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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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CNR No. DLHC010479452026
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W.P.(C) 14729/2026, CM APPL. 68935/2026
UNION OF INDIA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Raj Kumar, CGSC with
Ms. Vidushi Sah, Adv.
versus
INDRESH KUMAR PANDEY
Through:
.....Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
05.10.2026
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C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
This writ petition assails order dated 19 May 2026 passed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal1 in MA 2306/2026 in OA
1997/2025. The impugned order read as under:
“Heard learned counsel for the parties on the point of interim relief.
The brief facts relevant for deciding the issue of grant of interim
relief are as follows:
The first stage advice from the CVC was not obtained by the
respondents before initiation of the chargesheet to the applicant.
The affidavit in reply filed by the respondents itself reveals that the
Disciplinary Authority had taken a decision to drop all the charges
levelled against the applicant by conveying displeasure along with
debarring the applicant from taking part in any assignment
1 “Tribunal” hereinafter
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KUMAR
12:27:52
activities carried out by the Government of India or any State
Government for a period of one year. The decision to drop the
charges was apparently taken by the Disciplinary Authority under
Rule 14(5) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.
Subsequently, the respondents, vide order dated 05.03.2026,
appointed an Inquiry Officer to inquire into the same charges
mentioned above.
Having heard the respective parties and having gone through the
entire pleadings, we are of the prima facie opinion that the
respondents could not have appointed an Inquiry Officer to
continue the proceedings once the Disciplinary Authority had
decided drop the same.
In the above circumstances, by way of interim order, we stay the
impugned disciplinary proceedings.
MA No. 2306/2026 stands disposed of.
Dasti.
OA No. 1997/2025
Stand over to 29.07.2026.”
2.
We are sanguine that the seven Judge Bench of the Supreme
Court, when it rendered its historic decision in L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India2, never even anticipated that such orders would
become subject matter of challenge in writ petitions.
3.
Mr. Raj Kumar, learned CGSC appearing for the Union of
India, has no submissions to offer, when we queried him as to why
this Court should interfere with a purely discretionary order of the
Tribunal, which results in no irreparable prejudice to the petitioner.
He submits that an Inquiry Officer has already been appointed. That
can hardly constitute a basis for us to interfere with the aforesaid
2 (1997) 3 SCC 261
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order.
4.
The Tribunal has proceeded on relevant considerations in
passing the order. It is not an order which is passed without reasons.
The Tribunal has noted the fact that the first stage advice from the
CVC was not obtained before issuance of chargesheet to the
respondent; the disciplinary authority had taken a decision to drop all
the charges against the respondent, restricting himself to a mere
displeasure under Rule 14(5) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and
subsequently, the petitioner, vide order dated 5 March 2026, appointed
an Inquiry Officer to inquire into the very same charges.
5.
The Tribunal has observed that, in view of the decision taken by
the disciplinary authority, the Inquiry Officer could not have been
appointed to inquire into the very same charges.
6.
As we have already noted, Mr. Raj Kumar has unable to point
out any error in the impugned order. His only submission is that an
Inquiry Officer has been appointed. It is the very appointment of the
Inquiry Officer which, according to the Tribunal, is prima facie
illegal.
7.
Besides, as we have already noted, the order is purely
discretionary in nature.
8.
We
are
exercising
certiorari
jurisdiction,
which
is
circumscribed by the law declared in the following passages from
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Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan3:
“7.
The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in
that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued
for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or
tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court
or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior
Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot
be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible
and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as
an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In
dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear
in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground
that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points
cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that
the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to
issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari
Vishnu Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque4, Nagandra Nath Bora v
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam5
3 AIR 1964 SC 477
4 (1954) 2 SCC 881
5 AIR 1958 SC 398
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and Kaushalya Devi v Bachittar Singh6.
8.
It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe
what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means.
What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it
must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is
apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear
that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or
Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be,
even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which
are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so
plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no
difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said
error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be
that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious
or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need
an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt
that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law
and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as
would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face
of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two
constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior
Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be
open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is
neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to
describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately
described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of
law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the
nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have
been misconstrued or contravened.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9.
The Supreme Court has also, in its decision in Wander Ltd. v.
Antox (India) Pvt. Ltd.7, expounded on the extent of scope of
interference in appeal against discretionary orders passed by
authorities lower in the judicial hierarchy, thus:
6 AIR 1960 SC 1168
7 1990 (Supp) SCC 727
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“14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion
is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not
reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from
the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court
was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would
normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a
contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial
court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate
court would have taken a different view may not justify
interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After
referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph8:
“... These principles are well established, but as has been
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton &
Co. v. Jhanaton9 ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of
appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of
his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that
arises is due only to the application of well settled
principles in an individual case’.”
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”
10.
It goes without saying that the scope of interference under
Article 226 would be even more circumscribed than the scope of
interference available to an appellate court.
11.
Within the limits of certiorari jurisdiction which vests in us, no
case is made out to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal.
8 (1960) 3 SCR 713
1942 AC 130
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12.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed in limine.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA, J.
OCTOBER 5, 2026/aky
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