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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 4721 of 2026
In / And
L.P.A. No. 212 of 2026
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The secretary, water Resource Department, Govt. of Jharkhand,
Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
3. The Chief Engineer, Subernrekha Multi Project, Chandil, P.O. and
P.S. Chandil, District Singhbhum East.
...
Respondents/Appellants
Versus
1. Athar Hussain Ansari, son of Sri Abdul Rauf Ansri, Resident of – Q.
No. 36 “C”, Road no.13 (Taiba Nagar), Jawahar Nagar, P.O. and
P.S. Mango, District Jamshedpur, Jharkhand.
2. Sibu Prasad Sah, son of Late Ram Lachan Sah, Resident of – Village
and P.O. – Malpur Agrail, via – Chandan Patti, P.S. Shankra,
District Muzaffarpur, Bihar.
...
Petitioners/Respondent
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellants:
Mr. Ashutosh Anand, Addl. A.G.-III
--------Reserved on: 22.06.2026
Pronounced on: 24/06/2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1. Heard Mr Ashutosh Anand, learned A.A.G.-III, appearing for the
appellants-State.
2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 560 days in filing the
appeal against the judgment and order dated 09.05.2024 made by the
learned Single Judge, disposing of W.P.(S) No. 4036 of 2012.
3. Upon a perusal of the averments in the I.A., it is manifest that no
case whatsoever has been made out to explain this inordinate delay.
The application does no more than advert to the routine movement
of files between different authorities and departments of the
Government, followed by the seeking of a legal opinion and yet
another round of administrative vetting and departmental approval,
none of which, individually or cumulatively, constitutes a sufficient
cause for the delay occasioned.
4. The learned advocate for the appellants submits that the delay has
been caused by procedural formalities followed in governmental
departments. It is further submitted that the delay is not willful and
intentional. However, this submission is ex facie untenable, as the
prolonged delay in filing the appeal is plainly indicative of a casual
approach, entirely unsupported by any material demonstrating
diligent steps to expedite the matter. This administrative inertia fails
to explain, let alone justify, the inordinate 560-day delay.
5. In addition to the above, the learned counsel for the appellants has
specifically urged that, since almost the entire government
machinery was involved in conducting the Jharkhand State
Assembly Elections, it was virtually impossible for the concerned
government officials to manage any other workload simultaneously.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that this plea were
accepted as genuine, the appellants have neither properly explained
nor justified the entire remaining period of delay.
6. It is a matter of judicial notice that the 2024 Jharkhand Legislative
Assembly Elections were held in two phases, i.e., on 13th and 20th
November 2024, and the results were declared on 23rd November
2024. Post 23.11.2024, no impediment subsisted that could have
prevented the appellants from acting proactively and pursuing this
litigation diligently. Notwithstanding the same, the instant L.P.A.
was filed before this Court only on 22.12.2025, i.e., after 13 months.
7. Furthermore, it is noted that certain periods of delay remain wholly
inadequately explained. One such instance is discernible from a
combined reading of paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the I.A., wherein it
is stated that despite the Executive Engineer having submitted the
writ petition and the service book of the writ petitioner before the
Under Secretary for further action on 07.05.2025, the deliberation
with respect to the filing of an appeal or review against the
impugned judgment took place only on 02.08.2025, a hiatus of
nearly three months, for which no cogent explanation whatsoever
has been offered.
8. It is well settled that applications filed with utmost casualness and
based on routine bureaucratic delays cannot be accepted as showing
any sufficient cause. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that good grounds are available in favour of the Appellants and there
is every chance to succeed in the matter. However, nothing has been
shown to prima facie support such a submission and, in any event,
the merits of the case alone cannot justify condonation of a delay of
560 days in the absence of sufficient cause.
9. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble
SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India
Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said
case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed
with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or
extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file
movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does not
constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the
excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology,
particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay
cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is the
Government or a wing thereof.
10.Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of
India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his
LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that the status of a
litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when condoning
gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed non-deliberate,
and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial justice cannot
override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court further held that
before adverting to the merits, the court must first assess the bona
fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken into aid only
where the explanation and the opposition are evenly balanced.
Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy and equity,
the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as a matter of
generosity.
11.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules
of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and
equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the
condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay
in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and
casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of
doing substantial justice.
12.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a
government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the
Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology
of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a
particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were
not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking
appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable
to be rejected.
13.In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy
and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation
of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that
delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds,
until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the
State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and
remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to
justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation
from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.”
14.The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the
State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.
15.The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate
this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to
reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as
by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more
particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”.
16.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending
paraphernalia.
17.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if
a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to
contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it
reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are
obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to
seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and
apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process
of law.
18.Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances
of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been
shown and, consequently, we dismiss this I.A., which seeks
condonation of the delay of 560 days in filing the accompanying
appeal.
19.As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do
not survive and are disposed of.
20.No costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 24, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Manoj/Cp.2
Uploaded on 24.06.2026
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