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2026:HHC:3341
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2755 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.1.2026
Date of Decision: 23.1.2026.
Tushar Sharma
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary
& Panku Chaudhary, Advocates
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General, assisted by
ASI Bhamdev, IO, PS Manali,
District Kullu, HP.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 16 of 2025, dated 23.01.2025,
registered at Police Station, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Sections 103(1) read
with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3341
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
informant, Mayank Thakur, made a complaint to the police,
which led to the registration of the FIR. There is no eyewitness
in the case. The prosecution has cited 33 witnesses, out of whom
only one witness has been examined. The police have failed to
collect sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime. The police have filed the charge sheet
before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by
detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner belongs to a
respectable family and he would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the informant, Mayank Thakur, was discharging
his duties at Manu Rangshala, where a cultural programme was
being organised on 22.1.2025 at about 8.00 PM. The people were
dancing, when the informant heard some commotion. He went
to the spot and found that some people were quarrelling. One
person was bleeding. The informant caught hold of the injured
person, which the other persons went away. The injured person
2026:HHC:3341
was taken to the hospital, and he identified himself as Daksh
Thakur. He subsequently succumbed to his injuries. The police
registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The postmortem
examination of Daksh Thakur was conducted, and it was found
that the cause of death was hemorrhagic hypodermic shock as a
result
of
an
ante-mortem
incised
wound
leading
to
cardiopulmonary shock. The police checked the CCTV footage
and found five people leaving Manu Rangshala between 8.04 and
8.05 PM. One person was identified as Tushar Sharma (the
present petitioner). The police arrested him. He had sustained an
injury on his right hand. His clothes were blood-stained, and he
was wearing the same clothes as seen in the CCTV Footage. The
police arrested the petitioner and seized the clothes. The
involvement of other persons was not found. The investigation
revealed that the petitioner had an altercation with the
deceased, he inflicted injuries to the victim, Daksh Thakur, by
means of a broken bottle. The DNA profile of the deceased was
found on the petitioner’s shoes. The petitioner’s photograph
was found to be similar to the person shown in the CCTV
footage, but no definite opinion could be given. The clothes in
the photograph were similar to the clothes in the CCTV Footage.
2026:HHC:3341
As per the opinion of the Medical Officer, injuries sustained by
Daksh Thakur could have been caused by means of a broken
bottle. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on
20.4.2025 and a supplementary charge on 5.12.2025. Hence, the
status report.
4.
I have heard M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary and
Panku Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr
Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the
respondent-State.
5.
Mr Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and has
been falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the
petitioner with the commission of a crime. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
6.
Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was
involved in the commission of a heinous offence which is
punishable with the extreme penalty of death. Hence, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
2026:HHC:3341
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only
traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into
the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
2026:HHC:3341
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while
on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes
on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of
evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is
therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis
supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is
a genuine case against the accused and that the
prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence
in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
2026:HHC:3341
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be
granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning,
this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in
a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An
order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be
sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of
bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter
being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary
from case to case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be
a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the
same should always be coupled with other circumstances
warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is
one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail —
the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance
of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on
the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that
although it is established that a court considering a bail
application cannot undertake a detailed examination of
evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court
2026:HHC:3341
granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to
be borne in mind while considering an application for
bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and
casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu
2026:HHC:3341
Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p.
511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose
sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not be false,
frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the
nature of punishment that would follow a conviction
vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report mentions that the petitioner had
sustained injuries. The DNA of the deceased was found on the
petitioner’s shoes. His clothes were also blood-stained. The
petitioner’s photograph was found to be similar to the person
seen leaving Manu Rangshala between 8.04 and 8.05 PM. All
these
circumstances,
prima
facie,
show
involvement in the commission of a crime.
the
petitioner’s
2026:HHC:3341
11.
It was submitted that the informant, Mayank Thakur,
admitted in his cross-examination that no Test Identification
Parade was conducted in the present case, and the petitioner’s
identity has not been established. This submission will not help
the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Matru alias Girish Chandra Versus State of UP (1971) 2 SCC 75 that
the test identification parade does not constitute a substantive
piece of evidence. It is meant for the investigating agency to lend
an assurance that the investigation is proceeding along the right
lines. It was held in Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC
625: 1998 SCC (Cri) 859 that the identification of the accused in
the court is a substantive piece of evidence, and there is no
requirement of its corroboration from a previous identification
parade. It was held in Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 110, that the test identification parade is not necessary in
every case. Similarly, it was held in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N.,
(2024) 8 SCC 600: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that the dock
identification is a substantive piece of evidence and the absence
of a test identification parade is not fatal in every case.
Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the petitioner from
the absence of the test identification parade in the present case.
2026:HHC:3341
12.
The petitioner is accused of committing an offence
under Section 103 (1) of the BNS, which is punishable with death.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC
240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the
punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was
observed at page 244:
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage,
and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to
secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible
in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime
charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of
the highest magnitude and the punishment for it
assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may
reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no
amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at
the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law
Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J.,
concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J.
set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev.
ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
2026:HHC:3341
sufficient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried,
and because the detention is necessary to ensure
his appearance at trial .... It is a very important
element in considering whether the party, if
admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and
I think that in coming to a determination on that
point three elements will generally be found the
most important: the charge, the nature of the
evidence by which it is supported, and the
punishment to which the party would be liable if
convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of
wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission
by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the
punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
13.
Considering the nature of the offence and the
severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail.
14.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being
violated. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC
OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by
itself entitle a person to bail. It was observed at page 141:
2026:HHC:3341
“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the
grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the
Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than
one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the
accused was in custody for more than one year may not be
a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala
v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri)
743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by
itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail.
The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”
15.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek bail on the
ground of delay in the progress of the trial.
16.
No other point was urged.
17.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
18.
The observations made here-in-above are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case's merits.
23rd January, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
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