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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 17.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 09.01.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 09.01.2026
+
LPA 454/2010, CM APPL. 11909/2010 and CM APPL.
56989/2023
UNION OF INDIA & ORS
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. Ashish K Dixit, CGSC with
Mr. Vivek Goyal, CGSPC with
Gokul Sharma, Mr. Umar
Hashmi, Mr. Shivam Tiwari,
Ms. Iqra Shiesh, Mr. Abdullah
Sahid, Ms. Urmila Sharma, Ms.
Venni Kakkar, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Tarun Johri, Mr. Ankur
Gupta, Mr. Vishwajeet Tyagi,
Advs. for DMRC.
versus
NATIONAL COLD STORAGE & REFRIGERATION PVT
LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ajay Bhushan Kalia,
Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak,
Standing Counsel along with
Ms. K. Kaomudi Kiran, Mr.
Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M. S.
Akhtar, Advs. for LACGNCTD.
+
LPA 411/2011
UNION OF INDIA & ANR
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. Ashish K Dixit, CGSC with
Mr. Vivek Goyal, CGSPC with
Gokul Sharma, Mr. Umar
Hashmi, Mr. Shivam Tiwari,
Ms. Iqra Shiesh, Mr. Abdullah
Sahid, Ms. Urmila Sharma, Ms.
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
Venni Kakkar, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Tarun Johri, Mr. Ankur
Gupta, Mr. Vishwajeet Tyagi,
Advs. for DMRC.
versus
NATIONAL COLD STORAGE & REFRIGERATION PVT
LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ajay Bhushan Kalia,
Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak,
Standing Counsel along with
Ms. K. Kaomudi Kiran, Mr.
Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M. S.
Akhtar, Advs. for LACGNCTD.
+
LPA 529/2011 and CM APPL. 11450/2011
UNION OF INDIA & ANR
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. Ashish K Dixit, CGSC with
Mr. Vivek Goyal, CGSPC with
Gokul Sharma, Mr. Umar
Hashmi, Mr. Shivam Tiwari,
Ms. Iqra Shiesh, Mr. Abdullah
Sahid, Ms. Urmila Sharma, Ms.
Venni Kakkar, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Tarun Johri, Mr. Ankur
Gupta, Mr. Vishwajeet Tyagi,
Advs. for DMRC.
versus
NATIONAL COLD STORAGE & REFRIGERATION PVT
LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ajay Bhushan Kalia,
Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak,
Standing Counsel along with
Ms. K. Kaomudi Kiran, Mr.
Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M. S.
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
Akhtar, Advs.
GNCTD.
+
for
LAC-
LPA 531/2011 and CM APPL. 11474/2011
UNION OF INDIA & ANR
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. Ashish K Dixit, CGSC with
Mr. Vivek Goyal, CGSPC with
Gokul Sharma, Mr. Umar
Hashmi, Mr. Shivam Tiwari,
Ms. Iqra Shiesh, Mr. Abdullah
Sahid, Ms. Urmila Sharma, Ms.
Venni Kakkar, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Tarun Johri, Mr. Ankur
Gupta, Mr. Vishwajeet Tyagi,
Advs. for DMRC.
versus
+
NATIONAL COLD STORAGE & REFRIGERATION PVT
LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ajay Bhushan Kalia,
Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak,
Standing Counsel along with
Ms. K. Kaomudi Kiran, Mr.
Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M. S.
Akhtar, Advs. for LACGNCTD.
LPA 891/2015
UNION OF INDIA
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Ashish K Dixit, CGSC with
Mr. Vivek Goyal, CGSPC with
Gokul Sharma, Mr. Umar
Hashmi, Mr. Shivam Tiwari,
Ms. Iqra Shiesh, Mr. Abdullah
Sahid, Ms. Urmila Sharma, Ms.
Venni Kakkar, Advs. for UOI.
versus
NATIONAL COLD STORAGE & REFRIGERATION (P)
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
LTD & ORS
Through:
+
.....Respondents
Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ajay Bhushan Kalia,
Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak,
Standing Counsel along with
Mr. Sunil Kunjar Jha, Adv. for
LAC-GNCTD.
W.P.(C) 4792/2011 and CM APPL. 77555/2025
UOI AND ANR
Through:
.....Petitioners
Mr. Ashish K Dixit, CGSC with
Mr. Vivek Goyal, CGSPC with
Gokul Sharma, Mr. Umar
Hashmi, Mr. Shivam Tiwari,
Ms. Iqra Shiesh, Mr. Abdullah
Sahid, Ms. Urmila Sharma, Ms.
Venni Kakkar, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Tarun Johri, Mr. Ankur
Gupta, Mr. Vishwajeet Tyagi,
Advs. for DMRC.
versus
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak,
Standing Counsel along with
Mr. Sunil Kunjar Jha, Adv. for
LAC-GNCTD.
Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ajay Bhushan Kalia,
Adv. for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
1.
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the present
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
batch of matters, comprising five Letters Patent Appeals and one Writ
Petition, all arising out of a common factual background and
interlinked orders, are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2.
The principal questions which arise for consideration in the
present batch of matters concern the nature and character of the
leasehold rights of the Respondent-lessee in respect of public land; the
effect and enforceability of the resumption clause contained in the
lease deed; the entitlement, if any, of the lessee to conversion of the
leasehold rights into freehold under the applicable policy framework;
and the legality of the determination of compensation and valuation
undertaken pursuant to the directions of this Court, particularly in a
situation where substantial portions of the leased land have already
been resumed for public purposes.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3.
In order to comprehend the issues involved in the present batch
of matters, it is necessary to notice the relevant and largely undisputed
factual background, which forms the common substratum of all the
Appeals and the Writ Petition.
4.
In terms of Resolution No. 15 dated 10.03.1948, an area
admeasuring 0.68 acres (approximately 3,300 sq. yards/2,759.13 sq.
meters) at the site in question was leased to National Cold Storage and
Refrigeration Ltd. [hereinafter referred to as „NCSRPL‟] for a period
of nine years; however, the said lease was not confirmed by the Chief
Commissioner,
Delhi.
Thereafter,
the
competent
authorities
considered grant of a fresh lease over an area admeasuring 0.54 acres.
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PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
Pursuant to assessment of market value by the Revenue Assistant,
Delhi, a lease deed dated 06.09.1951 in respect of land measuring 0.54
acres (2614 sq. yards/approximately 2185.23 sq. meters), situated at
the junction of G.T. Road and Boulevard Road, was executed in
favour of NCSRPL for a period of 30 years, with an option of renewal
for two further terms of 30 years each, subject to the stipulated terms.
As per the lease deed, the land was to be utilised only for the purpose
of running a cold storage, though activities relating to an ice factory
and ice-cream manufacturing were also permitted. Any use for a
purpose other than those permitted rendered the lease liable to
determination. Clauses I(xi), III(c) and III(d) of the lease deed read as
under:
“1. (xi) if during the period of the lease the premises are required
for a public purpose or for administrative purposes by the
Government the Lessor shall be at liberty to take possession of the
land together with all buildings, structures and appurtenances and
the Lessees shall be entitled to compensation on respect of the
buildings and structure on the demised land at the time when notice
to the effect that the said land required for such purpose as aforesaid
has been served on the Lessee, and the Lessee will not be entitled to
any compensation for his interest in the said land except refund of a
proportion of the premium which in case of dispute shall be
determined by the Lessor or by such officer as it may appoint for the
purpose as nearly as may be in accordance with the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act or regulations for the time being in force and
the decision of the Lessor or its such officer shall be final and
conclusive;
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
III. And the lessor doth hereby covenant with the Lessee.
(c) Provided always and it is hereby agreed that after the expiration
of the said term or the extensions granted the Lessor or Lessee may
determine this tenancy by three calendar month notice in writing
from one to the other and immediately upon expiration of three
calendar months from the date of any such notice and whether the
same shall terminate within a quarter of the tenancy or otherwise
this tenancy shall absolutely cease and determine, provided that if
the tenancy be determined by the Lessor by notice otherwise than at
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
the expiration of a quarter of the tenancy the tenant shall be liable
only for a proportionate amount of rent for the broken period.
(d) In case this lease with the Lessee shall continue for the said
period of thirty years, and provided the Lessee has observed,
performed and complied with the terms and covenants, conditions of
this lease, the Lessor shall grant to the Lessee an option to renew the
lease for two terms of thirty years each on such terms and conditions
as the Lessor deems fit for a further period of thirty years each,
provided that the notice of the intention of the Lessee to exercise this
option of renewal is given to the Lessor six months before the
expiration of the lease; provided further that the lease is extended
for a further period of thirty years, the Lessor shall have the right to
enhance the rental at each renewal subject to maximum of 50%
increase at each renewal.”
5.
The lessee was required to pay a premium of Rs.52,280/-, and it
was agreed that the annual ground rent would be Rs.1,307/-.
6.
On 31.07.1984, on the application of NCSRPL, the lease was
renewed for a further period of 30 years by the Land and Development
Office [hereinafter referred to as „L&DO‟]. Thereafter, by letter dated
11.09.2000, sanction of the President of India was conveyed for
resumption of an area measuring 1087 sq. meters (approximately 1300
sq. yards) out of the total leased land under Clause (xi) of the lease
deed, for the public purpose of the Shahdara-Nangloi Metro Rail
Transport System Corridor of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation
[hereinafter referred to as „DMRC‟]. NCSRPL was called upon to
hand over possession of the said portion. In the circumstances,
NCSRPL filed W.P.(C) No. 7557/2000 challenging the proposed
resumption and, in the alternative, seeking compensation in terms of
Clause (xi) of the lease deed.
7.
During the pendency of W.P.(C) No. 7557/2000, valuation
reports were placed on record by the Respondents and by valuers
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PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
appointed pursuant to directions of this Court. On 07.11.2001, Rule
was issued in the said writ petition. The Petitioner thereafter amended
the writ petition, confining
the relief to determination of
compensation, as possession of the resumed land had already been
parted with during the pendency of the proceedings. The writ petition
was ultimately withdrawn with liberty to file a substantive petition
confined to the surviving grievance regarding compensation, pursuant
to which CWP No. 19878/2004 was filed seeking issuance of a writ of
mandamus for payment of compensation in accordance with law. In
the year 2005-06, a further parcel of land measuring 400 sq. meters
(approximately 478.3 sq. yards) was resumed for the purpose of
streamlining traffic by DMRC. NCSRPL challenged the said action by
filing CWP No. 8532/2005, in which interim relief was declined.
8.
In the year 2003, the Government issued a policy brochure
providing a facility for conversion of leasehold properties into
freehold on payment of prescribed charges. On 05.12.2006, NCSRPL
applied for conversion of the unresumed portion of the leased land
(698.23 sq. metres (approximately 699 sq. metres)/836 sq. yards,
being the balance after resumption of 1087 sq. meters and 400 sq.
meters) from leasehold to freehold. The request was rejected on
27.12.2006 on the ground that the lease was temporary. Aggrieved
thereby, NCSRPL filed W.P.(C) No. 1278/2007. Meanwhile, CWPs
No. 19878/2004 and 8532/2005 were disposed of on 04.02.2010, with
a direction to refer the claims of NCSRPL to the Land Acquisition
Collector [hereinafter referred to as „LAC‟] for determination of
compensation payable in respect of the buildings and structures on the
land and the proportionate refund of premium, in terms of Clause (xi)
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
of the lease deed.
9.
During this period, an offer was made by the Government to
pay compensation as assessed by a private valuer, which was not
accepted by NCSRPL. By order dated 16.03.2010, this Court clarified
its order dated 04.02.2010, observing that the LAC shall proceed
strictly in accordance with Clause (xi) of the lease deed, and that the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter referred to
as „LA Act‟], were to be applied as nearly as may be, as a guiding
framework for determination of compensation payable towards
buildings, structures and appurtenances, as well as refund of
proportionate premium, and not for determining compensation for the
land as such. Thereafter, on 05.04.2010, W.P.(C) No. 1278/2007 was
disposed of, whereby the L&DO was directed to convert the land to
freehold within eight weeks, subject to payment of the requisite
charges, while quashing the rejection order dated 27.12.2006 on the
ground that the lease was not temporary but a long-term lease. The
said order is the subject matter of LPA No. 454/2010.
10.
The remaining parcel of land was urgently required for a public
purpose, hence, on 15.04.2010, a notification under Section 4(1) read
with Section 17(1) of the LA Act, proposing to acquire 1183.96 sq.
meters (approximately 1,416 sq. yards) of land forming part of the site
in question for the Grade Separator Project by the Government of
NCT of Delhi/MCD was issued, followed by a declaration under
Section 6 of the LA Act on 28.06.2010. Notices under Sections 9 and
10 of the LA Act were thereafter issued, and possession of the land
was taken on 30.07.2010 and 18.10.2010, upon release of an interim
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
amount of Rs. 2,58,57,686/- at the time of taking possession, as
recorded in the Award, towards the statutory requirement of payment
under the urgency provisions of the LA Act, without prejudice to the
final determination of compensation. Ultimately, Award No.
10/LAC/N/10-11 dated 22.12.2010 was passed, determining the final
compensation.
11.
For the sake of clarity, it is noted that although an extent of land
admeasuring approximately 0.68 acres (3,300 sq. yards/2,759.13 sq.
metres) had initially been handed over to NCSRL, the lease deed
dated 06.09.1951 covered only an area of 0.54 acres (2,614 sq.
yards/approximately 2,185.23 sq. meters). The balance land
admeasuring approximately 573.90 sq. metres was not covered by the
lease deed. Out of the leased land measuring approximately 2,185.23
sq. metres, an area of 1,087 sq. metres was resumed in the year 2000,
and a further area of 400 sq. metres was resumed in the year 2005-06.
Consequently, the residual unresumed leased land measured 698.23
sq. metres (approximately 699 sq. metres). The land admeasuring
1,183.96 sq. metres, which was the subject matter of the acquisition
notification dated 15.04.2010, comprised the said residual unresumed
leased land measuring approximately 698.23 sq. metres together with
an area of approximately 485.73 sq. metres drawn from the balance
land not covered by the lease deed.
12.
As noticed above, LPA No. 454/2010 arises from the order
dated 05.04.2010. LPA No. 411/2011 arose from the order dated
22.02.2011, wherein this Court recorded that neither L&DO nor
DMRC had challenged the determination dated 26.05.2010 made by
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
the LAC pursuant to the directions of this Court issued on 04.02.2010,
and directed compliance thereof so long as the said determination
remained operative.
13.
The order dated 04.02.2010, whereby the learned Single Judge
declined to quantify compensation, is under challenge in LPA No.
529/2011. LPA No. 531/2011 challenges the clarificatory order dated
16.03.2010. In LPA No. 891/2015, rejection of the application filed by
the Union of India seeking joint hearing of appeals under Section 54
of the LA Act along with the pending LPAs and writ petition is under
challenge. In W.P.(C) No. 4792/2011, the Union of India seeks
quashing of the determination made by the LAC holding that
resumption of 1087 sq. meters and 400 sq. meters amounted to
acquisition of land along with plant, buildings and machinery
requiring determination of compensation under the LA Act.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
14.
Submissions on behalf of Union of India [„UOI‟]
14.1. Learned counsel appearing for the UOI submitted that all six
matters arise out of a common nucleus, namely the resumption of
portions of leasehold land forming part of a larger parcel admeasuring
approximately 0.54 acres at Property No. 18, Boulevard Road, Delhi,
originally leased to National Cold Storage & Allied Industries Ltd.
under a lease deed dated 06.09.1951, renewed in 1984, and the
consequent disputes relating to compensation, valuation, and
conversion.
14.2. It was contended that the governing provision for resumption is
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
Clause (xi) of the lease deed, which constitutes a complete contractual
code governing both the power of resumption and the measure of
compensation. Under the said clause, upon resumption for public or
administrative purposes, the lessee is not entitled to compensation for
its interest in the land as such. The compensable heads are strictly
limited to:
i.
the value of buildings, structures and fixtures standing on the
resumed portion; and
ii.
proportionate refund of the premium or charges paid under the
lease.
According to learned counsel, market value of land, solatium,
additional amounts, or interest applicable in cases of compulsory
acquisition of title under the LA Act have no application to a
contractual resumption of leasehold rights.
14.3. It was further urged that the order dated 04.02.2010 passed by
the learned Single Judge, whereby the issue of quantification was
referred to the LAC, expressly confined such exercise to
determination “with reference to the lease.” The LAC, however, by
Determination dated 26.05.2010, exceeded the scope of the referral as
well as the terms of the lease by adopting a market-value
methodology, thereby treating the matter as if it were a statutory
acquisition of ownership. According to the UOI, such an approach
was jurisdictionally impermissible and contrary to the limited interest
held by the lessee.
14.4. Learned counsel submitted that the subsequent clarification
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
order dated 16.03.2010 has been misconstrued in a manner that
impermissibly widens the scope of compensation and, in places, has
been read as permitting compensation “for land,” which is wholly
alien to Clause (xi). It was contended that to the extent any
observation or understanding suggests compensation for land, the
same requires reconsideration/ clarification by this Court.
14.5. Assailing the order dated 22.02.2011 directing release of 75%
of the amount determined by the LAC, it was submitted that no
disbursal could have been ordered when the foundational issues,
namely, the permissible heads of compensation and the legality of the
LAC‟s methodology, were themselves under challenge in the pending
Letters Patent Appeals and the writ petition. According to the UOI,
such interim release creates a fait accompli and exposes the public
exchequer to irretrievable loss.
14.6. It was further submitted that the statutory acquisition
proceedings culminating in Award No. 10/LAC/N/10-11 dated
22.12.2010, and the subsequent enhancement by the Reference Court,
constitute a separate and distinct legal track, governed by different
notifications, parcels, and legal principles. The rates, heads, or
apportionment applicable in those proceedings, it was urged, cannot
be imported into or relied upon for determining compensation under
Clause (xi). Learned counsel also drew attention to the interim stay
granted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on 06.05.2016 in the
acquisition-related proceedings, to emphasise judicial caution against
disbursal where entitlement and quantum remain contested.
14.7. With respect to freehold conversion, learned counsel submitted
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LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
that conversion from leasehold to freehold under the L&DO
conversion brochure is a matter of policy and administrative
discretion, and no mandamus can issue compelling conversion as a
matter of right. It was contended that Clause 1.4 of the policy merely
confers a right to apply, not a vested right to obtain conversion.
Reliance was placed on Clause 15, which bars conversion where
disputes regarding Government dues subsist, and Clause 20.3, which
bars conversion during the pendency of litigation between the lessor
and the lessee. In the present case, it was submitted, both these
disqualifications are attracted.
14.8. Finally, learned counsel emphasised the necessity of strict
compartmentalisation between (i) compensation for resumption under
Clause (xi), (ii) statutory acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, and (iii) policy-based freehold conversion. Any
conflation, it was urged, would result in double counting and confer
an unwarranted windfall upon the lessee.
15.
Submissions on behalf of Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.
(„DMRC‟)
15.1. Learned counsel appearing for DMRC adopted and supported
the submissions advanced on behalf of the UOI insofar as they relate
to the scope and interpretation of Clause (xi) of the lease deed dated
06.09.1951.
15.2. It was submitted that a plain reading of Clause (xi) makes it
clear that upon resumption of the leased premises for a public purpose,
the lessee is not entitled to compensation for its interest in the land,
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LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
except for refund of a proportionate part of the premium paid. The
reference to the provisions of the LA Act in Clause (xi), according to
learned counsel, is only for the limited purpose of determining the
proportion of premium in case of dispute, and not for determining the
market value of the land itself.
15.3. Learned counsel contended that the LAC committed a manifest
error in determining the market value of the land instead of restricting
the exercise to proportionate refund of premium and valuation of
structures, as contemplated by the lease. Since the proceedings before
the LAC were not proceedings under the LA Act, the document styled
as an „award‟ dated 26.05.2010, it was urged, could not bind the
parties unless accepted or affirmed by the Court after consideration of
objections.
15.4. Without prejudice to the above submissions, learned counsel
drew attention to the order dated 22.02.2011, wherein the learned
Single Judge directed L&DO to make payment of the amounts
determined by the LAC and expressly kept open all rights and
contentions of DMRC. It was submitted that no liability for payment
of compensation was fastened upon DMRC by the said order and that
any inter se liability between L&DO and DMRC was left open to be
determined in accordance with law.
15.5. It was further submitted that DMRC had not consented to the
reference made to the LAC for determination of compensation or
proportionate premium, as is evident from the tenor of the order dated
04.02.2010. The Determination dated 26.05.2010 is, in any event,
under challenge in LPA No. 411/2011, pursuant to the liberty granted
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
by the learned Single Judge.
16.
Submissions
on
behalf
of
National
Cold
Storage
&
Refrigeration Private Ltd. (NCSRPL‟)
16.1. Learned senior counsel appearing for the NCSRPL opposed the
Appeals and the Writ Petition and supported the orders passed by the
learned Single Judge as well as the Determination dated 26.05.2010
made by the LAC.
16.2. At the outset, it was submitted that NCSRPL has been in
uninterrupted possession of the subject land since 1948. Out of 3,300
sq. yards initially handed over to NCSRPL on 11.03.1948, a lease
deed dated 06.09.1951 was executed in respect of 0.54 acres (2,614
sq. yards/approximately 2,185.23 sq. meters) for a term of 30 years,
renewable at the sole option of the lessee for two further terms of 30
years each. It was contended that NCSRPL paid a premium of Rs.
52,280/-, which, as per the resolution of the Notified Area Committee
dated 29.11.1950, was claimed/stated by NSCRPL to represent the
then prevailing market value of the land, along with annual ground
rent.
16.3. Learned counsel submitted that the lease was renewed on
31.07.1984 and remained subsisting, with renewal rights extending up
to 05.09.2041. On this basis, it was argued that the lease was, in
substance, perpetual in nature and conferred a substantial and valuable
leasehold interest in the land.
16.4. With respect to the first resumption, it was submitted that in the
year 2000, L&DO resumed 1,087 sq. metres of land for the Delhi
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LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
Metro Rail Project under Clause (xi) of the lease. NCSRPL challenged
the resumption by filing W.P.(C) 7557/2000, pursuant to which the
Court permitted possession to be taken but directed joint valuation. It
was pointed out that interim compensation was disbursed only
towards shifting charges of plant and machinery and not towards the
value of plant and machinery embedded at site.
16.5. As regards the second resumption, learned counsel submitted
that on 20.01.2005, a further 400 sq. metres was resumed for traffic
streamlining, leading to W.P.(C) 8532/2005. Joint valuation exercises
conducted by Ernst & Young and the District Valuation Officer
revealed substantial disparities, and possession was taken on
10.04.2006.
16.6. It was submitted that, thereafter, by order dated 04.02.2010
passed in W.P.(C) 19878/2004 and W.P.(C) 8532/2005, the learned
Single Judge referred the issue of determination of compensation to
the LAC. By a subsequent order dated 16.03.2010, the Court clarified
that the LAC was required to act in accordance with Clause (xi) of the
lease deed and determine compensation for land together with
buildings, structures and appurtenances in accordance with the
provisions of the LA Act.
16.7. Pursuant to these directions, the LAC passed the Determination
dated 26.05.2010, determining compensation for both parcels of
resumed land. By order dated 22.02.2011, the learned Single Judge
directed L&DO to disburse 75% of the land compensation and 100%
of the compensation for superstructures to NCSRPL.
Signed By:SAVITA
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LPA 454/2010 and connected matters
18:23:09
16.8. On the interpretation of Clause (xi), learned counsel for
NCSRPL submitted that the clause expressly provides that
compensation is to be determined “as nearly as may be in accordance
with the provisions of the LA Act.” It was argued that this necessarily
attracts the principles contained in Section 23 of the LA Act, including
compensation for land, buildings, severance, and other statutory
components. According to NCSRPL, any interpretation confining
compensation merely to refund of premium would render the
reference to the LA Act otiose.
16.9. It was further contended that since the premium paid by
NCSRPL at the inception of the lease represented the market value of
the land at that time, the “refund of proportionate premium” envisaged
under Clause (xi) would, in effect, amount to payment of the market
value of the resumed land as on the date of resumption.
16.10. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Inder Parshad v. Union of India1 to submit that
lessees under perpetual or long-term leases are entitled to
compensation for their leasehold interest upon acquisition, and that
such compensation is required to be apportioned between the lessor
and the lessee.
16.11. It was further argued that the conduct of L&DO itself supports
NCSRPL‟s interpretation. In respect of another parcel of land
admeasuring approximately 1,183.96 sq. metres, which also formed
part of the original lease, L&DO initiated acquisition proceedings
under the Land Acquisition Act in 2010, resulting in an award
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granting 75% compensation to NCSRPL and 25% to L&DO.
NCSRPL contended that L&DO cannot be permitted to adopt
inconsistent stands in respect of different portions of the same leased
land.
16.12. On the challenge to the Determination dated 26.05.2010 in
W.P.(C) 4792/2011, learned counsel submitted that the Writ Petition
was filed belatedly after the Appellants had participated in the
proceedings before the LAC, filed their claims, and sought
apportionment. It was contended that notices had been duly issued by
the LAC and that the award, which according to NCSRPL, had been
approved by the Government under the proviso to Section 11 of the
LA Act.
16.13. It was further submitted that the LAC determined land
compensation on the basis of prevailing circle rates and adopted
valuations of recognised consultants for buildings and structures.
According to NCSRPL, the compensation awarded was reasonable
and, in fact, lower than what NCSRPL had originally claimed.
16.14. With regard to limitation, learned counsel submitted that the
Letters Patent Appeals filed by L&DO and DMRC suffer from
inordinate delay, ranging from 26 days to over 450 days. It was argued
that the Appellants had acquiesced in the orders dated 04.02.2010 and
16.03.2010, acted upon them by participating before the LAC, and
only challenged the orders after the implementation direction dated
22.02.2011 was passed. Reliance was placed on decisions of the
Supreme Court to contend that lack of bona fides disentitles the
(1994) 5 SCC 239
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appellants to condonation of delay.
16.15. In relation to freehold conversion (LPA 454/2010), learned
counsel submitted that NCSRPL had applied for conversion of the
residual land admeasuring 698.23 sq. metres (approximately 699 sq.
metres) in accordance with the L&DO brochure, fulfilled all eligibility
criteria, and deposited the requisite conversion charges, which were
encashed by L&DO. It was contended that pursuant to the order dated
05.04.2010 passed in W.P.(C) 1278/2007, all formalities for
conversion stood completed and that the land must be treated as
freehold. Consequently, according to NCSRPL, L&DO would have no
entitlement to any share in compensation payable for subsequent
acquisition.
16.16. As regards LPA 891/2015, learned counsel supported the view
taken by the learned Single Judge that proceedings arising out of
statutory acquisition under the LA Act and proceedings relating to
resumption under Clause (xi) operate in distinct legal fields and ought
not to be clubbed.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
17.
Having given this Court‟s anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and having carefully
examined the record, the orders passed by the learned Single Judge,
the lease deed dated 06.09.1951, and the proceedings before the LAC,
the following principal issues arise for determination in the present
batch of matters:
(i)
What is the true nature of the lease granted in favour of
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NCSRPL, and what legal incidents flow from the terms thereof,
particularly with reference to duration, user restrictions and the right
of resumption?
(ii)
What is the scope, ambit and legal effect of Clause (xi) of the
lease deed dated 06.09.1951, and whether resumption of leasehold
land thereunder constitutes a purely contractual resumption or
amounts to compulsory acquisition of land along with building, plant
and machinery attracting the provisions of the LA Act?
(iii)
Whether, upon resumption of portions of the leased land for
public purposes, the lessee is entitled to compensation only towards
buildings, structures and proportionate refund of premium, as
contended by the Union of India and DMRC, or whether
compensation for land is also payable by applying the principles
contained in the LA Act, as contended by the lessee?
(iv)
Whether the reference made to the LAC for determination of
compensation was limited to the terms of the lease deed, and whether
the LAC exceeded jurisdiction in determining compensation by
adopting a market value methodology?
(v)
Whether the directions issued by the learned Single Judge for
disbursal of compensation, pending challenge to the Determination
dated 26.05.2010 and allied proceedings, were legally sustainable?
(vi)
Whether the lessee has an enforceable right to conversion of the
residual leasehold land into freehold under the applicable policy, and
whether the order dated 05.04.2010 directing such conversion calls for
interference?
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(vii) Whether the proceedings arising out of statutory acquisition
under the LA Act and those arising out of resumption under Clause
(xi) of the lease deed operate in distinct legal fields, and the effect of
setting aside the order directing conversion?
(viii) Whether the Letters Patent Appeals and the Writ Petition suffer
from delay, acquiescence or lack of bona fides, and if so, the effect
thereof on the maintainability of the proceedings.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
ISSUE Nos. (i) & (ii): Nature of the lease and scope of the right of
resumption under Clause (xi)
18.
Issue Nos. (i) and (ii) may be taken up together, as the
determination of the true nature of the lease granted in favour of
NCSRPL [“the lessee”] and the legal incidents flowing therefrom are
inextricably linked with the scope, ambit and effect of the resumption
clause contained in Clause (xi) of the lease deed dated 06.09.1951.
19.
A careful reading of the lease deed reveals that the land in
question was not allotted as an unrestricted or general commercial
lease, but was granted for a highly specific and circumscribed
purpose, namely, the establishment and operation of a cold storage.
The lease deed expressly stipulated that the demised premises could
not be utilised for any purpose other than cold storage, save and
except for the allied activities of an ice factory and ice cream
manufacture, and that any deviation from the permitted user would
render the lease void.
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20.
The duration of the lease was initially fixed at thirty years, with
a further provision enabling renewal for two additional terms of thirty
years each, subject to compliance with the terms of the lease and
subject to such conditions as the lessor might deem fit. While the
cumulative duration could thus extend up to ninety years, the mere
length of the tenure cannot, by itself, be determinative of the legal
character of the lease. The nature of the rights conferred, the
restrictions imposed, and the overarching control retained by the
lessor, namely the Government, are of equal, if not greater,
significance.
21.
Of particular relevance is Clause (xi) of the lease deed, which
expressly reserved to the Government the liberty to resume possession
of the land, together with all buildings and structures thereon, at any
time during the subsistence of the lease, if the land was required for a
public or administrative purpose. The clause further restricted the
entitlement of the lessee, in the event of such resumption, to
compensation only in respect of buildings and structures standing on
the land at the time of notice, coupled with a proportionate refund of
premium, while excluding compensation for the lessee‟s interest in the
land as such.
22.
The presence of such a resumption clause is not incidental or
peripheral; rather, it goes to the very root of the leasehold
arrangement. The clause indicates that the Government never intended
to divest itself of dominion over the land, nor to create any enduring
or indefeasible interest in favour of the lessee. The lease,
notwithstanding its length, was always subordinate to the paramount
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right of the State to reclaim the land for public purposes, a right which
could be exercised at any point of time during the lease period.
23.
The argument advanced on behalf of the lessee that the lease, by
reason of its long duration and renewable character, ought to be
treated as a long-term lease conferring substantial proprietary
incidents, cannot be accepted in isolation from the express contractual
terms. A lease may be long in duration and yet remain temporary in
character, where the lessor has consciously reserved an overriding
right of resumption and has imposed stringent restrictions on user,
transfer and enjoyment.
24.
In the present case, the lease deed makes it abundantly clear that
the lessee‟s interest was conditional, limited and defeasible, and was
at all times subject to the superior title and requirements of the
Government. The resumption contemplated under Clause (xi) was not
predicated upon breach by the lessee, but upon the public need of the
State, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that the lease was granted as
a matter of regulated permission rather than as a conferment of nearownership rights.
25.
Once Clause (xi) is given its plain and intended meaning, it
follows that resumption of land thereunder is, in substance, an
exercise of a contractual right expressly reserved by the Government,
flowing from the terms voluntarily accepted by the lessee at the
inception of the lease. Such resumption, when effected strictly in
accordance with the lease deed, does not, per se, partake the character
of compulsory acquisition of land under the LA Act, though the clause
itself envisages determination of compensation by adopting principles
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“as nearly as may be” in accordance with the said Act.
26.
The reference to the LA Act in Clause (xi) cannot be construed
as converting a contractual resumption into a statutory acquisition.
The clause merely borrows the methodology or guiding principles for
valuation in case of dispute, without displacing the contractual
framework governing the rights and liabilities of the parties. To hold
otherwise would be to rewrite the bargain struck between the parties
and to efface the clear distinction between resumption under a lease
and acquisition under statute.
27.
Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the lease
granted in favour of the lessee, though long in duration, was
temporary and conditional in legal character, subject to stringent user
restrictions and an overriding right of resumption in favour of the
Government, and that resumption of land under Clause (xi), when
effected in accordance with its terms, constitutes a contractual
resumption and not a compulsory acquisition attracting the full rigour
of the LA Act.
ISSUE Nos. (iii) & (iv): Entitlement to compensation upon
resumption and the scope of the reference to the Land Acquisition
Collector
28.
Issue Nos. (iii) and (iv) relate to the nature and extent of
compensation payable to the lessee upon resumption of portions of the
leased land under Clause (xi) of the lease deed dated 06.09.1951, and
to the question whether the LAC, while acting pursuant to the
directions of this Court, remained within the bounds of the lease deed
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and the reference made to him, or exceeded jurisdiction by adopting a
market value methodology akin to a statutory acquisition of land
having plant, machinery and building.
29.
As noticed earlier, Clause (xi) of the lease deed constitutes a
self-contained code governing both the right of resumption and the
consequences flowing therefrom. The clause unequivocally stipulates
that, upon resumption for a public or administrative purpose, the
lessee shall not be entitled to compensation for its interest in the land
as such. The compensable components are expressly confined to:
a) the value of the buildings and structures standing on the land at
the time of notice; and
b) refund of a proportionate part of the premium paid in respect of
the resumed land.
30.
The clause further provides that, in case of disagreement as to
the quantum of compensation, the same shall be determined “as nearly
as may be in accordance with the provisions of the LA Act.” This
formulation, in the opinion of the Court, is of critical significance. It
cannot be construed as incorporating the LA Act wholesale, nor does
it elevate the lessee‟s interest to that of an owner whose land is being
compulsorily acquired. Rather, it adopts the principles of the LA Act
only as a guiding mechanism for quantification, within the confines of
the contractual entitlement already delineated.
31.
To read the reference to the LA Act as entitling the lessee to
compensation for land at market value would be to render nugatory
the express exclusion of compensation for land contained in Clause
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(xi). Such an interpretation would violate settled principles of
contractual construction, which require that effect be given to all parts
of the instrument and that no clause be treated as redundant or otiose.
32.
The distinction between (i) compensation for acquisition of title
under statute and (ii) compensation for resumption of a limited
leasehold interest under contract is fundamental. In the former, the
State extinguishes private ownership and is therefore obliged to pay
market value for the land itself. In the latter, the State merely reasserts
its pre-existing title in accordance with a right expressly reserved at
the inception of the lease, and the lessee is compensated only to the
extent contractually agreed.
33.
Turning now to the reference made to the LAC, it is evident
from the order dated 04.02.2010 that the learned Single Judge referred
the issue of determination of compensation to the LAC “with
reference to the lease”. This limitation was neither casual nor
accidental. It reflected the Court‟s conscious recognition that the
source of entitlement was the lease deed and not the LA Act.
34.
The subsequent clarification order dated 16.03.2010 reiterated
that the LAC was required to act in accordance with Clause (xi) of the
lease deed, while applying the principles of the LA Act for
determination of compensation. The clarification cannot be read as
enlarging the scope of the reference so as to permit determination of
compensation for land itself, contrary to the express stipulation
contained in the lease.
35.
However, a perusal of the Determination dated 26.05.2010
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passed by the LAC reveals that the exercise undertaken travelled
beyond these limits. The LAC proceeded to determine the market
value of the land by adopting prevailing rates and treated the
resumption as if it were a statutory acquisition of ownership rights.
This approach, in the considered view of the Court, amounted to a
jurisdictional error.
36.
The LAC was not acting as a statutory authority under the LA
Act, but as a valuing authority appointed pursuant to judicial
directions in a writ proceeding. His jurisdiction was thus
circumscribed by the terms of the reference and by the lease deed
itself. By determining compensation for land on a market value basis,
the LAC effectively rewrote the contract between the parties and
conferred upon the lessee a benefit expressly excluded by Clause (xi).
37.
The contention advanced on behalf of the lessee that the
premium paid at the inception of the lease represented the market
value of the land at that time, and that refund of proportionate
premium would therefore be equivalent to payment of market value,
cannot justify the methodology adopted by the LAC. The lease
contemplates refund of proportionate premium as a contractual
measure, not reassessment of land value as on the date of resumption.
Consequently, NCSRPL cannot claim the current market value of the
land merely because it had deposited the premium in the year 1951.
38.
Similarly, reliance on principles applicable to apportionment of
compensation between lessor and lessee in cases of statutory
acquisition is misplaced in the context of a contractual resumption.
Those principles presuppose acquisition of ownership and extinction
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of title, neither of which occurs when land is resumed under Clause
(xi).
39.
In view of the above, this Court holds that upon resumption of
portions of the leased land under Clause (xi), the lessee is entitled only
to compensation towards buildings and structures and to refund of
proportionate premium, and not to compensation for land at market
value. The reference to the LAC was limited to determination of
compensation strictly in accordance with the lease deed, and the LAC
exceeded jurisdiction in adopting a market value methodology
inconsistent with the contractual framework.
ISSUE No. (v): Legality of the directions for disbursal of
compensation pending challenge
40.
Issue No. (v) concerns the legality and propriety of the order
dated 22.02.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby
directions were issued for disbursal of 75% of the compensation for
land and 100% of the compensation for buildings and structures as
determined by the LAC, notwithstanding the pendency of Letters
Patent Appeals and the Writ Petition questioning the very basis and
methodology of such determination.
41.
It is not in dispute that, by the time the order dated 22.02.2011
came to be passed, serious and substantial challenges had already been
laid to the Determination dated 26.05.2010. The UOI and DMRC had
specifically assailed the jurisdiction of the LAC to determine
compensation for land at market value, contending that such
determination was contrary to Clause (xi) of the lease deed and
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beyond the scope of the reference made by the Court.
42.
The disbursal directed by the learned Single Judge was thus not
in respect of an admitted or undisputed amount, but was founded upon
an Award whose legality, jurisdictional basis and conformity with the
lease deed were themselves the subject-matter of challenge in pending
proceedings. In such a situation, the direction for release of substantial
sums necessarily called for circumspection.
43.
It is a settled principle that where the entitlement itself is in
serious dispute and the challenge raises prima facie jurisdictional
issues, courts must exercise restraint in directing disbursal of amounts
which may ultimately be found to be not payable. Interim directions
ought not to result in creation of a fait accompli or expose the public
exchequer to the risk of irretrievable loss, particularly where
restitution may be difficult or illusory.
44.
The concern articulated by the Appellants that release of
compensation for land, an element which, as held above, was not
contractually payable under Clause (xi), would amount to conferring a
windfall upon the lessee, cannot be brushed aside as speculative. Once
public funds are disbursed pursuant to an interim direction, recovery
in the event of success in appeal is often fraught with practical and
legal difficulties.
45.
It is true that the learned Single Judge sought to safeguard the
interests of the Appellants by observing that all rights and contentions
were kept open. However, the mere reservation of rights does not
neutralise the consequences of actual disbursal, especially where the
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amount released is founded on a determination which is later found to
be without jurisdiction.
46.
At the same time, the Court is conscious of the fact that the
lessee had been deprived of possession of the land and that valuation
of buildings and structures had been undertaken. To that limited
extent, directions for disbursal towards undisputed components, if
any, may have been justified. However, the direction for release of
75% of the compensation determined towards land, when the very
entitlement to compensation for land was under serious challenge,
cannot be sustained.
47.
Before parting with this issue, it is necessary to clarify the
position with regard to disbursal of compensation. The record
indicates that an amount of Rs. 2,58,57,686/- was released to the
lessee on 30.07.2010 at the time of taking possession, which was an
interim payment released at the time of taking possession in the
statutory acquisition proceedings initiated under the urgency
provisions of Section 17 of the LA Act, independent of and distinct
from the contractual resumption proceedings under Clause (xi) of the
lease deed. The final compensation was thereafter determined by
Award No. 10/LAC/N/10-11 dated 22.12.2010. It has been stated on
behalf of the Union of India that no further amount pursuant to the
said Award, or in terms of the order dated 22.02.2011, has been
disbursed, save and except amounts released towards relocation
expenses of plant and machinery.
48.
In these circumstances, while the interim amount already
released shall abide by and be subject to adjustment in accordance
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with law, any direction for disbursal of compensation for land under
clause (xi) founded upon the market value determination by the LAC
could not have been issued pending adjudication of the serious
jurisdictional and contractual challenges raised by the Appellants. At
the same time, it is clarified that this determination shall not prejudice
the entitlement of the lessee to compensation, if any, lawfully payable
under Clause (xi) of the lease deed, including compensation for
buildings, structures, plant and machinery, as well as proportionate
refund of premium or charges paid, subject to due verification and
determination in accordance with law. In the event it is found that any
amount has been disbursed pursuant to the Order dated 22.02.2011
towards compensation for land, the same shall remain subject to
restitution.
ISSUES (vi): Whether the lessee has an enforceable right to
conversion of the residual leasehold land into freehold, and whether
the order dated 05.04.2010 directing such conversion calls for
interference
49.
This issue goes to the heart of the present batch of matters. It
concerns the legality of the order dated 05.04.2010 passed in W.P.(C)
1278/2007, whereby the learned Single Judge quashed the order dated
27.12.2006 rejecting the request of NCSRPL for conversion of the
remaining leasehold land into freehold and directed the L&DO to
effect such conversion subject to payment of requisite charges.
50.
At the outset, it is necessary to note that conversion of leasehold
rights into freehold, under the policy framed by the Government in
2003, is not a matter of statutory entitlement. The policy is an
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executive measure intended to extend a facility or concession to
eligible lessees, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions and
subject to administrative discretion. It does not, by its own force,
confer a vested or indefeasible right to conversion.
51.
The legal character of such a policy has been consistently
recognised as conferring, at the highest, a right to apply for conversion
and to have such application considered in accordance with the policy.
It does not create a mandamus-enforceable right to obtain conversion,
particularly where the foundational eligibility conditions are absent or
where overriding public interest considerations intervene.
52.
When the terms of the lease deed dated 06.09.1951 are
examined, certain features assume central importance. The lease was
granted for a defined purpose, namely the establishment and operation
of a cold storage, with a clear prohibition against user for any other
purpose. The lease further contained an express and unqualified
resumption clause, Clause (xi), which reserved to the Government the
right to take back the land, together with buildings and structures, at
any point during the currency of the lease if the land was required for
a public or administrative purpose.
53.
The existence of a renewal clause permitting extension for two
further periods of 30 years does not dilute the legal effect of the
resumption clause. Renewal only prolongs the tenure of the lease; it
does not convert the nature of the interest into ownership nor does it
negate the overriding right of the lessor to resume the land for public
purposes. The lease, therefore, even though long in duration, remained
a lease subject to stringent conditions and defeasible at the instance of
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the Government.
54.
It is in this context that the rejection of the conversion
application on the ground that the allotment was “temporary” must be
understood. The expression “temporary” cannot be read in a purely
arithmetical sense of duration alone. A lease may endure for several
decades and yet remain temporary in character if it is purpose-specific,
conditional, and expressly resumable at any time for public purposes.
The substance of the rights conferred, rather than the length of tenure,
is determinative.
55.
By the time the application for conversion came to be
considered,
significant
developments
had
already
occurred.
Substantial portions of the leased land had been resumed for public
purposes, first for the Delhi Metro Rail Project and thereafter for
traffic streamlining. These resumptions were not speculative or
hypothetical; they were actual, implemented, and irreversible. The
remaining portion of land was also stated to be required imminently
for public purposes, a fact which subsequently culminated in statutory
acquisition proceedings.
56.
In such a situation, directing conversion of the residual land into
freehold would have the effect of fundamentally altering the legal
relationship between the parties. Conversion would extinguish the
Government‟s reversionary interest and resumption rights and would
convert a defeasible leasehold interest into absolute ownership, only to
be followed by compulsory acquisition and payment of full market
value compensation.
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57.
Such a course would result in a consequence which the policy
was never intended to achieve, namely, the creation of ownership
rights in favour of a lessee in respect of public land, immediately prior
to acquisition, thereby obligating the State to pay compensation as if it
were acquiring private property. This would amount to converting a
policy-based concession into a vehicle for unjust enrichment.
58.
The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that, under the lease
deed, the lessee never possessed an unfettered right in the land. The
land at all times remained Government land, subject to a limited right
of use, and subject to resumption without payment of compensation
for land. To compel conversion in such circumstances would be to
rewrite the contract between the parties and to defeat the express terms
of the lease.
59.
The learned Single Judge, while directing conversion, appears
to have proceeded primarily on the premise that the lease was a longterm lease and therefore could not be characterised as temporary. With
respect, such an approach places undue emphasis on duration and
insufficient emphasis on the decisive features of the lease, namely
purpose restriction, Government ownership, and unconditional right of
resumption.
60.
Equally significant is the fact that the conversion policy itself
contains exclusions and safeguards. Clauses barring conversion where
disputes relating to Government dues subsist, or where litigation
between the lessor and lessee is pending, are not empty formalities. In
the present case, multiple litigations concerning resumption,
compensation, valuation, and entitlement were pending at the time
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when conversion was sought and directed. Grant of conversion in the
midst of such disputes runs counter to the express policy framework.
61.
This Court is therefore unable to accept the proposition that
NCSRPL had an enforceable right to conversion of the leasehold land
into freehold, or that rejection of its application was arbitrary or
illegal. The direction for conversion effectively compelled the
Government to part with ownership of land which it required, and was
entitled to resume, for public purposes.
62.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that the order dated
05.04.2010 directing conversion of the leasehold land into freehold is
legally unsustainable and warrants interference. The said order is set
aside. Once the order directing conversion is set aside, the legal
character of the residual land remains that of Government land held
under lease, subject to Clause (xi).
ISSUE No. (vii): Whether the proceedings arising out of statutory
acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and those arising out of
resumption under Clause (xi) of the lease deed operate in distinct legal
fields, and the effect of setting aside the order directing conversion.
63.
This issue arises primarily in the context of LPA 891/2015,
wherein the Union of India assailed the order of the learned Single
Judge rejecting its application seeking that the Appeals arising out of
statutory acquisition proceedings under the LA Act be heard together
with the present batch of Letters Patent Appeals and the connected
Writ Petition, which primarily concern resumption of land under
Clause (xi) of the lease deed dated 06.09.1951.
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64.
At the threshold, it must be recognised that the source, nature
and legal incidents of resumption under Clause (xi) of the lease deed
are fundamentally distinct from those of compulsory acquisition under
the LA Act.
65.
Resumption under Clause (xi) flows from a contractual
arrangement between the Government as lessor and the lessee. The
right to resume is expressly reserved in the lease deed itself and is
exercisable upon the occurrence of a specified contingency, namely
the requirement of the land for a public or administrative purpose. The
consequences of such resumption, including the heads and measure of
compensation, are governed entirely by the terms of the lease.
66.
In contrast, acquisition under the LA Act is a statutory exercise
of sovereign power of eminent domain. It results in compulsory
divestment of rights in land, including ownership or other interests, by
operation of law, and compensation is required to be determined
strictly in accordance with the statutory scheme contained in Sections
23, 24 and allied provisions of the LA Act.
67.
The two mechanisms, therefore, operate in distinct legal fields.
One is rooted in contract; the other in statute. One governs the
consequences of termination of a limited, defeasible interest; the other
governs compulsory acquisition of rights recognised in law. The mere
fact that both may relate to portions of the same original parcel of land
does not obliterate this fundamental distinction.
68.
This distinction becomes even more pronounced when regard is
had to the specific facts of the present case. The resumptions of land
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admeasuring 1,087 sq. metres and 400 sq. metres were effected under
Clause (xi) of the lease deed for identified public purposes, and
disputes arising therefrom relate to the interpretation of the lease, the
permissible heads of compensation, and the jurisdiction exercised by
the LAC pursuant to judicial directions.
69.
The initiation of statutory acquisition proceedings in respect of
the remaining parcel was not an independent assertion of eminent
domain over privately owned land, but was a consequence flowing
from the legal position created by the order dated 05.04.2010 directing
conversion of the leasehold land into freehold. Once the said order
directing conversion is held to be unsustainable and is set aside, the
foundational premise for treating the residual land as privately owned
ceases to exist. The land, in law, continues to vest in the Government,
subject to the lease and its resumption clause. The State cannot be
compelled to acquire its own land under the LA Act. In such a
situation, the legally permissible mode for taking back possession of
the remaining land would ordinarily be resumption under Clause (xi)
of the lease deed.
70.
The issues arising in the statutory acquisition proceedings
concern matters such as market value, apportionment between lessor
and lessee, statutory benefits, and enhancement by the Reference
Court. These issues do not arise, and indeed cannot arise, in
proceedings relating to resumption under Clause (xi), where the lease
itself excludes compensation for land as such.
71.
The contention advanced on behalf of NCSRPL that the
Government cannot adopt inconsistent stands in respect of different
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portions of the same leased land cannot be accepted in the abstract.
The Government‟s conduct must be assessed in light of the legal
regime governing each transaction. The Government was forced to
proceed under the LA Act, in view of the direction contained in the
order passed on 05.04.2010 and not because the land had, in law,
ceased to be Government land independently of such direction.
72.
The choice of legal route, resumption or acquisition, may be
informed by administrative exigencies, project requirements, or
statutory compulsions. That choice, by itself, does not authorise a
court to collapse two legally distinct regimes into one or to apply the
incidents of statutory acquisition to a contractual resumption.
73.
The learned Single Judge, while rejecting the application
seeking consolidation or joint hearing of the acquisition-related
proceedings with the present batch, correctly appreciated this
distinction. Clubbing the proceedings would not only blur wellestablished legal boundaries but also risk importing considerations and
principles wholly alien to one regime into the other. In view of the
setting aside of the order directing conversion, the legal basis for
invoking statutory acquisition in respect of the remaining parcel does
not survive, and any taking over of possession would necessarily have
to be traced to Clause (xi) of the lease deed.
74.
This Court is therefore of the view that proceedings arising out
of resumption under Clause (xi) of the lease deed and proceedings
arising out of statutory acquisition under the LA Act operate in
distinct legal fields, governed by different sources of power and
different legal principles. They could neither be compulsorily clubbed
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nor decided together as a matter of course.
75.
Consequently, no fault can be found with the rejection of the
application giving rise to LPA 891/2015, and the challenge thereto
must fail.
ISSUE No. (viii): Whether the Letters Patent Appeals and the Writ
Petition suffer from delay, acquiescence or lack of bona fides, and if
so, the effect thereof on the maintainability of the proceedings
76.
This issue arises on account of the objection raised on behalf of
NCSRPL that the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the Union of India
and other Appellants suffer from inordinate delay; that the Appellants
had acquiesced in the orders dated 04.02.2010 and 16.03.2010 by
participating in the proceedings before the LAC; and that the
challenges were mounted only after the order dated 22.02.2011
directing disbursal of compensation, thereby disentitling the
Appellants to any discretionary relief.
77.
There can be no dispute with the proposition that delay and
acquiescence are relevant considerations in the exercise of appellate
and writ jurisdiction. However, it is equally well settled that these
considerations cannot be applied mechanically and must yield where
substantial questions of jurisdiction, legality and public interest arise.
78.
In the present batch of matters, the gravamen of the challenge
raised by the Union of India is not merely to the quantum of
compensation, but to the very jurisdiction and remit of the LAC in
determining compensation by adopting a market value methodology,
allegedly contrary to the terms of the lease deed and the limited
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referral made by the Court.
79.
The order dated 04.02.2010 referred the issue of quantification
to the LAC “with reference to the lease”. The subsequent grievance of
the Appellants arose only after the Determination dated 26.05.2010
was rendered by the LAC, which, according to the Appellants,
travelled beyond the scope of the referral by treating the matter as akin
to a statutory acquisition.
80.
The order dated 22.02.2011 directing release of 75% of the
amount determined by the LAC marked a further and significant stage,
inasmuch as it gave rise to an immediate and concrete apprehension of
irreversible financial consequences and loss to the public exchequer. It
is thereafter that the present cluster of Letters Patent Appeals and the
Writ Petition came to be instituted.
81.
Participation by the Appellants in the proceedings before the
LAC, pursuant to judicial directions, cannot by itself be construed as
acquiescence in the legality of the process or as a waiver of the right
to question jurisdictional excess. Compliance with a court-directed
procedure does not estop a party from challenging the outcome where
such outcome is alleged to be ultra vires the governing legal
framework.
82.
The determination dated 26.05.2010 submitted by the LAC was
not a statutory award under the LA Act but a determination made
pursuant to judicial directions. The learned Single Judge, while
directing disbursal, consciously kept all rights and contentions open.
In the absence of any statutory mechanism to challenge such
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determination, the Appellants were constrained to institute W.P.(C)
4792/2011. The filing of the said Writ Petition, therefore, cannot be
characterised as lacking in bona fides or as an act of approbation and
reprobation.
83.
The delay pointed out in some of the Appeals must also be
viewed in the backdrop of the multiplicity of interlinked proceedings,
overlapping orders, and evolving factual developments, including
parallel statutory acquisition proceedings and questions relating to
freehold
conversion.
The
record
reflects
a
continuous
and
interconnected litigation trajectory rather than abandonment or
conscious acceptance of the impugned orders.
84.
More importantly, the issues raised go to the root of the matter,
namely:
a) whether compensation for land can at all be awarded despite a
contractual resumption clause;
b) whether the LA Act regime can be imported into such
resumption; and
c) whether public funds can be disbursed on a basis not sanctioned
by the governing contract.
These are not merely inter partes disputes, but issues bearing directly
on the interpretation of Government leases, public policy, and fiscal
accountability.
85.
In such circumstances, technical objections as to delay or
alleged acquiescence cannot be permitted to defeat adjudication on the
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merits. Where jurisdictional error and potential public exchequer
implications are alleged, courts have consistently held that substantive
justice must prevail over procedural technicalities.
86.
Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the Letters Patent
Appeals and the Writ Petition do not warrant dismissal on the ground
of delay, acquiescence or lack of bona fides, and are maintainable.
Consequently, delay in filing the Appeals is condoned.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS & DIRECTIONS
87.
Having examined the entire conspectus of facts, the contractual
framework governing the parties, the sequence of judicial orders, and
the rival submissions, this Court summarises its conclusions issuewise as under.
A. Nature of the Lease and Right of Resumption
88.
The lease deed dated 06.09.1951 granted leasehold rights in
favour of NCSRPL for a fixed term of 30 years, renewable in
accordance with the terms of the lease.
89.
The lease was not an absolute or perpetual grant of land, but a
conditional allotment of Government land for a specific purpose,
coupled with an express stipulation reserving to the Government the
right of resumption for public or administrative purposes.
90.
The length of tenure or the presence of renewal clauses does not
alter the essential character of the lease as a Government allotment
subject to resumption. The lessee never acquired ownership rights in
the land, and its interest remained confined to the leasehold estate
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created by the deed.
B. Scope and Effect of Clause (xi) - Resumption and Compensation
91.
Clause (xi) of the lease deed constitutes a self-contained
contractual regime governing both the power of resumption and the
nature and extent of compensation payable upon such resumption.
92.
Resumption under Clause (xi) is a contractual resumption of
leasehold rights and does not amount to compulsory acquisition of
ownership of land so as to attract the substantive provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
93.
Upon resumption, the lessee is not entitled to compensation for
the land as such. The compensable heads under Clause (xi) are
confined to:
(a) the value of buildings, structures, fixtures, plant and machinery
standing on the resumed land; and
(b) proportionate refund of the premium or charges paid under the
lease.
94.
The reference in Clause (xi) to determination “as nearly as may
be in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act” is
limited to the mode of valuation in the event of dispute and does not
import the substantive right to market value of land, solatium, or other
statutory benefits applicable to compulsory acquisition of title.
95.
Any construction equating contractual resumption with
acquisition of ownership would negate the express terms of the lease
and result in conferring ownership-level compensation upon a lessee
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who never held title to the land.
C. Reference to and Award by the Land Acquisition Collector
96.
The order dated 04.02.2010 referred the issue of quantification
to the LAC expressly “with reference to the lease”. The LAC was
therefore bound by the contractual framework of Clause (xi).
97.
By adopting a market value methodology for land and treating
the exercise as one akin to statutory acquisition, the LAC transgressed
both the scope of the judicial reference and the limitations imposed by
the lease deed.
98.
The determination/Award dated 26.05.2010, insofar as it
determines compensation for land at market value and applies
principles of the LA Act beyond the limited purpose contemplated by
Clause (xi), is unsustainable in law.
D. Disbursal of Compensation
99.
The order dated 22.02.2011 directing disbursal of 75% of the
compensation determined by the LAC was passed at a stage when the
jurisdiction of the LAC and the legality of the methodology adopted
by it were already under serious challenge.
100. Directions for disbursal of amounts founded upon a disputed
and legally questionable determination, particularly involving public
funds, were premature and unsustainable.
101. Accordingly, the order dated 22.02.2011 is liable to be set aside
to the extent it directs disbursal of compensation premised on
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valuation of land, while leaving it open to the competent authority to
determine and disburse compensation strictly in accordance with
Clause (xi) of the lease deed and the findings recorded herein.
E. Statutory Acquisition Proceedings - Separate Legal Track
102. Proceedings arising out of statutory acquisition under the LA
Act, including Award No. 10/LAC/N/10-11 dated 22.12.2010,
constitute a distinct and independent legal track governed by separate
notifications, parcels of land and statutory principles.
103. The rates, heads of compensation or principles applicable to
statutory acquisition proceedings cannot be imported into or relied
upon for determining compensation payable upon contractual
resumption under the lease.
104. Even where proceedings have progressed contemporaneously,
strict segregation of issues, evidence and legal principles is imperative
to prevent impermissible overlap between the contractual and
statutory regimes.
F. Freehold Conversion
105. Conversion from leasehold to freehold under the L&DO
conversion policy is a matter of policy and administrative discretion.
The policy confers only a right to apply and does not create an
enforceable right to obtain conversion as a matter of course.
106. The policy itself incorporates express disqualifications,
including:
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i.
subsistence of disputes relating to Government dues (Clause
15); and
ii.
pendency of litigation between the lessor and the lessee (Clause
20.3).
107. In the present case, multiple disputes and litigations were
pending at the relevant time. In such circumstances, no mandamus
could have been issued directing conversion of the residual leasehold
land into freehold.
108. The order dated 05.04.2010 directing conversion of the residual
land into freehold, therefore, cannot be sustained and calls for
interference. The same is, accordingly, set aside.
G. Delay and Maintainability
109. The objections relating to delay, acquiescence and lack of bona
fides do not merit acceptance. The challenges raised involve
jurisdictional errors and issues of public importance affecting
Government land and public funds.
110. Participation in proceedings pursuant to judicial directions does
not amount to waiver or acquiescence, and technical objections cannot
defeat adjudication on merits in such circumstances.
OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
111. In view of the above conclusions:
i.
LPA Nos. 529/2011, 531/2011 and 411/2011 are allowed to the
extent indicated herein.
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ii.
W.P.(C) 4792/2011 is allowed, and the determination/Award
dated 26.05.2010 is set aside insofar as it determines
compensation for land contrary to Clause (xi) of the lease deed.
iii.
The order dated 22.02.2011 directing disbursal of compensation
is set aside to the extent it directs disbursal of compensation
premised on valuation of land.
iv.
LPA No. 454/2010 is allowed, and the order dated 05.04.2010
directing conversion of the residual leasehold land into freehold
is set aside.
v.
LPA No. 891/2015 stands disposed of in terms of the principles
of strict compartmentalisation laid down herein.
112. It is clarified that the competent authority shall be at liberty to
determine and disburse compensation, if any, payable to the lessee
strictly in accordance with Clause (xi) of the lease deed. It is also
declared that initiation of acquisition proceedings under the LA Act in
respect of the subject property cannot be sustained in law, having been
premised upon the direction of the learned Single Judge to convert the
property to freehold, which has been set aside by this Court.
Consequently, the remaining parcel of land admeasuring 698.23 sq.
metres (approximately 699 sq. metres) continues to vest in the
Government and any taking over of possession thereof can only be in
accordance with Clause (xi) of the lease deed. Any amount already
released shall be duly adjusted. In the event it is found that excess
amount has been disbursed towards compensation for land pursuant to
interim orders and contrary to this judgment, the same shall be liable
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to restitution in accordance with law.
113. All the pending applications shall stand closed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 09, 2026
jai/pal
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