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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 626 of 2026
In / And
L.P.A. No. 193 of 2026
1) The State of Jharkhand.
2) The Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O. P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3) The Chief Engineer, Minor Irrigation Department, Government of
Jharkhand, Nepal House, P.O.+ P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
4) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Department, Government
of Jharkhand, Nepal House, P.O.+ P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
5) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Khunti,
Government of Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.- Khunti, District-Khunti,
Jharkhand.
6) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.-Deoghar, District- Deoghar, Jharkhand.
7) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.-Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh, Jharkhand.
8) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.- Gumla, District- Gumla, Jharkhand.
9) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Dumka, Dist. Dumka, Jharkhand.
10) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O.+ P.S.-Madhupur, District Madhupur, Jharkhand.
11) The Executive Engineer, Minor Irrigation Division, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Godda, District – Godda, Jharkhand.
...
Writ Respondents/Appellants
Versus
1. Sudarshan Mahto, S/o- Bansropan Mahto, aged about- 63 years,
R/o- Kachari Chowk, Minor Irrigation Division, Abhiyantran
Bhawan, Ranchi, P.O. + P.S. Kutchery, District- Ranchi.
2. Bimal Kumar, S/o- Baiju Pandit, aged about- 65 years, R/o- Nadaul,
Masuri, Kharauna, P.O. + P.S. Masuri, District-Patna, Bihar.
3. Satya Narayan Pandey, S/o- Late Tarni Pandey, aged about-63
years, R/o- Saff Bank Colony, Vikas Nagar, Psca More, Ratu Road,
P.O.+ P.S.-Hehal, District- Ranchi-Jharkhand.
4. Bigan Uraon, S/o- Late Kapil Uraon, aged about-63 years, R/oVillage Boreya, P.O. + P.S.-Kanke, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Govind Sahu, S/o- Mahendra Sahu, aged about- 64 years, R/oKumhar Toli, Bargain, P.O. Lame Bargain, P.S.- Sadar, DistrictRanchi, Jharkhand.
6. Brajnandan Mahto, S/o- Mohan Mahto, aged about-67 years, R/oQr No-B 748, H.E.C., Sector-II, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S.-Jaggarnathpur,
District-Ranchi, Jharkhand.
7. Kaushal Kumar Keshri, S/o- Ramlakhan Prasad Singh, aged about63 years, R/o- benipur, P.Ο. + P.S. Raisa, District Nalanda, Bihar.
8. Mahesh Lohra, S/o- Sohan Lohra, aged about-68 years, R/oGarahdih, Sonahatu, P.O. + P.S-Sonahatu, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
9. Uma Vishwakarma, S/o- Birju Prasad, aged about-70 years, R/oOld Post Office Building, Church Road, Lower Bazar, GPO, P.S.
Lower Bazar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
10.Jitendra Nath, S/o- Chatu Sahu, aged about-72 years, R/o- Harijan
Muhullah, P.O.- Torpa, P.S. Torpa, District Khunti, Jharkhand.
11.Janki Nandan Lal Das, S/o- Chiranjib Lal Das, aged about-70 years,
R/o- R/o- Torpa, P.Ο.-Torpa, P.S.- Torpa, District- Khunti,
Jharkhand.
12.Abraham Guria, S/o- Paika Guriya, aged about-62 years, R/o-Ubka,
Torpa, P.O. Torpa, P.S.-Torpa, District Khunti, Jharkhand.
13.Karmpal Mahto, S/o-Bhusu Mahto, aged about-66 years, R/oMurhu, P.O. + P.S.- Korakel, District Khunti, Jharkhand.
14.Manoj Kumar Lal Das, S/o- Indu Shekhar Lal, aged about-62 years,
R/o-Abhiyantran Bhawan, Minor Irrigation Division, Ranchi,
Kutchery Road, G.P.O., P.S. Sadar, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
15.Ramnandan Prasad Singh, S/o-Late Bishshwar R/o-Damakundi,
Charakmara Prasad Singh, Kundahit, P.O. + P.S. Kundahit, DistrictDumka, Jharkhand.
16.Ram Kumar Singh, S/o-Kapil Dev Singh, aged about-79 years, R/oNarhat, Masouri, Kharauna, P.O.- Masaouri, P.S.- Kharauna,
District-Patna, Bihar.
17.Krishna Mandal, S/o- Ramchandra Mandal, aged about-68 years,
R/o-P.N.B. Argora, Doranda, P.O. + P.S.- Doranda, DistrictRanchi, Jharkhand.
18.Sushil Kumar Mishra, S/o- Upendra Mishra, aged about 62 years,
R/o- Rasyari, P.O.+ P.S.-Rasyari, District- Darbhanga, Bihar.
19.Anil Kumar Mandal, R/o-Late Tiru Mandal, aged about-61 years,
R/o- Village- Jhakhia, P.Ο.-Dhamnilata, P.S. Jarmundi, DistrictDumka, Jharkhand.
20.Narayan Prasad Sinha, S/o- Late Badri Prasad Sinha, aged about-61
years, R/o- Kunoni, P.O.-Kunoni, P.S.-Banka, District Banka, Bihar.
21.Shankar Prasad Rana, S/o-Thakur Rana, aged about-65 years, R/oBeaja, Chilra, P.O. P.S. Chilra, District Dumka, Jharkhand.
22.Surya Mohan Jha, S/o- Thakkan Jha, aged P.O.-District-about-68
years,
R/o-Rasiyari,
Ghanshyampur,
P.S.-Ghanshyampur,
Darbhanga, Bihar.
23.Shashi Bhushan Prasad Sandhwar, S/o-Ramchandra Prasad, aged
about 69 years, R/o-Near Theka Baba, New Kumar Para, P.O. +
P.S.-Dumka, District-Dumka, Jharkhand.
24.Kali Oraon, S/o- Mangra Oraon, aged about- 72 years, R/o- VillageKhora Jamtoli, P.O.-Khora, P.S. Gumla, District Gumla, Jharhand.
25.Sukhdeo Bhagat, S/o- Bhavran Bhagat, aged about- 66 years, R/oVillage Garhtoli, Soso More, P.O. Sakarpur Gamhariya, P.S. Gumla,
District- Gumla, Jharkhand.
26.Baban Ram, S/o- Late Puni Ram, aged about-67 years, R/o- Village
Dihara, Dehra Munji, P.O. +P.S. Munji, District- Rohtas, Bihar.
27.Bijay Kumar Ghosh, S/o-Late Bhawesh Chandra Ghosh, aged about66 years, R/o- Dalia, Bausi, P.O. + P.S. + District Banka, Bihar.
...
Petitioners/Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C.-II
Mr Ashwini Bhushan, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II
--------Reserved on: 22.06.2026
Pronounced on: 25/06/2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1.
Heard Mr Manish Kumar, learned Sr. S.C.-II, appearing for the
appellants-State.
2.
This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 475 days in filing the
appeal against the judgment dated 05.08.2024 made by the learned
Single Judge disposing of W.P. (S) No. 4299 of 2024.
3.
From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., it is axiomatic that no
sufficient cause has been made out to explain the inordinate delay
of 475 days. The application, in essence, does little more than trace
the routine movement of files, the obtaining of legal opinion, the
collection of records, and internal departmental processing,
culminating in the bald assertion that the grounds of appeal were
thereafter prepared and the appeal filed. Also and importantly, no
attempt has been made to explain why each of these steps
consumed the time that it did.
4.
To be precise, it is evident from paragraph 4 of the I.A. that the
impugned order was passed on 05.08.2024. Yet, the first concrete
step adverted to in the application is dated 04.11.2024, when the
file is stated to have been placed before the Secretary of the
Department, a gap of nearly three (3) months, for which the I.A.
offers no explanation whatsoever. The application is wholly silent
as to what transpired during this initial period, and no material has
been placed on record to suggest that any effective step was taken
in the interregnum.
5.
Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the I.A. discloses that the file was
forwarded to the Law Department for a legal opinion on
11.11.2024, and that the opinion was ultimately received on
04.09.2025. Inexplicably, the application neither explains the
reasons for this prolonged pendency nor indicates whether any
steps were taken during this considerable interval to pursue or
expedite the matter. This silence is compelling and cannot be
ignored.
6.
Lastly, the averments contained in paragraphs 5 to 8 of the I.A. are
confined to the decision to file the appeal taken on 10.09.2025, the
preparation of grounds, the collection of service records, the
obtaining of further opinion, the approval from the Law
Department, and the entrustment of the matter to the conducting
lawyer. These subsequent steps, however diligently narrated, do
nothing to cure the foundational infirmity, namely, the complete
absence of any explanation for the two most conspicuous periods
of inaction, the three months immediately following the impugned
order, and the ten months during which the legal opinion lay
pending.
7.
Accordingly, what emerges from the above is that the delay is
unsupported
by
chronology.
The
any
coherent
application
or
continuous
merely
explanatory
catalogues
routine
departmental steps without addressing, even cursorily, why the
matter remained dormant for such extended periods at the most
material stages. An applicant seeking the extraordinary relief of
condonation of delay must do more than narrate what eventually
happened; it must also account for what did not happen.
8.
The law is well settled that casual averments and formulaic
bureaucratic explanations do not constitute sufficient cause for
condoning delay of this magnitude. The mere recitation that files
moved through proper channels, that legal opinion was sought and
obtained, that service records were called for, and that the appeal
was eventually prepared, cannot, without more, justify the exercise
of discretion in favour of the appellants.
9.
In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble
SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India
Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said
case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed
with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or
extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file
movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does
not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the
excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology,
particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay
cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is
the Government or a wing thereof.
10. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Union
of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through
his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the
status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when
condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed
non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial
justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court
further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first
assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be
taken into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are
evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public
policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be
excused as a matter of generosity.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the
rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant
consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is
found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the
party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be
condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a
government department cannot claim a separate period of
limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone,
including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on
account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view
of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from
the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials
concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court
by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of
delay is liable to be rejected.
13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy
and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation
of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that
delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds,
until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the
State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides
and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to
justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical
attitude.”
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the
State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to
reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient
cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury,
more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC,
wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and neverending paraphernalia.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because,
if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable
to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present
case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves
such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts
are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post
to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the
process of law.
18. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances
of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has
been shown, and consequently, we dismiss this I.A., seeking
condonation of the delay of 475 days in filing the accompanying
appeal.
19. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein
do not survive and are disposed of.
20. No costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 25, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Manoj/Cp.2
Uploaded on 25.06.2026
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