The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
37. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Petitioner has failed to establish that limitation commenced only on 18.07.2024. The admitted receipt of the signed Impugned Award by the Petitioner's counsel on 09.10.2023 constitutes valid receipt for the purposes of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act and consequently triggers the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. The present Petitions, having been instituted beyond the maximum period prescribed under the statute, are hopelessly barred by limitation and are not maintainable.
38. Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent is sustained. The present Petitions, being barred by limitation, are dismissed.
39. The present Petitions, along with pending application(s), if any, are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
40. No order as to costs.
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 22.05.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 06.07.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025, I.A. 15/2025 (Stay) & I.A. 17/2025
Delay of 59 days in Re-filing the petition)
UNION OF INDIA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Sushil Kumar Pandey, SPC
with Mr. Aman Kumar Pandey
&
Mr.
Pradip
Sharma,
Advocates.
versus
M/S ISC-YUG (JV)
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Ms. Pooja Dua, Ms. Urzica
Chauhan & Ms. Gauri Ojha,
Advocates.
O.M.P. (COMM) 7/2025, I.A. 160/2025 (Stay) & I.A. 162/2025
(Delay of 100 days in Re-filing the petition)
UNION OF INDIA
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Sushil Kumar Pandey, SPC
with Mr. Aman Kumar Pandey
&
Mr.
Pradip
Sharma,
Advocates.
versus
M/S ISC YUG
Through:
.....Respondent
Ms. Pooja Dua, Ms. Urzica
Chauhan & Ms. Gauri Ojha,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The captioned Petitions, under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 19961, seek to assail the common Arbitral
Award dated 22.09.20232 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator in
ARB. Nos. 141 and 142 of 2023, the original signed copy of which is
stated to have still not been obtained by the Petitioner herein.
2.
The Petitions are accompanied by applications, being I.A.
17/2025 seeking condonation of the delay of 59 days in re-filing
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025, while I.A. 162/2025 has been filed seeking
condonation of the delay of 100 days in re-filing O.M.P. (COMM)
7/2025.
3.
At the very outset, before this Court adverts to the merits of the
captioned Petitions or even the Applications seeking condonation of
delay in re-filing the Petitions, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent
has
raised
a
preliminary
objection
as
to
the
maintainability of the present Petitions on the ground that the same are
barred by limitation.
4.
Therefore, this Court feels it is necessary to first adjudicate the
preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the
Respondent and determine whether the present Petitions are barred by
limitation.
5.
In the event that the challenge is found to be barred by
limitation, it would be neither necessary nor appropriate to enter into a
detailed examination of the factual matrix of the case.
A&C Act
Impugned Award
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
BRIEF FACTS:
6.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane for the
adjudication of the preliminary issue concerning the limitation are as
follows:
(a) The Petitioner herein floated a tender dated 09.09.2016 for the
work of construction of various Limited Height, which was
awarded in favour of the Respondent vide separate Letters of
Acceptance dated 02.12.2016 and 16.01.2017 respectively.
(b) Pursuant thereto, the parties entered into a contract agreement
dated 06.04.2017.
(c) It is stated that certain disputes arose as between the parties and
arbitral proceedings were initiated, which culminated in the
common Award dated 22.09.2023 rendered by the learned Sole
Arbitrator. It is stated in the Petition that the Award was
pronounced through video conferencing.
(d) It is stated that a signed copy thereof was allegedly not
delivered directly to the Petitioner in terms of Section 31(5) of
the A&C Act and the signed copy of the Impugned Award was
admittedly collected by the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the Petitioner on 09.10.2023.
(e) Thereafter,
an
Execution
Petition
bearing
OMP(ENF.)(COMM.) No. 45/2024 came to be filed by the
Respondent, pursuant to which the Petitioner moved an
application before Delhi International Arbitration Centre3 on
16.07.2024 seeking a copy of the Impugned Award.
DIAC
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
(f)
The Petitioner claims to have received a “copy to copy” of the
Impugned Award only on 18.07.2024.
(g) Aggrieved by the Impugned Award, the Petitioner has preferred
the present Petitions under Section 34.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
7.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would
submit that the present Petitions are egregiously barred by limitation.
It would be submitted that the date that the Petitioner has considered
for the calculation of the limitation period is predicated on a wholly
misconceived understanding of the facts and circumstances of the
present case, as well as the law.
8.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would draw the attention of
this Court to the pleadings themselves wherein it is stated that the
Petitioner gained knowledge of the Impugned Award on 22.09.2023,
i.e., the day on which the Impugned Award was pronounced, as has
been indicated by the Petitioner in their List of Dates appended to the
present Petition.
9.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would
further submit that the present Petitions have been carefully worded to
merely state that the Petitioner did not receive a signed copy of the
Award, while conspicuously omitting two material aspects, namely,
first, whether the counsel appearing for the Petitioner was authorised
to receive the Award on its behalf, and second, whether, upon such
receipt, the signed copy of the Award was in fact not transmitted by
the counsel to the Petitioner.
10.
It would further be submitted that the Petitioner had knowledge
of the Impugned Award since the day the same was pronounced;
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
however, it took no steps to obtain a signed copy of the Impugned
Award within the prescribed time period. It would be argued that the
Petitioner cannot now seek to argue on the strength of the fact that it
received the copy of the Impugned Award belatedly, after the
Petitioner itself chose not to act promptly and consciously failed to
take the requisite steps to obtain a signed copy of the Impugned
Award. Having acquiesced in such inaction, the Petitioner cannot now
seek to extend or postpone the commencement of limitation by relying
upon its own omission.
11.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would seek to rely upon
the judgment of this Court in Employees State Insurance
Corporation v Mukesh Associates4 to further buttress her argument.
12.
It would further be submitted by learned counsel for the
Respondent, on demurrer, that despite having gained knowledge of
the Impugned Award in February 2024, the Petitioner chose to sleep
over its rights till July 2024, which is when it chose to prefer an
application seeking the copy of the Impugned Award. This, as would
be argued by the learned counsel for the Respondent, shows the
lackadaisical conduct of the Petitioner and therefore, the present
Petitions are liable to be dismissed on the preliminary ground of
having been filed belatedly.
13.
Per contra, learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that
the present Petitions are not beyond the limitation period, primarily on
the ground that the signed copy of the Award was not served upon the
Petitioner but was instead served upon the counsel appearing on its
behalf. He would submit that such service is not valid in law and that,
2026: DHC : 829
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Maharashtra v. ARK Builders (P) Ltd.5, limitation would commence
only upon receipt of a signed copy of the Award by the party itself
and not merely upon service to its counsel.
14.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner would also seek to rely upon
the Affidavit filed on behalf of the Authorised Officer of the Petitioner
dated 04.05.2026 to state that the collection of the Impugned Award
by the erstwhile learned counsel for the Petitioner was invalid since he
was not authorised to collect the same.
15.
It would be submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner
that the Petitioner only became aware of the Impugned Award after
the Execution Petition came to be filed and the present Petitions came
to be promptly filed after having received the copy of the Impugned
Award.
16.
It would also be submitted that the limitation prescribed under
Section 34(3) of the A&C Act commences only upon the delivery of a
signed copy of the arbitral award in compliance with Section 31(5) of
the A&C Act. Since no such signed copy had been delivered to the
Petitioner, the limitation period had not begun to run. It would thus be
submitted that the Award having been received on 18.07.2024, the
limitation would commence thereafter, and therefore, the present
Petitions are not barred by limitation.
ANALYSIS:
17.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material on record
and the affidavits filed on behalf of the Petitioner.
[(2011) 4 SCC 616]
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
18.
The preliminary objection raised by the Respondent goes to the
very maintainability of the present Petitions. The question that
therefore falls for consideration is whether the Petitions under Section
34 of the A&C Act have been instituted within the period prescribed
under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
19.
Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be apposite
to note that the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C
Act is mandatory in nature. The provision stipulates that an
application for setting aside an arbitral award must be made within
three months from the date on which the party making the application
had received the arbitral award. The proviso empowers the Court to
condone delay only up to a further period of thirty days, provided
sufficient cause is shown. Beyond the said period, the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 34. Section 34 of the
A&C Act reads as under:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—
****
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter….”
20.
The language employed by the legislature is explicit and
mandatory. The expression “but not thereafter” occurring in the
proviso to Section 34(3) places a complete embargo on the power of
the Court to condone delay beyond the additional period of thirty
days. This Court is guided by the Judgment of the Apex Court in
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.6 wherein it has been held
as follows:
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go
further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set
aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso,
would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result.”
****
16. “Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application
for setting aside such award “in accordance with” sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting
aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an
application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, subsection (3) would not be an application “in accordance with” that
sub-section. Consequently, by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to
the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the
period prescribed.”
21.
This Court is further guided by the Judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India7,
wherein the following has been held:
“18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting
aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can
only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing
sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not
thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot
be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay
of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict
timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso
to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be
(2001) 8 SCC 470
(2019) 2 SCC 455
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear
statutory mandate.
19. The respondent received the arbitral award on 31-10-2014.
Exactly ninety days after the receipt of the award, the respondent
filed an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the
District Judge, Port Blair on 30-1-2015. On 12-2-2016, the District
Judge dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction and on 283-2016, the respondent filed an application before the High Court
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the arbitral
award. After the order of dismissal of the application by the
District Judge, the respondent took almost 44 days (excluding the
date of dismissal of the application by the District Judge and the
date of filing of application before the High Court) in filing the
application before the High Court. Hence, even if the respondent is
given the benefit of the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act in respect of the period spent in pursuing the proceedings
before the District Judge, Port Blair, the petition under Section 34
was filed much beyond the outer period of ninety days.”
22.
The controversy in the present case does not revolve around the
statutory position but rather the point from which limitation
commenced. According to the Petitioner, limitation began only on
18.07.2024, when it obtained a "copy to copy" of the Impugned
Award from DIAC. The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that
the signed copy of the Award had already been received by the
Petitioner's counsel on 09.10.2023 and that limitation must necessarily
be reckoned from that date.
23.
It is not disputed that the learned Sole Arbitrator pronounced
the Impugned Award on 22.09.2023 through video conferencing. It is
equally not disputed that the Petitioner's counsel collected the signed
copy of the Impugned Award on 09.10.2023. The Petition itself
specifically acknowledges this fact. The only attempt made by the
Petitioner is to contend that the receipt of the Impugned Award by its
counsel cannot be treated as receipt by the Petitioner itself, since the
counsel was allegedly not authorised to receive the same.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
24.
This contention, in the opinion of this Court, is wholly
untenable. Significantly, the Petition has been drafted with
considerable circumspection. While asserting that the Petitioner itself
did not receive the signed copy of the Impugned Award, it carefully
avoids pleading that the counsel appearing before the learned
Arbitrator lacked authority to receive the Impugned Award. Equally
absent is any pleading that the counsel, after receiving the signed
copy, failed to communicate the same to the Petitioner. These are
material facts which were required to be specifically pleaded if the
Petitioner intended to contend that the receipt by its counsel could not
be attributed to it. The omission assumes greater significance
considering that the Petitioner itself admits that the Impugned Award
had been collected by its counsel on 09.10.2023.
25.
The Petitioner has attempted to cure this deficiency by placing
reliance upon an affidavit dated 04.05.2026 of its Authorised Officer,
asserting that the erstwhile counsel was not authorised to collect the
Impugned Award. This Court is unable to attach any weight to such an
assertion. The affidavit has admittedly been filed nearly two years
after the institution of the present proceedings and after the
Respondent specifically raised the plea of limitation. More
importantly, no contemporaneous material has been placed on record
to demonstrate that the authority of the counsel stood restricted or that
any objection had ever been raised before the learned Arbitrator or
DIAC regarding the delivery of the Impugned Award to the learned
counsel. A subsequent self-serving affidavit cannot displace the
admitted factual position reflected from the record.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
26.
It is well settled that an advocate who represents a party in
arbitral proceedings acts as the recognised agent of such party for all
acts incidental to the conduct of those proceedings unless his authority
is shown to have been specifically curtailed. In the absence of any
contemporaneous material demonstrating such restriction, this Court
finds no reason to hold that the receipt of the signed Impugned Award
by the counsel was legally ineffective.
27.
Even otherwise, the conduct of the Petitioner completely belies
its present stand. The Petitioner admittedly had knowledge of the
pronouncement of the Award on 22.09.2023. Despite such knowledge,
it chose not to make any endeavour whatsoever to obtain a signed
copy of the Impugned Award from the learned Arbitrator or from
DIAC within the statutory period prescribed under Section 34(3) of
the A&C Act. If indeed the Petitioner had not received the Impugned
Award, ordinary prudence demanded that it immediately seek its
delivery. Instead, the Petitioner remained completely inactive.
28.
There is yet another aspect which militates against the
Petitioner's case. Vide Order dated 27.02.2026, this Court had called
upon the Petitioner to specifically clarify the circumstances
surrounding the receipt of the signed copy of the Impugned Award by
its erstwhile counsel and the authority under which the same had been
collected. The affidavit subsequently filed on behalf of the Petitioner,
however, conspicuously fails to answer the queries raised by this
Court. Apart from making a bald assertion that the erstwhile counsel
was not authorised to receive the Impugned Award, the affidavit
neither discloses the basis of such assertion nor explains how the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
Impugned Award came to be collected by the counsel representing the
Petitioner in the arbitral proceedings.
29.
Equally, the affidavit is silent as to whether the Impugned
Award, after being collected by the counsel, was ever transmitted to or
brought to the knowledge of the Petitioner. The affidavit thus does not
furnish any substantive explanation to the specific issues raised by this
Court and falls far short of discharging the burden cast upon the
Petitioner to establish that the receipt of the Impugned Award by its
counsel could not be treated as receipt by the Petitioner for the
purposes of Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the A&C Act.
30.
It is only after the Respondent initiated execution proceedings
that the Petitioner addressed a communication dated 16.07.2024 to
DIAC seeking a copy of the Impugned Award. Such conduct
unmistakably demonstrates that the Petitioner was content in allowing
the statutory period to lapse and only sought to obtain another copy
once execution proceedings had commenced. A litigant cannot be
permitted to take advantage of its own inaction and thereafter seek to
postpone the commencement of limitation on the ground that it
obtained another copy of the Award at a later point in time.
31.
The submission
that limitation
commenced
afresh on
18.07.2024 merely because DIAC supplied another copy of the
Impugned Award deserves outright rejection. Acceptance of such a
proposition would virtually render Section 34(3) of the A&C Act
otiose. A party, despite having knowledge of an Award and despite its
authorised representative having received the signed copy, could
indefinitely postpone limitation by simply applying for another copy
months or years later. Such an interpretation would defeat the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
legislative object of ensuring finality and expedition in arbitral
proceedings.
32.
The reliance placed by the Petitioner upon ARK Builders (P)
Ltd. (supra) is equally misplaced. There can be no quarrel with the
proposition that limitation commences upon delivery of a signed copy
of the Award in terms of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. However, the
said decision cannot be read to mean that where the signed Award has
admittedly been received by the counsel representing a party, the
limitation would nevertheless remain suspended until the party
chooses to obtain another copy for itself. The ratio of ARK Builders
(P) Ltd. (supra) cannot be extended to protect a litigant who, despite
having knowledge of the Award and whose counsel has admittedly
received the signed copy, remains indolent and seeks to revive
limitation by procuring another copy at a much later stage.
33.
This Court also finds merit in the submission of the Respondent
that the present Petitions are founded upon selective pleadings. While
the Petitioner repeatedly emphasises that it did not personally receive
the Impugned Award, it has deliberately refrained from disclosing the
circumstances in which its erstwhile counsel received the signed copy
or whether such copy was communicated to the Petitioner. A litigant
invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court is expected to
approach the Court with complete candour. Suppression of material
particulars assumes added significance where the issue concerns
limitation, which goes to the very jurisdiction of the Court to entertain
the Petition.
34.
The judgment of this Court in Employees State Insurance
Corporation (supra) correctly recognises that a party cannot
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
indefinitely postpone limitation by remaining passive despite
knowledge of the Award and thereafter seek to rely upon its own
omission to contend that limitation had not commenced. The principle
squarely applies to the facts of the present case.
35.
Once it is held that the signed copy of the Impugned Award had
been received by the Petitioner's counsel on 09.10.2023, limitation
under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act necessarily commenced from that
date. Even assuming the maximum permissible period available under
Section 34(3), including the additional period of thirty days, the outer
limit for maintaining the present Petitions stood exhausted long before
they came to be instituted. The Court's jurisdiction to entertain the
Petitions consequently stood extinguished upon expiry of the said
period.
36.
The applications seeking condonation of delay in re-filing
cannot improve the Petitioner's case. Re-filing delay becomes relevant
only where the original institution of the Petition is itself within the
period prescribed by law. Where the Petition is barred at the threshold
by limitation under Section 34(3), questions relating to delay in refiling become wholly academic.
DECISION:
37.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court has no hesitation
in holding that the Petitioner has failed to establish that limitation
commenced only on 18.07.2024. The admitted receipt of the signed
Impugned Award by the Petitioner's counsel on 09.10.2023 constitutes
valid receipt for the purposes of Section 31(5) of the A&C Act and
consequently triggers the commencement of limitation under Section
34(3) of the A&C Act. The present Petitions, having been instituted
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
beyond the maximum period prescribed under the statute, are
hopelessly barred by limitation and are not maintainable.
38.
Accordingly,
the
preliminary
objection
raised
by
the
Respondent is sustained. The present Petitions, being barred by
limitation, are dismissed.
39.
The present Petitions, along with pending application(s), if any,
are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
40.
No order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 06, 2026/va
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:52:20
O.M.P. (COMM) 2/2025 & connected matter
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