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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No. 31 of 2022
Date of Decision: 09.11.2023
Smti. Treasure Irene Syiemlieh
Vs. U Mestonath Kharshandi & 5 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Ms. M. Deb, Adv.
Ms. N. Deb, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. R. Debnath, Adv. (For R 1 & 2)
None for R 3-6
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
1.
This is an application under Article 227 (1) of the Constitution of
India read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Rule-6 of
the High Court of Meghalaya (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts)
Order, 2014.
2.
Heard Ms. M. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioner who has
submitted that the respondents No. 1, 2 & 3 as plaintiffs had filed a suit
before the court of the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong
registered as Title Suit No. 9 of 1999. The prayer made therein is for
declaration of right, title, ownership and possession and for permanent
injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with such title,
ownership and possession of the plaintiffs/respondents herein. The
defendants include one U Phromiwell Lyngdoh (since deceased) and two
others who are the Secretary and Lyngdoh of the Village Dorbar,
Nongpoh.
3.
The learned counsel went on to submit that in course of
proceedings in the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999, the plaintiff No. 3
expired. The defendant No. 1 also expired and the counsel for the said
defendant withdrew from the proceedings which was allowed. Vide order
dated 26.06.2014, the suit against the defendant No. 1 stands abated.
However, a petition for substitution of the deceased defendant No. 1 was
filed by the plaintiff which was allowed. Thereafter, vide order dated
06.06.2016, the court recorded that the defendants have chosen to remain
absent in spite of having received notice and accordingly proceeded ex
parte against the defendants.
4.
The learned Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Court
then delivered the judgment and order on 02.02.2017 with the suit decreed
in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents. The matter went further when it
was endorsed for execution of the decree in Execution Case No. 3 of 2018
leading to the issuance of the warrant of execution on 03.12.2018. The
bailiff of the court then submitted a report on 10.10.2019 that the
execution was completed on 09.10.2019.
5.
The learned counsel has further submitted that when the decree
issued vide judgment and order dated 02.02.2017 was executed on the
strength of the said warrant of execution dated 03.12.2018, the land and
building in question was under the possession of the petitioner herein who
was accordingly dispossessed from her own land without even being
aware of the existence of the preceding proceedings connected thereto.
6.
The petitioner maintains that she was in possession of land
measuring about 18236 sq. ft more or less situated at Nongpoh Downgate,
in the Ri-Bhoi District with boundaries as follows:
North :
Land of Sri Leh and house of Bah Tynsong – 187 ft
South :
Land of Deepak Sun
– 189 ft
East
Village Road
– 94 ft
G.S. Road (Now N.H.-40)
– 100 ft
:
West :
7.
The aforesaid land has been under the possession of the petitioner
since December 1994. In the year 1998, the petitioner had constructed a
two storied building measuring 60 ft. in length and 30 ft. in breadth which
was given on rent to different persons from time to time. This was done
with the knowledge and consent of (L) Phromiwell Lyngdoh, the deceased
defendant No. 1 in the said Title Suit aforementioned.
8.
The learned counsel has also submitted that the said suit land was
subsequently purchased by the petitioner from (L) Phromiwell Lyngdoh
on 25.03.2003 with the Village Dorbar Nongpoh issuing a No Objection
Certificate dated 14.05.2008, whereupon the petitioner had executed a
Deed of Declaration before the Sub-Registrar, Ri-Bhoi District, Nongpoh
to confirm her ownership and possession over the said land.
9.
The learned counsel then submitted that in the meantime, the
Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Ri-Bhoi District had issued notice vide
No.DCRB(LA)1/2009/20 dated 05.05.2009 to all land owners for
acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of the 4-Laning. In the
said notice, it is also indicated that a Joint Survey and Demarcation of the
land to be acquired would be conducted by the office of the Collector and
representatives of the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI). The
name of the petitioner also figures in the said notice.
10.
Eventually, after complying with all relevant aspects of the land
acquisition process, the Collector, Ri-Bhoi District having acquired about
190 sq. meters of land along with RCC building boundary wall, CGI
wooden wall flooring, etc., the petitioner was compensated for the same
amounting to ₹ 19,80,946/- and ₹ 78,552/- respectively on 08.07.2010.
11.
The learned counsel has again submitted that the petitioner has no
knowledge about the said title suit filed by the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3
and on coming to know about the same on 15.10.2019 had immediately
taken steps to apply for certified copy of the relevant orders and had also
engaged a counsel to do the needful in this regard. However, the said
counsel suddenly expired on 10.01.2020 and the petitioner could not take
any further steps thereafter on account of the situation arising out of the
COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioner was also personally handicapped as
she was suffering and was under treatment and it was only after she had
recovered that she had engaged a counsel to take necessary steps for filing
this instant petition.
12.
It is the contention of the petitioner that on perusal of the relevant
papers connected to the subject matter of the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999
and the Execution Case No. 3 of 2018 what could be seen is that the
description of the suit land of the said Title Suit which is also not
complete inasmuch as the area of the land has not been mentioned, is
totally different from the land of the petitioner which was clearly
demarcated and complete with proper measurements given. Again, no
prayer has been made in the plaint for recovery of possession and as such,
the proceeding before the learned Execution Court is totally illegal and
without jurisdiction.
13.
It is also noticed that in the plaint the respondents No. 1, 2 and
3/plaintiffs had enclosed a decision of the Village Court that is, Raid
Nongpoh wherein vide order dated 10.04.1999, the said Village Court on
a complaint made by the deceased defendant No. 1 against one Bli
Kharshandi who is said to have claimed ownership over the land of the
defendant No. 1, the opposing parties were summoned before it and on
evidence being recorded, after hearing the argument from both sides, the
Village Court had decided that the suit land belongs to the defendant No.
1 [(L) Promiwell Lyngdoh]. This, according to the learned counsel is an
appealable order, however, the plaintiffs therein instead of filing an appeal
had filed a suit before the court of the Subordinate District Council Court,
Shillong, which is contrary to legal precedents and relevant principles and
the relevant provisions of law. The impugned judgment and order is
therefore, liable to be set aside only on this ground alone, submits the
learned counsel.
14.
The learned counsel has also submitted that ordinarily the High
Court would not interfere with a decision of a Court or Tribunal by
exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India if there
is a remedy for appeal available. However, when there has occurred an
exercise of patent perversity or a gross manifest of failure of justice or that
the principle of natural justice has been flouted in the orders of the Court
and Tribunal subordinate to it, then the High Court is justified in
interfering with such order. In this regard the case of Radhey Shyam &
Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 423, paras 21 and 23 has
been cited to show that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborated on the
principle, power and jurisdiction under Article 227.
15.
The learned counsel has reiterated that the learned Presiding
Officer of the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong by
entertaining the Title Suit and by going through the process of disposing it
in the manner it was done so culminating in the passing of the impugned
Judgment and Order dated 02.02.2017, particularly when the dispute
between the relevant parties was settled at the Village Court level, under
the provision of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District
(Administration of Justice) Rules 1953, such order is appealable before
the court of the Subordinate District Council which was not resorted to by
the respondents No. 1, 2 & 3/plaintiffs, therefore, the same was done so
without jurisdiction and accordingly, a revision would lie against such
impugned order.
16.
It is further submitted that this Court under the provision of Order
6 of ‘The High Court of Meghalaya (Jurisdiction over District Council
Courts) Order, 2014’ is empowered to call for the proceedings of any civil
or criminal case decided by or pending in any court in the Autonomous
District Council constituted under the provisions of sub-paragraphs (1)
and (2) of paragraph 4 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and to
pass such orders as may deem fit. It is for the exercise of this revisional
power that the petitioner has approached this Court not particularly for reappreciation of the evidence or correction of the impugned judgment and
order.
17.
The learned counsel has also submitted that this Court, under the
relevant provision of Order 6 of the said Order of 2014 has been vested
with wide powers to deal with orders passed by the courts of the District
Council and such power also provides for revision of an order passed by a
subordinate court without any restriction. The case of Idis Mary
Kharkongor v. Ka Theirit Lyngdoh reported in ALR 1969 Assam and
Nagaland, 92 was cited by the petitioner to say that in the said case, the
Full Bench of the Gauhati High Court while interpreting the provision of
Rule 36 of the Administration of Justice and Police Rules in the Khasi and
Jaintia Hills and also Order 6 of the Assam High Court (Jurisdiction over
District Council Court) Order, 1954 which is para materia with Order 6 of
‘The High Court of Meghalaya (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts)
Order, 2014’ has held that the High Court while exercising revisional
powers, will be entitled to go into facts like an appellate Court. Therefore,
there is no hard and fast rule that the impugned judgment and decree and
corresponding execution process cannot be legally scrutinized by this
Court to correct the irregularity and illegality found therein.
18.
The learned counsel has then submitted under such circumstances,
this Court may be pleased to allow this petition and to pass necessary
order in this regard.
19.
Per contra, Mr. R. Debnath, learned counsel for the respondents
No. 1, 2 and 3 respectively, has submitted that at the outset, the
maintainability of this petition is questioned inasmuch as the petitioner
has no locus standi to file this petition being a stranger to the said Title
Suit No. 9 of 1999.
20.
It is also submitted that the learned Judge of the District Council
Court, Shillong has resorted to Rule 30 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills
Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 (As
amended) to endorse the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999 to the court of the
learned Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong for disposal of the
same.
21.
The provision of Rule 18 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills
Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 (As
amended) was also referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents
to say that under the said rule, the Subordinate District Council Court is
empowered to try cases when there is no village court and also if parties
are not residents of the same village. The parties to the said Title Suit No.
9 of 1999 not being residents of the place where the suit land is situated,
accordingly the village court could not have tried any suit or case related
to such parties. This is more pronounced from the conduct of the
defendants therein who have never objected to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, that is, the Subordinate District Council Court and as such, after the
matter was taken up in its entirety and the judgment and decree passed on
conclusion of the proceedings therein, the petitioner cannot come at this
point of time to object to such proceedings more so, when the execution
proceedings have already been concluded.
22.
Even if this Court would decide that the petitioner can agitate the
matter in Court, the provision for assailing the impugned judgment and
decree is found under Rule 20, 30 and 31 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills
Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 (As
amended) and Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides for
appeal. Therefore, the petitioner could not have resorted to Article 227 of
the Constitution of India to prefer this instant petition when there is an
alternative statutory remedy provided. The case of Sadhana Lodh v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2003) 3 SCC 524, paras 6 & 7
and also the case of Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma
Paribalana Sabai & Ors. v. Tuticorin Educational Society & Ors.,
(2019) 9 SCC 538, paras 13 & 14 was referred to in this regard by the
learned counsel for the respondents to say that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has clearly observed that the High Court could not have entertained a
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India if there is a
statutory remedy.
23.
The learned counsel has also touched upon the merits of the Title
Suit to say that the main deceased defendant No. 1 had secretly sold the
suit land to the petitioner herein on 25.03.2003 during pendency of the
suit before the court and an injunction in this regard was also in place. The
petitioner had also made the declaration deed on 22.05.2008 when the
same was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Ri-Bhoi District Nongpoh,
which is an illegal act since the matter is sub-judice at the relevant point
of time. The case of Jehal Tanti and Ors. v. Nageshwar Singh (Dead)
Through LRS, (2013) 14 SCC 689, para 13 and also the case of Surjit
Singh & Ors. v. Harbans Singh, (1995) 6 SCC 50, para 52 was cited to
support his contention.
24.
The learned counsel has further stressed on this point by
submitting that the alleged sale transaction between the petitioner and
deceased/defendant No. 1 is hit by the provision of Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which provides as follows:
“52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.—During
the 1[pendency] in any Court having authority 2[3[within the limits
of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir] or
established beyond such limits] by 4[the Central Government]
[***] of 6[any] suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in
which any right to immoveable property is directly and
specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or
otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to
affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or
order which may be made therein, except under the authority of
the Court and on such terms as it may impose.
[Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the pendency of
a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date
of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding
in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit
or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and
complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has
been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the
expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution
thereof by any law for the time being in force.]”
25.
It is, therefore, the prayer of the learned counsel that this petition
lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
26.
The respective contention raised by the parties in support of their
case and the submission made herein to persuade this Court to agree to
their respective point of view, factually and legally has been duly noted
and the basic facts found in such submission as detailed hereinabove need
not be repeated except if so required.
27.
From the submission of the parties what could be understood is
that the trial of Title Suit No. 9 of 1999 before the court of the
Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong culminating in the passing of
the judgment and order dated 02.02.2017 and following issue of such
decree, the execution proceedings before the learned Execution Court
resulting in the handing over of the suit land to the decree
holder/respondents No 1, 2, & 3 respectively have now been brought to
the attention of this Court in this instant application by the petitioner
herein.
28.
At the outset, the said relevant respondents have questioned the
maintainability of this petition which was filed with reference to the
provision of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and also the fact that
the petitioner was never a party in the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999, which
according to the respondents would render this petition to be dismissed at
the threshold.
29.
It is also noticed that the respondents No. 3-6 respectively have
failed to appear before this Court in spite of receipt of notice.
Accordingly, the matter shall proceed ex parte against such respondents.
30.
The petitioner has laid claim to the entitlement of coming before
this Court on the ground that the impugned judgment and order and more
particularly, by the execution of the decree, she was dispossessed from her
land which rightfully belonged to her without being given any opportunity
to prove her right and title to such possession and as such, there being no
alternative, the only way out for her is to approach this Court by this
instant petition.
31.
The admitted position of the petitioner is that though she was in
possession of the suit land since the year 1994, yet she actually purchased
the same only on 25.03.2003, the sale being approved by the Village
Dorbar on 14.05.2008 after which the petitioner got the same confirmed
by execution of a Declaration Deed dated 15.10.2008. This would only
show that the petitioner can claimed ownership and possession of the suit
land only in the midst of the trial of the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999.
32.
The law as regard the doctrine of ‘lis pendens’ is well settled.
With reference to the provision of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar v.
Sardari Lal & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 601 at para 5 of the same has
observed as follows:
“5. The doctrine of lis pendens expressed in the maxim "ut lite
pendente nihil innovetur" (during a litigation nothing new should
be introduced) has been statutorily incorporated in Section 52 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A defendant cannot, by
alienating property during the pendency of litigation, venture into
depriving the successful plaintiff of the fruits of the decree. The
transferee pendente lite is treated in the eye of the law as a
representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtor and held bound
by the decree passed against the judgment-debtor though neither
has the defendant chosen to bring the transferee on record by
apprising his opponent and the court of the transfer made by him
nor has the transferee chosen to come on record by taking
recourse to Order 22 Rule 10 CPC. In case of an assignment,
creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of any
suit, Order 22 Rule 10 CPC confers a discretion on the court
hearing the suit to grant leave for the person in or upon whom
such interest has come to vest or devolve to be brought on record.
Bringing of a lis pendens transferee on record is not as of right
but in the discretion of the court. Though not brought on record
the lis pendens transferee remains bound by the decree."
33.
In the case of Krishnaji Pandharinath v. Anusayabai and
Anr. (AIR 1959 Bombay 475), it was held that the application of the
doctrine of lis pendens does not depend upon the purchaser having notice
of the suit; even if the transferee pendente lite from a party has no notice
of the suit, the rights of the other party to a suit in which a right to
immovable property is directly and specifically in question under the
decree cannot be prejudicially affected by the transfer. In Har Prasad v.
Sita Ram (AIR 1940 Allahabad 141), it was held that even
though Section 52 does not operate to annul a transfer pendente lite it
renders the transfer subservient to the rights of the parties to the action as
determined by the judgment or decree passed in the action.
34.
In Rajender Singh & Ors v. Santa Singh & Ors, AIR 1973 SC
2537, para 15, Section 52 was further analysed as follows:
"15. The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to strike at attempts
by parties to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a court,
in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is
pending, by private dealings which may remove the subject matter
of litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a
pending dispute or frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any
immovable property during a litigation over it are held to be
bound, by an application of the doctrine, by the decree passed in
the suit even though they may not have been impleaded in it. The
whole object of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to
the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in
immovable property, which are the subject matter of a litigation,
to the power and jurisdiction of the Court so as to prevent the
object of a pending action from being defeated."
35.
In the light of the above proposition of law, what can be discerned
is that the petitioner having acquired title and possession to the suit land
pendente lite, she cannot at this juncture assert that the decree and the
execution proceeding following thereto has deprived her of her right to
assert her title and ownership over the said suit land. The decree is
accordingly binding upon her.
36.
However, another aspect to be considered is to the manner in
which the trial court, that is, the court of the Subordinate District Council
Court, Shillong has proceeded with the trial since its inception.
37.
From the materials on record, copy of the plaint and written
statement in the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999 has been annexed. It may be
mentioned that in the said Suit, the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1, 2 and 3
respectively have impleaded the deceased Phromiwell Lyngdoh as
defendant No. 1, Shri. P. Syngkli, Secretary, Raid Nongpoh and Shri. S.
Lyngdoh, Lyngdoh Raid Nongpoh.
38.
From the averments made in the plaint, the cause of action cited
by the plaintiffs therein arose on 19.01.1999 when the defendant No. 1
filed a complaint before the defendants No. 2 and 3 with regard to the suit
land and following such complaint the passing of the order dated
10.04.1999 by the said defendants No. 2 and 3.
39.
Copy of the order dated 10.04.1999 was also annexed with the
plaint and on perusal of the same, what is apparent is that the defendant
No. 1 (L) Phromiwell Lyngdoh had made a complaint that one Shri. Bli
Kharshandi had encroached upon his land which is bounded as follows:
East
:
24 mt. land of Phromi well Lyngdoh
Sout :
14.7 mt.
West :
GS Road
North :
40.
Land of Phromi well Lyngdoh
The Dorbar Raid Nongpoh taking cognizance of the said
complaint had summon both the parties and on examination of witnesses
and documents related thereto the Dorbar has passed judgment and order
in favour of the complainant, that is, (L) Phromi well Lyngdoh. In the said
order, the Dorbar Raid Nongpoh has also observed that the aggrieved
party may appeal against the said judgment and order dated 10.04.1999
within three months from the date of such order.
41.
At this point, it would be proper to refer to the relevant rules,
particularly the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District
(Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953 which rules govern the
administration of justice within the areas of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills
wherein it is provided the constitution of courts and hierarchy known as
the District Council Court. In Chapter II Rule 4 has described the Classes
of Courts specifying that there shall be three classes of courts, namely:
(i)
Village Courts,
(ii)
Subordinate District Council Courts and Additional
Subordinate District Council Courts,
(iii)
District Council Court and Additional District Council
Court.
42.
Under Chapter III Rule 11 what is provided is that a Village Court
shall try suits and cases including cases of a civil nature, provided that the
property in dispute is situated within the jurisdiction of the Village Court
and all the parties must reside or hold land within such jurisdiction.
43.
Rule 16 of the said Rules of 1953 provides that appeal from a
decision of the Village court would lie before the Court of the Subordinate
District Council Courts and Additional Subordinate District Council
Courts.
44.
As
has
been
observed
above,
it
is
evident
that
the
plaintiffs/respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 herein have filed a Title Suit against
the decision of the Dorbar Raid Nongpoh dated 10.04.1999. This is an
action preferred contrary to the said provision of the 1953 Rules(supra),
where instead of filing of a suit the parties ought to have preferred an
appeal before the Subordinate District Council Court, Shillong. This, not
having been done, the said Title Suit No. 9 of 1999 has been filed without
jurisdiction and the same ought to have been dismissed in limine. The
execution of the decree following the passing of the impugned judgment
and order dated 02.02.2017 should not have taken place in such a
situation.
45.
The learned counsels for the respective parties have referred to
relevant authorities on the jurisdiction and exercise of power of the High
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. All the authorities cited are
found to be relevant. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the proceedings entered into by the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 by filing
the said Title Suit before the Subordinate District Council Court, it is
apparent that the said Subordinate District Council Court lacks inherent
jurisdiction to try the suit and consequently, to pass the impugned
judgment and order since under the relevant rules, it was incumbent upon
the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 to have preferred an appeal
against the order dated 10.04.1999 passed by the Dorbar Raid Nongpoh
but instead of such appeal, the said Title Suit was filed.
46.
As to the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise power under Article
227, the case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. (supra)
is worth mentioning wherein at para 23 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as follows:
“23. The Bench then referred to the history of writ of certiorari
and its scope and concluded thus: (Surya Dev Rai Case (2003) 6
SCC 675)
18. …
19. …
24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram
v. Radhikabai (1986 Supp SCC 401) Proceedings under
Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the
High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the
Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article
227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of
the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power
of superintendence has been extended by this article to
tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an
ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is
intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases
for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and
tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for
correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases
occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when
(i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it
does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which
it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and
(iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a
manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of
jurisdiction.
25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the
occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised
jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts
and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the
distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost
obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has
become customary with the lawyers labeling their petitions as
one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution,
though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial
pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and
technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad
general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the
writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by
the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an
original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate,
revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of
certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been
certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the
High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its
jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and
then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the
High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned
proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such
directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may
warrant, may be, by way of guiding the inferior court or
tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed
further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High
Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while
exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a
decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the
inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable
of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the
party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of
being exercised suo motu as well.”
47.
In the case of Nawab Shaquafath Ali Khan & Ors. v. Nawab
Imdad Jah Bahadur & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 162 at para 42 and 48 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“42. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Rao on Ouseph Mathai
(supra) wherein it was held:
"4. ...In fact power under this article casts a duty upon the
High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within
the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the
limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such courts and
tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within
the ambit of the enactments creating such courts and
tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the
exercise of jurisdiction under this article unless the wrong is
referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of
power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in
grave injustice to any party."
48. If the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain either an
appeal or a revision application or a writ petition under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in a given case it, subject
to fulfillment of other conditions, could even convert a revision
application or a writ petition into an appeal or vice versa in
exercise of its inherent power. Indisputably, however, for the said
purpose, an appropriate case for exercise of such jurisdiction must
be made out.”
48.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in an appropriate case
the High Court can convert a revision application into an appeal vice
versa. In the facts and circumstances of the case of the parties, where an
apparent wrongful exercise of jurisdiction by the Subordinate District
Council Court, Shillong has been made out, therefore, even if this instant
petition is converted into an appeal, interference with the impugned
judgment and order dated 02.02.2017 and the order for execution dated
03.12.2018 is found well justified.
49.
Taking all aspects of the matter in hand into consideration, the
relevant authorities cited by the parties also being duly considered and
those found applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case being
cited, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment
and order dated 02.02.2017 and the order for execution dated 03.12.2018
are liable to be set aside and quashed which is done so herein.
50.
To the extent indicated, this petition succeeds. The impugned
judgment and order and the order of execution being held to be invalid,
the relevant parties can take necessary steps for recovery of possession, if
so advised.
51.
With the above, this petition is hereby disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
09.11.2023
“Tiprilynti–PS”
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