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2025:MLHC:809
Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MACApp. No. 3 of 2024
Date of Decision: 08.09.2025
United India Insurance Company Ltd.,
Beat House, Laitumkhrah,
Shillong, Meghalaya - 793003
Represented by its authorized signatory
……Appellant
- Versus1. Shri. Abdul Sattar,
S/o (L) Montaj Ali,
R/o. Barbari, P.O. Lalarchowk,
P.S. Badarpur, District-Karimjang,
Assam.
2. Shri. Shangaimon Kshi,
R/o Rymbai Village, East Jaintia Hills,
Meghalaya
(Owner of Vehicle No. ML 04 A 4379)
……Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
Mr. I. Kharmujai, Adv.
Ms. T. Pohlong, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. N.I. Choudhury, Adv. for R 1.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
Yes/No
2025:MLHC:809
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This is an appeal from the judgment and order dated 30.08.2024
passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT),
East Khasi Hills District, Shillong in MAC Case No. 41 of 2012, the
appellant/United Insurance Company Limited being the opposite party No. 2
in the said MAC case being aggrieved thereof.
2.
On perusal of the records, it is seen that the claimant, Shri. Abdul
Sattar has filed an application under Section 163A and 165 read with Section
140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with a prayer for grant of compensation
on account of an accidental death of his son (L) Kabir Uddin aged about 19
years who on 31.12.2009 along with the driver of a vehicle was kidnapped at
about 5:00 p.m. and the dead bodies of both his deceased son and the driver
of the vehicle (L) Lutfur Rahman was recovered on 01.01.2010 from Leshka
Wahlamu, Jaintia Hills District, Meghalaya. The particulars of the vehicle
involved are also found in the claim application being a Tata Sumo Vehicle
No. ML 04 A 4397.
3.
It may also be mentioned that in this regard upon recovery of the dead
bodies of the son of the claimant and the driver of the said vehicle, the police
have registered a criminal case being Khliehriat P.S. Case No. 01(01) of 2010
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under Section 364/302/201/379/34 IPC. However, the case ended by filing of
a final report by the Investigating Officer.
4.
It is also seen from the records that the Opp. Party No. 1 has failed to
appear and contest the claim, as such, vide order dated 18.10.2013, the learned
MACT has passed an order to proceed ex parte against such opposite party.
The Opp. Party No. 2/Insurance Company has contested the claim by filing
written statement.
5.
The learned MACT has then framed as many as 6(six) issues, inter
alia, whether the claim is maintainable in its present form, whether the death
of the son of the claimant was due to the accident arising out of the use of
motor vehicle. Thereafter, the claimant/respondent No. 1 herein has produced
4(four) witnesses from his side and has exhibited 5(five) documents to support
his case. The Opp. Party No. 2/Insurance Company has not adduced any
evidence in the case.
6.
The learned Tribunal on completion of recording of evidence of the
claimant, and upon hearing the parties, has appreciated the evidence in the
light of the issues framed, has come to the finding that a case has been made
out for grant of compensation in favour of the claimant/respondent No. 1
herein and has awarded a sum of ₹ 11,41,000/- (Rupees eleven lakhs, fortyone thousand) only with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the date of
filing the claim petition, that is, 14.09.2012 till payment of the same. The
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appellant herein is directed to deposit the claim amount with the Tribunal
within 30(thirty) days from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment.
7.
Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance
Company, who has submitted that, at the outset, the endeavour of the appellant
is to prove that the claim application is not maintainable before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal and therefore, the challenge on jurisdiction is
hereby raised.
8.
To elaborate on this contention, the learned counsel has submitted
that the learned Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter,
the reason being that the death of the deceased son of the claimant/respondent
No.1 was not caused out of the “use of a motor vehicle”. The fact is that the
deceased son of the claimant was a handy man of one vehicle, a Tata Sumo.
One day, while the deceased and the driver were in the said vehicle, some
miscreants took the vehicle and killed both the occupants. Because a vehicle
was involved when the deceased was murdered at the relevant point of time,
a claim application was filed before the MACT.
9.
It is the submission of the learned counsel that, from the surrounding
circumstances involving the death of the deceased son of the
claimant/respondent No. 1, the case is one of murder simpliciter and not a case
of accidental murder or one which happened when the vehicle was in use. The
fact being that the vehicle in which the deceased was travelling, was recovered
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on the next day, as such, the intention behind the felony was not theft of the
vehicle. In this regard the case of Rita Devi (Smt) & Ors v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr, (2000) 5 SCC 113, para 10 and 14 has been cited
to support his contention.
10.
To further consolidate his argument on this point, the learned counsel
has submitted that CW-4 who was the Investigating Officer (I/O) of the U.D
case in his deposition before the Tribunal on being cross-examined has stated
that “…it is also not a fact that the reason for the murder of the deceased was
for the purpose of stealing the vehicle.” This piece of evidence would only
confirm the fact that the dominant intention of the miscreants was not the theft
of the vehicle, but the murder of the occupants of the vehicle. The ratio in the
case of Rita Devi (supra) would therefore apply to the case of the parties
herein.
11.
The learned counsel has also stated that the issue of jurisdiction in a
case of similar circumstances has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Gauhati High
Court which is reflected in the case of Maya Rani Ghosh v. State of Tripura
& Ors, reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Gau 7, para 46 which reads as
follows:
“46. In short, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals deal with accidents,
which arise out of neglect or default. What is worth pointing out now,
is that the Claims Tribunal, which are constituted under Section 165
of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, decide only those cases of death or
injury which arise, because of neglect or default, in the use of motor
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vehicles, in public place. These Tribunals do not deal with, or
determine, any question of damages if a person dies due to wrongful
act of a person, who uses a vehicle in a public place. To make it more
explicit, we may point out that when an injury or death occurs due to
negligence or default, a Claims Tribunal, constituted under the MV
Act, 1988, can determine the question of compensation; but if the
person is deliberately killed or injured in a public place, the claim for
compensation, arising out of such wrongful act, will not lie in the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, constituted under the MV Act of
1988. In such cases, the injured, or the legal representatives of the
deceased, as the case may be, shall have to necessarily take recourse
to the provisions of the Act of 1855 and seek their remedy in the
ordinary civil Courts. In short, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals
deal with specified classes of tortious liability; but in respect of
claims for damages arising out of other classes of cases of tortious
liability, the jurisdiction still remains vested in the civil Courts and
would remain so vested in the civil Courts until legislature creates a
tribunal or some other forum for decision of such cases.”
12.
Again, to understand the term ‘use of the motor vehicle’, the learned
counsel has referred to the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil & Anr. v. Vatschala
Uttam More, (Smt): (1991) 3 SCC 530, para 36 which reads as follows:
“36. This would show that as compared to the expression "caused by",
the expression "arising out of" has a wider connotation. The
expression "caused by" was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and
96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In section 92-A, Parliament, however, chose to
use the expression "arising out of" which indicates that for the purpose
of awarding compensation under Section 92-A, the causal relationship
between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in
death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and
proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that
accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the
said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction
of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in Section
92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of
an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying
the enactment.”
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13.
It is therefore the submission of the learned counsel that on this
ground alone, the impugned judgment and award is liable to be set aside and
quashed. However, in case, this Court is of the opinion that jurisdiction lies
with the learned Member, MACT to decide the case as has been done, the
second limb of argument of the appellant is on the issue of maintainability as
regard the quantum of income brought forth by the claimant/respondent No.
1, that is, that the deceased was said to be earning ₹ 5000/- per month or ₹
60,000/- per annum which is beyond the pale of Section 163A. The cap on the
annual income of ₹ 40,000/- has been provided under Section 163A and
anything beyond that would make the related prayer not maintainable under
the said Section 163A. The case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Er. K.
Jothilingam, 2009 SCC Online Mad 750, para 9 was cited in this regard.
14.
The learned counsel has assailed the decision made by the learned
Tribunal as far as the quantum of award and compensation is concerned,
submitting that the learned MACT while awarding the amount of ₹
11,41,000/- along with interest as compensation, the calculation made was not
proper and in line with the provision of Section 163A which provides that the
amount of compensation payable in respect of a claim filed under Section
163A of the Act, under the Second Schedule, after the amendment of
22.05.2018, only an amount of ₹ 5,00,000/-, is payable in case of death.
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15.
In view of the above, the learned counsel has reiterated that the
appellant/Insurance Company cannot be found liable to pay the compensation
amount to the claimant and this appeal may be allowed with the impugned
judgment and award being set aside and quashed.
16.
Mr. N.I. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent No.
1/claimant has opposed the submission and contention raised by the learned
counsel for the appellant, and has submitted that the impugned judgment
contained no infirmity as to its findings and observations, wherein at para 45
and 46 of the same, the learned Member has observed that the cause of death
of the deceased son of the claimant was due to shock and haemorrhage as a
result of severe injury by sharp object, and further that the deceased at the time
of his death was the handyman of the said vehicle driven by the driver
deceased Lutfur Rahman. As such, the deceased son of the claimant died in
course of the use of the vehicle.
17.
The learned counsel has further submitted that this fact is confirmed
by the evidence on record, particularly of CW-4, the I/O who has also
produced the final report (Ext-5) and who has deposed before the Tribunal by
stating that “…On the basis of enquiry of the case that the miscreants have
murdered the driver and the handyman may be with the intention of stealing
the vehicle…”. Therefore, ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Rita Devi (supra) at para 10 and 14 and also the case of Shivaji
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Dayanu Patil (supra) at para 36 are squarely applicable to the case of the
claimant/respondent No. 1 herein.
18.
The fact that the evidence of the CW-4 has not been able to be refuted
or contradicted by the appellant/Opp. Party No. 1 before the Tribunal, the
appellant cannot come before this Court and agitate the issue, the same is not
sustainable in law, submits the learned counsel.
19.
On the other aspect of the matter, as was challenged by the appellant,
that is, that there is a cap of ₹ 40,000/- in the annual income, if the same is
computed under Section 163A of the MV Act, and that the
claimant/respondent No. 1 having proved in evidence that the annual income
of the deceased son of the claimant was ₹ 60,000/- annually, the case of Er.
K. Jothilingam (supra) being cited in support of this contention, the learned
counsel has submitted that this proposition has been negated by the ratio of
the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation &
Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 34 of the
same has held as follows:
“34. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994,
inter alia, inserting Section 163A and the Second Schedule with
effect from 14.11.1994. Section 163A of the MV Act contains a
special provision as to payment of compensation on structured
formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The
Second Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to
be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. It
specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded with reference
to the annual income range of Rs. 3000 to Rs. 40,000. It does not
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specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of
the deceased is more than Rs. 40,000. But it provides the multiplier
to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The table
starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes
down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third on
account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore,
where the application is under Section 163A of the Act, it is possible
to calculate the compensation on the structured formula basis, even
where compensation is not specified with reference to the annual
income of the deceased, or is more than Rs. 40,000, by applying the
formula : (2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of the annual income
multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased
would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability
are excluded when the claim is under Section 163A of MV Act.”
20.
Again, the contention of the appellant that in any view of the matter,
if this Court decides to grant relief to the claimant/respondent No. 1, then in
view of the amendment of the MV Act, 1988 vide Notification dated
22.05.2018, wherein it has been stipulated that under Section 163A the Second
Schedule, it has been stipulated that compensation in case of death in fatal
accidents shall be ₹ 5,00,000/- , the learned counsel has submitted that this has
no relevance to the case of the claimant/respondent No.1 as the case in
question relates to an incident which happened in the year 2009 and the claim
application was filed in the year 2012, much before the said amendment came
into force.
21.
In support of this contention as regard the prospective application of
a provision of law brought out through an amendment, the learned counsel has
cited the case of Aita Maya Gurung v. Ratna Kumar Pradhan and Others, in
which the Hon’ble High Court of Sikkim vide order dated 17.04.2023 in MAC
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App. No. 02 of 2022 has referred to this principle on prospective and
retrospective effect of law enacted at para 11 of the same, which reads as
follows:
“11. It may relevantly be stated here that in Assistant Excise
Commissioner, Kottayam and Others vs. Esthappan Cherian and
Another, (2021) 10 SCC 210, the Supreme Court was considering the
amendment of Rule 13 of the Kerala Abkari Shops Departmental
Management Rules, 1972. It was held therein that an amendment is
prospective. The relevant Paragraph is extracted hereinbelow;
“16. There is profusion of judicial authority on the proposition
that a rule or law cannot be construed as retrospective unless it
expresses a clear or manifest intention, to the contrary. In CIT
v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. [CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd.,
(2015) 1 SCC 1] this Court, speaking through a Constitution
Bench, observed as follows : (SCC pp. 21-22, paras 28-29)
“28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation
has to be interpreted, one established rule is that
unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is
presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective
operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current
law should govern current activities. Law passed
today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do
something today, we do it keeping in view the law of
today and in force and not tomorrow's backward
adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is
founded on the bedrock that every human being is
entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing
law and should not find that his plans have been
retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as
lex prospicit non respicit : law looks forward not
backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [Phillips
v. Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1], a retrospective legislation
is contrary to the general principle that legislation by
which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when
introduced for the first time to deal with future acts
ought not to change the character of past transactions
carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
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29. The obvious basis of the principle against
retrospectivity is the principle of “fairness”, which must
be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in
L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. YamashitaShinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [L'Office Cherifien des
Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.
Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 (HL)] Thus,
legislations which modified accrued rights or which
impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a
new disability have to be treated as prospective
unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the
enactment a retrospective effect; unless the
legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious
omission in a former legislation or to explain a
former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of
case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal
position clearly emerges from the various decisions and
this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the
parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments
containing this dicta, a little later.” [emphasis supplied]
22.
From what has been noted hereinabove, the case of the parties is that
on the death of the son of the claimant/respondent No.1 who is said to have
been murdered when the vehicle he was travelling with as a handyman was
intercepted while in use, an application for grant of compensation under
Section 163A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was made before the Member,
MACT at Shillong.
23.
The case was finally decided vide the impugned judgment and award
dated 30.08.2024, directing the appellant/Insurance Company to deposit a sum
of ₹ 11,41,000/- (Rupees eleven lakhs forty-one thousand) only with simple
interest @ 9% per annum from filing of the claim petition, that is, 14.09.2012.
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Being aggrieved with and dissatisfied with the said award, the
appellant/Insurance Company has come before this Court with this appeal.
24.
The main ground of challenge raised by the appellant is that the
deceased son of the claimant/respondent No. 1 was not murdered in course of
use of the vehicle, his death being unrelated to the use of the said vehicle,
inspite of his being the handyman of such vehicle and as such, no claim for
compensation can be made under the MV Act.
25.
The claimant/respondent No. 1 has countered such objection and has
maintained that the death of his deceased son was while the vehicle he was
travelling in as a handyman was in use and accordingly, the award of
compensation in this regard is justified.
26.
This Court, at the outset has to determine as to whether the
circumstances leading to the death of the deceased son of the claimant was
indeed connected to the fact that it was when the vehicle was in use or that it
was not so.
27.
For this, besides the fact as has been narrated above, not required to
be reiterated, the evidence on record have to be appreciated afresh to ascertain
the correct factual and legal position.
28.
What is relevant for consideration is whether the deceased son of the
claimant was killed when the vehicle he was travelling in was in use. It is the
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stand of the appellant that the death of the deceased son of the claimant is an
occurrence which can only be seen as a case of murder simpliciter not
connected to the use of the vehicle.
29.
However, on perusal of the evidence on record, it is an admitted fact
that the deceased son of the claimant was travelling in the said vehicle along
with the driver when on the next day, that is, 01.01.2010 his dead body as well
as that of the driver were found by the police, indicating that they were
murdered. The clarity in this matter is found in the evidence of CW-4,
Inspector Lumlanglin Lyngkhoi, who in his deposition before the Tribunal has
narrated that on 01.01.2010, an FIR was lodged by the owner of the vehicle
in question informing the police that his vehicle No. ML 04 A 4397 was
missing along with the driver Lutfur Rahman and his helper Kabir Uddin.
Accordingly, Khliehriat P.S. Case No. 01 (01) of 2010 under Section
364/302/201/379/34 IPC was registered.
30.
In course of investigation, the dead body of both the driver and the
handyman was recovered from Leshka river and the vehicle was recovered
from Mawryngkneng, apparently abandoned by the miscreants. Since during
investigation, no evidence or clue could be found out to establish the case, the
I/O has therefore filed the final report. According to him, the miscreants have
murdered the driver and the handyman may be with the intention of stealing
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the vehicle. The I/O has then filed the final report in this regard which has
been produced as Ext-5 before the Tribunal.
31.
This Court has further perused the contents of the final report (Ext-
5) and has also noted the findings of the I/O, inter alia, “however, on 1.1.10
the stolen vehicle has been recovered from Mawryngkneng N.H-44 on being
left abandoned by the miscreants due to the defective of the head lights…”.
This piece of evidence has not been able to be contradicted by the
appellant/Insurance Company in their cross-examination, the said Ext-5,
including the contents thereof have thus become part of the records.
Therefore, on this basis, it can be said that the death of the deceased son of the
claimant has occurred while the vehicle he was travelling in is in use. The case
of Rita Devi (supra) at para 10 and 14 relied upon by both the
appellant/Insurance Company and the claimant/respondent No. 1, would
indeed be relevant and applicable to such a situation as this. The relevant paras
are reproduced herein below as:
“10. The question, therefore is, can a murder be an accident in any
given case? There is no doubt that “murder”, as it is understood, in
the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with
intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against
the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder
can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a
“murder” which is not an accident and a “murder” which is an
accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In
our opinion, if the dominent intention of the Act of felony is to kill
any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder
but is a murder simplicitor, while if the cause of murder or act of
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murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in
furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an
accidental murder.
14. Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts
of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the auto
rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare
paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination.
During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to
commit an act of felony of stealing the auto rickshaw and in the
course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto rickshaw, they
had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw then it cannot but be
said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto rickshaw was
an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the
object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said
process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only incidental to the act of
stealing of the auto rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the
facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased
(Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of
committing theft of the auto rickshaw.”
32.
In view of the above, the findings of the learned Member, MACT as
regard issue No. (i) whether the claim is maintainable in its present form? and
(iv) whether death of the son of the claimant was due to the accident arising
out of the use of motor vehicle? in the positive cannot be faulted by this Court.
33.
The next contention of the appellant is with regard to the
maintainability of the claim petition under Section 163A of the Act read with
the Second Schedule thereof where the cap for annual income is set at ₹
40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) only. The learned counsel for the appellant
has also referred to the case of Er. K. Jothilingam (supra) at para 9 wherein
the Hon’ble Madras High Court referring to the case of Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd v. Hansrajbhai Kodala and Ors, (2001) 5 SCC 175, has held that a claim
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under Section 163A cannot be invoked since the claimant’s income exceeds
the ₹ 40,000/- limit. To counter this, the learned counsel for the
claimant/respondent No. 1 has referred to the case of Sarla Verma (supra)
wherein at para 34 of the same, the Apex Court while referring to the Second
Schedule under the MV Act has held “…The Second Schedule contains a table
prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and
income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded
with reference to the annual income range of Rs. 3000 to Rs. 40,000. It does
not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the
deceased is more than Rs. 40,000. “…where the compensation is not specified
with reference to the income of the deceased, or is more than R.s 40,000, by
applying the formula: (2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of the annual income
multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased would be the
compensation.”
34.
In the context of this case, this Court is inclined to agree with the
proposition laid down in the Sarla Verma case, however, in view of the
statutory limit as has been set out in the Second Schedule of the said MV Act,
the annual income of the deceased would be taken as ₹ 40,000/-.
35.
Again, as to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
that the amount awarded is in excess of the statutory limit, inasmuch as, the
Second Schedule of the Act has been amended on 22.05.2018, wherein in fatal
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accident cases, the compensation payable in case of death shall be ₹ 5,00,000/(Rupees five lakhs) only. To this, the learned counsel for the
claimant/respondent No. 1 has submitted that the effect of the said amended
provision is prospective, while the incident referred to in the claim application
is of the year 2009 and the claim application was filed in the year 2012, as
such, in view of the well settled proposition of law that a rule or law cannot
be construed to have retrospective effect unless it expresses a clear or manifest
intention to the contrary, therefore, the contention of the appellant cannot be
accepted. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
claimant/respondent No. 1 is found agreeable by this Court and as such, the
effect of the said amendment to the Second Schedule will not have any hold
as far as the case of the claimant/respondent No. 1 is concerned.
36.
Accordingly, in view of the above findings and observation, this
Court would modify the impugned judgment and award by assessing the
award of compensation to the Claimant as follows:
Annual income of the deceased
₹ 40,000/-
Add 40% of ₹ 40,000/- as future ₹ 16,000/prospects
= ₹ 56,000/-
Less ¼ of the annual income ₹ 14,000/deducted as expenses, the deceased
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would have incurred towards his
welfare during his lifetime
Net annual income
₹ 56,000 - ₹ 14,000 =
₹ 42,000/-
Multiplied
by
x
42,000/- ₹ 6,72,000/-
multiplier determined as per the table
of the Second Schedule, the age of the
deceased being 19 at the time of his
death.
37.
Add funeral expenses
₹ 15,000/-
Add Loss of estate
₹ 15,000/-
Total
₹ 7,02,000/-
Accordingly, this Court finds that the claimant is entitled to fair
compensation, calculated as above i.e. ₹ 7,02,000/- (Rupees seven lakhs two
thousand) along with 7% simple interest per annum from the date of filing of
the claim petition till realisation of the same. The rate of interest being taken
as the comparable rate of interest, presently applicable.
38.
Since there is no contest or objection as regard the liability of the
appellant/United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Shillong as far as the vehicle in
2025:MLHC:809
question is concerned, therefore, the appellant is liable to satisfy the award of
compensation indicated hereinabove.
39.
This appeal is disposed of in the light of the above findings and
observations, the impugned judgment and award being modified accordingly,
the appellant/United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Shillong is directed to pay to the
claimant the sum of ₹ 7,02,000/- (Rupees seven lakhs two thousand) along
with 7% simple interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition
till realisation of the same within 2(two) months from the date of this judgment
and order.
40.
Send back the record to the MACT, Shillong.
Judge
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2025.09.08 17:37:12 IST
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