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Form No. J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon?be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon?ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
M.A.T 1933 of 2025
IA No: CAN 1 of 2025
CAN 2 of 2025
The State of West Bengal and another
Vs.
Dinesh Kumar Goyal and another
For the appellants
:
Mr. Soumitra Bandyopadhyay
Mr. Priyabrata Batabyal
For the respondents
:
Mr. Pratyush Patwari
Heard on
:
27.01.2026
Judgment on
:
27.01.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:1.
We find from the application for condonation of delay that in
paragraph no. 6 thereof, it has been stated that although the
impugned order was communicated to the office of the Land
Manager, Bidhannagar on May 5, 2025, but <due to nonplacement
of
papers
and
documents
in
time
before
the
concerned higher authority= and for preparing the grounds of
appeal, no effective steps could be taken in time for preferring
the appeal before this court.
2.
Learned counsel for the respondents opposes the prayer and
submits that the ground stated in paragraph no. 6 is not a good
ground for condonation of delay.
3.
We find that some amount of departmental laxity was there,
which should not be taken so strictly as to shut out the rights of
the appellants to prefer the appeal.
4.
However, it is clear from the averment made in paragraph no. 6
of the application that the Land Manager, Bidhannagar, the
appellant/petitioner no.2 herein, was fully responsible for the
delay occasioned in preferring the appeal.
5.
Accordingly, CAN 1 of 2025 is allowed on condition that the
appellant
no.
shall
pay
costs
of
Rs.10,000/-
to
the
respondents within a fortnight from date from his own pocket.
6.
Subject to payment of such cost, the delay in preferring the
appeal is condoned.
7.
MAT
of
is
taken
up
for
admission
hearing
accordingly.
8.
The short question which has fallen for consideration in this
appeal is whether the demand of permission fees from the writ
petitioners/present respondents by the appellant authorities for
mutation of the writ petitioners? names on the strength of a
bequest in their favour of the subject property, situated at Salt
Lake (Bidhannagar), in the North Eastern fringes of the city of
Kolkata, by the original allottee/lessee by dint of a Will, was
valid in the eye of law.
9.
When the writ petitioner/present respondents sought to have
their names mutated by dint of a Will executed by the original
allottee in favour of the writ petitioners, who are strangers to the
family of the original allottee, permission charges were claimed
by the appellant authorities. It is submitted by the appellants
that such demand was made on the strength of a Notification
dated August 3, 2022.
10. From the impugned judgment, we do not find any reflection of
arguments on the 2022 Notification and/or anything to show
that such Notification was placed before the learned Single
Judge.
11. However, learned counsel for the appellant authorities submits
that the said Notification was a part of the report placed before
the learned Single Judge but was not considered.
12. It is submitted that in terms of the said Notification dated
August 3, 2022 issued by the Principal Secretary to the
Government of West Bengal, the writ petitioner/respondents
were duty-bound to pay additional permission fees, apart from
the usual processing fees, being strangers to the family of the
original allottee/lessee.
13. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/respondents
places reliance on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this
Court dated November 13, 2018 in the matter of Rina Dasgupta
vs. State of West Bengal and others, in W.P. No.2616(W) of 2018.
14. The learned Single Judge, in paragraph no. 16 thereof, while
quashing two Notifications dated June 22, 2012 and September
2, 2013, which were similar to the 2022 Notification now sought
to be relied on by the appellants, categorically held that His
Lordship did not find that the State of West Bengal has any
right, under the lease of deed by which it granted the lease to
the original lessee, to restrict the right of bequest by a Will of
the leasehold to the extent of the unexpired period of lease to
any person, whether by regulating the right on the basis of
payment of permission fees or otherwise, whether to a stranger
or to anyone who was not covered by the expression <closely
related by blood=.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that despite the
quashing of the said Notification dated June 22, 2012, in the
demand letter dated April 23, 2024, which was the subjectmatter
of
challenge before
the
writ court,
the
appellant-
authorities placed specific reliance on such quashed Notification
and sought the permission fees-in-question.
16. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents further cites a
coordinate Bench judgment of this court in the matter of the
State of West Bengal and others vs. Smt. Kusum Agarwal and
another (MAT No. 1263 of 2017), where the coordinate Bench,
while quoting excerpts from a judgment of the Hon?ble Supreme
Court in the matter of State of West Bengal and another vs.
Kailash Chandra Kapur and others reported at (1997) 2 SCC 387,
by relying on the proposition of law that a Will was a
posthumous disposition of the property and that the definition of
the Will should be read in the context of the restrictive covenant
in Clause 2(8) of the lease deed, proceeded to hold that the Apex
Court had elaborately dealt with such proposition of law which
was precisely the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor
General in that case before the Apex Court.
17. On the premise of such observations, the coordinate Bench went
on to hold that the lessees in respect of Salt Lake properties
have an unrestricted right to bequeath the leasehold interest by
way of a Will to any person and no fruitful purpose would be
served by making any further enquiry into the motive behind
such Wills.
18. It is argued that in view of the aforesaid judgments, the
appellant-authorities sought to make indirectly a monetary
demand which they could not do directly.
19. Lastly, learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondents
points out to the relevant portions of the Notification dated
August 3, 2022, where it has been specifically stated that the
Notification,
inter
alia,
was
in
partial
Notification
dated
June
22,
2012,
modification
which
was
of
a
specifically
quashed by the learned Single Judge in the matter of Rina
Dasgupta (supra).
20. Moreover, the very offending clause in the said Notification of
2012 which was quashed, was sought to be reintroduced by
paraphrasing the language thereof in the 2022 Notification.
21. Learned counsel for the appellant-authorities submits in reply
that the Notification dated August 3, 2022 still stands and has
not been challenged or quashed by any court of law.
22. As such, irrespective of the previous position of law, by dint of
the said Notification, the appellant-authorities were justified in
seeking the permission fees-in-question for the purpose of
mutating the names of the transferees/writ petitioners/present
respondents in respect of the subject plot, since they were
strangers to the family of the original allottee and did not come
within the exception clause therein, relating to close relatives of
the allottee.
23. On a careful consideration of the materials before us, we find
several grounds on which the impugned order of the learned
Single
Judge
was
justified,
even
if
no
reflection
of
the
Notification dated August 3, 2022 finds place therein, for the
obvious reason that the same was not stressed upon during the
arguments by the appellant-authorities before the learned Single
Judge.
24. First, we find that the present demand of permission fees dated
April 23, 2024, as per its own caption, was not premised on the
Notification of 2022 but the >Subject? heading of the demand
letter clearly discloses that the permission fees were demanded
pursuant to Notification No.2709-SL(AL)/4S-9/2004(PT.I) dated
June 22, 2012, which was specifically set aside in
Rina
Dasgupta’s case.
25. Thus, the demand itself was completely illegal, being based on
an already–quashed Notification.
26. Even otherwise, as held by the coordinate Bench in Kusum
Agarwal’s case, it is a settled proposition of law that lessees in
respect of Salt Lake properties have an unrestricted right to
bequeath the leasehold interest by way of a Will to any person
and no fruitful purpose will be served by making any further
enquiry into the motive behind such Wills.
27. By the Notification dated August 3, 2022, the very basis of the
said judgment and that of Rina Dasgupta (supra) has been
sought to be shaken by claiming restrictive permission fees only
on the premise that the bequest was made in favour of strangers
to the family of the original allottee.
28. We also note the fact that the Notification dated August 3, 2022,
on which the appellants vehemently rely, was a mere eye-wash
and in <partial modification= of the already-quashed Notification
dated June 22, 2012 mentioned above.
29. The Notification of 2022 itself states, in the same breath, that it
was in cancellation of the earlier Notification of 2013 and in
<modification of= the Notification dated June 22, 2012.
30. We accept the contention of the writ petitioner/respondents as
justified to the effect that an already-quashed Notification no
longer has any existence in the eye of law and cannot be
<modified= by a further Notification.
31. If so done, the subsequent Notification, being an extension (by
modification) of a quashed Notification, itself is a nullity in the
eye of law.
32. We further notice from the 2022 Notification that the same was a
vain attempt to re-introduce the self-same words which found
place
in
the
paraphrasing
quashed
the
Notification
relevant
of
expressions
2012,
used
in
by
the
merely
Notification.
33. For example, in the 2012 Notifications, it was stated that
transfer fees will not be applicable to cases that are within the
close blood relations, namely <father-mother, husband-wife,
brother-sister,
son-daughter,
son?s
daughter,
son?s
son,
daughter?s son and daughter?s daughter= and in those cases only
a nominal amount of processing fees as may be fixed by the
Government from time to time will be realised, thereby putting
strangers to the allottee?s family outside the purview of such
exception clause.
34. Notably, such words were substituted in the Notification of
August 3, 2022 by merely paraphrasing the same and, instead of
hyphens, using commas.
35. For
example,
under
the
exempted
relations
in
the
Notification, <father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter
(married, unmarried, widowed or divorcee), son?s wife, son?s
children,
daughter?s
children,
brother,
sister,
grandfather,
grandmother= were included, which were substantially the same
relationships
which
found
place
in
the
quashed
Notification.
36. Thus, we find that by the 2022 Notification, the exact same
relations which were exempted from high permission fees by the
2012 Notification were sought to be reintroduced.
37. Conspicuously, in the penultimate paragraph of the 2022
Notification, it has been boldly stated that all other terms and
conditions as stated in the quashed Notification of 2012 shall
remain unchanged.
38. Thus, this court is of the clear opinion from the discussions
above that Notification No.2309-SL(AL)/4S-9/2004 (Pt.I) dated
August 3, 2022 is old wine in a new bottle, being a virtual
reproduction of the quashed Notification of the 2012.
39. As such, in the teeth of the judgment dated November 13, 2018
passed in Rina Dasgupta’s case, the Notification dated August 3,
2022 is a nullity in the eye of law and is intended to defeat the
ratio laid down in Rina Dasgupta’s case.
40. On such ground alone, we exercise our suo motu powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India and hereby hold that the
Notification, bearing Notification No. 2309-SL(AL)/4S-9/2004
(Pt.I) dated August 3, 2022, is hereby held to be a nullity and
accordingly set aside.
41. In view of our above observations, since the demand has been
made from the writ petitioner/respondents on the basis of an
already-quashed Notification, we find no illegality whatsoever in
the order of the learned Single Judge which has been impugned
before us, whereby the writ petition of the respondents was
allowed and the appellants-authorities? claim for additional
permission fees from the respondents was set aside.
42. Accordingly, MAT 1933 of 2025 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the Judgment dated April 29, 2025 passed in WPA
25106 of 2024.
43. CAN 2 of 2025 stands disposed of accordingly.
44. There will be no order as to costs.
45. Urgent photostat copies of this order, if applied for, be given to
the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
AD-02
AK
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