Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:47935
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CrMMO No. 1141 of 2026
Reserved on: 12.10.2026
Date of Decision: 02.11.2026.
Tilak Raj
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & Ors.
…. Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
For the Respondents
:
Mr Ashok Sharma, Senior
Advocate with Ms Anubhuti
Sharma, Advocate.
Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 3 of 2025 registered at Vigilance Police
Station, Chamba, for the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 409, 420, 467, and 471 read with Section 120B of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the consequential proceedings
arising out of it.
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant Jai Ram made a complaint to the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:47935
police that the petitioner Tilak Raj was posted in Forest Beat,
Kalwara
between
and
2022.
The
petitioner
had
misappropriated the money in connivance with the other public
officials. Inspector Pawan Kumar and Sub Inspector Vijay Kumar
conducted the preliminary investigation. They seized the record
and found that 2500 trees of Deodar, 1000 trees of Baan, and 500
trees of Ritha were planted on 5 hectares of land by spending
₹1,54,950/- in the year 2020-2021. ₹25,000/- was spent on their
maintenance in the years 2020 to 2022, and ₹20,500/- was spent
between 2022 and 2023. A team headed by Ravi Guleria, ACF
Dalhousie, measured and inspected the spot on 22.07.2024 and
found that the plantation was carried out on an area of 2-50-00
hectares instead of 5-00-00 hectares. Tilak Raj had also shown
the plantation of 5,500 trees of Deodar on 5 hectares of land by
spending ₹2,03,100/-. ₹40,000/- was spent in the year 2022 2023 and ₹29,000 was spent in the year 2023-2024 for the
maintenance of the plants. However, the committee found that
1,765 trees were planted on 01-05-00 hectares. Petitioner Tilak
Raj had shown the plantation of 4,000 trees of Baan in Vagodi on
5 hectares of land by spending ₹2,00,450/- in the year 20202021. ₹29,000/- was spent in the year 2022-2023 and ₹21,500/-
2026:HHC:47935
were spent in the year 2023-2024 on their maintenance.
However, the committee found that 1,680 trees were planted.
The petitioner had also shown the plantation of 13,500 plants in
Tikretty, Kalwara and Vagodi by spending ₹7,27,550/-. However,
the committee estimated that ₹2,23,547/- was spent on the
plantation. The petitioner also claimed to have spent ₹1,50,000/on the maintenance of Kalwara Nursery. He claimed that he had
carried out 14 works at different places of soil conservation and
constructing check dams. A committee headed by Rakesh Maral
found
a
difference
of
₹3,12,111/-.
The
petitioner
had
misappropriated ₹ 9.66 lakhs from the Government money. The
police registered the FIR and carried out the investigation.
3.
Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the
consequential investigation being carried out by the police, the
petitioner has approached this Court for quashing the FIR and
the consequential proceedings, asserting that he had received an
intimation regarding illicit felling in reserve forest Kalwara beat
on 19.10.2020. He visited the spot and found that informant Jai
Ram was felling deodar trees. Petitioner apprehended Jai Ram
with 25 scans of Deodar. He prepared a damage report which was
signed by informant Jai Ram. The matter was reported to the
2026:HHC:47935
Range Forest Officer on 20.10.2020. The informant's relatives
had a history of illicit felling, and various damage reports had
been issued against them. The informant and his family
members were asked to deposit the money as per the damage
report; however, they failed to do so. The informant had filed
various applications under the Right to Information Act to
compel the petitioner not to pursue the case against the
informant
and his
family
members. The
petitioner
had
relinquished the charge on 08.10.2021, and nothing was pointed
out at the time of handing over the charge. The informant had
also made a complaint to the Forest Department, and an inquiry
was conducted by the department. The inquiry officer did not
find anything against the petitioner. The payments are being
made through RTGS. The works mentioned in the FIR are not
within the scope of the petitioner's duties. The bills are passed
after spot verification. The petitioner had made a complaint
against the informant, but it was not pursued for want of
sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The allegations in the FIR, even if taken to be true, do not
constitute the commission of any offence. Hence, it was prayed
2026:HHC:47935
that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and
consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.
4.
I have heard Mr Ashok Sharma, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Ms Anubhuti Sharma, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Ashok Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the
petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false and
they do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence.
The petitioner had relinquished the charge, and no irregularity
was found in his work. The petitioner was not entrusted with any
money, and the allegation against him that he had spent the
money on plantation and maintenance of the plants is incorrect.
The petitioner had made a complaint against the informant, but
it was not pursued because the provision of Section 17A of the
Prevention of Corruption Act applied to the informant. The same
provision would apply to the petitioner as well, but the FIR was
registered under various Sections of the IPC by omitting the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The continuation
of the investigation amounts to an abuse of the process of the
2026:HHC:47935
Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be
quashed. He relied upon the judgment in Mohd. Wajid and another
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2023) 20 SCC 219 in support
of his submission.
6.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the police are
carrying out the investigation and it is premature to say anything
at this stage. The allegations in the FIR clearly show the
misappropriation of the Government money and the forgery of
the record in connivance with other officials. The police will
fairly conduct the investigation, and if the allegations are not
established during inquiry, a cancellation report would be filed
before the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 7 as under: -
2026:HHC:47935
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some
of
the
principles
under
which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
2026:HHC:47935
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
2026:HHC:47935
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
9.
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
2026:HHC:47935
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
10.
It was held in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri)
234: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 80 that the Court has to determine
whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint
constitute the cognizable offence when the prosecution is at the
initial stage. It was observed on page 695
7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the
test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish
the offence. It is also for the court to take into
consideration any special features which appear in a
particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for
any oblique purpose and where, in the opinion of the
court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by
allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court
may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a
case, also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.
11.
The parameters for exercising jurisdiction to interfere
with the investigations being carried out by the police were
considered by the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court in
Neeharika
2026:HHC:47935
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401:
2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 and it was observed at page 444:
13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from
the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad
[King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC
29 : (1943-44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18], the following
principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police have the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate
cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information
report, the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The
rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing
under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm
which has been formulated in the context of the death
penalty, as explained previously by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of
which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry
as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
and a rarity rather than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent
power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the
2026:HHC:47935
ends of justice or prevent the abuse of the process by
Section 482 CrPC.
13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in the miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences.
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice.
13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
that must disclose all facts and details relating to the
offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the
police is in progress, the court should not go into the
merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be
permitted to complete the investigation. It would be
premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of the process of
law. During or after the investigation, if the investigating
officer finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer may
file an appropriate report/summary before the learned
Magistrate, which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
13.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
the conferment of wide power requires the Court to be
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
Court.
13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit,
regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the
self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the
parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC
866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
2026:HHC:47935
Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has the jurisdiction to
quash the FIR/complaint.
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused, the Court, when it exercises the power
under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or
not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and is not required to consider on
merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable
offence or not, and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations
in the FIR.
12.
It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy
(1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash
the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the
process of the Court. It was observed on page 703:
“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in
civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a
salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled
object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution rests,
and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are
higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to
be administered according to laws made by the legislature.
The compelling necessity for making these observations is
that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose
of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers
2026:HHC:47935
of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its
subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width
and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”
13.
The term abuse of the process was explained in
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014)
1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the
remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a wellestablished and recognised doctrine both by the English
courts and courts in India. There are some established
principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to
be an abuse of the process of court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401
(HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order
to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any
abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of its process.
***
The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction)
to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own
procedure must in a criminal court include a power to
safeguard an accused person from oppression or
prejudice.”
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same
case observed that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
2026:HHC:47935
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 :
(1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the
word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and
wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow
a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects,
a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates'
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993)
3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of
process, the court confirms that an abuse of process
justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the
following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a
fair trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of
the process because it offends the court's sense of
justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in
the circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App
R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
“It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of
the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a
technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the
defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the
part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R
94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main
strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases
where the court concludes that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes
that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.”
2026:HHC:47935
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine
on the individual facts of each case.
14.
It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15
SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was
observed on page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a
duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read between the lines. The Court,
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only
to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials
collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance,
the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a
period of time. It is in the background of such
circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as
alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v.
Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the
types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an
FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between
consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that
2026:HHC:47935
manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be
considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda
Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy,
(2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 57)
“5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement
of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of
the process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of
justice. In the exercise of its powers, the court would be
justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought
to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this
Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want
of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at its face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
2026:HHC:47935
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable
appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained.
That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial
process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of
oppression or needless harassment. The court should
be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion
and should take all relevant facts and circumstances
into consideration before issuing the process, lest it
would be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death.”
(emphasis supplied)
15.
It was held in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4
SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 417 that the
High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie opinion when
the facts are hazy, and the evidence has not been collected. It was
observed on page 366:
“20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and the
very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision
in the exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court, being the highest
2026:HHC:47935
court of a State, should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude
and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can
be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court
will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceedings at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary
[(1992) 4 SCC 305: 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] and Raghubir Saran
(Dr.) v. State of Bihar [(1964) 2 SCR 336: AIR 1964 SC 1 :
(1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .]
16.
A similar view was taken in Mohd. Wajid (supra).
17.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18.
The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner was
posted as a Forest Guard and he had carried out various
plantation, maintenance and other works. The works executed by
the petitioner were verified by independent committees headed
by Ravi Guleria, ACF Dalhousie and Rakesh Marol, Assistant
Engineer, HPPWD. A difference of ₹3,12,111/- was found in the
work. The committees noticed that the plantation was not carried
out on the area mentioned by the petitioner and the number of
plants was also less. These allegations prima facie show that the
2026:HHC:47935
money was taken out of the Government funds on the basis of the
false averments about the extent of the plantation.
19.
A heavy reliance was placed upon the entries in the
daily diaries (Annexure P15) to submit that the plantation was
destroyed in a forest fire, and the difference in the number of
trees is attributable to the forest fire, for which the petitioner
cannot be faulted. This submission will not help the petitioner.
The investigation is being carried out, and it is yet to be seen
whether the contents of the entries in the daily diary are correct
or not. It will be open for the police to determine whether any
forest fire had taken place and if so, whether it had caused
damage to the plantation mentioned in the FIR or not. It is
premature for this Court to quash the FIR merely because
somebody had reported the forest fire.
20.
It was submitted that the relationship between the
informant and the petitioner is strained as the petitioner had
issued a damage report against the informant and his family
members. The FIR was lodged by the informant to wreak
vengeance upon the petitioner. This submission will not help the
petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2026:HHC:47935
Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a
complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to
enmity. It was observed:
“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated
because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for
quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by
Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987)
1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that
a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based
upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on
account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first
informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati,
CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view,
there was no difference of opinion with regard to this
finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v.
Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for
the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or
catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”
Xxxx
39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings
cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the
complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible
that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest
of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would
not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to
quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the
possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by
the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal
case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint
constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the
allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in
the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the
allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare
2026:HHC:47935
cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are
frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint
Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be
quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The
High Court rightly dismissed the application under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.”
21.
Thus, the FIR cannot be quashed because it was
lodged due to enmity.
22.
It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are
incorrect. This submission will also not help the petitioner. The
Court exercising the jurisdiction to quash the FIR does not go
into the credibility of the witnesses or the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations made by the parties. It has to accept
the contents of the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely
according to its whims or caprice.”
23.
2026:HHC:47935
It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent
jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of
quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if
taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the
cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do
not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a
case against the accused. We are of the considered view
that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the
categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. v.
State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23],
this Court, while deciding the question of whether
the High Court could entertain the Section 482
petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet
2026:HHC:47935
was filed by the police during the pendency of the
Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even prima
facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the
charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single
Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007
SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
made out from the complainant's FIR, charge
sheet, documents, etc. or not.
24.
It was submitted that the petitioner had also made a
complaint against the informant, but it was not investigated
because no sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of
Corruption Act was obtained. The same parameter should have
been applied to the petitioner as well. This submission will also
not help the petitioner. The allegations in the FIR show that the
false representation regarding the plantation was made and the
Government money was withdrawn by forging the documents.
These allegations prima facie show the commission of offences
punishable under Section 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC.
Hence, the FIR cannot be quashed simply because another
complaint against the informant was not registered for want of
sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
25.
2026:HHC:47935
It was submitted that the FIR has to be scrutinised
with due care and caution when there is enmity between the
parties. This submission will not assist the petitioner. Even if the
contents of the FIR are seen with due care and caution, they
constitute the commission of cognizable offences, and the FIR
cannot be quashed at this stage.
26.
It was submitted that the same transaction cannot
constitute the commission of an offence punishable under
Sections 409 and 420 of the IPC. It is not necessary to deal with
this submission because investigation is being carried out, and it
would be open for the investigating agency to drop one of the
sections which may be found to be not attracted after the
investigation. However, this is not sufficient to quash the FIR.
27.
In the present case, the investigation is at the initial
stage. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences,
and it is impermissible to quash it without allowing the police to
carry out the investigation. Hence, the present petition fails, and
it is dismissed.
28.
2026:HHC:47935
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
2nd November, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review