passed that Ms. Komal Gupta, as
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she was not in a position to handle the affairs, dissolved the
partnership firm which was the holder of the rights in the trademark in
question and thereafter assigned the rights to the appellant company
which is now prosecuting the appeal. She also subsequently resigned
her from directorship of the company.
11.
We have considered the submissions in the light of averments
contained in the additional affidavit filed by the appellant and, keeping
in mind the law declared in Borse Brothers and Jharkhand Urja
Utpadan.
12.
The demise of Mr. Dinesh Gupta, though an unfortunate
circumstance, can hardly be of any relevance, as he died on 8 July
2022, which was almost a year and half prior to the passing of the
judgment under challenge on 23 March 2024.
13.
Even if it were to be assumed that for the entire period from 8
July 2022 till 23 March 2024, the affairs of the partnership firm
remained in a hiatus and suddenly rejuvenated after the impugned
order was passed on 23 March 2024, there is nonetheless no
explanation for (i) the period of 66 days from the passing of the
impugned order till the dissolution deed dated 29 May 2024, (ii) the
period of two months from the dissolution deed dated 29 May 2024
and the assignment deed dated 29 July 2024, and (iii) the period
thereafter, till the filing of the present appeal.
14.
In the process, a delay of 195 days in filing the appeal has been
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occasioned.
15.
We do not enjoy, while dealing with aspects of delay in
commercial appeals, the same latitude which we enjoy while dealing
with non-commercial appeals or appeals filed under Section 96 of the
CPC. We are governed by the principles enunciated in Borse Brothers
and Jharkhand Urja Utpadan.
16.
Applying the said principles, we are not satisfied that a case for
condonation of delay of as much as 195 days has been made either in
the original application for condonation of delay or in the averments
contained in the additional affidavit filed by the appellant.
17.
Accordingly, the prayer for condonation of delay is rejected.
18.
The application is dismissed.
RFA(COMM) 532/2024
19.
Accordingly, RFA(Comm) 532/2024 is also dismissed on the
ground of delay without going into merits.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
FEBRUARY 17, 2026
ss
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