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2026:HHC:22541
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 175 of 2026
Reserved on: 22.05.2026
Date of Decision: 17.06.2026
Vibha Bansal
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & Anr.
...Respondents
_____________________________________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioners
:
Mr Anirudh RH Sharma, Advocate
For respondents No.1/ :
State
Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 138 of 2022, dated 07.12.2022, registered at
Police Station Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 336, 337, and 504 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC) and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act 2015 (JJ Act). (The parties shall
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:22541
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police
stating that his son Kanav was a student of the 7 th class in I-Genius
School, Parwanoo. A call was received from the school on 23.11.2022
at about 1:15 p.m. that Kanav had sustained injuries while playing.
The informant’s wife made an enquiry from the class teacher, who
replied that the children do not listen to anybody and the school
teachers cannot be held responsible for their welfare. Kanav
revealed that the P.T. teacher was asking the students to race in a
game period. The school did not have adequate facilities for racing.
A wall was located at a distance of one foot from the end point of
the race. It was difficult for a child running at high speed to
suddenly stop, and the chances of his hitting the wall were quite
high. Kanav sustained injuries because he was unable to stop due to
the momentum. The informant and his wife went to the office of
Vibha Bansal (the present petitioner). The informant and his wife
made inquiries from the petitioner about the incident, and the
petitioner abused and threatened to evict the child from the school.
She called her husband, who had a scuffle with the informant.
2026:HHC:22541
Kanav went to the school on 28.11.2022, and he was not permitted
to join the assembly, dance class and games period. He was asked to
sit alone in the class. The petitioner gathered the children on
01.12.2022 and displayed the CCTV footage in which Kanav was
shown taking a notebook from his friend’s bag. The petitioner told
the students that Kanav was stealing their articles, and they should
be cautious. Kanav replied that he was taking the notebook for the
homework. The petitioner replied that this was theft, and the police
would send him to jail for the rest of his life for committing the
theft. She also asked Kanav whether his parents had taught him to
steal. She threatened Kanav and asked him to change his school.
Kanav was removed from the WhatsApp group of the class. The
matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and
investigated the matter. Kanav was produced before the Child
Welfare Committee, which sent him for counselling. Clinical
psychologist, Vishali Sharma, issued a report that the client
appeared
calm,
comfortable
and
friendly.
He
reported
no
significant signs of mental illness. She counselled the client and his
father individually and conjointly. The petitioner had traumatised
the victim, Kanav, by her acts. Hence, a charge sheet was filed
before the Court.
3.
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Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing
of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition
asserting that the allegations in the FIR do not constitute the
commission of any offence. Deputy Director of Elementary
Education dealt with the complaint regarding corporal punishment
and reported that the informant’s behaviour was inappropriate,
indecent, shameful, abusive, and violent with the principal,
teachers and some students. No corporal punishment was given in
the school. This report falsifies the allegations made in the FIR.
There was no negligence or mismanagement on the petitioner’s
part. The clinical psychologist had also found the child to be calm,
comfortable and friendly, which falsifies the allegation of mental
trauma. The school had adequate facilities as per the requirements
laid down by the Government. The petitioner did not have any
actual charge or control over a child, and she cannot be held
responsible under Section 75 of the JJ Act. The petitioner had shown
the CCTV footage to advise the children not to touch each other's
belongings. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it
be quashed.
4.
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I have heard Mr Anirudh RH Sharma, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for respondent No.1/State.
5.
Mr Anirudh RH Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR, even if taken
to be true, do not constitute the commission of any offence. The
petitioner was not responsible for the welfare of the child. She had
merely counselled the children not to touch each other's
belongings. The school had adequate facilities for the activities
being carried out in it, and this was duly certified by the Deputy
Director of Education. An enquiry was conducted in which the
informant was found at fault. The clinical psychologist had also not
found any signs of trauma in the child. The continuation of the
proceedings in these circumstances would be a futile exercise.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR
and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
respondent No.1/State submitted that the learned Trial Court is
seized of the matter and the petitioner should be left to the
remedies available to her under the law. This Court should not
2026:HHC:22541
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to scuttle the proceedings. The
allegations in the FIR and the result of the investigation clearly
show that the petitioner had called Kanav a thief in the presence of
the classmates, and traumatised him. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P.,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is
now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be
applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal
cases could be quashed in the following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
2026:HHC:22541
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
based on which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
2026:HHC:22541
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to a private and
personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the
concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are
instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”
9.
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither
controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision.
However, given the broad and profound nature of this
authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The
conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within
Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act
2026:HHC:22541
only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention
is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines
that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the
Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The
grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following
situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with
mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal
process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the
dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague
and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to
settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
10.
A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that
where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any
court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of
justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but
also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers.
The provision does not confer any new power on the High
Court but rather saves the power which the High Court
already possesses, from before the enactment of the
legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its
power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any
criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the
initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of
court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends
of justice.”
11.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12.
2026:HHC:22541
Section 75 of the JJ Act provides that if any person has
the actual charge of or control over the child assaults, abandons,
abuses, exposes or willfully neglects the child in a manner likely to
cause such child unnecessary mental or physical suffering shall be
punished. In the present case, the petitioner was the principal of
the school and had an overall charge of Kanav. She had shown the
CCTV footage to the children and called Kanav a thief in the
presence of his classmates. She threatened to call the police and put
Kanav behind bars. She also threatened Kanav to seek a transfer
from the school. All these acts would prima facie cause mental
suffering to the child.
13.
It was submitted that the clinical psychologist did not
find any evidence of trauma. She found the child to be calm,
composed, and friendly, which falsifies the prosecution's version
that the child had mentally suffered. This submission will not help
the petitioner. The prosecution can always prove by examining
Kanav that he had suffered mentally from the act of the accused.
Even if an objective test is applied, a teacher calling a child a thief
in the presence of the classmate and threatening to put him behind
bars for life would, prima facie, cause mental suffering to him.
2026:HHC:22541
Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed on the ground that the
clinical psychologist had not found any signs of trauma.
14.
A heavy reliance was placed upon the report of the
Deputy Director of Elementary Education. This report will not help
the petitioner because nobody stated that the child was subjected to
corporal
punishment.
Hence,
the
report
that
no
corporal
punishment was inflicted upon the child will not disprove the
prosecution’s case. The fact that the informant’s behaviour was
found to be inappropriate will not mean that the complaint made
by him was false.
15.
It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false,
and the petitioner had only counselled the children not to touch
each other’s belongings. This submission will not help the
petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025
SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as
correct. It was observed: “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court
must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint
to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save
in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in
2026:HHC:22541
a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process
should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not
be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.”
16.
It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024
SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to
quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the
allegations. It was observed: “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the
present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even
if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of
an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of
the considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the
case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in
the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of
the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once
the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of
the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this
submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court
in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A.
v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court
2026:HHC:22541
while deciding the question of whether the High Court
could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of
FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police
during the pendency of the Section 482 petition,
observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various
sections under which the appellant is being
charged and is to be prosecuted would show that
the same is not made out even prima facie from
the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet
had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph
Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj
365] could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by the
appellant were prima facie made out from the
complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc.
or not.”
17.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial
while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed on page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be
made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
2026:HHC:22541
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited
jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any
sufficient material is available to proceed further against
the accused for which the accused is required to be tried
or not’.”
18.
This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan
(Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section
482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing,
the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to
quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only
consider whether any sufficient material is available to
proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is
available, the power under Section 482 should not be
exercised.
Xxxx
27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by
embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or
otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR.
Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there
exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…”
19.
Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a
mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are
correct or not.
20.
The allegations in the FIR and the result of the
investigation show the commission of cognizable offences. The
2026:HHC:22541
Learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and it should be
permitted to continue with the proceedings. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed,
the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was
observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR
do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of
any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of
the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge
application before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer might
have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such
discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into
the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
21.
No other point was urged.
22.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed.
23.
The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the
pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
24.
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The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
17th June, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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