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2026:HHC:3331
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2552 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2026
Date of Decision: 23.01.2026.
______________________________________
Uchechukwau Emmahulf
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr K.S. Gill, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 28 of 2024, dated 21.02.2024, registered at
Police Station Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P., for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 21, 22 and 29 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS
Act).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
2026:HHC:3331
It has been asserted that police intercepted a vehicle
bearing registration No. HR-12Y-8814 and recovered 22.92 grams
of heroin and 960 capsules each containing Acetaminophen 325
MG, Dicyclomine Hydrochloride 10 MG, Tramadol Hydrochloride
50 mg. The police arrested Roshan Lal, the driver of the vehicle
and seized the contraband. Roshan Lal revealed during the
interrogation that he had purchased the drugs from Tej Pratap.
The police arrested him, and he made a statement that he had
purchased the drug from Uchechukwau Emmahulf (the present
petitioner). The police arrested the petitioner and recovered 32.45
grams of heroin from his possession. The petitioner has been in
custody since 29.02.204. The allegations against the petitioner
are false. The co-accused have been released on bail. The
petitioner belongs to a respectable family, and no fruitful purpose
would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The
prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which violates
the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 20.02.2024.
2026:HHC:3331
They received secret information at about 6:20 p.m. that Roshan
Lal was transporting the intoxicating drugs in his vehicle bearing
registration No.HR12Y-8814, and a huge quantity of capsules
could be recovered by its search.
The police reduced the
information into writing and sent it to the Superintendent of
Police, Nahan. The police joined Harish and Harinder and set up a
Nakka. A vehicle bearing registration No. HR12Y-8814 reached
the spot. The police stopped the vehicle. Roshan Lal was driving it.
The police recovered 960 capsules of Parivon Spas Plus
containing Tramadol and a polythene containing 22.92 grams of
heroin. The police seized the heroin and capsules and arrested the
driver, Roshan Lal, who revealed that he had purchased the
heroin and capsules from Tej Pratap. The police checked the
mobile phone of Roshan Lal and found the financial transaction
with 15-20 persons through Google Pay. Roshan Lal had paid
₹60,000/-in cash and the other amount by Google Pay to Tej
Pratap. The police found the transaction of ₹6,05,000/- between
the mobile number used by Roshan Lal and Tej Pratap. The police
obtained the call detail record and the customer application form,
and the mobile number xxxx xx7649 was found registered in the
name of Neetu Devi, and the mobile number xxxx xx5555 was
2026:HHC:3331
found registered in the name of Tej Partap. The location of these
mobile numbers was found to be at Ambala on 15.02.2024. The
police arrested Tej Pratap. He produced his vehicle bearing
registration No. HR85F-0550. Tej Pratap revealed during
interrogation that he had purchased the heroin from some
Foreign Nationals. He also disclosed the place from where he had
purchased
the
heroin.
The
police
arrested
Uchechukwau
Emmanual with a carry bag containing 32.45 grams of heroin. The
police also arrested Rajwinder Kaur and Nitu Devi, the owners of
the accounts, which were used for the transfer of money. The
police filed the charge sheet before the Court. 18 prosecution
witnesses have been examined out of 44 prosecution witnesses
cited by the prosecution. The statements of 19 witnesses have
been recorded, and the matter was listed for recording the
statements of the witnesses on 29/30.12.2025. The petitioner can
abscond in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State.
5.
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Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence
despite the lapse of more than one year from the date of the
petitioner’s arrest. The petitioner would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General
for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had
abetted the possession of the commercial quantity of Tramadol by
Roshan Lal. Rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the
present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. He had
earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by the Court, and
the present petition only lies when there is a change in the
circumstances. There is no change in the circumstances.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
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It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 19 of 2025
and was dismissed on 05.05.2025. It was held in the State of
Maharashtra v Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent
bail application can only be considered if there is a change of
circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of
granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little
or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap
of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these
two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the
release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline,
propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order
should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders,
including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of
days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the
fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with
restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court
is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain
ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one
judge or selected another to secure an order which had
hitherto eluded him.
9.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
2026:HHC:3331
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the
said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of
such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application
should be granted.”
10.
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
11.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for the
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
2026:HHC:3331
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
12.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence
of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for
filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in
circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled
by law is a change in the fact situation or law which
requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the
earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to
be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at
the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the
power of a judge to consider the application and a person's
right based on a material change in circumstances. A
material change in circumstance creates in a person
accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail
application. But the power to decide such a subsequent
application operates in a completely different sphere,
unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based
on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that
if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there
would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be
pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking
resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence
2026:HHC:3331
of the other side being put in issue and there would be
wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires
that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if
he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material
change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the
same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether
there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”
13.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it
is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14.
The status report mentions that the police had
recovered
a
commercial
quantity
of
capsules
(each
containing 50 mg of Tramadol) and 22.92 grams of heroin from
the vehicle being driven by Roshan Lal. Roshan Lal named Tej
Pratap Singh, with whom the financial transactions were found.
Tej Pratap Singh named the petitioner as the supplier of the drug.
The police arrested the petitioner and recovered 32.45 grams of
heroin from him. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 14 SCC 640: (2016) 4
SCC (Cri) 412: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043, that the information given
by the accused, leading to the discovery of another accused from
whom forged currency notes were recovered, is admissible under
2026:HHC:3331
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page
646: “15. It is apparent that on the basis of the information
furnished by accused Mehboob Ali and Firoz, and other
accused, Anju Ali was arrested. The fact that Anju Ali was
dealing with forged currency notes was not known to the
police. The statements of both the accused have led to the
discovery of the fact and arrest of the co-accused, not
known to the police. They identified him, and ultimately,
statements have led to unearthing the racket of the use of
fake currency notes. Thus, the information furnished by
the aforesaid accused persons vide information memos is
clearly admissible, which has led to the identification and
arrest of accused Anju Ali, and as already stated, from
possession of Anju Ali's fake currency notes had been
recovered. As per information furnished by the accused
Mehboob and Firoz vide memos Exts. P-41 and P-42, the
fact has been discovered by the police as to the
involvement of the accused Anju Ali, which was not known
to the knowledge of the police. The police were not aware
of the accused Anju Ali, as well as the fact that he was
dealing with fake currency notes, which were recovered
from him. Thus, the statement of the aforesaid accused
Mehboob and Firoz is clearly saved by Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. The embargo put by Section 27 of the
Evidence Act was clearly lifted in the instant case. The
statement of the accused persons has led to the discovery
of facts proving complicity of the other accused persons,
and the entire chain of circumstances clearly makes out
that the accused acted in conspiracy, as found by the trial
court as well as the High Court.
xxxxxxx
20. Considering the aforesaid dictums, it is apparent that
there was a discovery of a fact as per the statement of
Mehmood Ali and Mohd. Firoz. The co-accused was nabbed
on the basis of an identification made by the accused
2026:HHC:3331
Mehboob and Firoz. That he was dealing with fake currency
notes came to the knowledge of the police through them.
Recovery of forged currency notes was also made from
Anju Ali. Thus, the aforesaid accused had the knowledge
about co-accused Anju Ali, who was nabbed at their
instance and on the basis of their identification. These
facts were not to the knowledge of the police, hence the
statements of the accused persons leading to the discovery
of the fact are clearly admissible as per the provisions
contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which carves
out an exception to the general provisions about
inadmissibility of confession made under police custody
contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.”
15.
In the present case, the statement made by the co-
accused Tej Pratap Singh led the police to the present petitioner
and the petitioner was found in possession of the heroin;
therefore, prima facie, there is sufficient material to connect the
petitioner to the commission of the crime.
16.
The
petitioner
was
involved
in
abetting
the
commercial quantity of the contraband. Hence, the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. There is no
material to show that the petitioner would not indulge in the
commission of a similar offence if released on bail. Therefore, he
has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37
of the NDPS Act.
17.
2026:HHC:3331
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of
the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the delay.
This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese
2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of
prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions
laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and likely
delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a
casual observation. It is the statutory threshold under
Section
37(1)(b)(ii), which would
disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control and
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
2026:HHC:3331
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
18.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the allegations are serious since not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing with
the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
is made out in the present matter.”
19.
Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the
ground of delay alone when the petitioner had not satisfied the
requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
20.
No other point was urged.
21.
2026:HHC:3331
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed.
22.
The observation made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
23rd January, 2026.
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
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