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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
CNR No. DLHC010440352026
+
W.P.(C) 13565/2026 & CM APPL. 63337/2026, CM APPL.
63338/2026, CM APPL. 63339/2026
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rohan Jaitley CGSC, Mr.
Varun Pratap Singh, GP, Mr. Akshay
Sharma Adv, Mr. Dev Pratap Shahi Adv,
Mr. Yogya Bhatia Adv, Mr. Shyam Narayan
Kumar (ACIT Vigilance))
versus
VIDYOTMA SINGH
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Mohit Mathur Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Jai Anant Dehadrai, Mr. Rohit Anil
Rathi, Ms. Niharika Singh, Mr. Ram Pravesh
Dubey, Ms. Yashwi Aswani, Mr. Yashas
RK, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
16.09.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
The issue which arises for consideration in this matter is
whether the respondent, who is admittedly suffering from disability,
and is in possession of a certificate issued by the competent authority
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under the Right of Persons with Disability Act 20161, certifying that
she suffers from disability in excess of 40%, could, 9 years after she
was appointed on that basis, be subjected to a fresh medical
examination by the employer and further subjected to an inquiry on
the ground that, in the fresh medical examination, the percentage of
disability was found to be less than 40%.
2.
To our mind, a medical examination cannot constitute a basis
for the employer to sit in appeal over a certificate issued by the
competent authority under the RPwD Act. We may note that, apart
from the fact that the medical examination seems to indicate that the
percentage of disability from which the respondent suffered was less
than 40%, there is no other basis cited, in the show cause notice issued
to the respondent, to support the allegation that the certificate of
disability was fraudulently obtained.
3.
The respondent was an Indian Revenue Service (Income Tax)
Officer, who was recruited to the service following success in the
Central Civil Services Examination of 2015. She was appointed as a
person with benchmark disabilities2, in support of which she had
produced a disability certificate dated 27 December 2013, issued by
the Medical Superintendent, VMCC and Safdarjung Hospital, New
Delhi, certifying that she suffered from 40-50% hearing impairment in
both ears. Her disability was clinically assessed as “bilateral sensori
neural hearing loss”.
1 “RPwD Act” hereinafter
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4.
Moreover, prior to her joining services, as required by the
UPSC and in accordance with the rules of the CSE, the respondent
was again examined, apropos her disability, by the Ram Manohar
Lohiya Hospital, which certified that the respondent was “partially
deaf” with the percentage of her disability being 50.94%.
5.
Having joined the Income Tax Service in 2016, the respondent
was confirmed with effect from 29 August 2018 and promoted as
Deputy Commissioner with effect from 1 January 2021.
6.
Mr. Dehadrai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, also
points out that the respondent is presently before the Central
Administrative Tribunal assailing the failure on the part of the
petitioner to promote her as Joint Commissioner of Income Tax and
that the said OA is listed before the Principal Bench of the Tribunal
tomorrow i.e., 17 September 2026.
7.
Mr. Dehadrai submits that this petition has been urgently listed
today only so as to stymie the chance of the respondent succeeding in
the said OA.
8.
For want of adequate material, we do not return any finding on
the said submission.
9.
However, having heard learned Counsel, we are of the opinion
that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal does not call for any
2 “PwBD” hereinafter
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interference.
10.
Reverting to the facts, the respondent was called upon to
undergo a fresh medical examination which was undertaken on 29-30
August 2024. According to the respondent, the tests which she was
called upon to undergo during the said examination were not the
appropriate test and were different from the tests which she had
undergone at the time of obtaining her disability certificate, as
conducted by the VMCC and Safdarjung Hospital.
11.
Be that as it may, following the fresh medical examination, a
medical report was issued on 20 September 2024, opining that the
respondent suffered only from 9% hearing impairment.
12.
On the ground that 9% hearing impairment would not qualify
the respondent as a PwBD under the RPWD Act, the petitioner issued
the following show cause notice to the respondent on 4 December
2024:
“Confidential
No. C-29016/99/2024-Ad VIA
Government of India
Ministry of Finance
Department of Revenue
(Central Board of Direct Taxes)
North Block, New Delhi
Dated: 4th December, 2024
Show Cause Notice
WHEREAS Ms. Vidyotma Singh. IRS(IT) [CSE 2015) has entered
into Central Government service under Persons with Benchmark
Disabilities (PwBD) category on the basis of Civil Service
Examination (CSE) 2015 conducted by Union Public Service
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Examination.
AND WHEREAS as per provisions of CSE Rules, a candidate who
suffers permanently from not less than 40% of relevant benchmark
disability is eligible to apply against services reserved for PwBD
category. If a candidate is found to be below 40% of disabilities,
he/she is disqualified for allocation of service under PwBD
category.
AND WHEREAS upon conducting re-medical examination for
assessment of Benchmark Disability of Ms. Vidyotma Singh,
IRS(IT) [CSE 2015], DGHS, M/o Health & Family Welfare has
forwarded Medical Report dated 20.09.2024 in respect of Ms.
Vidyotma Singh where here Hearing impairment (HI) has been
found to be 9% which is below 40% of the Benchmark Disability
(copy enclosed).
AND WHEREAS on a careful consideration of the Medical Report
dated 20.09.2024, the Competent Authority has provisionally come
to the conclusion that Ms. Vidyotma Singh has secured
employment on the basis of fraudulent claim of PwBD for which
she is not entitled to.
NOW, THEREFORE, Ms. Vidyotma Singh is hereby given an
opportunity of making representation within 15 days of its receipt
as to why an enquiry under Rule 14 & 15 of CCS(CCA) Rules,
1965 may not be held against her for imposition of penalty of
dismissal/removal from service, in case the charges are proved.
The receipt of the Notice should be acknowledged.”
13.
Though the respondent submitted a preliminary response to the
show cause notice, she chose to challenge the very issuance of the
show cause notice before the Tribunal by way of OA 377/2025.
14.
By the present impugned judgment dated 9 December 2025, the
Tribunal has allowed OA 377/2025. The reasoning of the respondent,
as contained in paras 16 to 23 of the impugned judgment, read thus:
“16.
At the threshold, on examining the facts of the case, it is
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evident that the impugned Show-Cause Notice suffers from serious
procedural infirmities. The non-supply of the medical report and
other documents relied upon, the inadequate opportunity afforded
to the applicant to submit an informed and meaningful reply, and
her abrupt repatriation contemporaneous with the issuance of the
above impugned Show Cause Notice, collectively establish a denial
of procedural fairness. Courts and tribunals have repeatedly held
that a show-cause notice that withholds foundational material or
reflects a pre-decisional mind cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. In
this context, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd.3 (supra), wherein it was
held:
“A. quasi-judicial authority, while acting in exercise of its
statutory power, must act fairly and with an open mind
while initiating a show-cause proceeding... The authority
cannot confront the noticee with conclusions of guilt at the
very threshold; if that is done, the entire proceeding stands
vitiated by unfairness and bias."
17.
Thus, while the administration does possess the authority in
principle to order a re-medical examination or to re-verify
eligibility for reservation, such power must be exercised in a fair,
transparent and reasoned manner. Any re-examination must be
based on disclosed documents, clearly stated reasons, and testing
methodologies comparable to the original 2016 assessment. The
absence of these essential elements renders the impugned ShowCause Notice vulnerable. Although delay is not invariably fatal, an
unexplained or inordinate delay causing demonstrable prejudice
vitiates the proceedings. In light of the applicant's long-completed
appointment, confirmation and service progression, the belated
attempt to unsettle the settled eligibility raises a serious issue of
prejudice and laches, particularly where the administration relies
on a solitary late test almost after 09 (nine) years without
disclosing the underlying medical record.
18.
Under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the
determination of "benchmark disability'' requires assessment of
40% disability by a duly notified certifying authority. In the present
case, the applicant was duly certified by competent Medical Boards
in 2013 and 2016. These certifications constitute strong evidence
of eligibility at the material time. Any later re-test conducted in
2024, if relied upon to impeach the earlier certificates, must
withstand strict scrutiny as to comparability of tests, methodology,
equipment, and reasons for re-assessment. A failure to maintain
parity between the original and subsequent examinations materially
3 Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2010) 13 SCC 427
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undermines the probative value of the 2024 assessment.
19.
As observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Oryx Fisheries
(supra), a valid show-cause notice must clearly indicate the charges
and fully disclose the material forming the basis of the proposed
action including the 2016 medical examination report as was done
while induction of the applicant in service, so that the noticee may
effectively respond. A notice alleging "fraud" but withholding
essential medical records, test protocols or comparative data, is
procedurally defective and reduces the exercise to an empty
formality. The impugned notice, as issued, fails to satisfy this
foundational requirement.
20.
It is well-settled that while administrative authorities
possess the power to investigate allegations of fraud, such power
must be exercised reasonably and on the basis of cogent material.
A generic referral by DoP&T for re-examination of multiple
candidates may justify a broad administrative exercise in principle,
but it does not authorise arbitrary reopening of individual cases
without reasons specific to the officer concerned. The absence of
any stated cause, preliminary inquiry, or material indicating
irregularity in the medical test conducted in the years 2013 & 2016
certification further undermines the legitimacy of the re-test and
the resulting Show-Cause Notice.
21.
Although the CCS Rules do not prescribe a statutory period
of limitation for initiating disciplinary or eligibility-related
proceedings, the consistent judicial view is that unexplained or
inordinate delay which results in prejudice to the employee vitiates
the action. Here, the applicant had long been confirmed, promoted
and deputed, and any belated reopening of eligibility required clear
and objective justification. The unexplained gap of nearly eight
years, together with the applicant's repatriation immediately
following issuance of the Show-Cause Notice, gives rise to prima
facie prejudice and renders the administrative action unsustainable.
22.
It is noticed that the applicant's eligibility had been duly
certified by Government Medical Boards in 2013 and 2016. A
reassessment in 2024 after almost 09 (nine) years triggered by
certain complaints and undertaken without supplying the earlier
medical records cannot validly be used to impeach those
certifications without full disclosure of methodology, prior test
data, and meaningful opportunity to rebut. The eight-year interval,
coupled with the timing of repatriation soon after service of the
impugned Show Cause Notice, demonstrates tangible prejudice and
strongly suggests that the notice was issued without a fair,
reasoned, or legally sustainable process. On these grounds, we are
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of the considered view that the impugned Show Cause Notice
deserves to be quashed.
23.
In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the present OA is
allowed in the following terms:
(i) The impugned Show-Cause Notice dated 04.12.2024 is
quashed and set aside;
(ii) The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential
benefits that naturally accrue upon the quashing of the
impugned Show-Cause Notice; and
(iii) The respondents are directed to comply with these
directions as expeditiously as possible, preferably within
six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
Order.”
15.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the Union of India is
before us in the present writ petition.
16.
We have heard Mr. Varun Pratap Singh, learned GP for the
petitioner and Mr. Dehadrai, learned Counsel for the respondent.
17.
Mr. Varun Pratap Singh invokes, in his support, the well-known
principle, enunciated by the Supreme Court in several decisions,
advising circumspection by courts while interfering with inquiry or
disciplinary proceedings at their inception. He submits that there are
only two circumstances in which such interference could be permitted,
the first being where the authority issuing the notice is incompetent to
do so and the second being where there is a violation of the principles
of natural justice.
18.
Mr. Singh also places reliance on the following circular issued
by the DOPT on 5 August 2024:
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“Government of India
Department of personnel & Training
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions
North Block, New Delhi-11001
Confidential
Dated: 05 August, 2024
th
Dear Prof. Goel
“As you are aware, the Civil Services Examination (CSE) Is
conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC)
annually in accordance with the CSE Rules notified by this
Department. The CSE Rules are formulated each year by this
Department In consultation with various stakeholders Including
DGHS. As per the CSE Rules prescribed medical examination
including assessing whether a PwBD category candidate meets the
benchmark requirements is mandatory.
2.
As per the provisions of CSE Rules, a candidate who
suffers permanently from not less than 40 percent of relevant
benchmark disability Is eligible to apply against services reserved
for PwBD category. Further, the candidates whose benchmark
disability has been assessed to be 40% or more by the respective
Medical Board under the sub-category of the PwBD category under
which they have been recommended by UPSC, are considered for
allocation of service, subject to fulfilment of Functional
Classification (FC) and Physical Requirements (PR) criteria.
3.
Recently, this Department Is In receipt of various reports
alleging that some of the candidates of the Civil Services
Examination across the years have used disability certificates
fraudulently to get the benefit of reservation under the Persons with
Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) category and finally succeeded in
getting service. A list of such CSE candidates is annexed at
Annexure-A.
4.
In view of the above It has been decided to inquire into the
genuineness of PwBD claims. Accordingly, I would request DGHS
to kindly enquire on the following points:
a)
Whether these candidates as mentioned in
Annexure-A, have the benchmark disability for availing the
Reservation available to PwBD candidates.
b)
The percentage of their disability along with
Functional Classifications and Physical Requirements (FC
& PR).
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c)
Whether these candidates have physical limitation
which hampers their writing capabilities owing to their
disability, If any.
5.
DGHS may consider to constitute a fresh Medical Board
with the experts on the subject and examine their detailed disability
as per extant relevant rules and regulations. Further, DGHS may
seek necessary cooperation from the States/ CCAs where the
persons are serving.
6.
I shall be grateful if the requisite information/report could
be provided to this Department, latest by 02.09.2024, positively.”
Regards
Yours sincerely
Sd/.
05/08/2024
Avinash Joshi”
19.
He cites, for this purpose, the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana4. He further submits
that the issuance of show cause notice was in sync with the judgment
of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma5.
20.
Having heard learned Counsel, in our view, the approach of the
Tribunal is eminently in sync with the philosophy of the RPWD Act
read with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the issue.
21.
We may note, at the cost of repetition, that there is no material
cited in the show cause notice issued to the respondent to support the
allegation that the respondent obtained her disability certificate from
the VMCC and Safdarjung Hospital by fraudulent means. The
4 2006 (12) SCC 28
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certificate itself is not alleged to be fabricated. Ordinarily, it is
difficult to believe that an institution such as the VMCC and
Safdarjung Hospital would issue a disability certificate fraudulently.
22.
The only basis on which fraud in obtaining the certificate is
alleged in the show cause notice is the fresh medical examination
conducted by the petitioner. There is no justification cited in the show
cause notice for conducting the fresh medical examination. Besides, a
disability certificate issued by the competent authority under the
RPWD Act is entitled to pre-eminence under the provisions of the
statute and cannot be sought to be questioned on the basis of an
independent medical examination conducted later.
23.
An illuminating discussion of the reason for this, is to be found
in para 70 of Ravinder Kumar Dhaliwal v. Union of India6 in which
Chandrachud J has observed:
“70. Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act defines the words “person
with disability” as “person with a long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with
barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in the society
equally with others”. Section 2(c) defines barrier to mean “any
factor
including
communicational,
cultural,
economic,
environmental, institutional, political, social, attitudinal or
structural factors which hamper the full and effective participation
of persons with disabilities in society”. On a combined reading of
the definitions provided in Sections 2(s) and 2(c) of the Act, it is
evident that the RPwD — similar to the 2017 Act — defines
“disability” as a social construct and not solely as a medical
construct. The Act does not define a mental impairment to solely
constitute a disability. Rather, it defines disability based on the
interaction of the impairment with the barriers which in effect
hamper the effective participation of an individual.”
5 (2016) 4 SCC 791
6 (2023) 2 SCC 209
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(Emphasis supplied)
24.
Thus, it is not the medical condition of a person which, by
itself, renders him “disabled” within the meaning of the RPwD Act,
but the extent to which the condition interferes with his effective
participation in society. A simple medical examination, conducted
after a person has been employed after extending the benefit of the
RPwD Act – in this case, 9 years after employment – cannot,
therefore, override the certificate, and the benefit that flows from it.
25.
At the cost of repetition, we are constrained to observe, with
some degree of disquietude, that the fresh medical examination in the
present case was conducted 9 years after the respondent joined
service. Why, and in what circumstances, the petitioner decided, 9
years after the respondent had joined service, to subject her to a fresh
medical examination, is unknown. At the very least, no such basis is
available in the show cause notice issued to the respondent. We may
go to the extent of holding that, even if the decision was bona fide, it
is unjustified.
26.
The approach of the Court, as well as of the executive
authorities, while dealing with persons with disabilities, has to be
qualitatively different from that which is adopted while dealing with
other persons. A sensitive approach, in sync with the philosophy of
the RPwD Act has to be adopted. This aspect has been reiterated,
times without number, by the Supreme Court. The entire philosophy
of the RPwD Act is one of reasonable accommodation and ensuring of
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the availability of meaningful avenues to provide optimum chances for
persons with disabilities to perform to the best of their abilities. If, 9
years after a person has, with her, a duly issued certificate under the
RPwD Act, issued by a competent authority and on the basis of which
she is provided employment, she is to be subjected to inquiry
proceedings on the basis of a purportedly independent medical
examination which was conducted by the employer, we would be
doing violence to the very basis and philosophy of the policy of
emancipation of the differently abled, and would empower executive
authorities to flagrantly disobey the provisions of the RPwD Act.
27.
Apropos the submission that the Court should not interfere with
inquiry proceedings at the very inception, it is well settled that, where
the proceedings themselves are found to be misconceived in the sense
that there is no basis forthcoming even on the basis of the material
contained in the notice issued to the employee, a court can interfere
without requiring the employee to be subjected to inquiry proceedings.
In Union of India v. Upendra Singh7, it has been held that if the
allegations in a charge-sheet do not constitute misconduct, a Court can
interfere even at that stage.
28.
This principle would apply with all the more rigour where the
employee concerned is a person suffering from disability.
29.
We are sanguine that the afore-extracted circular dated 5
August 2024 can be invoked only in a case where there is prima facie
7 (1994) 3 SCC 357
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material to indicate that the very obtaining of the disability certificate
by the concerned candidate was fraudulent. It cannot be invoked in a
case in which there is no such material, or merely on the basis of a
subsequent medical examination, whether conducted by the authorities
or by the employer.
30.
In the present case, the respondent is in possession not of one
but of two certificates, one by the VMCC and Safdarjung Hospital and
the second by the RML Hospital, both of which were as per the
statutory norms, each of which certified the respondent to be suffering
from over 40% disability.
31.
It is not the allegation of the petitioner that either of these
certificates were fraudulently obtained.
32.
In these circumstances, we are clear that the issuance of the
show cause notice to the respondent cannot be sustained on the basis
of the circular dated 5 August 2024 issued by the DOPT.
33.
In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal
acted well within its powers in setting aside the proceedings against
the respondent following the issuance of show cause notice dated 4
December 2024.
34.
We, therefore, do not find this to be a case meriting interference
in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
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35.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
VINOD KUMAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 16, 2026/dsn
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