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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 18.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 09.01.2026
+
LPA 671/2019 & CM APPL. 45953/2019 (Delay of 173 days in
filing LPA)
ALL INDIA DRUG ACTION NETWORK
Through:
.....Appellant
Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Mr.
Krishna Kumar Keshav and Mr.
Ankush Khanna, Advocates.
versus
LUPIN LTD & ORS.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Raj Sekhar Rao, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Ajay
Bhargava, Ms.Vanita Bhargava,
Mr. Aseem Chaturvedi, Mr.
Milind Jain and Mr. Anuj
Shrotriya, Advocates.
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG for
UOI with Mr. P.S. Singh,
CGSC
with
Ms.
Shiva
Lakshmi, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr.
Madhav Bajaj, Mr. Vivek
Mathur, Mr. R.V. Prabhat, Mr.
Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikram
Aditya Singh, Mr. Yash
Wardhan Sharma, Mr. Naman,
Mr. Dinesh Kumar, Advocates,
Mr. Deepak Kumar, Mr.
Rajneesh K. Sharma, Mr.
Ashutosh Bharti, Ms. Minakshi
Singh and Mr. Prituysh Kumar,
ADC (I) for R-3 & 4
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
18:12:56
LPA 671/2019 & two connected Appeals
+
LPA 105/2020, CM APPL. 6860/2020 (Stay), CM APPL.
6862/2020 (Delay of 280 days) & CM APPL. 6863/2020
(Delay of 25 days in re-filing the appeal)
UNION OF INDIA
.....Appellant
Through:
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with
Mr. P.S. Singh, CGSC with Ms.
Shiva Lakshmi, Mr. Amit
Gupta, Mr. Madhav Bajaj, Mr.
Vivek Mathur, Mr. R.V.
Prabhat, Mr. Shubham Sharma,
Mr. Vikram Aditya Singh, Mr.
Yash Wardhan Sharma, Mr.
Naman, Mr. Dinesh Kumar,
Advocates, Mr. Deepak Kumar,
Mr. Rajneesh K. Sharma, Mr.
Ashutosh Bharti, Ms. Minakshi
Singh and Mr. Prituysh Kumar,
ADC (I) for UOI
versus
ERIS LIFESCIENCES LIMITED & ANR.
Through:
+
.....Respondents
Mr. R. Jawahar Lal and
Mr.
Sayyam
Maheswari,
Advocates.
LPA 106/2020, CM APPL. 6864/2020 (Stay), CM APPL.
6866/2020 (delay of 280 days) & CM APPL. 6867/2020 (Delay
of 25 days in re-filing the appeal)
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Appellants
Through:
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG for
UOI with Mr. P.S. Singh,
CGSC
with
Ms.
Shiva
Lakshmi, Mr. Amit Gupta,
Mr.Madhav Bajaj, Mr. Vivek
Mathur, Mr. R.V. Prabhat,
Mr.Shubham Sharma, Mr.
Vikram Aditya Singh, Mr. Yash
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BHATIA
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LPA 671/2019 & two connected Appeals
Wardhan Sharma, Mr.Naman,
Mr. Dinesh Kumar, Advocates,
Mr. Deepak Kumar, Mr.
Rajneesh K. Sharma, Mr.
Ashutosh Bharti, Ms. Minakshi
Singh and Mr. Prituysh Kumar,
ADC (I)
versus
M/S MICRO LABS LIMITED
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Akhil Sibal, Senior
Advocate along with Ms.
Archana Sahadeva, Mr. Harshit
Bhoi and Ms. Jahnavi Sindhu,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Letters Patent Appeals 1, namely LPA No.
105/2020, LPA No. 106/2020, and LPA No. 671/2019, assails the
common Judgment dated 13.02.2019 2 passed by the learned Single
Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) Nos. 11278/2018, 9978/2018, and
10936/2018, respectively. The said writ petitions were instituted
challenging two notifications, namely S.O. 4471(E) and S.O. 4472(E),
issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section
LPA
Impugned Judgement
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LPA 671/2019 & two connected Appeals
26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 3, whereby the
manufacture and sale of certain Fixed Dose Combinations 4 were
prohibited.
2.
LPA Nos. 106/2020 and 671/2019 arise from W.P.(C) Nos.
9978/2018 and 10936/2018 and pertain to the challenge to notification
S.O. 4471(E), whereas LPA No. 105/2020 arises from W.P.(C) No.
11278/2018 and concerns notification S.O. 4472(E).
3.
Notification S.O. 4472(E) proscribed the manufacture and sale
of FDCs comprising the formulation “Glimepiride 1 mg/2 mg +
Pioglitazone 15 mg/15 mg + Metformin 850 mg/850 mg”, while
notification S.O. 4471(E) proscribed the manufacture and sale of
FDCs comprising the formulation “Glimepiride 1 mg/2 mg/3 mg +
Pioglitazone 15 mg/15 mg/15 mg + Metformin 1000 mg/1000 mg”.
4.
Vide the Impugned Judgment, the learned Single Judge, after
considering the rival submissions and the material on record, set aside
both notifications. Aggrieved thereby, LPA Nos. 105/2020 and
106/2020 have been preferred by the Union of India, while LPA No.
671/2019 has been preferred by the All India Drug Action Network.
5.
Since the three appeals arise out of a common Impugned
Judgment and involve substantially similar questions of law and fact,
they were, with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the
parties, heard together and are being disposed of by this common
Judgment.
6.
The Union of India 5, which is the Appellant in LPA No.
105/2020 and LPA No. 106/2020, along with the All India Drug
Drugs Act
FDC
UOI
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Action Network, which is the Appellant in LPA No. 671/2019, shall
hereinafter be collectively referred to as the “Appellants”, whereas the
pharmaceutical companies, namely M/s Micro Labs Limited, Intas
Pharmaceuticals Limited, Lupin Limited, and Eris Lifesciences
Limited, who were the writ petitioners before the learned Single
Judge, shall be referred to as the “Respondents”, unless the context
otherwise requires.
BRIEF FACTS:
7.
At the cost of some minor repetition, the brief conspectus of the
facts, as emerging from the record, is set out hereunder:
7.1 The present appeal arises from the common judgment dated
13.02.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court,
whereby the learned Single Judge set aside notifications S.O.
4471(E) and S.O. 4472(E) dated 07.09.2018, issued by the
Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 26A
of the Drugs Act, and remanded the matter to the Drug
Technical Advisory Board 6/ Sub-Committee for fresh
consideration.
7.2 The Respondents/Writ Petitioners, are manufacturers of certain
FDCs used in the treatment of Type-II Diabetes Mellitus. By
notification S.O. 4471(E) dated 07.09.2018, the Central
Government prohibited the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of FDCs comprising Glimepiride 1 mg / 2 mg / 3 mg +
Pioglitazone 15 mg + Metformin 1000 mg, and by notification
S.O. 4472(E) dated 07.09.2018, prohibited FDCs comprising
DTAB
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Glimepiride 1 mg / 2 mg + Pioglitazone 15 mg + Metformin
850 mg, on the ground that such FDCs involved risk to human
beings and lacked adequate safety justification.
7.3 The issuance of the aforesaid notifications traces its origin to
an exercise undertaken by the Central Government on
10.03.2016, whereby 344 FDCs were prohibited on the basis of
the recommendations of an Expert Committee chaired by
Professor C.K. Kokate. Certain notifications issued in 2016,
including S.O. 806(E) and S.O. 807(E), related to FDCs
containing Glimepiride, Pioglitazone, and Metformin. Those
notifications were challenged before the High Court of Delhi
and were set aside by a common judgment dated 01.12.2016,
primarily on the ground that consultation with DTAB was
mandatory prior to the issuance of notifications under Section
26A of the Drugs Act.
7.4 The UOI carried the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
which by Judgment dated 15.12.2017 in Union of India v.
Pfizer Limited & Ors. 7 rejected the view that consultation with
DTAB was mandatory and remanded the matter to DTAB or a
Sub-Committee thereof with directions that the re-examination
must be undertaken strictly within the parameters of Section
26A the Drugs Act, that the affected manufacturers must be
heard, that the Committee must identify whether the FDCs
involved risk to human beings, lacked therapeutic value, or
contained ingredients without therapeutic justification, and that
2018 (II) SCC 39.
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in cases of proposed prohibition, reasons must be furnished as
to why regulation or restriction would not suffice.
7.5 Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, DTAB in its meeting dated
12.02.2018 recommended the constitution of a Sub-Committee
under the Chairmanship of Dr. Nilima Kshirsagar, which was
formally constituted by Office Memorandum dated 19.02.2018.
The Sub-Committee issued notices dated 12.03.2018, called for
information from the manufacturers in the prescribed format,
afforded hearings to the concerned stakeholders including the
AIDAN, and thereafter submitted its report to the Central
Government.
7.6 In relation to the FDC containing Glimepiride 1 mg / 2 mg / 3
mg + Pioglitazone 15 mg + Metformin 1000 mg, the SubCommittee recorded that triple-drug therapy is recognised in
standard treatment guidelines for Type-II Diabetes Mellitus,
that a large population of patients does not respond adequately
to diet, exercise, mono-therapy, or dual therapy, that the DCGI
had previously approved an FDC comprising Glimepiride +
Pioglitazone 15 mg + Metformin 500 mg, and that the dosages
of each ingredient in the impugned FDC were recommended
and approved. The Sub-Committee nevertheless recommended
prohibition on the ground that the FDC may involve risk of
hypoglycaemia and that no safety data pertaining to the FDC
was available.
7.7 With respect to the FDC containing Metformin 850 mg, the
Sub-Committee recommended prohibition on the grounds that
sufficient therapeutic options were available, that increments in
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Metformin dosage are ordinarily made in steps of 500 mg, and
that availability of multiple strengths could lead to medication
errors.
7.8 Accepting the recommendations of the Sub-Committee, the
Central Government issued notifications S.O. 4471(E) and S.O.
4472(E) dated 07.09.2018, prohibiting the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of the aforesaid FDCs in exercise of powers
under Section 26A of the Drugs Act.
7.9 Aggrieved by the said notifications, the manufacturers
approached the High Court by way of the aforesaid writ
petitions. By the Impugned Judgement, the learned Single Judge
held that although the power under Section 26A of the Drugs
Act is legislative in nature, it is amenable to judicial review;
that the Sub-Committee had itself accepted the therapeutic
value and approved dosage of the FDCs; that the reasons
recorded for prohibition were cryptic, internally inconsistent,
and did not satisfy the parameters laid down by the Supreme
Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra); that the Sub-Committee
failed to explain why regulation or restriction was insufficient;
and that the Central Government had relied exclusively on such
deficient recommendations. On that reasoning, the learned
Single Judge set aside notifications S.O. 4471(E) and S.O.
4472(E) and remanded the matter to DTAB / Sub-Committee
for fresh consideration.
8.
The present appeals are preferred by the UOI and the AIDAN
being aggrieved by the Judgment dated 13.02.2019, contending, inter
alia, that the learned Single Judge has, while exercising writ
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LPA 671/2019 & two connected Appeals
jurisdiction, exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review by reassessing the adequacy and sufficiency of expert material, failed to
accord due deference to the satisfaction of the Central Government
formed on the basis of expert recommendations in a matter concerning
public health, and has erred in setting aside legislative notifications
issued under Section 26A of the Drugs Act thereby necessitating
interference by this Hon’ble Court in appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:
9.
Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned Additional Solicitor General 8,
assisted by Mr. P.S. Singh and Ms. Shiva Lakshmi, learned Central
Government Standing Counsel 9, would articulate the challenge to
the Impugned Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge broadly in
the following manner:
I.
Learned ASG would contend that the Impugned Judgment
proceeds on a fundamentally erroneous premise inasmuch as it
equates the approval of individual drug components with the
approval of those very components when formulated together as
a FDC, whereas, in law and regulatory practice, approval of
individual active pharmaceutical ingredients cannot ipso facto
be construed as approval of their combination in a single
formulation. He would submit that the learned Single Judge, in
transposing the approval of individual constituents to the
impugned FDCs, has overlooked the settled principle that each
FDC constitutes a distinct drug entity requiring independent
evaluation.
ASG
CGSC
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II.
He would further contend that the FDCs in question were not
supported by any dedicated clinical trial data, safety data, or
scientific evidence validating their usage, dosage, or risk profile
as combinations, and that the absence of such data was a
determinative factor weighed by the expert body while
recommending prohibition.
III.
Learned ASG would submit that the learned Single Judge erred
in presuming therapeutic value in the impugned FDCs solely on
the basis that the individual components and their respective
dosages had received approval, whereas such approval, in the
absence of combination-specific evidence, could not form the
basis for sustaining the legality of the FDCs or for invalidating
the impugned notifications.
IV.
He would thus contend that, in the absence of any scientific or
clinical evidence pertaining to the safety and efficacy of the
combination as such, the UOI was fully justified in invoking its
statutory powers under Section 26A of the Drugs Act, to
proscribe the manufacture and sale of the impugned FDCs in
larger public interest.
V.
He would further submit that the statutory standard under
Section 26A of the Drugs Act is not the establishment of actual
harm but the determination of whether the use of a drug is likely
to involve risk to human beings, and that the learned Single
Judge has erroneously elevated this statutory threshold by
requiring a higher degree of proof than what the provision
mandates. He would thus submit that mere likelihood would
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LPA 671/2019 & two connected Appeals
suffice for the purpose of justifying the proscription of these
FDCs.
VI.
Learned ASG would further contend that the finding of the
learned Single Judge characterising the reasons of the DTAB
Sub-Committee as cryptic is unsustainable, as it fails to
appreciate the deficiencies expressly recorded by the SubCommittee, including the absence of clinical data, the lack of
approved indications for the combinations, and the admitted
absence of acceptance of the impugned FDCs by international
regulatory authorities.
VII.
Learned counsel for the Appellant would contend that, in
exercise of judicial review, this Court does not sit in appeal
over the sufficiency, adequacy, or scientific weight of the
material considered by an expert body, and its scrutiny is
confined to examining whether relevant material existed and
whether the decision-making process was lawful. He would
submit that once the statutory satisfaction of the Central
Government is demonstrably founded on expert evaluation and
bears a rational nexus with the object of protecting public
health, incidental economic hardship to manufacturers is legally
immaterial and cannot vitiate regulatory action, a principle
reiterated by the Supreme Court in 63 Moons Technologies
Ltd. v. Union of India 10, as well as in Ugar Sugar Works
Ltd.11, Mohd. Murtaza v. State of Assam 12, Systopic
(2019) 18 SCC 401
(2001) 3 SCC 635
(2011) 12 SCC 413
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Laboratories (P) Ltd. v. Dr. Prem Gupta 13, and Hubli
Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay 14. He would further
contend that judicial review does not extend to substituting the
Court’s view for that of specialised authorities on matters of
scientific assessment, policy choice, or regulatory prudence, a
position consistently affirmed by constitutional courts.
VIII.
Learned ASG would further contend that the DTAB SubCommittee, constituted pursuant to the directions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra),
undertook extensive expert deliberations before submitting its
report, reflecting a detailed and considered examination of the
impugned FDCs.
IX.
He would submit that the Sub-Committee comprised experts
drawn from diverse medical and scientific disciplines and had,
in the course of its deliberative process, co-opted additional
experts prior to formulating its recommendations, thereby
reinforcing the robustness and technical depth of the decisionmaking exercise.
X.
He would submit that the extensive bibliography appended to
the report of the DTAB Sub-Committee, comprising 395
scientific publications and research papers, clearly evidences
the depth, breadth, and rigour of the expert deliberation
undertaken prior to recommending prohibition of the impugned
FDCs.
(1994 Supp (1) SCC 160)
1946 SCC OnLine Bom 58
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XI.
He would further contend that the proscription of the impugned
FDCs was clearly warranted, public health being an integral and
inseparable facet of public interest, and that where the use of
such FDCs was found to be likely to involve risk to human
beings, coupled with the absence of supporting clinical data and
the lack of clear therapeutic justification, the Central
Government was justified in treating such formulations as
inherently injurious to public health.
XII.
He would further submit that the statutory mandate as imposed
by the Section 26A of the Drugs Act provides only for the
Central Government to be “satisfied” and this satisfaction is to
be based on relevant considerations. He would submit that this
subjective satisfaction, as expressed by the Statute, cannot be
subjected to an Appeal by the learned Single Judge in exercise
of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 15.
XIII.
He would further submit that in matters concerning prohibition
of manufacture and sale of drugs, primacy must necessarily be
accorded to considerations of public health and prevention of
harm, and that the Court cannot insist upon a standard of proof
or justification higher than that contemplated by the statutory
scheme itself.
XIV.
Learned counsel for the Appellant would contend that the
impugned FDC constitute a “new drug” within the meaning of
Rule 122E(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and
Rule 2(w)(iii) of the New Drugs and Clinical Trials Rules,
2019, as the combination, ratio, and dosage form had not been
Constitution
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previously approved. He would submit that, once so classified,
Rule 52 of the 2019 DCT Rules squarely applies, casting a
mandatory statutory obligation upon the manufacturer to obtain
prior permission of the Central Licensing Authority and to
establish safety, efficacy, and therapeutic justification through
clinical data strictly conforming to Appendix VI of Schedule Y.
XV.
He would further contend that the DTAB Sub-Committee has
categorically recorded that the Respondent-manufacturers failed
to discharge this statutory onus, having placed no combinationspecific clinical trial or safety data, relied upon inadequate and
irrelevant literature, and remained unable to specify approved
indications. He would submit that the Sub-Committee also
noted that the triple-drug FDC of Glimepiride, Pioglitazone,
and Metformin lacks approval in any other jurisdiction, thereby
underscoring the absence of global regulatory acceptance.
XVI.
He would thus contend that, in light of the admitted noncompliance with the statutory threshold, the satisfaction arrived
at by the Central Government under Section 26A of the Drugs
Act, based on expert findings of risk and absence of safety data,
is legally unassailable, and that the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra) authorises and
indeed compels prohibition in such circumstances in the
paramount interest of public health.
XVII.
He would lastly contend that, having regard to the cumulative
assessment undertaken by the UOI, the sensitive nature of the
drugs involved, and their widespread use by a large segment of
the population in a country with a high prevalence of Type-II
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Diabetes Mellitus, the prohibition imposed by the Central
Government was justified and in larger public interest, and that
the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge warrants
interference and deserves to be set aside.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
10.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondents in
the connected appeals would advance submissions broadly on similar
lines as follows:
I.
They would contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Pfizer
Limited & Ors. (supra), has clearly delineated the contours
within which judicial review was to be exercised by the learned
Single Judge while examining notifications issued under
Section 26A of the Drugs Act.
II.
They would further contend that there was a manifest failure on
the part of the DTAB Sub-Committee to adhere to the binding
directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and that such
non-compliance vitiates the report itself. In support thereof,
they would place reliance upon the relevant findings recorded
by the learned Single Judge in the Impugned Judgment.
III.
They would submit that Section 26A of the Drugs Act requires
the competent authority, before issuing any notification
regulating, restricting, or prohibiting a drug, to clearly identify
and record which of the statutory conditions is attracted,
namely, whether the use of such drug is likely to involve any
risk to human beings or animals, whether the drug does not
possess the therapeutic value claimed or purported to be
claimed for it, or whether it contains ingredients and in such
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quantities for which there is no therapeutic justification, and
that paragraph nos. 31 to 33 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra) reiterate this
statutory mandate by requiring the DTAB Sub-Committee to
expressly indicate, with reasons, the specific limb or limbs of
Section 26A on the basis of which regulatory action is
proposed. The relevant portions of the Judgement are
reproduced hereinbelow for reference:
“31. On the facts of these cases, a suggested course of action
was stated by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant-petitioners. This course is that instead of now
remitting the matter back to the Delhi High Court for an
adjudication on the other points raised in the writ petitions, the
case of 344 FDCs that have been banned, plus another 5 FDCs
that have been banned, which comes to 349 FDCs [barring 15
FDCs that are pre-1988 and 17 FDCs which have DCG(I)
approval] pursuant to the Kokate Committee Report, by
notifications of the Central Government under Section 26-A of
the Drugs Act, should be sent to the DTAB, constituted under
Section 5 of the Drugs Act, so that it can examine each of
these cases and ultimately send a report to the Central
Government. We reiterate that only on the peculiar facts of
these cases, we think that such a course commends itself to us,
which would obviate further litigation and finally set at rest all
other contentions raised by the petitioners. We say so because
we find that the Kokate Committee did deliberate on the 344
FDCs plus 5 FDCs and did come to a conclusion that the
aforesaid FDCs be banned, but we are not clear as to what
exactly the reasons for such conclusions are, and whether it
was necessary in the public interest to take the extreme step of
prohibiting such FDCs, instead of restricting or regulating their
manufacture and supply. In order that an analysis be made in
greater depth, we, therefore, feel that these cases should go to
the DTAB and/or a sub comittee formed by the DTAB for the
purpose of having a relook into these cases. It is important,
however, that the DTAB/sub-committee appointed for this
purpose will not only hear the petitioner-appellants before us,
but that they also hear submissions from the All-India Drugs
Action Network. The DTAB/sub-committee set up for this
purpose will deliberate on the parameters set out in Section 26A of the Drugs Act, as follows.
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32. First and foremost in each case, the DTAB/sub-committee
appointed by it must satisfy itself that the use of the fixed dose
combinations (FDC) in question is likely to involve any one of
the aforesaid three things:
(a) that they are likely to involve any risk to human beings
or animals; or
(b) that the said FDCs do not have the therapeutic value
claimed or purported to be claimed for them; or
(c) that such FDCs contain ingredients and in such quantity
for which there is no therapeutic justification.
33. The DTAB/sub-committee must also apply its mind as to
whether it is then necessary or expedient, in the larger public
interest, to regulate, restrict or prohibit the manufacture, sale
or distribution of such FDCs. In short, the DTAB/subcommittee must clearly indicate in its report:
(1) as to why, according to it, any one of the three factors
indicated above is attracted;
(2) post such satisfaction, that in the larger public interest,
it is necessary or expedient to (i) regulate, (ii) restrict, or (iii)
prohibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of such FDCs.”
IV.
They would further contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has vide paragraph no. 34 of Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra)
additionally required that, after arriving at a conclusion on the
aforesaid statutory parameters, the Sub-Committee must
specifically examine and indicate whether, in the larger public
interest, it was necessary or expedient to regulate, restrict, or
prohibit the manufacture, sale, or distribution of the FDCs.
V.
They would thereafter submit that the learned Single Judge has
clearly held that the deficiencies which were earlier found in the
DTAB Sub Committee Report persist in the present Report and
taking note of the same, the learned Single Judge has rightly set
aside the impugned Notifications.
VI.
They would further submit that, in the absence of clear and
cogent reasons justifying complete prohibition, the learned
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Single Judge was justified in interfering with and setting aside
the impugned notifications.
VII.
They would contend that, in the present case, the SubCommittee itself has acknowledged the therapeutic value and
therapeutic justification of the impugned FDCs, and that the
sole basis for recommending prohibition was that the
formulations “may involve risk to human beings”.
VIII.
They would further submit that such justification, founded
merely on a speculative possibility, does not satisfy the
statutory threshold prescribed under Section 26A of the Drugs
Act, and that the standard applied by the Sub-Committee is
neither contemplated by the statute nor sanctioned by the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pfizer Limited &
Ors. (supra).
IX.
They would further contend that the Sub-Committee failed to
accord due and meaningful consideration to the material and
data submitted by the Respondents in support of the safety,
efficacy, and therapeutic justification of their formulations.
11.
The above are the broad submissions made by the Respondents,
however, there are certain further submissions that have been made
which are with respect to the reasoning given by the UOI in support of
the two impugned Notifications and which will be dealt with in the
analysis portion.
ANALYSIS:
12.
We have heard learned ASG appearing for the UOI, assisted by
Ms. Shiva Lakshmi, CGSC, and other learned counsel appearing
alongside him. We have also heard Mr. Raj Sekhar Rao, learned
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Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Ajay Bhargava, Advocate, Mr. Akhil
Sibal Sr. Adv. Assisted by Ms. Archana Sahadeva, Mr. Jawahar Lal
and other learned counsels appearing for the Respondents.
13.
With their able assistance, we have had the benefit of perusing
the relevant and material portions of the voluminous record placed
before us. We place on record our appreciation for the succinct and
focused submissions advanced, as well as for the concise manner in
which the documents were presented for our consideration.
14.
We consider it appropriate to reproduce the relevant extracts of
the Impugned Judgment, which are relatable to the Notification being
S.O. 4471(E) which deals with FDCs comprised of “Glimepiride 1
mg/2 mg/3 mg + Pioglitazone 15 mg/15 mg/15 mg + Metformin 1000
mg/1000 mg” and which read as under:
“30. Thus, the limited question that falls for consideration of this
Court is whether the Central Government’s decision to ban the
manufacture, sale and distribution of the FDCs in question is based
on relevant material, and whether the impugned notification has
been issued by due compliance of the directions of the Supreme
Court in Pfizer (supra).
31.
At the outset, it is relevant to note that the Sub Committee
has approved an FDC comprising of Glimepiride 1/2mg +
Pioglitazone 15 mg + Metformin 500 mg by a S.O. No. 4711(E)
dated 07.09.2018. It is, thus, apparent that the only objection in
respect of the FDCs proscribed in terms of S.O. No. 4471(E) and
S.O. 4472(E) relate to the increased dosage of Metformin: 1000mg
in FDCs proscribed by S.O. 4471(E)and 850 mg in FDCs
proscribed by S.O. 4472(E).
32.
First six paragraph of the reasons indicated by the Sub
Committee do not indicate any reason for proscribing the FDC. On
the contrary, paragraph 3 of the said reasoning indicates that there
is a sufficiently large population of patients that requires a triple
drug combination for addressing the chronic disease. It is also
noted in paragraph 4 of the said reasons that DCGI has approved
the FDC of Glimepiride (1mg/2mg) + Pioglitazone (15mg) +
Metformin (500 mg ER) uncoated tablet for indication as the third
line treatment of Type II diabetes mellitus in cases where diet,
exercise and single agents and second line therapy with two drugs,
do not result in adequate glycemic control.
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33.
It is important to note that in paragraph 5 of its report, the
Sub Committee expressly noticed that the FDCs in question
contain “recommended” and “approved” therapeutic dosage of
each ingredient. Thus, there is no dispute that the FDC in question
have a therapeutic justification and are prescribed for certain
patients. This is also the conclusion drawn by the Sub-Committee,
as is apparent from paragraph 6 of their observations quoted above.
It is expressly stated that the said FDC has therapeutic value and
has the potential to address the need of patients with Type II
Diabetes, who are not responding to mono or dual therapy.
34.
The only reason provided by the Sub-Committee for
proscribing the said FDC is that it can lead to risk of hypoglycemia
and there is no safety data pertaining to this FDC. Once it is
accepted that the formulations in the dosages, as included in the
said FDC, is recommended and approved therapeutic dosages for
treatment of Type II Diabetes in certain cases, it is difficult to
understand the reason for proscribing the said FDCs on ground of
lack of safety data.
35.
Insofar as the observation that the said FDC can lead to risk
of hypoglycemia is concerned, the petitioners have produced
material on record, which indicates that the risk of hypoglycemia
in Metformin is minimum. However, this is not an area of
controversy which is required to be examined by this Court. The
question whether a particular drug has any adverse effects is
required to be examined by the experts, and the observation that
the FDC can lead to hypoglycemia, must be accepted. However, it
is difficult to understand the rationale to proscribe the said FDC on
this count, considering that it is accepted that the formulations in
that dosage included in the FDC is recommended and approved.
Admittedly, the said FDC has therapeutic value in certain cases.
36.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Pfizer Limited (supra),
had remanded the matter to DTAB/Sub-Committee for the reason
that the reasons given by the Kokate Committee were cryptic.
Plainly, the decision of Central Government founded on such
reasons could not be sustained. This malady continues to subsist
with the observations made by the Sub-Committee, as it provides
little clarity for sustaining an action under Section 26A of the Act.
37.
It is also conceded that the Central Government had not
examined any other material other than the observations/
recommendations of the Sub-Committee for issuing the impugned
notification. In absence of clear and cogent reasons, such a
decision would be manifestly arbitrary and not sustainable.
38.
It is also relevant to note that in Pfizer Limited (supra), the
Supreme Court had expressly directed that in case where
DTAB/Sub-Committee prohibits a particular FDC, it must also
indicate in its report as to why restrictions or regulations are not
sufficient to control the manufacture and use of the FDC. The
recommendations of the Sub-Committee, read in conjunction with
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the risks indicated, do not indicate why regulations or restrictions
are insufficient in controlling the use of the FDC.”
15.
The relevant paragraphs of the Impugned Judgment, insofar as
they pertain to Notification S.O. 4472(E), are extracted and
reproduced hereinbelow:
“39. In view of the above, the notification S.O. No. 4471(E) is
not sustainable. Insofar as S.O. No. 4472 (E) is concerned, the
same proscribes an FDC comprising of Glimepiride 1mg/2mg +
Pioglitazone 15mg/15mg + Metformin 850mg/850. As observed
above, it is obvious that the said FDC has been proscribed on
account of an incremental dosage of Metformin 850mg,
considering that the FDC comprising of Glimepiride 1mg/2mg +
Pioglitazone 15mg and Metformin 500 mg is approved. The
observations made by the Sub Committee for proscribing this FDC
are, essentially, three fold. First, that there is sufficient therapeutic
option; second, that increments in the dosage of Metformin are in
steps of 500mg as per treatment guidelines; and third, that
availability of multiple strengths can lead to medication error of
overdosing or under-dosing.
40.
Clearly, the reason that there are therapeutic options
available is not a ground for prohibiting a drug under Section 26A
of the Act. A drug can be proscribed under Section 26A, (i) if it
involves any risk to human being or animals; (ii) the drug does not
have any therapeutic value purported to be claimed; and (iii) that
the drug contains ingredients in such quantity for which there is no
therapeutic justification.
41.
The fact that there are other alternatives available cannot be
a ground for proscribing the FDC in question.
42.
The second reason – that the increments in the dosage of
Metformin are in steps of 500mg and, therefore, the FDC which
contain the formulation in the strength of 850 mg ought to be
proscribed – is also unsustainable. This is so because it is conceded
before this Court that Metformin 850mg is an also approved drug.
The petitioner has also produced material to indicate that
Metformin in the dosage of 850mg is prescribed in certain patients.
Plainly, if Metformin 850mg is an approved dosage, the question
of proscribing the FDC on the ground that the strength of
Metformin is not a multiple of 500mg is not sustainable.
43.
It is also relevant to note that the Central Government had
also issued a notification under Section 26A of the Act proscribing
FDCs comprising of: Metformin 1000 mg + Pioglitazone 7.5 mg +
Glimepiride 1 mg; and, Metformin 1000 mg + Pioglitazone 7.5 mg
+ Glimepiride 2 mg. The said notification – S.O 4467(E) – was
subject matter of challenge in Unison Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd
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(supra). It is relevant to note that the said FDCs were proscribed
for the reason that Pioglitazone 7.5 mg was not an approved dose;
there was no issue with regard to inclusion of Metformin 1000 mg
in the said FDCs.
44.
The third reason, namely, that availability of multiple
strengths can lead to medication error, is also cryptic in the sense
that drugs comprising of the FDC are available in multiple
strengths.
45.
It was contended on behalf of the respondents that if the
FDC in question is over prescribed or under prescribed, it would
entail a serious risk to the patient. In this regard, it is relevant to
observe that the rationale for making a FDC is for the convenience
of a patient, who is prescribed several drugs (comprising the FDC).
There is a compelling argument that an FDC is expedient in cases
where a patient is required to take multiple medicines. The risk of
over prescription or under prescription is common in all FDCs. The
reasons indicated by the Sub-Committee do provide any clarity as
to why this reason is relevant for the FDCs in question.
46.
In view of the above, the recommendation of the Sub
Committee that there is no therapeutic justification, is difficult to
accept. This is also considering that it is not disputed that the
contents of the FDC, in the dosage as included, are prescribed to
patients to address Type II Diabetes.”
16.
Upon the aforesaid analysis, the learned Single Judge proceeded
to conclude as follows:
“47. In view of the above, the impugned notifications are set
aside. The matter is remanded to DTAB/Sub-Committee
constituted with the direction to examine the issue regarding the
FDCs in question in accordance with the directions issued in Pfizer
Limited and Ors (supra).
48.
The DTAB Sub-Committee shall submit a report to the
Central Government clearly providing an explanation for its
recommendations along with the material in support thereof. The
Central Government is required take an informed decision after
examining the report of DTAB/Sub-Committee and the material
provided along with it.”
17.
In order to appreciate the analysis undertaken and to place the
controversy in its proper statutory perspective, it would be apposite to
reproduce Section 26A of the DC Act, which reads as follows:
“26A. Powers of Central Government to [regulate, restrict or
prohibit] manufacture, etc., of drug and cosmetic in public
interest.—Without prejudice to any other provision contained in
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this Chapter, if the Central Government is satisfied, that the use of
any drug or cosmetic is likely to involve any risk to human beings
or animals or that any drug does not have the therapeutic value
claimed or purported to be claimed for it or contains ingredients
and in such quantity for which there is no therapeutic justification
and that in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do,
then, that Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
[regulate, restrict or prohibit] the manufacture, sale or distribution
of such drug or cosmetic.]”
18.
We also deem it appropriate, for the purposes of the present
analysis, to extract the relevant paragraphs from the Judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra), which are
reproduced hereunder:
“1.
Leave granted. The present appeals and transfer petitions
relate to the interpretation of Section 26-A of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as “the Drugs Act”).
By the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court dated 1-12-2016, the learned Single Judge has
held that the mandatory condition precedent for the exercise of the
power by the Central Government under Section 26-A of the Drugs
Act is the prior consultation of the Drugs Technical Advisory
Board (DTAB) set up under Section 5 of the said Act. It must be
stated that the learned Single Judge differed from the judgments of
the Karnataka and the Madras High Courts in this regard, wherein
two other learned Single Judges of two other High Courts have
held that such consultation with the DTAB is not mandatory before
exercise of such power under Section 26-A. Since we are
concerned only with this narrow question that has been decided by
the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, we are not going
into any other contentions that have been raised by the learned
counsel for the parties.
2.
The issue regarding the prevalence of many fixed dose
combinations (hereinafter referred to as “FDCs”) that were
flooding the Indian market and had not been tested for efficacy or
safety was considered by the Parliamentary Standing Committee
on Health and Family Welfare in its 59th Report in May 2012. The
Standing Committee observed that some of the State Licensing
Authorities have issued manufacturing licences for a very large
number of FDCs without prior clearance from the Central Drugs
Standard Control Organization (CDSCO). Such FDCs can pose
significant risks to persons and need to be withdrawn immediately
in that human lives can be at risk. The Committee recommended
that a clear and transparent policy may be framed for approving
FDCs based on scientific principles, and that, at present, Section
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26-A of the Drugs Act is adequate to deal with the problem of
FDCs not cleared by the Cdsco. Pursuant to the aforesaid report,
the Ministry of Health in October 2012 issued directions to the
States and Union Territories under Section 33-P of the Drugs Act
not to grant licences to FDCs falling under the definition of “new
drugs” and not approved by the Drug Controller General of India
[DCG(I)]. The DCG(I), in turn, had requested all States/Union
Territories Drug Controllers to ask the manufacturers concerned in
their respective States/Union Territories to prove the safety and
efficacy of such FDC licences issued prior to 1-10-2012, without
due approval of the DCG(I), within a period of 18 months, failing
which such FDCs would be considered for being prohibited, both
qua manufacture and marketing in the country. On 5-7-2013, the
DCG(I) vide its communication to the State Drug Controllers
asked manufacturers to make applications as per the procedure
prescribed within this 18 month period. We have been informed
that a large number of applications were received from the
manufacturers within the 18 month period for 2911 products,
which had to be subjected to examination.
*****
14.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is clear
that Section 26-A has been introduced by an amendment in 1982.
A bare reading of this provision would show, firstly, that it is
without prejudice to any other provision contained in this Chapter
(meaning thereby Chapter IV). This expression only means that
apart from the Central Government's other powers contained in
Chapter IV, Section 26-A is an additional power which must be
governed by its own terms. Under Section 26-A, the Central
Government must be “satisfied” that any drug or cosmetic is likely
to involve (i) any risk to human beings or families; or (ii) that any
drug does not have the therapeutic value claimed or purported to be
claimed for it; or (iii) contains ingredients in such quantity for
which there is no therapeutic justification. Obviously, the Central
Government has to apply its mind to any or all of these three
factors which has to be based upon its “satisfaction” as to the
existence of any or all of these factors. The power exercised under
Section 26-A must further be exercised only if it is found necessary
or expedient to do so in public interest. When the power is so
exercised, it may regulate, restrict or prohibit manufacture, sale or
distribution of any drug or cosmetic.
*****
16.
As has been stated hereinabove, Section 26-A was brought
in by an amendment in 1982. The amendment specifically made
changes in Sections 33 and 33-N in which it added the words “on
the recommendation of the Board”. From this, it is clear that
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Parliament in the very Amendment Act which introduced Section
26-A made certain changes which involved the DTAB under
Section 5 of the said Act. It is clear that the additional power that is
given to the Central Government under Section 26-A does not refer
to and, therefore, mandate any previous consultation with the
DTAB. On the contrary, the Central Government may be
“satisfied” on any relevant material that a drug is likely to involve
any risk to human beings, etc. as a result of which it is necessary in
public interest to regulate, restrict or prohibit manufacture, sale or
distribution thereof. So long as the Central Government's
satisfaction can be said to be based on relevant material, it is not
possible to say that not having consulted the DTAB, the power
exercised under the said section would be non est. Take the case of
an FDC that is banned in 50 countries of the world owing to the
fact that the said FDC involved significant risk to human beings.
Assuming that the Central Government is satisfied based on this
fact alone, which in turn is based on Expert Committee Reports in
various nations which pointed out the deleterious effects of the said
drug, can it be said that without consulting the DTAB set up under
Section 5, the exercise of the power under Section 26-A to prohibit
the manufacture or sale or distribution of a drug that is banned in
50 countries would be bad only because the DTAB has not been
consulted? The obvious answer is no inasmuch as the Central
Government's satisfaction is based upon relevant material, namely,
the fact that 50 nations have banned the aforesaid drug, which in
turn is based on Expert Committee Reports taken in each of those
nations. Take another example. Suppose the Central Government
were to ban an FDC on the ground that, in the recent past, it has
been apprised of the fact that the FDCs taken over a short period of
time would lead to loss of life, which has come to the notice of the
Central Government through reports from various district
authorities, in let us say, a majority of districts in which the said
FDC has been consumed. Could not the Central Government then
base its ban order on material collected from district authorities
which state that this particular drug leads to human mortality and
ought, therefore, to be prohibited? The obvious answer again is yes
for the reason that the Central Government has been satisfied on
relevant material that it is necessary in public interest to ban such
drug. Examples of this nature can be multiplied to show that the
width of the power granted under Section 26-A cannot be cut down
by artificially cutting down the language of Section 26-A.
*****
22.
It was also argued that Section 26-A had no non obstante
clause to keep Section 5 out of harm's way. On our construction of
Section 26-A, it is clear that no such non obstante clause was
necessary in that the width of the expression “is satisfied”
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contained in Section 26-A cannot be cut down by reference to
Section 5. As has been stated by us hereinabove, the expression
“without prejudice” makes it clear that Section 26-A is an
additional power given to the Central Government which must be
exercised on its own terms.
*****
24.
If the power under Section 26-A is exercised on the basis of
irrelevant material or on the basis of no material, the satisfaction
itself that is contemplated by Section 26-A would not be there and
the exercise of the power would be struck down on this ground.
Further, it is argued that the provision may be read down to make it
constitutionally valid, but in so doing, words cannot be added as a
matter of constitutional doctrine.
*****
31.
On the facts of these cases, a suggested course of action
was stated by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant-petitioners. This course is that instead of now remitting
the matter back to the Delhi High Court for an adjudication on the
other points raised in the writ petitions, the case of 344 FDCs that
have been banned, plus another 5 FDCs that have been banned,
which comes to 349 FDCs [barring 15 FDCs that are pre-1988 and
17 FDCs which have DCG(I) approval] pursuant to the Kokate
Committee Report, by notifications of the Central Government
under Section 26-A of the Drugs Act, should be sent to the DTAB,
constituted under Section 5 of the Drugs Act, so that it can
examine each of these cases and ultimately send a report to the
Central Government. We reiterate that only on the peculiar facts of
these cases, we think that such a course commends itself to us,
which would obviate further litigation and finally set at rest all
other contentions raised by the petitioners. We say so because we
find that the Kokate Committee did deliberate on the 344 FDCs
plus 5 FDCs and did come to a conclusion that the aforesaid FDCs
be banned, but we are not clear as to what exactly the reasons for
such conclusions are, and whether it was necessary in the public
interest to take the extreme step of prohibiting such FDCs, instead
of restricting or regulating their manufacture and supply. In order
that an analysis be made in greater depth, we, therefore, feel that
these cases should go to the DTAB and/or a sub-committee formed
by the DTAB for the purpose of having a relook into these cases. It
is important, however, that the DTAB/sub-committee appointed for
this purpose will not only hear the petitioner-appellants before us,
but that they also hear submissions from the All-India Drugs
Action Network. The DTAB/sub-committee set up for this purpose
will deliberate on the parameters set out in Section 26-A of the
Drugs Act, as follows.
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32. First and foremost in each case, the DTAB/sub-committee
appointed by it must satisfy itself that the use of the fixed dose
combinations (FDC) in question is likely to involve any one of the
aforesaid three things:
(a) that they are likely to involve any risk to human beings
or animals; or
(b) that the said FDCs do not have the therapeutic value
claimed or purported to be claimed for them; or
(c) that such FDCs contain ingredients and in such
quantity for which there is no therapeutic justification.
33. The DTAB/sub-committee must also apply its mind as to
whether it is then necessary or expedient, in the larger public
interest, to regulate, restrict or prohibit the manufacture, sale or
distribution of such FDCs. In short, the DTAB/sub-committee
must clearly indicate in its report:
(1) as to why, according to it, any one of the three factors
indicated above is attracted;
(2) post such satisfaction, that in the larger public interest,
it is necessary or expedient to (i) regulate, (ii) restrict, or
(iii) prohibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of such
FDCs.
34.
The DTAB/sub-committee must also indicate in its report
as to why, in case it prohibits a particular FDC, restriction or
regulation is not sufficient to control the manufacture and use of
the FDC. We request the DTAB/sub-committee to be set up for
this purpose to afford the necessary hearing to all concerned, and
thereafter submit a consolidated report, insofar as these FDCs are
concerned, to the Central Government within a period of six
months from the date on which this judgment is received by the
DTAB. We may also indicate that the Central Government,
thereafter, must have due regard to the report of the DTAB and to
any other relevant information, and ultimately apply its mind to the
parameters contained in Section 26-A of the Drugs Act and,
accordingly, either maintain the notifications already issued, or
modify/substitute them or withdraw them.”
19.
A careful reading of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra) indicates that the Court was
primarily concerned with examining the limited and specific issue as
to whether, prior to the exercise of powers by the Central Government
under Section 26A of the Drugs Act, there existed a mandatory
requirement of consultation with the DTAB constituted under Section
5 of the Drugs Act. This question arose in the backdrop of serious
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regulatory concerns regarding the proliferation of FDCs in the Indian
market which had not been subjected to adequate evaluation for safety
and efficacy, an issue that had also engaged the attention of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare in
its 59th Report.
20.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court thereafter traced the course of
action adopted by the Central Government in addressing the aforesaid
concerns, including the adoption of various regulatory measures such
as the prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain drugs. In
paragraph no. 5 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
delineated the categorisation of FDCs and the corresponding
recommendations of the expert committees constituted for that
purpose, the FDCs involved in the present matter falling within
Category ‘A’.
21.
While answering the question placed before it, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court unequivocally held that Section 26A of the Drugs Act
does not mandate prior consultation with the DTAB before the Central
Government proceeds to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the manufacture,
sale, or distribution of drugs. The Court thus construed Section 26A of
the Drugs Act as an enabling provision which sets out the
circumstances under which such regulatory power may be exercised
by the Central Government. The relevant portion the aforesaid
Judgement is reproduced hereinbelow for reference:
“5. On 16-4-2015, a detailed report in this regard was submitted by
the Kokate Committee to the Ministry stating the reasons for
declaring FDCs as irrational. We have been informed that for the
FDCs which were considered as irrational by the Committee, the
Committee wrote to various manufacturers/associations calling
upon them to submit material to establish the therapeutic
justification/rationality of the FDCs. Replies received from such
associations were examined by the Expert Committee and final
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recommendations therein were given only on 10-2-2016. In
Category A, following the final recommendations of the Expert
Committee, the Central Government has banned 344 FDCs. In
Category B, 944 FDCs needed to be considered/deliberated upon
further, which meant that they would be referred to the respective
Expert Committees out of the 10 Expert Committees already
constituted for further examination. In Category C, 1493 FDCs
have been declared “rational” and we are informed that approvals
have since been issued by the DCG(I) in respect of these FDCs. In
Category D, 126 FDCs have to be considered for further generation
of data by the prospective applicants. It is only after carrying out of
this exercise, that by Notifications dated 10-3-2016 issued under
Section 26-A, the Central Government banned manufacture and
sale of 344 FDCs.”
22.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the context of the matters under
consideration, issued specific directions for the manner in which the
DTAB was to conduct the exercise of consideration, in paragraph nos.
32, 33 and 34 of the Judgment, which are reproduced hereunder:
“32. First and foremost in each case, the DTAB/sub-committee
appointed by it must satisfy itself that the use of the fixed dose
combinations (FDC) in question is likely to involve any one of the
aforesaid three things:
(a) that they are likely to involve any risk to human beings
or animals; or
(b) that the said FDCs do not have the therapeutic value
claimed or purported to be claimed for them; or
(c) that such FDCs contain ingredients and in such
quantity for which there is no therapeutic justification.
33. The DTAB/sub-committee must also apply its mind as to
whether it is then necessary or expedient, in the larger public
interest, to regulate, restrict or prohibit the manufacture, sale or
distribution of such FDCs. In short, the DTAB/sub-committee
must clearly indicate in its report:
(1) as to why, according to it, any one of the three factors
indicated above is attracted;
(2) post such satisfaction, that in the larger public interest,
it is necessary or expedient to (i) regulate, (ii) restrict, or
(iii) prohibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of such
FDCs.
34. The DTAB/sub-committee must also indicate in its report as to
why, in case it prohibits a particular FDC, restriction or regulation
is not sufficient to control the manufacture and use of the FDC. We
request the DTAB/sub-committee to be set up for this purpose to
afford the necessary hearing to all concerned, and thereafter submit
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a consolidated report, insofar as these FDCs are concerned, to the
Central Government within a period of six months from the date on
which this judgment is received by the DTAB. We may also
indicate that the Central Government, thereafter, must have due
regard to the report of the DTAB and to any other relevant
information, and ultimately apply its mind to the parameters
contained in Section 26-A of the Drugs Act and, accordingly,
either maintain the notifications already issued, or
modify/substitute them or withdraw them.”
23.
The aforesaid paragraphs constitute the foundational basis of
the submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondents, who contend
that the DTAB Sub-Committee failed to adhere to the directions so
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
24.
We find it apposite to note that, in addition to delineating the
parameters which the Committee was required to address and the
manner in which its conclusions were to be articulated in the report,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph no. 34, also issued an
express and specific direction, which reads as follows:
“34. …..We may indicate that the Central Government thereafter
must have due regard to the Report of the DTAB Sub Committee
and to any other relevant information and ultimately apply its mind
to the parameters contained in Section 26A of the Drugs Act and
accordingly, either maintain the notifications already issued or
modify, substitute them or withdraw them.”
25.
A careful analysis of the aforesaid directions reveals that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the prefatory paragraph nos. 32 and 33,
while prescribing the manner in which the DTAB Sub-Committee was
to undertake its examination and structure its report, did not, in any
manner, curtail or dilute the statutory autonomy, independence, or
discretion vested in the Central Government under Section 26A of the
Drugs Act. On the contrary, the judgment preserves the primacy of the
Central Government’s role in arriving at the requisite statutory
satisfaction, making it clear that the report of the Sub-Committee was
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intended to operate as a relevant and informed input, and not as a
binding determination. The Hon’ble Supreme Court consciously left it
to the Central Government to assess the Sub-Committee’s report,
along with any other relevant material, and to thereafter independently
apply its mind to the conditions expressly enumerated under Section
26A of the Drugs Act before deciding whether regulation, restriction,
or prohibition was warranted in public interest.
26.
In that view of the matter, even assuming, arguendo, that the
Sub-Committee did not submit its report in strict conformity with the
manner indicated by the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
determinative factor remains the subsequent and independent exercise
undertaken by the Central Government in arriving at its statutory
satisfaction. Since what is under challenge in the present proceedings
is the latter act of the Central Government in exercising its powers
under Section 26A of the Drugs Act, the issue as to whether the SubCommittee’s report, per se, adhered in all respects to the directions of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not, in our considered view, assume
decisive significance.
27.
Before proceeding further, it is apposite to emphasise that,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution,
courts are required to exercise restraint and circumspection while
reviewing reports and recommendations of expert committees,
particularly in matters involving technical and scientific domains such
as pharmaceuticals. In this context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
Systopic Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Prem Gupta and Ors. 16, has
held as follows:
AIR 1994 SC 205
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“19. Having considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Solicitor
General in this regard, we must express our inability to make an
assessment about the relative merits of the various studies and
reports which have been placed before us. Such an evaluation is
required to be done by the Central Government while exercising its
powers under Section 26A of the Act on the basis of expert advice
and the Act makes provision for obtaining such advice through the
Board and the DCC.”
28.
To further reinforce the aforesaid principle, the Co-Ordinate
Bench of this Court, while placing reliance on Systopic Laboratories
(Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), in E. Merck (India) Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors.17, elucidated and clarified the scope and limits of
judicial review in matters involving expert committee reports, and
held as follows:
“29. By now it is also well settled that the matters which are to be
decided by experts, are to be left for them to decide and once such
expert bodies take decisions in technical and scientific matters, it is
not for the Court to interfere with the evaluation made by these
expert bodies. In fact the argument which is advanced by the
petitioners on the basis of the reports of DTAB and the arguments
raised before Supreme Court and was considered by the Supreme
Court in the case of Systopic Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Prem
Gupta (AIR 1994 SC 205) (supra) and other connected petitions
reported in the said judgment. That was a case where validity of
the notification issued by the Government of India prohibiting
completely the manufacture and sale of fixed dose combination of
corticosteroids with any other drug for internal use was challenged.
In the said notification it was stated that Central Government was
satisfied that long term use of steroids in fixed dose combinations
for treatment of asthma is likely to involve risk to human beings
and such formulations do not have therapeutic justification and
further that it was necessary and expedient in public interest to
prohibit the manufacture and sale of the said drugs. On behalf of
the petitioners, scientific data in the form of published papers in
the various medical journals had been filed to show that fixed dose
combination of a corticosteroid and an antihistamine is highly
beneficial for the treatment of asthma. Relying upon such studies,
it was sought to be argued that the decision of the Central
2001 AIR Del 326.
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Government in prohibiting the manufacture and sale of the drug in
question was not proper. While rejecting the contention of the
petitioners, the Court observed as under:
“19. Having considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned
Additional Solicitor General in this regard, we must
express our inability to make an assessment about the
relative merits of the various studies and reports which
have been placed before us. Such an evaluation is required
to be done by the Central Government while exercising its
powers under Section 26-A of the Act on the basis of
expert advice and the Act makes provision for obtaining
such advice through the Board and the Drugs Consultative
Committee (DCC).””
(emphasis added)
29.
To augment the aforesaid position, and as a reiteration of the
settled principles governing the scope of judicial review in matters
involving expert evaluation, it would be apposite to extract the
following observations of this Court in Wockhardt Limited and Anr
v. Union of India and Anr.18, which also delineate the role, remit, and
scope of consideration of an expert Sub-Committee, and which bear
direct relevance to the controversy at hand and are reproduced
hereunder:
“26. Petitioner no.1 had also stated that two other FDCs, namely,
(i) Aceclofenac (100 mg) + Paracetamol (500 mg) and (ii)
Aceclofenac 200 mg/200 mg SR + Rabeprazole 10mg/20mg
Capsule were already approved. It is not for this Court to consider
whether the therapeutic justification as provided by the petitioners
was merited or not. Clearly, this Court cannot embark on the said
inquiry. The scope of judicial review would not extend supplanting
this Court’s opinion over of the concerned authorities. However, if
the expert Sub-committee had considered the aforesaid justification
and rejected the same, no further interference would be called for.
However, it would be important to ascertain whether the Subcommittee had applied its mind to the said justification provided
by the petitioners.”
(emphasis added)
2019:DHC:3
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30.
In light of the foregoing discussion and the settled position of
law, the scope of challenge in the present proceedings necessarily
stands confined to the validity of the impugned notifications
themselves. In that regard, we find merit in the submissions advanced
by the learned ASG that, in exercise of judicial review, this Court
does not ordinarily sit in appeal over the sufficiency or adequacy of
the material placed before the authority. This approach is wholly
consistent with the conclusion reached earlier, particularly having
regard to the fact that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has unequivocally
posited that the Central Government is required to apply its mind to
the parameters expressly enumerated under Section 26A of the Drugs
Act. Consequently, any alleged deviation or infirmity in the manner in
which the Sub-Committee structured or articulated its report would, at
the highest, relate to the sufficiency or depth of the material
considered, and cannot, by itself, vitiate the subsequent exercise of
statutory power by the Central Government in issuing the impugned
notifications.
31.
It is not in dispute, nor has it been the case of any of the parties,
that there was a complete absence of material before the Central
Government while arriving at its subjective satisfaction with reference
to the parameters enumerated under the Drugs Act.
32.
A plain reading of Section 26A of the Drugs Act, would, in our
considered view, indicate that the statutory parameters prescribed for
the Central Government to arrive at its requisite satisfaction are, first,
whether (i) the use of the drug is likely to involve any risk to human
beings or animals, (ii) the drug does not possess the therapeutic value
claimed or purported to be claimed for it, or (iii) the drug contains
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ingredients and in such quantities for which there exists no therapeutic
justification. These contingencies constitute the first limb of the
statutory framework governing the exercise of power under Section
26A of the Drugs Act.
33.
The second limb of the provision contemplates that, upon the
existence of any one or more of the aforesaid contingencies, the
Central Government must further be satisfied that, in the larger public
interest, it is necessary or expedient to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the
manufacture, sale, or distribution of such drug by issuance of a
notification. Thus, the statutory scheme makes it clear that regulatory
action under Section 26A of the Drugs Act is premised upon the
concurrence of one or more of the specified contingencies with an
overarching determination of public interest warranting such
intervention.
34.
We are of the considered opinion that the statutory standard
prescribed under Section 26A of the Drugs Act does not require the
establishment of actual or proven harm to human beings. The
legislative intent underlying the provision is clearly precautionary in
nature and is satisfied once it is shown that the use of a drug is likely
to involve risk to human health. The focus of the inquiry, therefore, is
not on demonstrable injury but on the potential or foreseeable risk
arising from continued use of the drug. In this context, the learned
Single Judge committed error while elevating the statutory threshold
and insisting upon a higher degree of proof than what Section 26A of
the Drugs Act contemplates. Such an approach defeats the preventive
object of the provision, which is designed to enable timely regulatory
intervention in the interest of public health.
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35.
In the present case, a perusal of the report of the DTAB Sub-
Committee would reveal that it expressly recorded its conclusion that
the Impugned FDCs were likely to lead to a risk of hypoglycaemia
and that there was an absence of safety data pertaining to the
combinations. The learned Single Judge has, in fact, accepted the
expert observation that the FDCs may lead to hypoglycaemia. Having
done so, the learned Single Judge nevertheless proceeded to question
the rationale behind the proscription of the FDCs, primarily on the
reasoning that the individual components, in the dosages employed,
were separately recommended and approved, and that the FDCs were
perceived to possess therapeutic value in certain cases.
36.
In our considered view, neither of the aforesaid considerations
lay within the permissible domain of judicial scrutiny. The DTAB
Sub-Committee was an expert body constituted pursuant to the
directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, comprising specialists
drawn from diverse disciplines, which had co-opted additional
experts, examined a vast body of scientific material, and engaged in
extensive deliberations prior to formulating its recommendations.
Once such an expert body recorded its conclusions on matters of
safety and risk, it was not open to the learned Single Judge to
substitute such expert assessment with judicial reasoning grounded on
assumptions dehors the expert material.
37.
The second ground on which the learned Single Judge
interfered with Notification S.O. 4471(E), namely, that the individual
components
of
the
FDCs
were
themselves
approved
and
recommended therapeutic dosages, is equally untenable. It cannot be
presumed, as a matter of law or science, that individual drug
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components would behave, interact, or manifest identical safety
profiles when administered in combination, as opposed to being
administered independently. Such a presumption is antithetical to the
regulatory framework governing FDCs and cannot obviate the
statutory requirement of safety data for the combination as a distinct
drug entity.
38.
The reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge that the
existence of approved dosages of individual components dispensed
with the necessity of safety data for the FDCs, therefore, cannot be
sustained. The requirement of safety data is intrinsic to the regulatory
evaluation of FDCs and flows directly from the statutory mandate
underlying Section 26A of the Drugs Act.
39.
The mere fact that the individual components of a FDC are
approved and in use cannot, by itself, dispense with the statutory
rigour of Section 26A of the Drugs Act. Each FDC is required to be
independently assessed under Section 26A, as the pharmacological
impact of a combination may differ from that of its individual
constituents. This position stands reinforced by the decision of this
Court in Alkem Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India 19, wherein the
proscription of an FDC comprising individually approved drugs was
upheld, recognising that an FDC constitutes a distinct therapeutic
entity warranting separate evaluation. The relevant portions of the said
Judgement are reproduced hereinbelow for reference:
“20. I shall now proceed to examine the challenge to the
Notification in the present case applying the law laid down by this
Court in the above referred judgments.
2019 SCC OnLine Del 11058
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21. The reasons given by the DTAB for proscribing the FDC in
question are re-extracted herein below:
“1. Nimesulide in combination has potential of misuse and
safety concern. It's use in children below 12 years is
already banned in India and it's use is limited to 15 days in
adults in Europe.
2. Pharmacodynamically inappropriate FDC as both have
similar mechanism of action (both drugs acting on the
same enzyme). However, adverse effects of the two drugs
(such as Gastrointestinal, ulceration, nephrotoxicity and
hepatoxicity) add up. Thus, combining two NSAIDs may
not improve the efficacy of treatment but may increase the
risk.
3. Further, Diclofenac poses specific risk to animals
(vultures).
4. This combination is not as per the standard therapeutic
guidelines.
There
is
no
convincing
scientific/clinical
evidence/justification for the FDC.”
22. As far as the 1st and 3rd reasons are concerned, clearly the
same could not have independently formed the basis for
proscribing the FDC in question, inasmuch as it is not denied that
Nimesulide and Diclofenac have been independently approved for
manufacture and sale.
23. At the same time, both the Kokate Committee Report as also
the DTAB have opined that the FDC in question is
pharmacodynamically inappropriate as both Nimesulide and
Diclofenac have similar mechanism of action and therefore, their
combination, though cannot improve efficacy of treatment, but
may add up to the adverse effects of the two drugs thereby
increasing the risk. It was further observed that there is no
convincing scientific/clinical evidence/justification for the FDC.
24. In the present case, barring relying upon certain general
Articles, which I shall deal with in the latter part of this judgment,
the petitioners have not been able to place any material on record
to show how the above opinion of the Expert Committee as also
the DTAB can be found to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
25. Admittedly, the petitioners have not taken the approval for the
FDC under Rule 122B of the Rules. Rule 122E(c), includes within
definition of a “New Drug”, a Fixed Dose Combination of two or
more drugs, individually approved earlier for certain claims, which
are now proposed to be combined for the first time in a fixed ratio,
or if the ratio of ingredients in an already marketed combination is
proposed to be changed, with certain claims, which is, indications,
dosage, dosage form (including sustained release dosage form) and
route of administration.
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26. Appendix VI to Schedule Y of the Rules and specifically
Clause (d) thereof, on which reliance was also placed by the
learned counsel for the petitioners, is reproduced herein below:
“(d) The fourth group of FDC includes those whose
individual active ingredients (or drugs from the same
class) have been widely used in a particular indication(s)
for years, their concomitant use is often necessary and no
claim is proposed to be made other than convenience. It
will have to be demonstrated that the proposed dosage
form is stable and the ingredients are unlikely to have
significant interaction of a pharmacodynamic or
pharmacokinetic nature.”
27. A reading of the above would show that even where the claim
of FDC is based on convenience, the applicant has to demonstrate
that the individual active ingredients of the FDC have been widely
used in a particular indication for years and their concomitant use
is often necessary, but also that the proposed dosage form is stable
and the ingredients are unlikely to have significant interaction of a
pharmacodynamic or pharmacokinetic nature. Therefore, the
burden of proving the same has to be on the applicant, herein the
petitioners. As noted hereinabove, barring making of a reference of
a few general Articles, the petitioners have been unable to place
before this Court any material that may have even remotely
satisfied the above conditions.
28. As far as the submissions of the learned counsels for the
petitioners that both Nimesulide and Diclofenac are also available
in combination with acetaminophen (Paracetamol), learned counsel
for the respondent submits that the same is irrelevant inasmuch as
paracetamol is not considered as an NSAID.
29. As far as the submissions of the petitioners that Nimesulide and
Diclofenac are also been prescribed in combination, barring
making a bald statement in this regard in the petitions, there was no
other material placed on record by the petitioners before the DTAB
or the Kokate Expert Committee or even in this petition. During
the course of the arguments, learned counsels for the petitioners
handed over a chart showing that the data published by IQVIA
demonstrates prescription and sale of Diclofenac and Nimesulide
simultaneously and that the sale of around 30,640 units was
reported in July, 2019 as compared to 46,070 units in July, 2018.
In my view, the same cannot be read as evidence to show a
substantial use of the two drugs in combination being prescribed
by the Doctors.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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40.
There are various pharmacological reasons for manufacturing
FDCs. The combination may result in synergy, enhancing the effects
of the drug or maybe purely for convenience. It is further apposite to
note that Rule 122E of the Drugs Rules, 1945 define a “new drug” and
expressly include FDCs within that category. In particular, Appendix
VI to Schedule Y of categorises various FDCs into four categories and
enlist the additional data required for their approval for marketing. It
is thus clear that a bald reference to the approved status of the
ingredients of an FDCs, even if no claim is proposed to be made other
than convenience with regards to the FDC, is inadequate to establish if
a particular FDC has been proscribed in contravention with Section
26A of the Drugs Act.
41.
The further reason which weighed with the learned Single
Judge in setting aside the impugned notifications was the perceived
non-conformity of the DTAB with the directions issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pfizer Limited & Ors. (supra). This aspect
has already been dealt with at length hereinabove. As noticed earlier,
the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not curtail the
statutory discretion vested in the Central Government under Section
26A of the Drugs Act, but merely required the DTAB SubCommittee’s report to operate as a relevant input in the decisionmaking process. The ultimate obligation to apply its mind to the
statutory parameters and to arrive at the requisite satisfaction was left
to the Central Government. The learned Single Judge, therefore, erred
in treating the alleged non-adherence to the Supreme Court’s
directions as a determinative factor for invalidating the impugned
notifications.
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42.
Viewed thus, the Impugned Judgment in so far as regard to
Notification S.O. 4471(E), in our considered opinion, traverses
beyond the permissible contours of judicial review in matters
concerning the Statutory satisfaction expressed by the Central
Government, in conjunction with the inputs from the expert regulatory
assessment and also public health considerations, thereby warranting
appellate interference.
43.
Turning next to the challenge concerning the proscription of the
FDCs by Notification S.O. 4472(E); having already dealt with the
general submissions common to both notifications, it becomes
necessary to address the specific reasoning which weighed with the
learned Single Judge in relation to the said formulation.
44.
The relevant extracts of the Judgment dealing with the said
Notification have already been extracted hereinbefore and are
articulated in paragraph nos. 39-46 of the Impugned Judgment.
45.
The learned Single Judge held that the reasoning of the DTAB
Sub-Committee, namely that sufficient therapeutic options were
available, could not by itself constitute a valid ground for prohibition
under Section 26A of the Drugs Act, and on that basis proceeded to
discount the recommendation of the expert body. In our considered
view, such an approach reads Section 26A of the Drugs Act in an
unduly constricted manner. The statutory threshold under Section 26A
is the satisfaction of the Central Government, founded upon relevant
considerations, and not a rigid or compartmentalised inquiry divorced
from the overall regulatory context. The observation regarding
availability of therapeutic alternatives cannot be examined in
isolation, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the undisputed
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position that only general data had been provided by the Respondents
and no specific data was made available in respect of the said FDCs as
also the fact that the impugned FDCs are not approved or marketed in
other jurisdictions, a factor which bears directly upon the regulatory
assessment undertaken in public interest.
46.
Equally, the said reasoning cannot be severed from the other
grounds recorded by the Sub-Committee, namely, that increments in
the dosage of Metformin are ordinarily prescribed in steps of 500 mg
in accordance with treatment guidelines, and that the availability of
multiple strengths in a single FDC may lead to medication errors,
including over-dosing or under-dosing. The learned Single Judge,
however, approached each of these considerations in isolation rather
than examining their cumulative effect, thereby fragmenting what
was, in essence, a holistic expert assessment.
47.
It also bears emphasis that Section 26A of the Drugs Act,
expressly empowers the Central Government to prohibit a drug where
it contains ingredients and in such quantities for which there exists no
therapeutic justification. The statutory framework does not mandate
the establishment of actual or demonstrable harm in every case; the
absence of therapeutic justification, when assessed in the light of
expert opinion and overarching public health considerations, by itself
constitutes a sufficient statutory trigger for regulatory intervention.
This position stands reinforced by the decision of this Court in E.
Merck (India) Ltd. (supra), which reads as under:
“23. The arguments of the petitioners that the entire basis of the
decision is the opinion of two Members of the Core Group namely,
Dr. Antia and Dr. Naresh Banerjee who had personal bias is also
without any merit. It is totally untenable on the part of the
petitioners to argue that the decision lacks fairness or is arbitrary.
Under Section 26-A of the Act, manufacture of a drug can be
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banned if the Central Government is satisfied that the drug does
not have any thereapeutic value. It can also be banned if the
Central Government is satisfied that it does not have therapeutic
justification. If a particular FDC has no therapeutic justification it
would be in public interest to prohibit the manufacture, sale or
distribution of such a drug. One has to keep in mind the ground
realities prevailing in a poor country like India. If the drug in
question did not have any therapeutic justification and doctors
prescribe this drug as a matter of routine, it would be unnecessary
and unjust burden on the pockets of poor people in this country to
have such a drug. It was rightly argued by the respondents that
with the change in times, now the emphasis is on therapeutic
rationality for continuing the drug i.e. whether a drug is really
required at all. If it does not have any rationale or therapeutic
justification that would also be one of the relevant factors
mentioned in Section 26-A of the Act which may permit the
Central Government to issue Notification prohibiting the
manufacture etc. of such a drug. Therefore, it is not necessary
that a drug has to be only hazardous before it is banned. It is
also not necessary that sufficient material is not available to
show that a particular drug lacks therapeutic value. Once it is
found that the drug in question lacks therapeutic justification
that would be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Central
Government under Section 26-A of the Act. It is not disputed
that Vitamins B1, B6 and B12 are available separately. It is not a
case of the respondents that these vitamins taken individually do
not have therapeutic value. What is prohibited by the impugned
Notification is the fixed dose combination of the three Vitamins. If
a patient/person requires either vitamin B1 or B6 or B12, what is
the justification in giving him vitamin B-Complex which contains
fixed dose combination of Vitamins B1, B6 and B12 thereby
administering other two vitamins not needed. After all these tablets
or injections of vitamins contain chemicals and unnecessary
chemicals are being administered by giving FDC of banned Drug
which are not required. Therefore, when the opinion of Dr. Antia
or Dr. Naresh Banerjee suggested that FDC does not have
therapeutic value/justification and there was no material available
in the Text Books or National Formularies to support it, that would
also be a relevant consideration. In any case the Core Group had
discussed the entire matter before accepting such opinion and did
not blindly follow the opinion of these doctors. Same exercise was
done by DTAB and thereafter by the Central Government.
Therefore, the argument that Notification was result of personal
bias of two doctors, cannot be accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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48.
In dealing with the second reason, relating to dosage increments
of Metformin, the learned Single Judge placed emphasis on the fact
that Metformin 850 mg is independently marketed as an approved
drug and, relying upon material produced by the writ petitioners,
concluded that the prescription of such dosage in certain patients
rendered the Sub-Committee’s concern untenable. In our view, this
line of reasoning is fundamentally flawed. First, there was no
occasion for the learned Single Judge to enter upon an evaluation of
scientific or clinical material to arrive at conclusions regarding
appropriate dosages, as courts are institutionally ill-equipped to
adjudicate
upon
specialised
pharmacological
determinations.
Secondly, and more importantly, the mere fact that an individual drug
component is approved or prescribed at a particular dosage does not
ipso facto justify its inclusion in a FDC at that dosage, the
combination being a distinct therapeutic entity requiring independent
assessment of safety and risk.
49.
The learned Single Judge thereafter examined the third reason
recorded by the Sub-Committee, namely, the possibility of medication
errors arising from multiple strengths, and characterised the same as
cryptic. Proceeding on that premise, the learned Single Judge
observed that FDCs are often expedient where patients are required to
consume multiple medicines, and that such convenience constitutes a
compelling argument against prohibition. With respect, this reasoning
overlooks the fundamental regulatory concern that convenience
cannot supplant considerations of safety. The fact that individual
components may be prescribed separately cannot, without more,
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sustain an assumption that their combined administration would
operate in an identical or benign manner.
50.
We also find ourselves unable to appreciate the reasoning of the
learned Single Judge in observing that “the risk of over-prescription
or under-prescription is common in all FDCs.” The expert SubCommittee had expressly recorded that over-prescription or underprescription of the impugned FDCs could entail serious risk to
patients. The learned Single Judge, however, appears to have
neutralised this expert concern by treating such risk as commonplace
across all FDCs, without disclosing any scientific or evidentiary basis
for such an assumption. In matters of drug regulation, where expert
bodies have identified specific risks associated with particular
formulations, it is impermissible for the Court to dilute those concerns
on the basis of broad generalisations unsupported by technical
material.
51.
Viewed thus, the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge
in relation to Notification S.O. 4472(E) traverses beyond the
permissible contours of judicial review, substitutes expert assessment
with judicial inference, and fails to accord due deference to the
composite and precautionary evaluation undertaken by the statutory
authorities in exercise of powers under Section 26A of the Drugs Act.
DECISION:
52.
In view of the afore-mentioned discussion, analysis, and
conclusions arrived at by us, we find merit in the contentions
advanced on behalf of the Appellants and are of the considered view
that the learned Single Judge erred in interfering with the Notifications
bearing no. S.O. 4471(E) and S.O. 4472(E), issued by the Central
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Government in exercise of powers under Section 26A of the Drugs
Act, thereby warranting appellate interference by this Court.
53.
For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the present
appeals, namely LPA No. 105/2020, LPA No. 106/2020, and LPA No.
671/2019, deserve to be allowed, and accordingly, the Impugned
Judgment dated 13.02.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge is set
aside.
54.
The present appeals, along with pending application(s), if any,
stand disposed of in the above terms.
55.
No Order as to costs.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 09, 2026/rk/kr
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