The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an (2026: JHHC: 17151-DB) enormous State, and its elaborate and never exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.
13. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we decline to condone the delay of 317 days in filing this appeal. The I.A. is dismissed.
14. As a consequence of the dismissal of the aforesaid I.A., the accompanying appeal and the pending I.As therein, do not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) June, 15, 2026 Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp.2 Uploaded on 17.06.2026
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 8953 of 2025
In
L.P.A. 460 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Secretary, Rural Development Department, Government of
Jharkhand, F.F.P Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa,
District Ranchi
3. The Under Secretary, Rural Development Department,
Government of Jharkhand, F.F.P Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.
Dhurwa, District Ranchi
...
…
Appellants
Versus
1. Gopal Ram Rajak, Son of Late Bechan Ram Rajak, resident of
Behind D.A.V. Kapildeo School, Upkar Nagar, Kadru, Ashok
Nagar, P.O & P.S. Argora, District Ranchi
2. The Accountant General, Jharkhand, Ranchi, P.O and P.S.
Doranda, District Ranchi
...
…
Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Sahbaj Akhtar, Advocate
For the Accountant General: Mr Sudarshan Shrivastava, Advocate
--------02/Dated: 15.06.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This I.A. seeks condonation of delay of 317 days in filing this appeal
against the judgment and order dated 09.11.2023 disposing of W.P
(S) No. 195 of 2021.
3. In the I.A., it is admitted that the appellants were throughout aware
of the passing of the impugned order. Though in paragraph-4, there
is a statement that information regarding the order was received by
the department only on 09.01.2024.
4. Though, the information was allegedly received on 09.01.2024, this
appeal has been filed only on 23.10.2024. The reasons relate to
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
putting up files before the various officers and Advocates and the
time spent for preparing the appeal. Based upon such routine,
unverifiable bureaucratic reasons, no case is made out for
condonation of delay.
5. In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media
India Limited and Another, (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:“25. We have already extracted the reasons as
mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr.
Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting
Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the
said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and
is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief
Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009.
Even according to the deponent, their counsel had
applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only
on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the
Department on the very same day. There is no
explanation for not applying for the certified copy of
the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within
a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified
copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a
period of nearly four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file
better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither
the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any
explanation for not applying the certified copy within
the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the
affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show
that there was delay at every stage and except
mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the
decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such
delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the
Department that the delay was due to unavoidable
circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains
that from day one the Department or the
person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
6.
prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking
appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues involved
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking
up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in
this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is
to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter
of condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides,
a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts
and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including
the
Government.”
In the case of Union of India &Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:“25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court long after the
lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and
say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by
the delay being condoned. This litigation between the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his
decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned or
not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for a
long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay
and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to
be preferred as against the technical considerations.
While considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been
said that delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have
failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case.”
7.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the rules of limitation
are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The
length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation of
delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the
delay may not be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.
8.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a
government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the
Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a
particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were
not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking
appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to
be rejected.
9.
In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy and
laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of
delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we want to
convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall
not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper
case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is
able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all
throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said.
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not
to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally
suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High
Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of
the State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority.
They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The
constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a
private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual
litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are
frustrated at later stages.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to
reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice,
not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause
exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more
particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”.
12.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain
for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is
the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an
(2026: JHHC: 17151-DB)
enormous State, and its elaborate and never exhausting paraphernalia.
Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason,
is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the
present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and
leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts
are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to
seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and
apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process
of law.
13. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and
circumstances of the present case, we decline to condone the delay of
317 days in filing this appeal. The I.A. is dismissed.
14.
As a consequence of the dismissal of the aforesaid I.A., the
accompanying appeal and the pending I.As therein, do not survive and
are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June, 15, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp.2
Uploaded on 17.06.2026
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