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2023:MLHC:644
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP. No. 12 of 2023
Date of Decision: 24.10.2025
1. Umsaw Khwan Village Dorbar,
P.O – Umsaw, Ri Bhoi District,
Meghalaya,
[Represented by its Headman Shri Handerland Nongkseh]
2. Shri. Stanlywiss Rymbai,
S/o Shri Truin Kharpran of Umbir Village, PO- UCC,
PS- Umiam, Ri Bhoi District,
Meghalaya.
..…..Applicants
- Versus 1. The State of Meghalaya represented by the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya,
Forest and Environment Department.
...…..Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Mr. V.G.K. Kynta, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. C. Nongkhlaw, Adv.
2023:MLHC:644
For the Respondent(s)
:
Dr. N. Mozika, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, Adv.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This is an application made under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India read with the provisions of Rule 36-A of the Rules of Administration
of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937, the applicants being
aggrieved with the order dated 15.06.2023 passed by the learned District
Judge/Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Ri-Bhoi District,
Nongpoh in Misc. Case No. 2 of 2022 connected to RFA No. 1 of 2022.
2.
In the application, what is stated is that the genesis of the case
between the parties dates back to the filing of a plaint by the Plaintiff/State of
Meghalaya being Money Suit No. 8 of 2014 praying for a decree for
realization of rupees eight crores with compound interest @ 12% per annum,
the same being directed at the applicants herein as defendants. The basis being
that a parcel of land measuring about 9,24,441.10 sq. m. situated at Mawpalai
village was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, the total amount of compensation coming to rupees ten crores, an initial
amount of eight crores of which was paid to the Umsawkhwan Village through
its Headman and the applicant No. 2 herein as the power of Attorney holder,
after which the Government in the Forest Department has taken over the land
on 21.06.2011.
2023:MLHC:644
3.
The applicant seeking to demand the balance amount of rupees two
crores which was not paid to them, had then filed a writ petition before this
Court (the then Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court) being W.P.(C) No.
275 of 2012 with a prayer that the said sum be paid to them. However, the
Government of Meghalaya, on receipt of notice has instead decided to annul
the entire land acquisition proceedings which then prompted the applicants to
file another writ petition before this Court being W.P.(C) No. 299 of 2012.
This petition was disposed of vide order dated 17.02.2014, holding inter alia,
that the Government may file a suit for recovery of the said rupees eight crores
and in the meantime, the balance sum of rupees two crores is to be paid within
four months from the date of receipt of the judgment and order along with
interest @ 9% and thereafter @12 % for each delay.
4.
The State accordingly filed the said Money Suit No. 8 of 2014
before the Court of the Learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, RiBhoi District, Nongpoh, seeking recovery of the eight crores.
5.
In response, the applicants as defendants/applicants have filed an
application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure with a
prayer for rejection of the plaint. The learned Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner disposed of the said application vide order dated 16.02.2016,
holding that the said suit is not maintainable in its present form for non-joinder
of necessary parties as well as for want of cause of action, being thus barred
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by the provisions of clauses (a) & (d) of Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint therefore
was rejected.
6.
On the plaint being rejected, the Government then filed an appeal
before the Court of the Learned District Judge, Ri-Bhoi District, Nongpoh,
being registered as RFA No 1 of 2018, accompanied by an application for
condonation of delay of 707 days for filing of the said appeal, the application
being Misc. Case No. 2 of 2018, which application was then allowed vide the
said impugned order dated 15.06.2023. Hence this instant application.
7.
Mr. V.G.K. Kynta, learned Sr. counsel along with Ms. C.
Nongkhlaw, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants has
submitted that inspite of non-mentioning of any provision in the application
seeking condonation of delay, for example as to whether the same is made out
under the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned
District Judge has condoned the delay of 707 days, apparently under the said
provision and passed the impugned order. Even if the issue of non-mentioning
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not pressed, however, the very
applicability of the said provision is under challenged in this instant revision
petition, submits the learned Sr. counsel.
8.
Another argument canvassed is that a reading of Rule 36-A of the
1937 Rules, would reveal that the same does not incorporate or expressly
permit the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as there is no
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provision in the said 36-A Rules which provides for condonation of delay or
to import the purport of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this, in the face of the
embargo created by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Rule 41 of the said
1937 Rules only speaks about the law of limitation by referring to the
Limitation Act of 1908 and not the Limitation Act of 1963, submits the
learned Sr. counsel. The observations of the Apex Court in the case of
Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., reported in (2008) 7
SCC, 169 at para 20 has been referred to in this regard.
9.
Therefore, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the
ground that Rule 36-A of the 1937 Rules is a State law, whereas the Limitation
Act is a Central Law and as such, as per the provision of Article 254, if there
is a conflict between a Central Act and a State Act, the former would prevail
over the latter, the proposition put forth by the learned First Appellate Court
is not correct legally and therefore, the impugned order was passed without
jurisdiction, submits the learned Sr. counsel. The case of Wallam Jingsuk
Barim v. Union of India & Ors, Crl.M.C. No. 108 of 2023 was also cited in
this regard to support this contention, wherein vide order dated 19.02.2024,
this Court, at para 9 and 15 of the same, has observed as follows:
“9.
Learned counsel for the respondent contended that there is
no sufficient cause shown by the petitioner to condone the delay
of 114 days and in terms of Section 21 of the Act, which is referred
to supra, no application can be entertained beyond the outer time
limit of 30 days as prescribed under the Act of 2008. He has further
2023:MLHC:644
contended that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 much
less Section 29 (2) will not be applicable to this case, as the Act of
2008 is a special law, governing the proceedings relating to the
offences falling under the said Act. Section 29 (2) of the Act, 1963
reads as follows:
"29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the
provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose
of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
Thus, it was stated that the petitioner, having not shown any
sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 114 days in preferring
the appeal, has no statutory right to seek for condonation of delay
and hence, the application ought to be rejected at the threshold.
15.
When the Special Law prescribes an outer time limit, this
Court cannot extend the time on the reasoning that it would
amount to legislation by the Court itself, which is not permissible.
For example, if any application is filed for discharge, it has got to
be filed within the time limit stipulated and if the contention of the
petitioner is accepted against the discharge petition, the accused
will take his own sweet time to file such a petition with a request
to condone the delay. Though Article 21 of the Constitution deals
with personal liberty of a person, it does not mean that the said
Article can be invoked to overcome the statutory provisions, more
so, Special Enactments like NIA. For example, under the
Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 r/w Rule 7(2) of the
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (extracted below), an outer time
limit of 120 days is prescribed under Section 7-1 in preferring the
appeal beyond which the Tribunal will become functus officio.
"7(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued
by the Central Government or an order passed by the
Central Government or any other authority under the Act,
may within 60 days from the date of issue of the
notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal:
Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that
the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
2023:MLHC:644
preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend
the said period by a further period of 60 days."
Similarly, under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 also,
the maximum period of 120 days is prescribed to prefer an appeal
before the Appellate Authority against the order of the Controlling
Authority, beyond which the Appellate Authority has no power to
entertain the same as also the condition of pre-deposit within the
time is emphasized, in the absence of which, no appeal can be
entertained.”
10.
On the other aspect of the matter, the learned Sr. counsel has
submitted that the judgment and order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the
Learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Ri-Bhoi District, Nongpoh in
Misc. Case No. 12 (T) of 2014 arising out of Money Suit No. 8 of 2014 was
under challenged before the learned District and Sessions Judge, Ri-Bhoi
District, Nongpoh, the appeal preferred by the State was apparently delayed
by 707.
11.
It is the submission of the learned Sr. counsel that when the matter
was heard before the Court of the learned Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner, after which the said judgment and order dated 16.02.2016 was
passed, the State was duly represented by its counsel. Even so, if the statement
of the State that the copy of the said order was received only on 05.04.2016,
there is no plausible explanation as to why the delay was occasioned, except
to say that the said appeal was contemplated to be filed only after obtaining
approval from the Law Department, which do not constitute any judicially
tenable explanation for condonation of the inordinate delay.
2023:MLHC:644
12.
The learned Sr. counsel went on to argue that it is a settled position
of law that the State is not occupying any preferred coveted position than any
other litigant when it comes to explanation of the cause of delay. Sufficient
cause is a legal threshold that demands real, credible and satisfactory
explanation, not general excuses and should incorporate conditions to prove
that the delay was a result of fraud, natural calamity etc. But in the present
case, the respondent State has not been able to demonstrate such facts, far less,
to explain each day’s delay for the 707 days in question. Therefore, the
observation of the learned Lower Appellate Court in the impugned order that
“…the applicant had sought legal opinion or advice from many legal counsels
including the Law Department…” does not constitute sufficient cause. In
support of this contention, the following cases have been referred to by the
learned Sr. counsel:
i.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors v. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654, para 3;
ii.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors v. M/s Satish Chand
Shivhare & Brothers 2022 Live Law (SC) 430, para 17 &
18.
13.
In reply, Dr. N. Mozika, learned Sr. counsel and Special counsel
for the State/respondent along with Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, learned counsel has
submitted that the first challenge to the jurisdiction of the learned court in
2023:MLHC:644
passing the impugned order is to the absence in mentioning of the correct
provision of law, more particularly, that the application for condonation of
delay was not preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, nevertheless,
the learned Court has passed the said impugned order by resorting to the said
provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This, would not be an
impediment as it is well settled that non-mentioning of the relevant provision
of law would not take away the Court’s jurisdictional powers, if so vested.
The case of J. Kumaradasan Nair & Anr v. Iric Sohan & Ors, (2009) 12
SCC 175, para 18 was referred to in this regard.
14.
The second limb of argument put forth by the learned Senior
Special counsel is that, though, the provision of Rule 36-A of the said
Administration of Justice Rules, 1937 prescribes a period of appeal within 30
days, but is silent on the aspect of condonation of delay, however, Rule 41 of
the same rules does not preclude the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1908,
particularly if the dispute in question is between persons not belonging to a
Scheduled Tribe or Tribes. This is further cemented by the fact that a Full
Bench of this Court in the case of Shella Action Committee, Rally of Shella
Village Natives v. The State of Meghalaya & Ors, has held that the
Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the entire State of Meghalaya including the
tribal areas of Autonomous Districts or Regions.
15.
Yet again, if the provision of Rule 36-A is silent on condonation,
2023:MLHC:644
then in such a scenario, the proposition found in the case of State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr v. Anshuman Shukla, (2014) 10 SCC, 814, para 20, 21 ,22, 23
and 24 as well as the case of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil
Aboobacker reported in (1995) 5 SCC 5 would apply, wherein it was held that
when a special law does not expressly exclude, the provision of Section 29 (2)
of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to such law and the provision of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would come into play under the
circumstances.
16.
On the contention of the petitioner that no sufficient cause was set
out to warrant passing of the impugned order, the learned Senior Special
counsel has submitted that there were sufficient grounds elucidated by the
State respondents in the condonation application, stressing more particularly
that the State Government is an impersonal machinery acting through its
officers/servants after obtaining legal opinions from Government counsels,
such opinions requiring approvals at various stages of the administrative
hierarchy, the delay so cause has been properly explained. To buttress this
contention, reliance has been placed in the following case laws:
i.
State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors, (1996) 3 SCC
32, para 11;
ii.
Ramnath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, para
15;
2023:MLHC:644
iii. Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bgargavi Amma,
(2008) 8 SCC 321, para 13; and
iv. N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123,
Para 9 to 13.
17.
On an understanding of what has been put forth by the parties in
their respective argument, this Court is of the view that what is required to be
decided here are two issues, first is the issue of applicability of the law of
limitation to the case of the parties and second is whether sufficient cause has
been shown to condone such delay.
18.
True, under Rule 36-A of the 1937 Rules, an outer limit of
limitation for filing an appeal or application has been fixed at 30 days which
is the statutory period prescribed for filing of appeal or revision or any other
applications. No provision for condonation of delay for any such appeal or
applications filed after the said 30 days period is found in such rule. It would
thus be concluded that any such appeal or application filed after the 30 days’
period will not be accepted by the court. However, this rule read in
conjunction with Rule 41 of the same Rules, where it has been expressly
provided that the principles of the Limitation Act, 1908 (the Act of 1963 came
later when the 1908 Act was repealed) will be applicable in disputes between
persons not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe (the Government being
considered an entity not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe), would only mean
2023:MLHC:644
that condonation for exceeding the period of limitation can be resorted to by
the party by way of an appropriate prayer.
19.
It has to be reminded that the 1937 Rules occupies only a part of
the space within the State of Meghalaya, more particularly within the Khasi
and Jaintia Hills with the exclusion of the Garo Hills region. Therefore, it is a
special Act or law or even a State law with limited territorial jurisdiction.
Whereas, the Limitation Act is a Central law which covers the territorial
jurisdiction of the whole of India. The applicability of the Limitation Act in
the State of Meghalaya has only been reinforced by the pronouncement of a
Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shella Action Committee, Rally of
Shella Village Natives (supra) which has held that “…Limitation Act, being
an Act of Parliament and having not been excluded from operation by any
notification by the President, applies to the State of Meghalaya including the
tribal areas…” Thus, this issue is no longer res integra. The contention of the
Revision Petitioner in this respect, cannot be accepted and the related
authorities cited would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of this
case in this regard.
20.
Even in the case of Wallam Jingsuk Barim (supra) where this
Court has reiterated the prevalence of the provisions of a special or local law
to make the provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act inoperable, as
has been observed hereinabove, in the face of Rule 41 and the ruling of a Full
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Bench, this Court in the case of Shella Action Committee, Rally of Shella
Village Natives (supra), it is apparent that the law of limitation in the form of
the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to the case of the parties in question.
21.
The case of Anshuman Shukla (supra) as well as that of Mukri
Gopalan (supra) cited by the State respondent wherein in brief, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that when a special law does not expressly exclude,
the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to such
law and the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the limitation Act would apply,
would also be applicable to the case of the parties herein as essentially, the
principles of the Limitation Act being applicable has been accepted by
competent courts as well as by this Court in such similar situations.
22.
On the objection that the impugned order was passed on an
application, without the same not being preferred under specific provisions of
law, the reliance of the learned Sr. counsel/Special Counsel for the State
respondent in the case of J. Kumaradasan Nair (supra) at para 18 of the same
is found acceptable by this Court since this proposition is well settled by now.
Para 18 is reproduced below as:
“18. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that
mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any
provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the
jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. While
exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has
the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply
the beneficent provisions like Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation
2023:MLHC:644
Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply
and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court will
refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision has been
mentioned. In a case of this nature, sub-section (2) of Section 14
of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as
indicated hereinbefore, the principles thereof would be applicable
for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5
thereof.”
23.
The next issue is whether sufficient cause has been shown or rather
whether such cause shown by the State respondent as accepted by the learned
District Judge can pass muster the test of law.
24.
In the context of the facts and circumstances of the case of the
parties, what has been presented by the State respondent as sufficient cause to
defend the filing of the relevant application leading to the passing of the
impugned order is that the concerned department in the Forest and
Environment Department, Government of Meghalaya, has admitted that the
initial order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the learned Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner was received by the Department on 05.04.2016. On
21.04.2016, the Law Department has opined that the said order can be
appealed
against
before
the
Court
of
the
Additional
Deputy
Commissioner/District and Sessions Judge.
25.
However, a further legal opinion was sought for and the
department was advised to now proceed with filing an intra-court appeal
against the Judgment dated 17.02.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge of
2023:MLHC:644
this Court in W.P.(C) No 299 of 2012. Accordingly, the State respondent
herein then filed the said writ appeal along with an application for condonation
of delay on 27.07.2016.
26.
Thereafter, after obtaining relevant opinion from the Law
Department, the concerned Department then appointed a senior advocate as
special counsel to prepare a draft appeal against the order dated 16.02.2016
passed by the Learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in Misc. Case
No. 12 (T) of 2014. The said appeal was then filed on 23.02.2018. Apparently,
since the appeal is delayed by time permissible, the related application for
condonation of delay of 707 days in filing such appeal was preferred before
the Court of the learned District Judge.
27.
The explanation given for the said delay is that the same is not
intentional, but due to the circumstances stated, that is, that the department is
of the belief that the proper remedy lies in filing of the writ appeal (supra), but
it was only on the advice of the learned Senior counsel that it was realized that
the remedy is indeed by filing the appeal against the said impugned order
dated 16.02.2016 (supra)
28.
The learned District Judge, in the impugned order has allowed the
application for condonation of delay and the explanation given therein by
holding that “…Since the matter has moved horizontally and vertically till it
gravitates towards conclusion, the same can be considered as good cause for
2023:MLHC:644
condonation of delay. This Court finds that the intention of the applicant was
bonafide, there was no deliberate inaction on the part of the applicant in taken
up the matter and they have not slept over their right or waive it and it also
shows that they are interested to pursue the matter. As such, this court finds
that in the interest of justice, the delay of 707 days is hereby condoned.”
29.
Though the learned District Judge has not spelt out in great details
the reasons cited by the State/applicant for the delay caused, yet as indicated
above, it is seen that the main cause for the delay in filing the said appeal is
because of conflicting advice given by the learned counsel, first that filing of
the said intra-court appeal would suffice, but then it was eventually found out
that an appeal against the said order dated 16.02.2016 is the proper remedy.
In the process, the time for filing of the said appeal has run out.
30.
The relevant authorities cited by the learned Sr. counsel for the
petitioner herein as regard the conduct of State machineries or departments in
trying to explain delay on account of procedural or bureaucratic dilly-dally,
such action cannot be condoned by a court, yet the fact remains that each case
has to be looked into on its own particular facts and circumstances and the
reasons cited. Here, to the extent of repetition, what has been cited as the main
ground for the delay is the heeding to a wrong advice of a counsel until the
error was corrected by the decision to file the related appeal before the proper
court, that is, the Court of the learned District Judge/Additional Deputy
2023:MLHC:644
Commissioner. This, would form sufficient cause, in the considered opinion
of this Court.
31.
Another aspect of the matter is that on an overall consideration of
the impugned order, it is noticed that the same has not been passed arbitrarily
or that it was a perverse and capricious order based on irrelevant
consideration. The exercise of discretion in this regard cannot be overturn by
this Court under such circumstances. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason
to interfere with the impugned order. The same is hereby upheld.
32.
In the light of the above observations, this revision petition is
hereby dismissed as devoid of merits and the same is disposed of accordingly.
No costs.
Judge
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2025.10.24 16:11:26 IST
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