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2026:HHC:23565
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No.695 of 2025
a/w CMPMO No.35 of 2026
Reserved on: 04.06.2026
Decided on: 19.06.2025
1.
CMPMO No.695 of 2025
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
….Petitioner
Versus
2.
Maisha Aggarwal & others
...Respondents
CMPMO No.35 of 2026
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
….Petitioner
Versus
Maisha Aggarwal & others
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the petitioner:
Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Ishaan Sharma, Advocate.
For the respondents:
Mr. Vishwas Kaushal, Advocate, for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Vijay Sharma,
respondent No.2.
Advocate,
for
Romesh Verma, Judge
The present petitions arise out of the impugned order
dated 26.09.2025, as passed by learned Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., whereby application filed by
the present petitioner under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with
2 2026:HHC:23565
Section 151 of CPC for impleadment of Project Director, National
Highway Authority of India, Project Implementation Unit Bagla,
Muhal Chakkar, P.O. Nagchala, District Mandi, H.P. through Varun
Chari, presently working as Project Director and Director of KMC
Construction Limited at door No.1-80/40/SP/58-65, Shilpa homes
layouot, near Meenakshi Deloitte Gachibowli, Hyderabad, as
party respondents has been dismissed.
2.
The facts which emerge for filing the present
petitions are that Maisha Aggarwal, daughter of Prashant
Aggarwal, being minor, through her grandfather, filed two claim
petitions before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kullu on
account of deaths of her mother Smt. Dhanwanti and her brother
Sh.Chinmay Aggarwal. They died in motor vehicle accident, which
took place at 6 Mile (near Pandoh), District Mandi, H.P. while they
were travelling in a vehicle bearing No.HP-31B-1985, due to rash
and negligent driving of respondent No.2.
3.
As per the averments as made in the claim petitions,
it was averred that the accident took place on 11.08.2023, at
about 7:45 PM at 6 Mile (near Pandoh) District Mandi, H.P. It has
been averred in the claim petitions that on 11.08.2023,
claimant/respondent No.1 along with her mother Smt. Dhanwanti
and brother, Chinmay Aggarwal, was travelling from Kullu to
3 2026:HHC:23565
Sunder Nagar. When they reached at 6 Mile, District Mandi, on
account of heavy rain, large hanging boulders/rocks were falling
from hillside. Respondent No.2 was fully aware that stones and
boulders were falling and could hit the vehicle, even then he tried
to cross the sliding portion of the National Highway by driving the
vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. In the meantime, a large
hanging boulder/rock fell over the vehicle, due to which the
claimant/respondent No.1 sustained minor injuries, but Smt.
Dhanwanti and Chinmay Aggarwal sustained multiple grievous
injuries.
4.
After the accident, the mother of the claimant was
seriously injured and she was taken to PGI Chandigarh. However,
during the course of her treatment, she died on 12.08.2023 at
Fortis Hospital, Chandigarh. Her brother, Chinmay Aggarwal, was
declared dead on arrival by the doctors on duty. Consequently,
claimant/respondent No.1 filed two different claim petitions
bearing Claim Petition No.66 of 2024, titled Maisha Aggarwal vs.
Prashant Aggarwal & another, and Claim Petition No.67 of 2024
titled Maisha Aggarwal vs. Prashant Aggarwal & another.
5.
The
claim
petitions,
as
preferred
by
claimant/respondent No.1, were duly resisted by the present
petitioner/insurance company. Preliminary objections with regard
4 2026:HHC:23565
to maintainability, cause of action etc., were raised in the reply
filed to the claim petitions. It was averred in the reply that the
construction/cutting was being conducted on road and no SOP
was maintained at the work site in accordance with the guidelines
and SOPs laid down by the Ministry of Highways. It has been
averred in the petition that the NHAI and its contractors KMC
Construction Ltd. were made party to the initial FIR, which clearly
indicates the negligence of the NHAI and its contractor KMC
constructions Ltd. Therefore, it was prayed that the petitions be
dismissed by imposing costs.
6.
During the pendency of claim petitions filed by
respondent No.1, the present petitioner in both the claim petitions,
filed applications under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC read with Section
151 of CPC for impleadment of the Project Director, National
Highway Authority of India, Project Implementation Unit Bagla,
Muhal Chakkar, P.O. Nagchala, District Mandi, H.P. through Varun
Chari, presently working as Project Director as respondent No.3
in the claim petitions and Director of KMC Construction Limited at
Door
No.1-80/40/SP/58-65,
Shilpa
Homes
layout,
near
Meenakshi Deloitte Gachibowli, Hyderabad, as respondent No.4
in the claim petitions.
5 2026:HHC:23565
7.
In the applications, it was averred by the present
petitioner that on 11.08.2023 due to the negligence of NHAI,
shooting stones were falling from hillside. If NHAI had constructed
proper breast wall/retaining wall at the place of accident, the
accident could not have occurred and as such, the insurance
company wants to add National Highway Authority of India and
Director of KMC Construction Ltd. as party respondents in the
proceedings.
8.
The
said
applications
were
duly
resisted
by
claimant/respondent No.1 by filing reply raising therein the
objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action etc. It
was prayed that the applications, as filed by the insurance
company, deserve to be dismissed.
9.
Learned MACT-II, Kullu, vide its order dated
26.09.2025 dismissed the applications as filed by the Insurance
Company in both the claim petitions.
10.
Feeling dissatisfied, the present petitioner/Insurance
Company has filed CMPMO Nos.695 of 2025 & 35 of 2026 before
this
Court
against
the
rejection
of
the
applications
for
impleadment of National Highway Authority of India and Director,
KMC Construction Ltd as party respondents.
6 2026:HHC:23565
11.
It is contended by Mr.Ashwani K, Sharma, learned
Senior Counsel, duly assisted by Mr.Ishaan Sharma, Advocate,
for the petitioner/Insurance Company that the impugned orders as
passed by learned MACT-II, Kullu, dated 26.09.2025 are
erroneous in the eyes of law and the same deserve to be
quashed and set aside. He further submitted that the National
Highway Authority of India and Director, KMC Construction Ltd.
are necessary parties for the adjudication of the claim petitions.
Therefore, after allowing the present petitions, the applications
which were filed by them before the learned MACT-II, Kullu,
deserve to be allowed.
12.
On the other hand, Mr. Vishwas Kaushal, Advocate,
has defended the impugned orders as passed by MACT-II, Kullu,
H.P.. He has submitted that the MACT-II, Kullu,
has rightly
determined the point in controversy and after following the legal
process of law has rightly come to the conclusion that the
respondent being dominus litis is within his right to add or delete
any party in the proceedings. He further submitted that, while
exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
this Court will not interfere in the well reasoned order as passed
by the learned MACT-II, Kullu.
7 2026:HHC:23565
13.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
have also gone through the case file.
14.
The claimant/respondent No.1, Maisha Aggarwal,
instituted two claim petitions on account of death of her mother
Smt. Dhanwanti and her brother Chinmay Aggarwal. Both of them
died in accident, which took place on 11.08.2023 at 7:45 PM at 6
Mile, near Pandoh, District Mandi, H.P. On account of the death
of
her
mother,
respondent
No.1/claimant
has
sought
compensation to the tune of Rs.25,00,000/-. Similarly, on account
of death her brother, Chinmay Aggarwal, the claimant also sought
compensation to the tune of Rs.25,00,000/15.
The
claim
petitions
as
preferred
by
the
claimant/respondent No.1 have been resisted by the Insurance
Company by raising objection with respect to maintainability. On
merits, all the averments, as raised in the claim petitions, have
been refuted and denied. The applications have been filed by the
petitioner/Insurance Company for the impleadment of National
Highway Authority of India and Director, KMC Construction Ltd.
on the ground that they are necessary and proper party in the
present proceedings.
16.
It is the case of learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that both the proposed respondents are necessary and
8 2026:HHC:23565
proper party and no effective order or judgment can be passed in
their absence.
17.
On the other hand, it is the contention of respondent
No.1/claimant that as the dominus litis, she is well within her right
to array any person as a party respondent. Consequently, she
cannot be compelled to join the additional proceedings or to
contest the case against those proposed respondents. Learned
counsel for the claimant has taken this Court to the provisions of
Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (for short, “the Act”) which
read as follows:
“168. Award of the Claims Tribunal. - (1) On receipt of
an application for compensation made under section
166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of
the application to the insurer and after giving the
parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being
heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case
may be, each of the claims and, subject to the
provisions of [section 163] may make an award
determining the amount of compensation which
appears to it to be just and specifying the person or
persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in
making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify
the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or
owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident
or by all or any of them, as the case may be:
(2)
The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver
copies of the award to the parties concerned
9 2026:HHC:23565
expeditiously and in any case within a period of
fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3)
When an award is made under this section,
the person who is required to pay any amount in
terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the
date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal,
deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner
as the Claims Tribunal may direct.
18.
A perusal of provisions of Section 168 of the Act
reveals that it empowers the Tribunal to pass an award as against
the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the
accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. Therefore,
it is clear that an award could be passed only as against an
insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle. The authority, who is
empowered with the laying or maintenance of the road, cannot be
mulcted with the liability under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Motor
Accident Tribunal is just a statutory authority under the Motor
Vehicles Act and it does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the
tortious claim as against any other person who had not been
named under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore,
as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for claimant/respondent
No.1 that, as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the
Tribunal can pass the award only against the insurer or owner or
driver. Therefore, it is clear that no award can be passed against
the 3rd respondent in the claim petition. Consequently, the
10 2026:HHC:23565
contention, as raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
that the impleadment of National Highway Authority of India and
Director KMC Construction Ltd. is necessary, does not hold good
and deserves to be rejected.
19.
While deciding the application under Order 1 Rule 10
of CPC, this Court has to satisfy two tests for determining the
question as to who is a necessary party. The tests are (1) there
must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the
controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree
can
be
passed
in
the
absence
of
such
party.
The
claimant/respondent No.1 is the dominus litis. It is the choice of
the claimant/respondent No.1 to whom she intends to add as
party defendant. In the present case also, the petitioner has failed
to establish any right, to the relief which has been sought. The
petitioner has failed to corroborate that no effective decree can be
passed in absence of such party.
20.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs.
Kiran Kant Robinson and others, (2020) 13 SCC 773 has held
as follows:
“5.2 An identical question came to be considered
before this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) and
applying the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus
litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court observed and held that the question
11 2026:HHC:23565
of jurisdiction of the court to invoke to add a party
who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff
shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added
has direct and legal interest in the controversy
involved in the suit. It is further observed and held
by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for
determining the question who is a necessary party.
The tests are – (1) there must be a right to some
relief
against
such
party
in
respect
of
the
controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no
effective decree can be passed in the absence of
such party. It is further observed and held that in a
suit for specific performance the first test can be
formulated is, to determine whether a party is a
necessary party there must be a right to the same
relief against the party claiming to be a necessary
party, relating to the same subject matter involved in
the proceedings for specific performance of contract
to sell. It is further observed and held by this Court
that in a suit for specific performance of the contract,
a proper party is a party whose presence is
necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in
the suit. It is further observed and held that the
parties claiming an independent title and possession
adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the
basis of the contract, are not proper parties and if
such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the
suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a
suit for title and possession, which is impermissible.
It is further observed and held that a third party or a
stranger cannot be added in a suit for specific
performance, merely in order to find out who is in
12 2026:HHC:23565
possession of the contracted property or to avoid
multiplicity of the suits. It is further observed and
held by this Court that a third party or a stranger to a
contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of
one character into a suit of different character.”
21.
Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mumbai
International Airport Pvt. Ltd. vs. Regency Convention
Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 416 has held
that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the
persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be
compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any
relief. A `necessary party' is a person who ought to have been
joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could
be passed at all by the Court. If a `necessary party' is not
impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A `proper party'
is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose
presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and
adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit,
though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the
decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or
necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him,
against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely
to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided
13 2026:HHC:23565
against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party
or a proper party to the suit
The Hon’ble Apex Court has
reiterated the principles of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of CPC in the
following manner:
“13.
The general rule in regard to impleadment
of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus
litis, may choose the persons against whom he
wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a
person against whom he does not seek any relief.
Consequently, a person who is not a party has no
right to be impleaded against the wishes of the
plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the
provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil
Procedure (`Code' for short), which provides for
impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The
said sub-rule is extracted below:
"Court may strike out or add parties. -(2) The Court
may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or
without the application of either party, and on such
terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order
that the name of any party improperly joined,
whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and
that the name of any person who ought to have
been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or
whose presence before the Court may be necessary
in order to enable the Court effectually and
completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the
questions involved in the suit, be added."
The said provision makes it clear that a
court may, at any stage of the proceedings
(including suits for specific performance), either
14 2026:HHC:23565
upon or even without any application, and on such
terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any
of the following persons may be added as a party:
(a) any person who ought to have been joined as
plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any
person whose presence before the court may be
necessary in order to enable the court to effectively
and completely adjudicate upon and settle the
question involved in the suit. In short, the court is
given the discretion to add as a party, any person
who is found to be a necessary party or proper
party.
15.
A `necessary party' is a person who ought
to have been joined as a party and in whose
absence no effective decree could be passed at all
by the Court. If a `necessary party' is not impleaded,
the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A `proper
party' is a party who, though not a necessary party,
is a person whose presence would enable the court
to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate
upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he
need not be a person in favour of or against whom
the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to
be a proper or necessary party, the court has no
jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the
plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a
right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is
decided against the plaintiff, will not make such
person a necessary party or a proper party to the
suit for specific performance.”
15 2026:HHC:23565
22.
In
the
present
case,
admittedly
the
claimant/respondent No.1 is the dominus litis. It is the choice of the
claimant/respondent No.1 to array a party respondent. As rightly
pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent that the
claimant will be at risk in case the Tribunal came to the conclusion
that the petition is bad on account of non-joinder of necessary
party. He further submitted that the petitioner/insurance company
cannot be permitted to implead the parties against the wishes of
dominus lites. The claim petitions which have been instituted by
the claimant/respondent No.1 have been filed against the
Insurance Company` and one Shri Prashant Aggarwal being
owner-cum-driver of the vehicle.
23.
As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the
claimant while referring to the provision of Section 168 of the Act,
the tribunal can pass an award only against the insurer or owner
or the driver and the tribunal has got no authority to pass an
award against the third person in the claim petition. Therefore, in
the considered opinion of this Court, the National Highway
Authority of India and Director, KMC Construction Ltd. are neither
necessary nor property parties. The petitioner has failed to prove
and establish that how and in what manner the impleadment of
said proposed respondents is necessary for the final adjudtion
16 2026:HHC:23565
and determination of the claim petitions. Learned Courts below
have rightly determined the point in controversy and has rightly
rejected the applications for impleadment.
24.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.13801 of
2025, titled Shri Digant vs M/S. P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors.,
while adjudicating the powers of High Court while deciding the
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has held as
follows:
“22. The scope of High Court’s jurisdiction under
Articles 226/227 fell for consideration before a threeJudge Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam &
another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. 1 This Court held that
judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a
writ of certiorari under Article 226, though they may
be questioned in the supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The
power under Article 227 is intended to be used
sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the
purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and
tribunals within the bounds of their authority and
correcting mere errors. exercised in cases The not
for power occasioning may be grave injustice or
failure of justice such as when (i) the court or
tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not
have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it
does have, such failure occasioning a failure of
justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is
being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to
overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.”
17 2026:HHC:23565
25.
Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sugarbai M.
Siddiq and others vs. Ramesh S. Hankare (dead) by LRs,
2001(8) SCC 477 has held as under:
“6.
There can be little doubt that in an application
under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court
has to see whether the lower courts/tribunal has
jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether
the
impugned
order
is
vitiated
by
procedural
irregularity; in other words, the court is concerned not
with decision but with decision making process. On
this ground alone the order of the High Court is liable
to be set aside.”
26.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Garment Craft vs.
Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, has held that while
exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court does not act as a Court of first appeal. The relevant
paras of the said judgment read as under:
“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are
clearly of the view that the impugned order is
contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several
reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court
exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a
court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the
evidence or facts upon which the determination
under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is
not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw
when the final finding is justified or can be
18 2026:HHC:23565
supported. The High Court is not to substitute its
own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the
inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is
in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right
grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation
of fundamental principles of law or justice. The
power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in
appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at
all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no
reasonable person can possibly come to such a
conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It
is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be
exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of
justice
16.
Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under
Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass
Estate (P) Ltd.2 has observed:—“6. The scope and
ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
examined and explained in a number of decisions of
this Court. The exercise of power under this article
involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior
courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and to see that they do the duty expected
or required of them in a legal manner. The High
Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to
correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions
made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this
power and interfering with the orders of the courts or
tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction
of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental
principles of law or justice, where if the High Court
does
not
interfere,
a
grave
injustice
remains
19 2026:HHC:23565
uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court
while acting under this article cannot exercise its
power as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to
correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of
the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the
findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there
is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so
perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly
come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal
has come to.”
27.
In view of above exposition of law, this Court sees no
infirmity or perversity in the impugned order.
28.
In view of aforesaid discussions and for the reasons
stated hereinabove, the instant petitions being devoid of any merit
are dismissed, so also the pending application (s), if any, leaving
the parties to bear their own costs.
25.
Before parting, it is made clear that any observation
made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the main case and the same shall be
adjudicated upon uninfluenced by any observation made here- inabove, which are only for the purpose of the instant petitions.
( Romesh Verma )
Judge
19th June, 2026
(vt)
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