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2025:MLHC:1103-DB
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No.6/2025 with
MC (WA) No.34/2025
Date of order: 13.11.2025
1. Union of India represented by the Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi-110011.
2. The Director General Assam Rifles, Assam Rifles Headquarters,
Shillong-793010 .
3. The Inquiry Authority 44 Assam Rifles Pin-932044 C/o 99 APO
4. Commanding Officer 44 Assam Rifles Pin-932044 C/o 99 APO
..... Appellants
Vs.
5360091 F/A Smt Maya Devi
..... Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Soumen Sen, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellants :
Mr. R. Debnath, CGC
For the Respondent :
Mr. L. Khyriem, Adv with
Mr. W. Jyrwa, Adv
i) Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
2025:MLHC:1103-DB
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
This appeal arises out of a judgment passed by the learned single
judge in a writ petition filed by the respondent challenging the decision of
the competent authority in imposing a major penalty of compulsory
retirement from service.
2.
The writ petitioner was initially appointed as a female attendant on
11.07.2002 in the Assam Rifles on compassionate ground in place of her
husband (L) Nirmal Kumar Singh, who had predeceased her and who,
during his lifetime, was personnel of the Assam Rifles and lost his life in
the line of duty in an avalanche in the year 1992.
3.
In the course of her work, the writ petitioner took leave for 26
days, including two days of earned leave and six days transit leave from
01.10.2010 to 26.10.2010. On the prayer made, the writ petitioner was
allowed extension of leave till 15.11.2010 for a further period of 20 days.
Admittedly, the writ petitioner could not resume her duties on the expiry of
the said leave for which she received a letter No.14043/A/2010/473 dated
23.12.2010, issued by the respondent authority requesting her to resume
duty immediately.
4.
The writ petitioner, however, did not join her duty citing various
reasons, which inter alia, included the pendency of a criminal case filed
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against her son and herself for which she had to attend to, and also for
settling of family affairs, resulting in her not being able to resume duty in
time. The writ petitioner appeared on 16.10.2012 at the Transit Camp at
Dimapur, Nagaland with the Assam Rifles Unit there to rejoin her duty.
She joined for duty at 44 Assam Rifles on 21.10.2012.
5.
In view of her overstayed leave, a show cause notice was issued
being No.44AR/A/A3/2339 (CIVIL) dated 06.12.2012. The writ petitioner
submitted her reply to the said show cause notice on 07.12.2012,
explaining the reasons for her absence and also pointing out that she had
earlier sent a number of letters whereby she had informed the authorities
concerned about her absence. However, the respondent authorities
proceeded to conduct an inquiry into the matter and set out a statement of
imputations of charge in support of the articles of charges framed against
the writ petitioner for alleged absence from duty without prior permission.
An inquiry officer was appointed, who held the preliminary hearing in the
matter and had requested the writ petitioner to attend the same vide his
communication No.5360091/FA/44/AR/Discp/2014/026 dated 28.03.2014.
The writ petitioner attended the inquiry proceedings in person. Thereafter,
the writ petitioner was served with a copy of the order bearing
No.I.12015/A (Discp)/DI-Maya Devi/2014 dated 23.05.2014, wherein the
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proceeding against her was concluded with the major penalty of
compulsory retirement from service.
6.
Being aggrieved by the said order dated 23.05.2014, the writ
petitioner approached the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court by way of a writ
petition being WP (C) No.517 of 2015, and the same was disposed of on
04.02.2015 with a direction upon the authorities concerned to accept the
appeal to be filed by the writ petitioner in this regard.
7.
The writ petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the competent
authority against the impugned order dated 23.05.2014, which was rejected
with an order No.I.12015/A (Discp)/DI-Maya Devi/2015/841 dated
04.06.2015, and the penalty of compulsory retirement from service was
upheld. Again, the writ petitioner preferred an application dated
30.07.2016 before the concerned authority seeking reinstatement of her
service, but she was informed by a letter No.I.14015/Rec/Adm-IV
(Civ)/Pension/2016/111 dated 08.09.2016 that she cannot be reinstated and
she is also not entitled to any pension as she is 22 days short for being
eligible for pension as far as qualifying service under the Central Service
(Pension) Rules, 1972 is concerned. Thereafter, with the letter
No.I.14015/Rec/Adm-IV(Civ)/Pension/2017/148 dated 16.01.2017, the
writ petitioner was directed to sign the final settlement of her accounts and
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payments pertaining to her entitlements. The writ petitioner did not accept
the said direction of her superior officers and being aggrieved by the
impugned order dated 23.05.2014, the appellate order dated 04.06.2015,
the order dated 08.09.2016 refusing reinstatement as well as the order
dated 16.01.2017 whereby she was directed to sign the necessary
documents and papers for payment of her entitlement and filed a writ
petition praying inter-alia, for quashing of the said order. The writ petition
was allowed. This order is under challenge.
8.
The learned single judge considered the materials on record as
well as the submissions made on behalf of the parties, and thereafter,
following the decision in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & ors v.
B. Karunaka & ors1 directed reinstatement with all due benefits, including
back wages to which she is entitled to in accordance with law, had she not
been issued with the said impugned order by which she was compulsorily
retired from service. The learned single judge has considered the affidavits
filed by the parties, wherefrom it would appear that the reasons for the writ
petitioner's inability to join service due to ill health and other factors were
duly communicated to the Assam Rifles and the said letters explaining and
disclosing the reasons have been duly received by the Assam Rifles. In
(1993) 4 SCC 727
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fact, the employer has enquired from the writ petitioner, as to when she
would be fit to join since she had been continuously absent since
15.11.2010. The writ petitioner has also specifically alleged in the writ
petition that the inquiry report was not furnished to her and as a result
whereof, she was unable to file any response to such report and the
imposition of penalty, was in clear violation of the principles of natural
justice.
9.
In response to such allegation, the respondent authorities in their
affidavit-in-opposition have denied the averment and stated that all
possible opportunity was afforded to the writ petitioner to defend herself
and she was informed of the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings
against her. The writ petitioner was allowed to file her show cause to
nominate a serving or retired government employee to assist her in the
proceedings, but she chose not to nominate anyone in this respect, but has
personally participated in the whole proceedings, her signature being
attested to the relevant papers throughout the whole process. However, the
respondent authority has not made any categorical statement that after the
conclusion of the inquiry, upon the inquiry officer having prepared and
filed his report to the authority concerned, a copy of such report was given
to the writ petitioner.
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10.
The consequence of not serving the inquiry report has been dealt
with elaborately in Managing Director, ECIL (supra) and in fact, the
learned single judge in deciding the matter in favour of the writ petitioner
has relied upon paragraphs 25, 27 and 29, which are reproduced below:
“25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report
is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first
stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes
into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show
cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage
when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the
report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of
the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its
conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The
second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty
although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the
second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken
away by the Forty-second Amendment.
27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than
the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into
two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority
arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry
officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The
second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to
impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary
authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second
stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the
report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending
himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to
him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove
his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings.
29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the
disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has right to
receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the
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guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges
levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to
defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial
of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority
takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable
opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a
breach of the principles of natural justice.”
11.
There cannot be any doubt that a major punishment was imposed
upon the writ petitioner without supplying her with any inquiry report.
This is a clear act of violation of the principles of natural justice.
Managing Director, ECIL (supra), is a clear authority for the proposition
that the enquiry report in a disciplinary proceeding is required to be
furnished to the delinquent employee, so that he can make an adequate
representation explaining his/her stand failing which it shall be considered
to be breach of natural justice. This principle is laid down in Managing
Director, ECIL (supra) in paragraph 29, which is reproduced below:
“29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not
the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to
receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the
disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion with regard to the
guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges
levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee’s right to
defend himself against the charges levelled against him.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.
In the instant case, admittedly, the enquiry officer is other than the
disciplinary authority. Accordingly, the ratio in Managing Director, ECIL
(supra), squarely applies to this case.
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13.
We have already referred to paragraph 29 above, however, for
the purpose of better understanding, paragraphs 30(iv) and (v) are also
reproduced below:
“30. …. (iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to
make representation to the disciplinary authority against the
findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the
opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of
principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only
appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan case should
apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or
non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether
there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and
whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the
report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of
punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be
held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent
employee should have the benefit of the report of the enquiry
officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the
charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered
accordingly.
(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the
order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not
furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to
him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to
the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or
removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the
report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of
the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it
may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded
to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with backwages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical
ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of
natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to
assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not
incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all the
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sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to
the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report,
has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no
different consequence would have followed, it would be a
perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to
get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the
dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of
justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an
“unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is
antithetical to justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
14.
The non-supply of an enquiry report, the findings and other
materials relied upon by the enquiry officer are required to be disclosed to
the writ petitioner in order to enable him to explain the circumstances
which formed the basis and foundation of the enquiry report and nonsupply of such materials and enquiry report are clear violation of the
principles of natural justice. Whether the writ petitioner has absented
wilfully, or disobeyed the direction of his superior must be well reflected
in the enquiry report and the writ petitioner is entitled to know the reasons
for any adverse observation made by the enquiry officer in the report in
this regard. An unauthorised absence, does not always mean that it was
done wilfully.
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15.
In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and others2, the scope of judicial
review in the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings, has been
explained in paragraph 25 in the following words:
“25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is
limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in
nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge.
Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required
to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt,
we cannot lost sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a
quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must
arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of
probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record.
While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant
fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift
the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the
witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot
enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had
not been charged with.”
16.
Similarly, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others3, a
three-judge Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had noticed the
scope of judicial review with regard to the disciplinary proceedings and
observed as follows:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
(2006) 5 SCC 88
(1995) 6 SCC 749
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public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether
rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted
with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and
authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of
Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that
evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer
is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority
held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
conclusions or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is
based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no
reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal
may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the
relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power
to reappreciate the evidence or the nature or punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held
at p.728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from
patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at
all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
17.
It is trite law that before forming any opinion with regard to the
punishment which is to be imposed on the writ petitioner, the delinquent
has to be given an opportunity to submit a reply or representation on the
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enquiry report offering adequate reasons to show that the findings are
erroneous or perverse. The impugned decision of removal was arrived at
without there being any consideration of the comments of the writ
petitioner on the enquiry report. We have already noted the various
grievances that the writ petitioner raised in the enquiry proceedings, which
have not been denied. The writ petitioner in her representation to the
enquiry report is entitled to point out any defect with the procedure, a
defect of substantial nature in the appreciation of evidence and any
misleading evidence on both oral or documentary. In her representation,
any input and explanation given by the delinquent are also to be considered
by the disciplinary authority before it embarks with further proceedings as
per statutory rules.
18.
We are, thus of the view that there has been a violation of the
principles of natural justice at the level of the disciplinary authority when
an opinion was formed to punish the writ petitioner with dismissal without
forwarding the enquiry report to the delinquent and before obtaining her
comments on the enquiry report.
19.
In this regard, we may also refer to a fairly recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of U.P. v. Ram Prakash Singh4,
(2025) SCC OnLine SC 891
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thereafter an extensive consideration of all the decisions including the
decision where B. Karunakar (Supra) was discussed, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has succinctly summarised the principles that emanate from B.
Karunakar (Supra) and other decisions in the following paragraphs:
“43. Interpretation of B. Karunakar (supra), particularly bearing in
mind the shifting trend towards the ‘prejudice’ principle and the
insistence on the pleading and proof of ‘prejudice’, may have
unintended consequences for delinquent employees which have not
been visualized hitherto, therefore, having the potential of
rendering the law laid down by the Constitution Bench a dead
letter.
44. To recapitulate, B. Karunakar (supra) has unequivocally held
that non-furnishing of the enquiry report would deprive the
employee of the opportunity and disable him to demonstrate before
the disciplinary authority the perversity in such report by filing a
representation. The object that is sought to be achieved by
furnishing of the enquiry report is this. If the report were furnished,
the delinquent employee could persuade the disciplinary authority
to hold that either he is innocent and/or that he does not deserve
any punishment, or may be let off with a minor punishment.
Providing a delinquent employee with an opportunity to respond to
the enquiry report is, thus, a crucial procedural step that must
precede disciplinary action. Failure to do so, such as imposing
punishment without furnishing the report, could severely handicap
the employee’s ability to effectively question or challenge the
decision in an appeal/appropriate proceedings, as he would be
unaware of the materials against him. In such a case, at best,
nothing more than a plain and simple plea can be urged that nonfurnishing of the enquiry report has deprived him of reasonable
opportunity to counter the findings of guilt without, however, he
being able to demonstrate prejudice. It is axiomatic that without
reading the enquiry report, there cannot be an effective and
meaningful challenge to the findings contained therein.
45. That apart, the right to receive the report of enquiry being
available prior to a final decision being taken in the disciplinary
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proceedings cannot be postponed by any arbitrary act of the
employer in not following the law, which can be or should be
validated by the court, and what was intended to be a pre-decisional
opportunity cannot be made to partake the character of a postdecisional opportunity.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.
The decision of the disciplinary authority stands vitiated by reason
of the fact that she is unaware of the reasons for the enquiry officer to
come to a finding against her by not accepting the explanation she had
offered for not being able to join the duty as the enquiry report was not
admittedly supplied to her. She is entitled in law to know the reasons
forming the basis of the final decision. In our view, it is a clear violation of
the principles of natural justice.
21.
The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India & ors v. Bidyut
Kumar Mitra & ors5 to argue that the writ petitioner would be required to
demonstrate prejudice caused to her in not supplying the inquiry report. In
our respectful reading of the said decision, it appears that the issue
presently under consideration is different and the ratio of the said decision
would not be applicable in the present case. In State Bank of India (supra),
it would appear that the respondent did not care to raise the issue of nonsupply of the documents during the entire course of the enquiry
(2011) 2 SCC 316
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proceedings, and also in the written brief containing his defence
arguments, he has not raised such issue. The respondent also did not
comply with the procedural requirement and hence, it was held that he
cannot now complain that there is a breach of the procedural requirements.
In such circumstances, it was held that the respondent failed to prove any
prejudice he had suffered that has resulted in miscarriage of justice. It was
further found that the respondent did not even care to submit the list of
documents within the stipulated period. Further, the respondent did not
even care to specify the relevance of the documents sought to be
requisitioned. The respondent was merely trying to make capital out of his
own lapse in not submitting the list of documents in time and also not
stating the relevance of the documents required to be produced. It was on
such a conspectus of fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of
the Division Bench.
22.
Moreover, unlike the decisions where it was held that non-supply
of the report may not result in the disciplinary proceedings being declared
null and void, in the instant case, it is on record that she was never allowed
to be represented by any of her friends or colleagues who are familiar with
the procedure and formalities of the inquiry, and she was never supplied
with the documents relied upon by the inquiry officer nor was she ever
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allowed to inspect such documents even though she was given only a list
of the documents relied upon by the authorities in the said inquiry. The
writ petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine the
prosecution’s witnesses.
23.
In view thereof, we accept and conclude that there is a violation of
the principles of natural justice and the ratio in Managing Director, ECIL
(supra) applies in the instant case.
24.
Accordingly, we direct the appellants to supply a copy of the
inquiry report upon the writ petitioner within a fortnight from date, to
which the writ petitioner, shall make a detailed representation within four
weeks thereafter.
25.
The disciplinary authority is directed to conclude the proceedings
preferably within a period of three months from date of submission of the
representation by the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner, shall be reinstated
only for the purpose of completing the disciplinary proceeding and she
shall be entitled to the subsistence allowance as per the extant rules from
the date of the order of dismissal i.e., on or from 23.05.2014, till the
proceedings are concluded. All the arrears towards the subsistence
allowance, shall be paid within a period of four weeks from the date, and
that shall be a condition precedent before any further proceeding can be
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initiated for conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding. In the event the
subsistence allowance is not paid within the aforesaid period, the
impugned order shall revive.
26.
The reinstatement to be made, as a result of setting aside the
enquiry for failing to furnish the report, is treated as a reinstatement for the
purpose of holding a fresh enquiry from the stage of furnishing the report.
The said direction is in accordance with the decision in Managing
Director, ECIL (supra) as discussed in paragraph 31 of the judgment.
27.
The impugned order stands modified to the aforesaid extent.
28.
Accordingly, the appeal and the miscellaneous application are
disposed of, however, without costs.
(H.S. Thangkhiew)
Judge
(Soumen Sen)
Chief Justice
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2025.11.18 17:26:40 IST
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