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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 770 of 2025
Upendra Prasad, aged about 42 years, son of Late Ramjee Yadav, ExHandling Labour, Food Corporation of India, Dhanbad Depot, P.O. &
P.S.- Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad, resident of Village- Barmasia, Near
Football Ground, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S.-Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad
…
…
...
Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
1. Food Corporation of India through its Managing Director,
Barakhamba Road, P.O. & P.S. & District-New Delhi, PIN-110001
2. District Manager (now Divisional Manager), FCI Divisional Office,
Kutchery Road, Ranchi, P.O. - G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, DistrictRanchi-834001.
3. Assistant Manager, Depot, FCI, Food Storage Depot, Chutia, P.O.
& P.S.- Chutia, District-Ranchi
4. Area Manager, Food Corporation of India, P.O. & P.S.- Hazaribagh,
District- Hazaribagh, PIN-825301
...
Respondents/Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
--------For the Appellant :
Mrs. M.M. Pal, Sr. Advocate
Mrs. M. Patra, Advocate
Miss Shipra Shalini, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr.Nipun Bakshi, Advocate
Mr. Shubham Sinha, Advocate
--------02/Dated: 13.01.2026
M. S. Sonak, C.J.(Oral)
1.
Heard Mrs. M.M. Pal assisted by Mrs. M. Patra, learned counsel
for the appellant, and Mr. Nipun Bakshi assisted by Mr. Shubham
Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents.
2.
This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge’s order dated
01.09.2025 dismissing the appellant’s petition seeking a direction on
the respondents to appoint him on compassionate grounds.
3.
The Appellant’s father opted for voluntary retirement. It is
pleaded that at that stage, the father stated that he would opt for
voluntary
retirement,
provided
his
son
was
appointed
on
compassionate grounds. The respondents rejected the petitioner’s
application for a compassionate appointment on 08.11.2010.
4.
After that, the petitioner, until the institution of Writ Petition No.
4619 of 2025 in which the impugned order has been made, did not
challenge the rejection order dated 08.11.2010. In the petition, the
petitioner applied for a direction upon the respondents “not to give
effect to their order of rejection dated 08.11.2010”.
5.
Mrs. Pal, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
submitted that the petitioner’s case was entirely covered by the
decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India
and another Vs. Ram Kesh Yadav and Another1, where, in similar
circumstances, the benefit of compassionate appointment was granted
to the respondent therein. She further submitted that in almost identical
circumstances, relief was granted by this Court to Ramawater
Chandravanshi. Post this decision, it was a duty of the respondents to
have
considered
or
reconsidered
the
petitioner’s
case
for
reappointment on compassionate grounds.
6.
Mrs. Pal relied upon State of Karnataka and others Vs. C.
Lalitha2 to submit that Articles 14 and 16 mandate parity, and all
persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, irrespective of
the fact that only one person may have approached the Court. She
(2007) 9 SCC 531
(2006) 2 SCC 747
also relied upon Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and Another v. State of
Jammu and Kashmir and Others3 to submit that there ought to be
parity in the State’s dealings with its citizens without even requiring the
citizens to approach the Court. Mrs. Pal also submitted that the
petitioner was informed on 15.10.2024 that his case is under
consideration by the respondents.
7.
Finally, Mrs. Pal submitted that the petitioner is still unemployed
and continues to face hardships. She submitted that the benefit of a
compassionate appointment was wrongfully denied, and, if the Court
considers appropriate, such an appointment may now be directed with
prospective effect without any claim for back wages, etc. Mrs. Pal
submitted that since the above aspects have not been adequately
considered in the learned single judge’s impugned order, this appeal
be allowed and the reliefs claimed for in the appellant’s writ petition be
granted.
8.
Mr. Nipun Bakashi and Mr. Shubham Sinha, learned counsel for
the respondents, defended the impugned order based upon the
reasoning reflected therein. They submitted that this is a case in which
the petitioner approached the Court after a gross delay and laches.
They submitted that the petitioner had sat on the fence and merely
taken a chance after relief was granted to Ramavatar Chandravanshi,
who had been agitating the issue of the denial of a compassionate
appointment to him since the year 2008. In any event, they submitted
that there was no absolute parity between the petitioner’s case and the
said Ramavatar’s case.
(2008) 9 SCC 24
9.
The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
10.
In this case, we are concerned with the petitioner’s claim for a
compassionate appointment based on his father's voluntary retirement
before 2010. It is well settled that such an appointment, in a sense, is
an exception to the normal rules of appointment, which have to be
consistent with the constitutional provisions in Articles 14 and 16. The
object of such compassionate appointment is to provide for some
immediate relief to the family members of the deceased-employee who
has passed away in harness.
11.
In Ram Kesh Yadav’s case (supra), relied upon by Mrs. Pal, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that an employer cannot be directed
to act contrary to the terms of its policy governing compassionate
appointments. Nor can compassionate appointment be directed dehors
the policy. The scheme clearly bars compassionate appointment to the
dependant of an employee who seeks voluntary retirement on medical
grounds, after attaining the age of 55 years. This is a logical and valid
object in providing that the benefit of compassionate appointment for a
dependant of an employee voluntarily retiring on medical grounds, will
be available only where the employee seeks such retirement before
completing 55 years. The Court noted that but for such a condition,
there will be a tendency on the part of employees nearing the age of
superannuation to take advantage of the scheme and seek voluntary
retirement at the fag end of their service on medical grounds and
thereby virtually creating employment by “ succession”. Therefore, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the Courts cannot relax such
conditions. However, on facts, relief was granted to the respondent in
the said matter. There was no question of delay or laches involved in
the said case.
12.
The main issue in this petition is whether the appellant is
entitled to any relief after his application for appointment on
compassionate grounds was rejected by the respondents on
08.11.2010 based on a petition instituted only in 2025.
13.
Admittedly, from 08.11.2010 until 2025, i.e., for almost 15 years,
the petitioner did not question the rejection dated 08.11.2010. Only
after another employee, i.e., Ramavatar Chandravanshi, who had
been agitating the issue of his denial of a compassionate appointment
from 2008 onwards, ultimately succeeded in obtaining some relief from
this Court, did the appellant institute Writ Petition No. 4619 of 2025.
14.
The delay in this case is inordinate, and the explanation offered
for such inordinate delay is not acceptable. The petitioner, it appears,
has sat on the fence, without challenging the rejection letter dated
08.11.2010, for almost 15 years. The petition, which is now dismissed
by the impugned order, was only to take a chance and see whether
any relief could be obtained now. Any grant of relief at this stage, and
after such inordinate delay, would virtually defeat the objective of a
compassionate appointment.
15.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tinku vs.
State of Haryana4 has reiterated that compassionate appointment can
neither be claimed as a vested right nor could it be regarded as a
condition of service of an employee, who dies in harness. In the event,
the Government has any scheme for compassionate appointment,
2024 INSC 867
then such an appointment can be given on a proper and strict scrutiny
of the various parameters as laid down with an intention to help a
family out of sudden pecuniary financial destitution to help it get out of
the emerging urgent situation where the sole bread earner has
expired, leaving them helpless and may be penniless. Compassionate
appointment is, therefore, provided to bail out a family of the deceased
employee facing
extreme
financial
difficulty and but
for the
employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court explained that whether there is no policy, instruction,
or rule providing for an appointment on compassionate grounds, such
an appointment cannot be granted. Further, such appointment is an
exception culled out to the general rule in favour of the family of the
deceased-employee. The purpose of such schemes is to provide
immediate succor to the family.
16.
In the present case, as noted earlier, it is not as if the petitioner’s
father had expired. His father had only opted for voluntary retirement,
therefore, must have secured the financial benefits that go with such
retirement. In any event, even if this is not the ground on which the
petitioner could have been denied relief, the delay on the petitioner’s
part in approaching the Court after almost 15 years by trying to take
advantage of the reliefs obtained by Ramawater, is a good ground to
infer acquiescence and denial relief to the petitioner.
17.
C. Lalitha (supra) was a case where relief in rem was granted,
and it is in that context that the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that
all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, irrespective of
the fact that only one of the persons had approached the Court. There
was no question of delay and laches involved in the case of C. Lalitha
(supra). Similarly, in the case of Maharaj Krishan Bhatt (supra), there
was no question of delay or laches. It was not a case in which the
petitioner approached the Court almost 15 years after the cause of
action accrued. Accordingly, neither decision assists the petitioner’s
case, given the inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the
Court for a compassionate appointment.
18.
In the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana5, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that if a person chooses to sit over the matter
and then wakes up after the decision of the Court in another matter,
then such a person cannot stand to benefit. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that the delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief
under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Hon’ble Supreme
Court noted that the petitioners kept sleeping over their rights for a
long time and woke up only after they had some impetus from the
latter decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India Vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that the petitioner’s desperate attempt to redo the seniority
would not be amenable to judicial review at this belated stage.
19.
To the same effect are the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the Government of West Bengal Vs. Tarun K. Roy7, where
a belated petition was filed on ly after another person, who had been
diligently agitating his cause, succeeded in obtaining relief from the
Court.
(1997) 6 SCC 538
(1995) 6 SCC 684
(2004) 1 SCC 347
20.
In State of U.P. Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava8, Hon’ble
Supreme Court, after analysing several decisions on the subject,
culled out the following legal principles:“22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the
aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the
respondents, can be summed up as under.
22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is
given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to
be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount
to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service
matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by
this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated
persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would
be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not
approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this
principle is
subject to well-recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence.
Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their
cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay
only because of the reason that their counterparts who had
approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then
such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment
rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to
them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays,
(2015) 1 SCC 347
and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their
claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the
judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with
intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they
approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the
obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit
thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur
when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy
matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C.
Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6
SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the
judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the
said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an
intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly
found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who
want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall
have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches
and delays or acquiescence.”
21.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the normal rule is that
when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other
identically situated persons must be treated alike by extending that
benefit, even if they have not approached the Court. However, this
principle is subject to the well-recognised exceptions of laches, delay,
and acquiescence. If those persons do not challenge the wrongful
action in their cases, acquiesce in it, and wake up only after a long
delay because their counterparts who had approached the Court
earlier succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot insist
that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly
situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as
fence-sitters, and laches, delay, and/or acquiescence would be valid
grounds for dismissing their claim. In this case, the relief granted to
Ramavtar was not some relief in rem. Therefore, the principle in
paragraph 22.3 above would not apply either.
22.
On perusal of the RTI information furnished to the petitioner,
which is at page 72 of the paper-book, we think that such responses
do not entitle the petitioner to any relief, having approached the Court
with such enormous delay and laches.
23.
Accordingly, based on the material on record and the law on the
subject, we find no infirmity whatsoever in the view taken by the
learned Single Judge in the impugned order. In fact, the impugned
order is very much aligned with the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court referred to above.
24.
This Letters Patent Appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed
and is hereby dismissed, without any order as to costs.
25.
Interim applications, if any, will not survive and are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
January 13, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2
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