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2026:MLHC:718-DB
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Arb.A. No. 1 of 2026 with
MC (Arb.A) No. 2 of 2026
Date of Decision: 15.07.2026
Union of India
Through the Engineer-in-Charge,
Meghalaya-II, CPWD, Shillong
.…….. Appellant
-VsM/s. Rajnish Infratech OPC Pvt. Ltd
E 3/1, Top Floor,
Jhandewalan Extension,
New Delhi 110055
……… Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S. Yadav, Adv with
Mr. D. Das, Adv.
2026:MLHC:718-DB
Per W. Diengdoh, (J):
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The background factual situation of this case is that for the purpose of
construction of the Administrative Building at NEIAH, New Shillong, the
appellant/Union of India has floated a tender being NIT No. 25/NIT/CE/EE/MEGHII/2023-24 at an estimated cost of ₹ 24,94,17,881/- (Rupees twenty-four crores,
ninety-four lakhs, seventeen thousand, eight hundred eighty-one) only. The
respondent participated in the bid process and emerged as the lowest bidder (L-1),
the appellant herein then issued the Letter of Acceptance dated 23.02.2024, for which
the respondent was requested to furnish the Performance Guarantee for an amount
of ₹ 1,18,00,587/- (Rupees one crore, eighteen lakhs, five hundred eighty-seven)
only, which was done so in the form of an FDR.
2.
Thereafter, the work was allotted to the respondent vide letter of Award
dated 06.03.2024 and a Contract Agreement was also signed vide Agreement No.
21/CE/EE/Megh-II/2023-24 for a total contract value of ₹ 23,60,11,736/- (Rupees
twenty-three crores, sixty lakhs, eleven thousand, seven hundred thirty-six) only.
The start date for the contract was 04.03.2024 and the scheduled date for completion
was 03.09.2025.
3.
It is also on record that as per the terms of the contract, the respondent
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was required to submit certain documents including Trading Licence issued to NonTribal Contractors by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC). This
is in terms of Clause X of the NIT. The period required to receive the said Trading
Licence was one month from the date of receipt of the contract, failing which the
respondent will be liable for any action by the CPWD or the KHADC.
4.
Evidently, the respondent failed to submit several documents required,
for which the appellant caused issuance of a letter dated 12.04.2024 with a condition
that if the Firm failed to produce such documents and show progress of the work,
suitable action under relevant clauses of the contract will be taken against it. Another
such letter was issued on 25.04.2024 prompting a response from the respondent vide
letter dated 30.04.2024, to say that, though, the application for the Trading Licence
was made, however, due to the implementation of the Model Code of Conduct, no
fresh Trading Licence was issued by the District Council.
5.
Eventually, vide show cause notice dated 09.05,2024, the appellant then
put to notice to the respondent as to why action under Clause 5 of the Agreement
should not be taken against the respondent, this step was to be taken in case no cause
is shown or, if shown, that it should be satisfactory. In response, the respondent in
its reply dated 15.05.2024 has stated that they are trying to get the said Trading
Licence from the KHADC for in the absence of the Trading Licence, no materials
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could be procured as no GST registration could be obtained without the Trading
Licence.
6.
Finally, after about three months have elapsed, the respondent having
failed to obtained the said Trading Licence, the appellant vide letter dated 24.06.2024
determined the Contract and the Performance Guarantee stands forfeited.
7.
The respondent/Firm then raised the matter in Arbitration, and on being
so referred, Shri Sudhir Kumar, Former ADG, CPWD was appointed as the Sole
Arbitrator. The respondent/Firm raised 6 Claims, while the appellant/Petitioner
raised 1 Counter-Claim, the same being the following:
Claim No. 1: Declaring the action taken under clause 3 of the agreement
to be null and void.
Claim No. 2: Recovery of PG forfeited to a tune of Rs. 1,18,00,587/-.
Claim No. 3: Claim for losses and damages of Rs. 25,00,000/-.
Claim No. 4: Claim for loss of profit @ 15% on the tender value.
Claim No. 5: Interest on all of the above claims @18% from the date of
cause of action till the final payment is made.
Claim No. 6: All the expenses which are being incurred.
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Claim No. 7: Cost of litigation.
The Counter-Claim raised by the respondent herein before the Arbitrator
is only with regard to the Cost of arbitration for which an amount of ₹ 7,80,000/was claimed.
8.
After the arbitration proceedings came to an end, the Arbitrator has
passed the Award dated 26.12.2024 and has dealt with the respective claims as
follows:
Claim No.
Particulars of Claim Claim Amount
in brief
Declaring the action
taken under clause 3
of the agreement to be
null and void
Recovery of PG Rs. 1,18,00,587/forfeited
Claim for losses and Rs. 25,00,000/damages
Claim for loss of Rs 1,77,00,880/profit @7.5% on the
tender value.
Interest on all of the
above claims @18%
from the date of cause
of action till the final
payment
Interest awarded-
Award Amount
Action
under
clause 5 declared
invalid.
PG
(Rs.
1,18,00,587/- in
the shape of FDR)
to be released
NIL
NIL
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(i) Pre-award interest:
There shall not be any
pre-award interest
7.
CC-1
9.
(ii)
Post-award
interest: No postaward interest shall be
payable if the award
amount; i.e. the PG (in
the shape of FDR
amounting to Rs.
1,18,00,587/-)
is
released
to
the
claimant contractor on
or before 25.01 2025.
Failing this, the PG
amount
(Rs
1,18,00,587/-) shall
bear
post-award
simple interest @2%
per annum w.e.f.
27.12.2024 till the
date
of
actual
payment.
On
account
of Not specified
expenses Incurred
On account of cost of
litigation
On account of cost of 7,80,000/arbitration
Rs. 3,00,000/-
NIL
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said Award of the learned
Arbitrator, the appellant has approached the Commercial Court at Shillong with
Commercial Arbitration No. 13 of 2025 under the provision of Section 34 of the
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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, assailing the said Award dated 26.12.2024.
10.
The learned District Judge after hearing the parties, has disposed of the
said application vide the impugned order dated 03.02.2026, effectively dismissed the
challenge to the said Arbitral Award, that is, that the said Award stands justified.
11.
Once again, being aggrieved by the said impugned order passed by the
learned Commercial Court, the appellant has now approached this Court with this
instant appeal under Section 37 of the said Arbitration and Conciliation Act, seeking
to set aside and quash the same.
12.
Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI in his argument has submitted that since
the respondent/Firm has failed to comply with the terms of the contract as far as
commencement of the work is concerned, the fact being that the Firm failed to
procure the Non-Trading Licence to enable it to obtain the labour license and the
GST registration, therefore, on show cause notice being issued, Clause 5 of the
Contract was invoked.
13.
It is further submitted that as per Clause 5, which was amended on
08.12.2023, in case of default even after the time period specified in the notice in
writing by the Engineer-in-Charge, then the performance guarantee shall be forfeited
by the Engineer-in-Charge which was done so.
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14.
In further clarification of what Clause 5 entails, the learned DSGI has
submitted that the unamended clause would be implemented in the following
sequence: first the default, then forfeiture of performance guarantee. On the contrary,
Clause 3 of the contract stipulates that on non-commencement of the work, the
contract will firstly be determined or terminated, then comes the forfeiture of the
performance guarantee.
15.
As to the amended Clause 5, the learned DSGI has submitted that in view
of the said amendment, the sequence will now be as follows: first the default, then
forfeiture of the performance guarantee and finally, the determination or termination
of the contract. This, according to the learned DSGI was not considered by the
learned Arbitrator, thereby, leading to the wrong conclusion made in the award.
16.
However, the learned DSGI has fairly submitted that the amended Clause
5 was never brought to the notice of the learned Arbitrator in the arbitration
proceedings.
17.
That the learned Commercial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that
the learned Arbitrator, while coming to the finding that the final action of the
respondent-EE on determination of the contract under clause 5/GCC is not in
accordance with the contractual provisions, and further, that the final action travels
beyond the bounds of show cause notice issued, therefore, the action is
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impermissible and without jurisdiction, and to that extent, the action taken under
clause 5/GCC is invalid, such finding is incorrect and not based on the terms of the
NIT and the contract, contends the learned DSGI. As such, it is prayed that the
impugned judgment dated 03.02.2026 be set aside and quashed.
18.
Mr. S. Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that what
is to be looked into in this matter is whether the appellant has applied the proper
clause of the contract while determining the contract of the respondent. Admittedly,
the appellant has invoked Clause 5 which is under the heading “Time and extension
for delay” as such, this clause speaks only about extension of time if a contractor
commits defaults in commencing the execution of the work in time, and on such
default the performance guarantee shall be forfeited. However, Clause 3 of the said
contract speaks of when the contract can be determined and under this Clause a
number of cases has been cited, for example, sub-Clause (ii) speaks about the default
of the contractor to proceed with the work, for which under sub-Clause (xii)(a) the
Engineer in-Charge can determine or terminate the contract and upon such
determination the performance guarantee shall stands forfeited.
19.
The learned counsel has further submitted that the appellant has resorted
to the amended Clause 5 to determine the contract, which clause was never brought
to the notice of the learned Arbitrator, as such, the decision of the learned Arbitrator
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being fair and just, the fact that the same has been upheld by the learned Commercial
Court in the said application under Section 34 of the Act also stands justified submits
the learned counsel.
20.
Again, the learned counsel has submitted that the scope of interference
by this Court as far as Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is very limited, the case of
MMTC Limited v. M/s Vedanta Limited, (2019) 4 SCC 163 has been cited to
support this contention at para 14.
21.
Upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties, facts of the case duly
noted hereinabove, what is understood is that after the contract was determined and
the performance guarantee forfeited, the respondent referred the matter for
arbitration and about six claims were presented before the learned Arbitrator.
Correspondingly, the appellant herein has also made a counter claim of Rs.
7,80,000/- for cost of Arbitration.
22.
As has been submitted, the learned Arbitrator has disposed of the matter
and relevantly on claim No. 2 that is, recovery of PG forfeited, carrying an amount
of Rs. 1,18,00,587/-, the same is directed to be released. Against claim No. 6 on
account of expenses incurred, an award of Rs. 3,00,000/-. The counter claim made
by the appellant herein as respondent in the arbitral proceedings was also not allowed
by the learned Arbitrator.
2026:MLHC:718-DB
23.
Importantly, what the learned Arbitrator has concluded is that there is no
ground for the appellant to invoke Clause 5 (supra), the findings in this regard being
that the final action of the respondent-EE on determining the contract under Clause
5/GCC is not in accordance with the contractual provision. The learned Commercial
Court dealing with the Section 34 application has also concurred with this finding,
inasmuch as, the same was not disturbed.
24.
It is also noticed that as per Clause 3 of the General Condition of Contract
(GCC), failure of the contractor to proceed with the work will result in the same to
be determined and thereafter the Performance Guarantee will be forfeited. Whereas,
as per Clause 5 of the said GCC in case of default by the contractor, the result would
be forfeiture of the performance guarantee. However, vide initial impugned action
of the Engineering-in-Charge vide notification dated 24.06.2024, the allegedly by
resorting to Clause 5 (supra), the Engineer-in-Charge has determined the contract,
and upon such determination, the performance guarantee stands forfeited. Thus, it is
apparent that a wrong provision of the GCC was invoked by the Engineer-in-Charge
which was noticed by the learned Arbitrator, the same being reflected in the Arbitral
Award. This is a finding on facts which cannot be gone into by this Court under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The fact that the learned Commercial Court has
also concurred with such findings, therefore, a concurrent finding of facts cannot be
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easily overturned by a superior court.
25.
In the case of MMTC Limited (supra), at para 14 of the same, the
Supreme Court has held as follows:
“14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per
Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference
under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under
Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent
assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the
exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the
scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award
has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an
appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow
to disturb such concurrent findings.”
26.
It may not be out of place to refer to the well settled law as far as exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 37 is concerned. In the case of Haryana Tourism
Limited v. Kandhari Beverages Limited, (2022) 3 SCC 237 at para 8 and 9. It was
held as follows:
“8. So far as the impugned judgment and order, Kandhari Beverages Ltd.
v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3233 passed by the
High Court quashing and setting aside the award and the order passed by
the Additional District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are
concerned, it is required to be noted that in an appeal under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act, the High Court has entered into the merits of the
claim, which is not permissible in exercise of powers under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act.
9. As per settled position of law laid down by this Court in a catena of
decisions, an award can be set aside only if the award is against the public
policy of India. The award can be set aside under Sections 34/37 of the
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Arbitration Act, if the award is found to be contrary to: (a) fundamental
policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality;
or (d) if it is patently illegal. None of the aforesaid exceptions shall be
applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The High Court has entered
into the merits of the claim and has decided the appeal under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act as if the High Court was deciding the appeal
against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Thus,
the High Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment and order,
Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine
P&H 3233 passed by the High Court is hence not sustainable.”
27.
In the case of Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited and
Anr. v. Sanman Rice Mills and Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2632 at
para 20, it was observed as follows:
“20. In view of the above position in law on the subject, the scope of
the intervention of the court in arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if
not absolutely barred and that the interference is confined only to the
extent envisaged under Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power of
Section 37 of the Act is limited within the domain of Section 34 of the
Act. It is exercisable only to find out if the court, exercising power under
Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its limits as prescribed thereunder
or has exceeded or failed to exercise the power so conferred. The
Appellate Court has no authority of law to consider the matter in dispute
before the arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find out as to whether the
decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or wrong upon reappraisal of
evidence as if it is sitting in an ordinary court of appeal. It is only where
the court exercising power under Section 34 has failed to exercise its
jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 or has travelled beyond its
jurisdiction that the appellate court can step in and set aside the order
passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its power is more akin to that
superintendence as is vested in civil courts while exercising revisionary
powers. The arbitral award is not liable to be interfered unless a case for
interference as set out in the earlier part of the decision, is made out. It
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cannot be disturbed only for the reason that instead of the view taken by
the arbitral tribunal, the other view which is also a possible view is a
better view according to the appellate court.”
28.
In view of the above findings and observations, we are of the view that
the impugned judgment passed by the learned Commercial Court, Shillong cannot
be faulted and the same is hereby upheld.
29.
As has been awarded by the learned Arbitrator, the appellant herein is
directed to satisfy the award and to make all necessary payments to the respondent
within 4(four) weeks’ time, particularly as regard Claim No. 2 and Claim No. 6
therein.
30.
This appeal being devoid of merits is hereby rejected and accordingly
disposed of. No Costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Revati Mohite Dere)
Chief Justice
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2026.07.15 18:11:57 IST
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