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2025:MLHC:1083
Serial No.01
Daily List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No.21/2024
Date of Judgment: 10.11.2025
1. The Union of India represented by Under Secretary, Ministry of
Defence, New Delhi.
2. The Geneal Army Commander, Army Headquarter, New Delhi.
3. The Brigade Commander, Headquarter 24 MTN BDE, C/o 99 APO.
4. The Station Commander, Station Headquarter, Umroi Military
Station, C/o 99 APO.
5. The Colonel Administration for Station Commander, Umroi Military
Station, C/o 99 APO.
..... Petitioners
Vs.
Smti. Koshiliya Choudhury
..... Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Soumen Sen, Chief Justice
Appearance:
For the Petitioners
: Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. K. Gurung, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. S. Thapa, Adv with
Mr. S. Chanda, Adv
i)
Whether approved for
Yes
reporting in Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
Yes/No
in press:
JUDGMENT: (Oral)
This revisional application is directed against an order dated
31.01.2023 passed in a proceeding filed by the plaintiff under Order 39
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Rule 2A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(CPC) filed on 18.02.2021.
2.
In or about 27.07.2016, the plaintiff filed the suit being T.S.
No.6 (T) of 2016 before the Court of Assistant to the Deputy
Commissioner (Judicial) at Nongpoh praying, inter alia, for a
declaration that she is entitled to peaceful occupation of the suit
premises without any intrusion from the petitioners herein, refund of all
expenditure as per bills incurred by her for renovating and constructing
the suit premises and the shed within the suit premises and also for a
permanent restraining the petitioners herein from interfering with her
peaceful possession of the suit premises.
3.
The facts and circumstances resulting in the filing of the suit in
brief are that the plaintiff is a bona fide tenant under the opposite
parties. She had taken the suit premises/plot of land being allotted to her
by the Station Commander, Station Headquarters on rent for the
construction of a shed for the purpose of running a shop dealing in chat
and sweets shop (shop No.17) and a chicken shop (shop No.16) under a
memo of agreement dated 01.04.2015 executed between the petitioners
and the plaintiff. The monthly rental in respect of the said premises has
been fixed at Rs.7400/- and Rs.2400/- per month, respectively. Since
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the shop rooms are in a shabby and dilapidated condition, the plaintiff
repaired and renovated the shop rooms on a clear understanding that in
the event the plaintiff is required to leave the shop rooms she shall
either be accommodated in another place or the amount invested by her
shall be refunded by the present petitioners. On the basis of such
understanding, it is claimed that the plaintiff expended a substantial
amount for the purpose of renovation and construction of the shed after
obtaining necessary permission from the petitioners, as would appear
from the letter dated 14.01.2011. Since then, the plaintiff is in peaceful
occupation of the two shop rooms and has been carrying on her business
without any hindrance. Sometime in the month of March, 2016 some
officials of the present petitioners started interfering with the peaceful
possession and occupation of the said shops without any reason and was
objecting to the business being carried out by the plaintiff from the said
two shop rooms. She was threatened with eviction. In or about April,
2016, the plaintiff approached the petitioners for renewal of the
agreement. The defendants/petitioners on one pretext or the other
delayed the same and when the said agreement was not renewed, the
plaintiff became suspicious and being dissatisfied with their behaviour
requested the petitioners to refund the amount/expenditure incurred and
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to accommodate the plaintiff to some other place as agreed earlier at the
time of the commencement of the agreement to which the petitioners
assured her of redressing her grievance and promise to do the needful.
However, contrary to such representation and assurance in or about
July, 2016 some officials of the petitioners at the instance of the
defendant No.5 came to the shop premises of the plaintiff and
threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences in the event the shop
rooms are not vacated immediately. Apprehending the dispossession,
the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit.
4.
On 28.07.2016, the learned trial court passed an order
restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession
and occupation of the plaintiff of shop No.17 and shop No.16
respectively, besides doing anything that may adversely affect her
interest in the said shops. The order was initially made ex parte but was
extended from time to time in presence of the petitioners and ultimately
on 11.12.2020 an order was passed directing the parties to maintain the
status quo as prevailing on that date till 08.02.2021 in respect of the suit
properties. On 08.02.2021, the Presiding Officer was on leave and the
matter was taken up again on the following day i.e. 09.02.2021, when
the status quo as ordered on 11.12.2020 was again extended till
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18.02.2021. Subsequently, on 18.02.2021 it was finally ordered that
status quo as on 11.12.2020 is to be maintained in respect of the suit
properties till disposal of the suit and the misc. case was disposed of
accordingly.
5.
In or about 18th February, 2021, the plaintiff filed an application
under Order 39, Rule 2A read with Section 151 of the CPC dated
18.02.2021 for alleged violation of the orders of the learned trial court
dated 11.12.2020 and 09.02.2021, respectively. It was alleged that the
present petitioners/defendants by taking advantage of the absence of the
Presiding Officer on 08.02.2021 dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit
premises on 09.02.2021 by force. The plaintiff also contended that when
the Presiding Officer resumed court on the following day i.e.
09.02.2021, on her application the court ordered that the status quo as
on 11.12.2020 be extended till 18.02.2021. This order alleged to have
been communicated to the defendants on the same day but the plaintiff
was not restored to possession of the properties in question. The
contention of the present petitioners before the learned trial court
appears to be that since the order of status quo was to operate and
remain valid till 18th February, 2021, it would imply that upon the
stroke of midnight on 09.02.2021, the benefit of status quo would
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automatically extinguish and become inoperative. It was further alleged
that the plaintiff had wilfully vacated the suit premises in the morning
of 09.02.2021, therefore, the present petitioners have not flouted any
order of the court.
6.
The matter was heard extensively by the learned trial court and
ultimately the learned trial judge has passed, inter alia, the following
directions:
“a) Status quo ante, as directed and described in orders dated
11.12.2020 and 09.02.2021, is to be restored;
b) Defendants are to be peacefully restore status quo ante and
handover possession to the plaintiff;
c) Defendants shall file an affidavit confirming the completion
of handing over possession and restoration of status quo ante;
it is made clear that this order does not otherwise reflect upon
the merits of the main suit which is still to be decided.”
7.
This order is presently under challenge.
8.
The learned Deputy Solicitor General has submitted that in a
similar situation, the Division Bench of this Court by an order dated
26.07.2022 passed in WA No.18 of 2021 [Koshilya Choudhury v.
Union of India & ors] in relation to another property belonging to the
plaintiff had while not appreciating the manner in which the appellant
was dispossessed of the properties directed payment of compensation
after recording that the writ petitioner/appellant overstayed her welcome
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and there is no equity in favour of the appellant and the appellant could
not be put back into possession. The learned DSG further contended
that the plaintiff is a mere licensee for one year and in the meantime the
Government of India had come up with a new policy for allotment of
shops to the war widows and battle causalities. The learned DSG has
submitted that the license of the plaintiff was never renewed after one
year and the shops are essentially meant for the war widow and battle
casualties. The plaintiff has become a trespasser after the license period
was over. It is further submitted that after taking possession on
09.02.2021, the shops have been let out to third parties and in the event,
the petitioners are directed to put back the plaintiff to the original
possession it would cause prejudice to the third parties who are
presently in possession of the shop rooms.
9.
We are governed by the rule of law. One of the fundamental
principles of law that does not require reiteration is might is right and an
injustice would prevail over justice in the hands of powerful person or
authority have no place in our judicial system. Whenever injustice is
caused the court must step in so that the faith of the people in the justice
delivery system remains unshaken. Judiciary is respected because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. While India
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became independent at the stroke of midnight, one of its citizens was
dispossessed on a specious plea that the plaintiff is only entitled to the
benefit of the interim order till the midnight of 08.02.2021 and with the
advent of the morning – new day – the plaintiff would forfeit all the
benefits and protection that the plaintiff had been enjoying till
08.02.2021. It is a matter of serious concern the manner in which the
interim orders have been flouted. The petitioners are not private bodies
and cannot be allowed to take the law into their own hands. Moreover, it
is a fact that the plaintiff was in no way responsible for the expiry of the
interim order after 08.02.2021 and the interim order was restored
immediately on 09.02.2021. An act of court shall not prejudice a
litigant. The court was not functional on the particular day. The plaintiff
cannot suffer for the consequences that may occur due to the absence of
the court on that date and render remediless. The plaintiff was enjoying
the interim order throughout in different forms till 08.02.2021 and the
petitioners are not denying that the plaintiff was in possession till
08.02.2021 by reason of the interim order. Even if it is assumed for the
sake of argument that on 09.02.2021, the prayer for an interim order
needs a fresh consideration on the basis of the records available, there
are enough justifications for an interim order till the disposal of the suit.
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The petitioners have not challenged the initial order dated 28.07.2016
by which an order of injunction was passed, nor any of the subsequent
orders by which the right of the plaintiff vis-à-vis the properties have
been preserved. Given the position that the petitioners hold in the public
domain, propriety demands that they ought to have waited for the court
to resume its functioning and ought not to have taken steps to
circumvent the orders passed in favour of the plaintiff since July, 2016.
10.
It is also important to note that the misc. case was disposed on
18th February, 2021 by a detailed reasoned order. The submission of the
parties was recorded and thereafter, the court has independently
assessed the material on record and on due consideration of the
submissions made, disposed of the misc. case by directing the parties to
maintain the status quo as on 11.12.2020 till the disposal of the main
suit. The plaintiff was in possession of the said properties. The order
dated 08.02.2021 is not under challenge. Even in the order passed by the
Division Bench on 26.07.2022, the manner of taking over possession by
the present petitioners, who are respondents in the said proceeding was
not appreciated as would be evident from the views expressed by the
Hon’ble Division Bench in paragraph 3 of the said order, which reads as
follows:
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“3. Though there may be no equity in favour of the appellant in
this case, in the system followed in this county governed by the
rule of law, no person or the high or mighty can take the law
into its own hands and evict a person – even a rank trespasser –
without restoring to the procedure established by law.”
(emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid order was passed in a writ petition.
11.
However, unlike the matter where the aforesaid order was
passed in the instant matter, the parties have been litigating since July,
2016 and by reason of the orders of the learned trial court, the plaintiff
was enjoying interim protection. It is neither fair nor desirable that the
petitioners would take advantage of the absence of the Presiding Officer
for a day to dispossess the plaintiff and the absence for a day ought not
to have been used for the purpose of entering the premises of the
plaintiff to dispossess her from the suit premises and take illegal
possession. The petitioners are not contending that they have taken
possession of the properties in question by due process of law. The
written statement was not filed in time. They have not made any
counterclaim in the written statement. No suit was filed for eviction of
the plaintiff. The crux of the submission appears to be that the
government being the licensor and owner of the property has undoubted
power to take possession of the land given under a license with the
licensee continue to remain in possession of the properties in question
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on revocation or expiry of the license period, a view that was at one
point of time accepted in some of the judicial decisions one of which is
State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath1 where CJ Chakravarti
following the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal (in
Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club Ltd.2) observed that on termination
of the lease, the full right of the lease hold property including the right
of possession, revert to the lessor and he then becomes entitled to enter
his own land and take with it what order he likes. “If the lessor in
making a forcible entry infringes the criminal law, he will make himself
liable to be punished under a prosecution but he will infringe no right of
the lessee...For forcible entry the lessee himself, it he has become a
trespasser, has no cause of action against the lessor merely on the
ground that it was forcible”.
12.
This view however did not find favour with the other courts
including the Supreme Court as in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his
legal representative v. Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620, the
Supreme Court referred to the above Calcutta case and observed:
“In that case the High Court refused to issue an order under
Article 226 of the Constitution prohibiting the Government from
forcibly taking possession of lands which had been validly
AIR 1955 Cal 601
(1920) 1 K.B. 720
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resumed by Government. We are not concerned with that
question here. But we do not agree with the conclusion of the
High Court that a lessor is entitled in India to use force to throw
out his lessee.”
(emphasis supplied)
13.
Prior thereto in Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. V. Naresh
Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144 the Privy Council observed:
“In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession;
they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through
a Court.”
14.
Again, in K.K. Verma v. Union of India, AIR 1954 Bom 358, it
has been laid down:
“Under the Indian Law the possession of a tenant who has ceased
to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a
right to continue in possession after the termination of the
tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected
by statute.”
(emphasis supplied)
15.
In the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Yar
Muhammad v. Lakshmi Das, AIR 1959 All 1 (FB), it is observed:
“Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It
will nor permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to
dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse
to a Court.”
(emphasis supplied)
16.
On consideration of the aforesaid decisions, a Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court in Union of India & ors v. P.C. Ray & Co.
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India (Pvt) Ltd.3 make the following observation in paragraph 38,
which reads as follows:
“38. The ratio of the decisions appears to be that a lessee
continuing in possession on expiry of lease is entitled in law to
retain his possession against all including those having best of
title till evicted by due process of law.…….”
17.
In a later decision in Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRS.
v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao4 this principle was reaffirmed and
reiterated as would appear from the following observation:
“8. .... It is a well settled law in this country that where a person is
in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he
had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed
by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any
authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the
decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant
Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh. This Court in that judgment cited
with approval the well known passage from the leading Privy
Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v.
Naresh Narayan Roy where it has been observed:
“In India persons are not permitted to take forcible
possession; they must obtain such possession as they are
entitled to through a court.”
9. The proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this
Court in Ram Rattan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The Division
Bench comprising of three learned Judges held that a true owner
has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is
in the act or process of trespassing but this right is not available
to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in
accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner.
In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should
dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under
1974 SCC OnLine Cal 248
(1989) 4 SCC 131
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the law. In the present case, we may point out that there was no
question of the plaintiff entering upon the premises as a trespasser
at all, as she had entered into the possession of the restaurant
business and the premises where it was conducted as a licensee
and in due course of law. Thus, defendant 3 was not entitled to
dispossess the plaintiff unlawfully and behind her back as has
been done by him in the present case. It was pointed out by Mr.
Tarakunde that some of the observations referred to above were
in connection with a suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 or analogous provisions in the earlier Specific
Relief Act, 1877. To our mind, this makes no difference in this
case as the suit has been filed only a few weeks of the plaintiff
being unlawfully deprived of possession of the said business and
the premises and much before the period of six months expired.
In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by us, we do not
propose to consider the question whether the agreement between
the plaintiff and defendant 3 amounted to a license or a sublease.”
(emphasis supplied)
18.
In a revisional jurisdiction, unless there is an error of jurisdiction
or a patent error of law resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice or
there is a manifest injustice caused to a party by reason of the order, the
revisional court is not to interfere with the discretion exercised by the
learned trial court. The revisional court is not exercising its power as an
appellate court. The learned trial court has taken into consideration the
undue haste and the arbitrary conduct of the petitioners in overreaching
the court orders and in my view has rightly exercised its discretion in
directing status quo ante. On such consideration, I do not find any
reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial court. It is
well settled that Article 227 bestows the high courts with powers of
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administrative and judicial superintendence over subordinate courts.
The test for exercise of such power was laid down in a 5-Judge
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rajendra Diwan v.
Pradeep Kumar Ranibala5 as follows:
“85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is,
however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this
power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly,
to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their
authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the
High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary
writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or
flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot
be exercised ‘in the cloak of an appeal in disguise’.
86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence
and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to
cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision;
perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of
principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation
of powers. The High Court does not reassess or re-analyse the
evidence and/or materials on record.... The writ jurisdiction of
the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate
forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the
eye of the law”.
(emphasis supplied)
19.
Order 39 Rule 2A read with Section 151 CPC takes care of a
situation like this where there has been disobedience of an order passed
by a court and where it appears to the court that irremediable mischief
has been done, the status quo ante might be restored as the said section
(2019) 20 SCC 143
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applies to all cases of disobedience whether or not the effect of the
disobedience is eligible of removal or reparation.
20.
In the instant case, the plaintiff in the suit has claimed that she
made the construction and the said license may not be revokable and in
any event the plaintiff is required to be compensated for all the
expenditure she had incurred for making the said shop rooms useable
before the defendants (the petitioners herein) could even consider of
evicting the plaintiff from the said premises. The plaintiff was
successful at the interlocutory stage and was enjoying an interim order
that has now attained finality. Dominion and control over the property
by the plaintiff appears to have been retained till the plaintiff has been
dispossessed by the defendant. Once the plaintiff is able to prove her
possession and prima facie proves that her dispossession is not legal or
with her consent or in accordance with law the plaintiff is entitled to
restoration of possession based upon her possessory title as the
possession is the ninth point in law and law respects possession over a
title.
21.
On a conspectus of facts as narrated above, the learned trial
court granted an interim order of injunction which was later modified to
status quo. Admittedly the plaintiff was in juridical possession on the
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midnight of 09.02.2021 when the petitioners entered the shop rooms
and took possession of the shop rooms without giving any notice to the
plaintiff and in violation of the status quo order. The status quos that
could be and required to preserve was the status quo that existed before
this illegal act of dispossession on the part of the defendants/petitioners
was accomplished during the pendency of the suit and in such view of
the matter, the discretion exercised by the learned trial judge in
directing the status quo ante in exercise of its jurisdiction under Rule 39
Order 2A of the CPC read with Section 151 CPC does not call for any
interference.
22.
At this stage, the learned DSG has made an offer of granting two
shops of equivalent space to the plaintiff as a temporary measure and
has assured that she would not be dispossessed of the said shops till the
suit is disposed of finally. In view of the changed circumstances, the
learned counsel has submitted that the plaintiff may accept the said
offer. The petitioners shall provide two shop rooms of the same
measurement, more or less, or of the same description to the plaintiff
within three months from date, failing which it would be open to the
plaintiff to approach the learned trial court for implementation of the
impugned order.
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23.
The suit shall proceed only after the shops are allotted to the
plaintiff. After restoration, it would be open for the petitioners to pray
for early disposal of the suit.
24.
The petition stands dismissed.
25.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(Soumen Sen)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
10.11.2025
“Lam DR-PS”
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2025.11.12 18:54:42 IST
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