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2026:JHHC:28650-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) 7314 of 2026
------
1. The Union of India, through the General Manager, Eastern Railway,
Fairlie Place, Kolkata P.O. GPO Kolkata & P.S. Hare Street
2. The Chief Personnel Officer (Administration), Eastern Railway,
Fairlie Place, Kolkata P.O. GPO, Kolkata & P.S. Hare Street
3. The Divisional Railway Manager, Eastern Railway, Malda Division,
P.O. & P.S. English Bazar, District – Malda, West Bengal.
4. The Additional Divisional Railway Manager, Eastern Railway, Malda
Division P.O. & P.S. English Bazar, District – Malda, West Bengal.
5. The Senior Divisional Personnel Officer, Eastern Railway, Malda
Division, P.O. & P.S. English Bazar, District – Malda, West Bengal.
... Petitioners
Versus
Mahesh Prasad Ram, Son of Late Kedar Ram, Resident of Mohalla –
Gorabari, Stadium Raod, Near B.D.O. Office, P.S. & P.O. Jirawabari,
District – Sahibganj, Jharkhand – 816109.
... Respondent
CORAM
: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
------
For the Writ Petitioners
: Mr. Prashant Kr. Singh, DSGI
: Ms. Pinky Shaw, AC to DSGI
For the Respondent
: None
-----02/Dated: 17th September, 2026
1. The instant writ petition is under Article 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India directed against the order dated 05.05.2026
passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Patna
Bench, Circuit Sitting at Ranchi in O.A. No. 051/00404/2023 by
which the decision taken by the authority as contained in Letter No.
E/Pen/MLDT/ONR/6155 dated 22.09.2015 directing to recover a
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sum of Rs. 2,24,497/- from the arrears of pension relief of the
applicant has been quashed.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition incorporated on the basis of the original application is
referred herein which reads as under:
(i) The applicant (respondent herein) was subject to action under
Railway Servant (Disciplinary & Appeal) Rules and the
disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from
service. Subsequently, the appellate authority, vide order dated
30.01.2008, modified the punishment from dismissal to
Compulsory Retirement with admissible pensionary benefits,
with effect from the date of the original punishment.
(ii) Being aggrieved from the aforesaid orders, the applicant
(respondent
herein)
had
approached
the
learned
Administrative Tribunal Calcutta Bench by filing O.A. No. 803 of
2008, which was dismissed vide order dated 08.04.2011. The
writ petition and the Special Leave Petition preferred before
this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court, respectively were also
dismissed, and the order of compulsory retirement thus
attained its finality.
(iii) When the applicant's pension and pensionary benefits were
not released, he approached this Tribunal at Patna in OA No.
651 of 2015 wherein the written statement filed by the
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respondents (writ petitioners herein) and in the said OA the
respondents enclosed letter dated 22.09.2015 whereby Rs.
2,24,497/- was recovered from the arrear of pay & DA
(amounting to Rs. 30,582/-) difference of Leave Salary
(amounting to Rs. 2,416/-), Revised DCRG of applicant
(amounting to Rs. 2,416), revised DCRG of applicant
(amounting to Rs. 1,88,749/-) and the rest amount, i.e.
(2,24,497-2,21,747= 2,750) was recovered from arrears of
pension relief of applicant.
(iv) The said OA No. 651 of 2015 was disposed of by the learned
Tribunal vide order dated 24.02.2016 as having become
infructuous as retiral dues including DCRG were already
released. In the said order it was further observed by the
Tribunal that since damage rent is a subject matter of
independent cause of action it cannot be adjudicated within the
parameters of the present OA and while disposing of the said
OA liberty was granted to the applicant to pursue his grievance
of deduction of damage rent recovery in appropriate forum.
(v) The applicant then challenged the said order dated 22.09.2015
before the Railway Administration by way of submitting
various representations but no action was taken and when the
applicant was provided with letters dated 02.09.2019 and
04.01.2022 under the RTI Act, 2005 the actual truth regarding
non-occupancy and non-retention of govt. quarter by the
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applicant was revealed. In Column 4 of the letter dated
02.09.2019 it is stated, "As per available record these quarter
had crossed their codal life and presently in dilapidated
condition and hence, unsafe for accommodation of staff.
However, in, order to development of circulating area of
Sahibganj station these quarters have been vacated as per
instruction of DRM/MLDT and staff concerns have been given
alternate accommodation. Some of the said quarters had been
vacated on 28.05.2011 and 14.11.2011.
(vi) It had been contended by the applicant (respondent herein)
before the learned Tribunal that after his dismissal followed by
modification of punishment to compulsory retirement, the
applicant had no cause to remain at Railway Quarter which
was in dilapidated condition as stated above. As the applicant
remained outstation in the process of pursuing his litigations,
he could not submit the quarter vacation letter to the
administration on time which was admittedly submitted by
him in the year 2014 through his application dated 09.09.2014.
But the respondents deducted the retiral dues and other
amounts of applicant vide impugned order dated 22.09.2015
for a railway quarter which was very old, crossed its codal life
and was in dilapidated condition and
since as per the
02.09.2019 and 04.01.2022 said quarters had been lastly
vacated on 28.05.2011 and 14.11.2011, deduction from
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applicant up to the period September, 2014 is wholly
unjustified.
(vii) The respondents (writ petitioners) had taken the ground
before the learned tribunal that the Applicant did not vacate
the
railway
quarter/accommodation
and
continued
in
unauthorized occupation thereof until 29.08.2014. Consequent
thereto, damage rent for the period of unauthorized
occupation, i.e., from 01.08.2007 to 29.08.2014, was duly
deducted from his settlement dues. In substantiation of the
said assertion, the Respondents/Writ Petitioners have annexed
a letter dated 08.09.2014 evidencing that the Applicant vacated
the quarter on 29.08.2014. Further, a communication dated
20.01.2015 issued by the Electrical Department regarding
deduction of electric rent and disposal of electrical fittings
corroborates that the quarter remained in the possession of
the Applicant till 29.08.2014. By reference to the aforesaid
factual aspects, it is contended that the deduction of damage
rent from the settlement dues of the Applicant for the period of
unauthorized occupation of railway quarters is in consonance
with the applicable Railway Rules and procedures, and hence,
the Original Application is liable to be dismissed.
(viii)
The learned Tribunal, while adjudicating the Original
Application, took note of the circumstance that the quarter in
question had already crossed its codal life, was in a dilapidated
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condition, and had remained locked for certain periods.
Proceeding on such reasoning, the learned Tribunal, vide order
dated 05.05.2026, held that the recovery of damage rent is
unjustified and accordingly quashed the impugned letter dated
22.09.2015.
(ix) Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondents/Writ Petitioners
have instituted the present writ petition.
3. It is admitted from the factual aspect that the sole respondent herein
was the applicant before the Tribunal.
4. The applicant, who started his service career on 29.03.1979 as
Wireman Grade-I was implicated in a departmental proceeding and
vide order dated 29.03.2007 he was imposed punishment of
dismissal by Disciplinary Authority and later on the Appellate
Authority modified the 'Dismissal order of applicant to 'Compulsory
retirement with full pensionary benefits vide order dated
30.01.2008 from the date the order was imposed by Disciplinary
Authority.
5. The sole Respondent had earlier approached the learned Tribunal
by instituting Original Application No. 803 of 2008 assailing the
order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as that of the Appellate
Authority. The said Original Application came to be dismissed vide
order dated 08.04.2011. The dismissal order was thereafter carried
in challenge before this Court and subsequently before the Hon’ble
Apex Court. With the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the
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order of compulsory retirement has attained finality.
6.
The Respondent, upon non-release of his pensionary benefits,
instituted O.A. No. 651 of 2015 before the learned Tribunal at Patna.
In the said proceedings, the Respondents/Writ Petitioners filed their
written statement enclosing letter dated 22.09.2015, whereby a sum
of Rs. 2,24,497/- was recovered from arrears of pension relief on
account of damage rent.
7.
The Tribunal, by order dated 24.02.2016, disposed of the Original
Application as infructuous, observing that retiral dues had already
been released, and further held that damage rent constituted an
independent cause of action, granting liberty to the Applicant to
pursue his grievance in an appropriate forum.
8.
The Applicant thereafter submitted representations before the
Railway Administration challenging the recovery order dated
22.09.2015, but no action ensued. Subsequently, upon obtaining
letters dated 02.09.2019 and 04.01.2022 under the RTI Act, 2005,
the Applicant contended that the quarters in question had crossed
their codal life, were dilapidated, unsafe, and had been vacated on
28.05.2011 and 14.11.2011, thereby rendering the recovery wholly
unjustified.
9.
In opposition, the Respondents/Writ Petitioners asserted that the
Applicant had continued in unauthorized occupation of the railway
quarter until 29.08.2014, and accordingly damage rent for the
period 01.08.2007 to 29.08.2014 was deducted from his settlement
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dues. Reliance was placed upon a letter dated 08.09.2014 evidencing
vacation of the quarter on 29.08.2014, and a communication dated
20.01.2015 from the Electrical Department regarding deduction of
electric rent and disposal of fittings, to substantiate continued
possession.
10. The learned Tribunal, however, upon adjudication of the Original
Application, observed that the quarter had crossed its codal life, was
dilapidated, and remained locked for certain periods, and on such
reasoning, vide order dated 05.05.2026, quashed the impugned
recovery order dated 22.09.2015.
11. Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondents/Writ Petitioners have
preferred the present writ petition.
Submissions of the learned DSGI appearing for the writ petitioners:
12. Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned DSGI appearing on behalf of the
writ petitioner, respondent before the learned Tribunal, has
submitted that consequent upon the compulsory retirement, the
respondent (applicant before the learned tribunal) ceased to be
entitled to retain the Railway accommodation beyond the
permissible period prescribed of four months under the Railway
rules and upon expiry of the permissible period, continued
occupation
automatically
becomes
unauthorized
and
the
employee/applicant becomes liable to payment of damage rent at
the prescribed rates till the date of actual vacation and handling over
the possession.
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13. It has further been submitted that despite cessation of the service,
the respondent/applicant failed to vacate and hand over possession
of Railway Quarter No. 123/C, Type-II, Sahibganj within the
permissible prescribed period under the Railway Rules.
14. It has been contended that the respondent/applicant himself
disclosed in his Settlement Booklet that he continued to be in
occupation of the Railway Quarter allotted to him. Thereafter, the
competent authority processed the settlement dues of the
respondent in accordance with the applicable Railway rules. Since
the Railway accommodation had not been vacated within the
permissible period, damage rent became recoverable for the period
of unauthorized occupation.
15. It has further been contended that the Railway records establish
that the respondent actually handed over the possession of the
quarter only on 29.08.2014, where after the Estate authorities
accepted the vacation of the quarter, as such, it is the liability of the
sole respondent, applicant before the Tribunal to make payment of
the damage rent as per the policy decision of the writ petitioner.
16. It has further been submitted that the Electrical Department also
issued communication dated 20.01.2015 regarding deduction of
electricity charges and disposal of electrical fittings consequent
upon vacation of the quarter. The said communication also records
that the quarter remained under the allotment of the respondent till
29.08.2014.
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17. It is submitted that after due calculation, damage rent was recovered
from the settlement/retiral dues of the respondent. The said
recovery formed part of the total recovery of Rs. 2,24,497/- effected
from the retiral dues of the respondent under different heads,
namely arrear of pay and dearness allowance (Rs. 30,582/-),
difference of leave salary (Rs. 2,416/-), revised DCRG (Rs. 1,88,749/)
and the arrears of pension relief (Rs. 2750/-), and the details
whereof
were
communicated
through
Office
Letter
No.
E/Pen/MLDT/ONR/6155 dated 22.09.2015.
18. It has been contended that the fact about the locking of the quarter
from January 2011 to August, 2014 has not been taken into
consideration in right perspective, and merely on consideration of
the fact that the quarter has been vacated by the petitioner on
28.05.2011 & 14.11.2011, the decision so taken by the authority on
22.09.2015 has been quashed and set aside. Therefore, the order
passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from an error.
Analysis:
19. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the writ petitioner.
20. This Court, before proceeding to assess the legality and propriety of
the order passed by the learned Tribunal deem it appropriate to
refer about the jurisdiction which has been conferred to this Court
to look into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the
Tribunal under its power of Judicial Review as per the judgment
pronounced by the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of L.
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Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261.
21. The power which is to be exercised as per the position of law is to
look into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the
learned Tribunal in exercise of power conferred under the power of
judicial review as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at
paragraph- 99 in the aforesaid judgment. The said paragraph is
being referred as under:
"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d)
of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court
under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are
unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of
jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis
of Articles 323-A and 323- B would, to the same extent, be
unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts
under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of
our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other
courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in
discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article
323- B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test
the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All
decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny
before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless,
continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of
law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be
open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases
where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where
the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged)
by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section
5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in
the manner we have indicated."
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22. The power of judicial review has also been deliberated by the
Hon'ble Apex Court, which is to be considered while exercising the
said power only to the extent that if any order is being passed found
to be having error on the face of the order or without jurisdiction or
suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of the order
means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then
only the power of judicial review is to be exercised.
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School
Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at
paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised by
the Court after determining that the impugned order is vitiated by
an error apparent on the face of the record and not the same has
been established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the
aforesaid judgment is being referred as under: "30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see
whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of
law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error
apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is selfevident on the face of the record or whether the error requires
examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be
established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may
reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the
face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan
Hegde
v.
Millikarjun
Bhavanappa
Tirumale
[Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa
Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137] . ---."
24. In the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Anr., (1955) 1 SCR
250, their Lordship have held that the patent error in a decision can
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be corrected by writ of certiorari, when it is manifested by the error
apparent on the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:
"11. ... An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error
apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g. when it is based on
clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other
words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but
not a mere wrong decision. ...."
25. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled legal position it is evident
that the power of judicial review can be exercised, if error on the
face of the order impugned, challenged under the Article 226 of
Constitution of India, appears to be there or suffers from perversity.
26. The word "perverse" has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex
Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous
consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu
and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and
Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word
perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking
into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered
infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of
the said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of
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cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court
observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings of
the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence
brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice
of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.
CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed
that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse
that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of
pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1
LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may
probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v.
Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined "perverse" as turned the
wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th
Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.--Law
(of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language
(Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.--Purposely deviating from
accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward;
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stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that
is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence.""
27. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law then it will come under the
purview of perverse order. Further "perverse verdict" may probably
be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but
is altogether against the evidence. Thus, "perversity" refers to a
finding or decision so unreasonable or irrational that no reasonable
person acting judicially could have reached it. It signifies a gross and
unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by a court.
28.Further Perversity is a high threshold for intervention, distinguishing
it from a mere error of fact or law. The "safest approach on
perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference
on the facts but inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of
evidence is not perversity, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.
29. It is thus evident from the interpretation of the word "perverse" that
the erroneous finding without consideration of the fact will be said
to be perverse order.
30. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court is
now proceeding to examine the factual aspect in order to come to
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the conclusion on the issue of legality and propriety of the order
passed by the learned Tribunal.
31. This Court is now proceeding to examine the legality and propriety
of the order passed by the learned Tribunal under the power of
Judicial Review which is being exercised under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
32. The undisputed fact herein is that the sole respondent while
working as Workman Gr.-I had been allotted a quarter being Quarter
No. 123/C, Type-II, Sahibganj.
33. The petitioner although on the earlier decision was dismissed from
service but subsequently the order of dismissal was modified to that
of compulsory retirement holding the writ petitioner entitled for full
pensionary benefit in consequence of the compulsory retirement.
34. The order of compulsory retirement has attained its finality by
dismissal of Special Leave Petition by the Hon’ble Apex Court as has
been taken note by the Tribunal while dealing with the facts as
under Para- 2 of the impugned order.
35. The cause of action for the sole respondent to invoke the jurisdiction
of the learned Tribunal emanates from the allegation of
unauthorized retention of the quarter during the period from
01.08.2007 to 29.08.2014.
36. The writ petitioners have specifically pleaded that the quarter
continued to be retained by the applicant up to 29.08.2014, whereas
the categorical stand of the applicant, as urged before the Tribunal,
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is that after his dismissal followed by modification of punishment to
compulsory retirement, the applicant had no cause to remain at
Railway Quarter and the applicant remained outstation in the
process of pursuing his litigations, he could not submit the quarter
vacation letter to the administration on time which was admittedly
submitted by him in the year 2014 through his application dated
09.09.2014, but the respondents deducted the retiral dues and other
amounts of applicant vide impugned order dated 22.09.2015 for a
railway quarter which was very old, crossed its codal life and was in
dilapidated condition and as per the letter dated 02.09.2019 and
04.01.2022 said quarters had been lastly vacated on 28.05.2011 and
14.11.2011, therefore deduction from applicant up to the period
September, 2014 is wholly unjustified.
37. It is an admitted position that the writ petitioners have relied upon
Letter
No.
114/SSE/ELECT/G/SBG
communication
dated
20.01.2015 (Annexure-6), which was issued in connection with
deduction of electricity rent and related charges, and has also been
enclosed as Annexure R/3 in the written statement. From the said
communication, it stands recorded that the quarter remained locked
from January, 2011 till August, 2014. This documentary evidence
clearly establishes that the applicant was not residing in the quarter
during the relevant period.
38. From the pleadings advanced on behalf of the sole respondent and
upon perusal of Annexure-7A appended to the instant writ petition,
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it emerges that the quarter was vacated on 28.05.2011 and
14.11.2011, and alternate accommodation had already been
provided to the concerned staff. This fact further stands
corroborated
by
the
communication
dated
20.01.2015
(Annexure-6), wherein it was recorded that the quarter remained
locked from January, 2011 till August, 2014.
39. Thus, the fact about allotment of the alternate accommodation is not
disputed and further as would be evident from the aforesaid letter
communicated dated 20.01.2015, that the quarter was found to be
locked since January, 2011 to August, 2014.
40. In view of the materials on record, there remains no manner of
doubt that the quarter in question had remained under lock from
January, 2011 till August, 2014, which by necessary implication
establishes that the petitioner was not in possession thereof during
the said period.
41. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the electricity meter had been
installed in the quarter in question and, as reflected in Annexure-6,
the said quarter remained locked from January, 2011 till August,
2014. In the face of such documentary evidence, the contention
advanced by the writ petitioners that the applicant/respondent
continued to remain in possession of the quarter during the
aforesaid period cannot be accepted as a correct statement of fact.
42. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the applicant had
continued in possession of the quarter in question, the responsibility
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to secure its evacuation rested solely upon the employer, inasmuch
as the petitioner had already been detached from service in the year
2007. No endeavour appears to have been undertaken by the
employer or the authority concerned to effectuate such eviction, and
the failure in this regard cannot be attributed to the applicant.
43.
Thus, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, it is
evident that the quarter in question was in an abandoned and
dilapidated condition, having crossed its codal life, and that the
applicant has stated that he was residing with his brother at Bandel.
The communication dated 20.01.2015 (Annexure-R/3) itself
records that the quarter remained locked from January, 2011 to
August, 2014, thereby negating the allegation of continued
occupation. Further, Annexures A/7 and A/8 issued under RTI
confirm that the quarters had been vacated on 28.05.2011 and
14.11.2011, with staff being allotted alternate accommodation.
Thus, in such circumstances, mere non-submission of a quarter
vacation certificate cannot furnish a valid ground for recovery of
damage rent in a situation when another quarter has been allotted,
particularly when the quarter was not habitable and the applicant
had already been compulsorily retired in 2007. The recovery
effected from the DCRG of the applicant is, therefore, unjustified and
unsustainable in law, being contrary to the respondents’ own
documentary record.
44. The learned Tribunal, upon consideration of the aforesaid premise,
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particularly the contents of the communication dated 20.01.2015
(Annexure-6), wherein it stood revealed that the quarter remained
locked from January, 2011 till August, 2014, and further taking note
of Annexure-7A, which records that the quarters had been vacated
on 28.05.2011 and 14.11.2011, as well as the fact of allotment of
alternate accommodation, came to the conclusive finding that the
decision to effect recovery from the arrears of pensionary benefits of
the sole respondent could not be regarded as just or proper. It was
on this basis that the learned Tribunal found occasion to interfere
with the impugned recovery.
45. Thus, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, it is the
considered view of this Court that the order impugned dated
05.05.2026 passed by the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any
error.
46. The other aspect, though not adverted to by the learned Tribunal,
pertains to the propriety of the decision to effect recovery from the
arrears of pensionary benefits of a Class-III employee.
47. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of
recovery from the Class III employee has propounded the guidelines
in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White
Washer) and Ors., (2015) 4 SCC 334 at Para 18 which is being
referred herein:
"18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which
would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments
have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their
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entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to
hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following
few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be
impermissible in law:
(i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV
service (or Group C and Group D service).
(ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due
to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.
(iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been
made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is
issued.
(iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required
to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly,
even though he should have rightfully been required to work against
an inferior post.
(v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that
recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or
arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable
balance of the employer's right to recover."
48. The recovery cannot be allowed to be made if any of the conditions
as under condition nos.(i) to (v) is there and in addition to that if the
court comes to the conclusion in making recovery, the concerned
employee will be put to great hardship then the Court can pass order
quashing and setting aside the order of recovery.
49. Admittedly herein, the writ petitioner was holding the post of classIII and as per the guidelines formulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White
Washer) and Ors. (supra) as under paragraph-18 which contains
five parameters having one of the parameters that there cannot be
any recovery from the class-III employee.
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50. The petitioner-Wireman Gr.-I and on the allegations of retention of
quarter, the amount has been decided to be recovered from the
arrears of pensionary benefits, hence the case of the sole respondent
is coming under the Para-18 of the judgment rendered in the case of
State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors.
(supra).
51. In view of the foregoing discussion on facts and law, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the order dated 05.05.2026 passed by
the learned Tribunal neither discloses any error apparent on the
face of the record nor suffers from perversity. Consequently, it is not
a fit case warranting interference in exercise of the power of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
52. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed, and as such, disposed
of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
17th September, 2026
Samarth
Uploaded on 26.09.2026
A.F.R.
Page 22
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