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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 12383 of 2025
In / And
L.P.A. No. 624 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Forest, Environment Climate Change Department,
and Government of Jharkhand, at P.O. and P.S. Doranda, Dist.
Ranchi.
3. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Department of Forest,
Environment and Climate Change, Government of Jharkhand, P.O.
and P.S. Doranda, Dist. Ranchi.
...
Respondents/Appellants
Versus
1. Ramesh Kumar Pathak, aged about 60 years son of late Rajeshwar
Pathak, resident of Forest Colony, Near Block, Quarter No. 13, P.O.,
P.S and Dist. Latehar.
2. Sachchida Nand Singh, aged about 59 years, son of late Laldeo
Singh, resident of Government Quarter, at P.O. & P.S. Barwadih,
Kutku Range, Dist. Latehar.
3. Rabindra Kumar Sinha, aged about 59 years three months, son of
late Yogendra Nath Lal, at P.O. & P.S. Chandwa, Block Colony,
Dist. Latehar.
4. Parmeshwar Sahu, aged about 58 years, son of late Ram Dayal Sahu,
resident of village and P.O. Katma, P.S. Chandwa, Dist. Latehar.
5. Sk. Kayum Ansari, aged about 54 years, son of late Sk. Ahmad
Ansari, resident of Village – Ichak, P.O. and P.S. Latehar, Dist.
Latehar.
...
Writ Petitioners/Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr. S.C.-I
For Resp. Nos.1,2&4: Mr Akhouri Sankalp, Advocate
--------06/Dated: 27.10.2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1.
Heard Mr Ashok Kumar Yadav for the applicants and Mr Akhouri
Sankalp for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4.
2.
The respondent No.3 has expired. Despite opportunity, no steps
were taken by the applicants to bring on record the legal
representatives of the deceased - respondent No. 3.
3.
Therefore, ultimately, on 02.09.2026, this Court granted a final
opportunity to the State to take steps to bring on record the legal
representatives of the deceased - 3rd respondent. In this order, it
was clarified that if no steps were taken within a week of the order,
this appeal would stand dismissed against the legal representatives
of the deceased-3rd respondent, without any further reference to
this Court.
4.
Despite the peremptory order, no steps were taken within a week
to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased-3rd
respondent. Now, i.e. today, an Interlocutory Application has been
filed seeking substitution.
5.
Since, by virtue of the self-operating order dated 02.09.2026, this
appeal has already been dismissed as against the legal
representatives of the deceased-3rd respondent, there is no question
of entertaining an Interlocutory Application seeking substitution
now. No I.A. has been filed seeking any restoration. Therefore,
I.A. No. 15503 of 2026 is dismissed as not maintainable.
6.
As to I.A. No. 12383 of 2025, we note that this I.A. seeks
condonation of delay of 243 days in filing the accompanying
appeal against the judgment and order dated 26.11.2024 in W.P.
(S) No. 2054 of 2018. Because of this delay, one of the
respondents, who was the petitioner in W.P. (S) No. 2054 of 2018,
died without receiving any benefits under the impugned order.
7.
That, apart, on perusing the lengthy application for condonation of
delay, we find that the applicants have pleaded only the movement
of files from one officer to another or from one table to another.
8.
The applicants also make the usual averments about submitting the
files to various Advocates, either to seek their opinion or to have
them draft the grounds of appeal, and then the usual delay in filing
the appeal.
9.
From the tenor of the averments in the I.A., it is apparent that the
appellant and its officers are firmly convinced that the law of
limitation framed by Parliament does not apply to them. They
proceed on the premise that their so-called SOPs or bureaucratic
procedures will supersede the law laid down by the Parliament.
Therefore, whatever period of limitation Parliament may prescribe,
the appellant insists on moving the files from officer to officer and
from table to table before filing any appeal and is firmly convinced
that the time spent must be excluded or accepted as sufficient
cause.
10. The statements made in this regard are mostly unverifiable and are
made as a matter of routine notwithstanding several decisions of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarifying that such reasons do not
constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
11. Mr Yadav, however, submitted that the appellants have a very
good case on merits and therefore, the delay should be condoned.
He relied on the order dated 27.08.2026 in L.P.A. No. 223 of 2025,
to submit that it covers the issue raised in this appeal in favour of
the appellants-State.
12. In the first place, it is difficult to accept the contention that the
order dated 27.08.2026 in L.P.A. No. 223 of 2025 covers the issue
raised in this appeal. In any event, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024
SCC Online SC 489, has held that when considering a plea for
condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of
the main matter. The Court must first ascertain the bona fides of
the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. Only if
the litigant's cause is sufficient and the other side's opposition is
equally balanced may the Court bring the merits of the matter into
aid to condone the delay. The Court clarified that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration, since the rules of
limitation are based on sound public policy and equity.
13. For the reasons above, we cannot accept Mr Yadav’s contention
that this is a fit case for condoning the 243-day delay in filing the
accompanying appeal because the appellant allegedly has a good
case on merits.
14. In State of Odisha vs Managing Committee of Namatara Girls
High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that an “explanation” and an “excuse” differ as grounds
for condoning delay. Referring to its earlier decisions, the Court
observed that there is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot
help a litigant, even if that litigant is the Government, which is
itself shackled by bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of
limitation binds everybody, beyond a particular point no
indulgence can be shown, even to the Government, which
functions through an impersonal machinery. In this case, the
appellant offers only excuses, not a cogent explanation.
15. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media India
Limited and Another, (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government
Department or the persons concerned have not shown diligence in
pursuing the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court held
that, without a plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay
cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notings cannot be accepted as a matter of course,
given the modern technologies available. It was reiterated that the
law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the “Sword of
Damocles” cannot be kept hanging over the respondent’s head
indefinitely, at the appellants’ whim and fancy. Therefore, delay
should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Substantial justice
should not prejudice the opposite party. Where the appellants
failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in prosecuting the
matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that delay in
filing the appeal arose from the party's own negligence and casual
attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the ground of doing
substantial justice. In this matter, due to the delay, one of the
original petitioners expired without receiving any benefits under
the impugned order.
17. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay
should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds
unless a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, in which the
State machinery is able to establish that it acted in good faith and
remained vigilant throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice,
as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate procedure for a litigating
State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation in
pursuing litigation due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not to
lend legitimacy to such a callous attitude by State authorities or
their instrumentalities and should remain particularly cautious
when the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority.
They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy.
The constitutional courts ought to be mindful of the apathy and
distress of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage.
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a broad scope for the lis to attain
finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is
the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against
an enormous State and its elaborate and never-exhausting
paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the
very threshold, because, if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in
appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round
of litigation and leaves such a litigant listless yet again. As courts
of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not
sent from pillar to post in search of justice. No litigant should be
permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, let alone be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.
20. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present
case, we find that no sufficient cause has been shown to explain
the 243-day delay in filing the accompanying appeal. Any undue
indulgence will severely prejudice the surviving respondents
because all that the impugned order has granted them is pensionary
benefits under the old pension scheme, after clarifying that if any
amount has been received by the original petitioners under the
head of the contributory provident fund scheme, then the same
would have to be refunded by the original petitioners to the
respondents, i.e. the appellants herein.
21. For the reasons above, we dismiss I.A. No. 12383 of 2025.
22. Accordingly, the accompanying appeal will not survive and is
hereby dismissed.
If there are any other pending IAs in this
appeal, they will also not survive and are hereby disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
October 27, 2026
(Manoj Prasad, J.)
N.A.F.R.
M.Kr./Sharda/Cp.2
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