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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 6046 of 2025
In / And
L.P.A. No. 400 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Home Affairs, Government of Jharkhand at Project
Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
3. The D.I.G. (Jail), Ranchi at Hotwar, P.O. Hotwar, P.S. Khelgaon,
District Ranchi.
4. The Jail Superintendent, Birsa Munda Central Jail, at Hotwar, P.O.
Khelgaon, P.S. Khelgaon, District Ranchi.
...
Appellants/Respondents
Versus
Anirudha Tiwari, aged about 61 years, son of Late Kanhaiya Tiwari,
resident of Village- Fasar, P.O. & P.S. Fasar, District Aurangabad
(Bihar), at present residing at Birsa Munda Central Jail, at Hotwar, P.O.
& P.S. Khelgaon, District Ranchi.
...
Respondent/Petitioner
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Kumar Rahul Kamlesh, A.C. to S.C.-IV
For the Respondent:
Ms Ganga Kumari Kachhap, Advocate
Mr Samrat Sinha, Advocate
--------Reserved on: 15.06.2026
Pronounced on: 17/06/2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 356 days in filing the
appeal against the judgment and order dated 09.10.2023 made by the
learned Single Judge, disposing of W.P.(S) No. 07 of 2023.
3. From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., no case whatsoever has
been made out to explain this inordinate delay. All that the
application refers to is the routine movement of files to and from
different authorities and departments of the Government. The delay
is further sought to be excused on the ground of seeking legal
opinion, followed by another routine round of administrative vetting
and departmental approval.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that government
functionaries
operate
within
multi-layered
decision-making
processes requiring approvals at successive stages. However, this
submission is ex facie untenable as the prolonged delay in filing the
appeal is plainly indicative of a casual approach, entirely
unsupported by any material demonstrating diligent steps to expedite
the matter. This administrative inertia fails to explain, let alone
justify, the inordinate 356-day delay.
5. Furthermore, it was argued by the ld. Advocate of the respondent
that, although the impugned judgment was passed on 09.10.2023,
the appellants did not take any steps towards filing the appeal for
more than three months, and it was only on 24.01.2024 that the
matter was first forwarded to the Home, Jail and Disaster
Management Department, Government of Jharkhand, for obtaining
the opinion of the Finance Department. We find merit in the
respondent’s submission that the appellants could not have remained
passive and awaited a representation from the petitioner before the
Inspector General, Prison, before taking steps towards filing an
appeal.
6. Moreover, we have noted that certain periods of delay remain
inadequately explained. One such instance is reflected in para 8 of
the I.A., wherein the appellants state that it took approximately 2
months to prepare and receive the draft memo of appeal. No cogent
explanation has been offered for the same.
7. It is well settled that applications filed with utmost casualness and
based on routine bureaucratic delays cannot be accepted as showing
any sufficient cause. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the State has a good case on the merits. However, nothing has
been shown to prima facie support such a submission and, in any
event, the merits of the case alone cannot justify condonation of a
delay of 356 days in the absence of sufficient cause.
8. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Postmaster General and Others v. Living
Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563.
In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government
departments staffed with legally conversant personnel cannot claim
any special or extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of
dates of file movement, without explaining the reason for each
interval,
does
not
constitute
sufficient
cause.
The
Court
categorically rejected the excuse of impersonal machinery and
bureaucratic methodology, particularly in the age of modern
technology, and held that delay cannot be condoned mechanically
solely because the applicant is the Government or a wing thereof.
9. Moreover, in the recent past, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Union of India & Anr. vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that
the status of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when
condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed
non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial
justice cannot override the bar of limitation. The Hon’ble Court
further held that before adverting to the merits, the court must first
assess the bona fides of the explanation offered; merits may be taken
into aid only where the explanation and the opposition are evenly
balanced. Reiterating that limitation is grounded in public policy
and equity, the Hon’ble Court held that delay cannot be excused as
a matter of generosity.
10.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the rules
of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and
equity. The length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the
condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay
in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and
casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds of
doing substantial justice.
11.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a
government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the
Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology
of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies available and in use. If it is found from the record of a
particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were
not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking
appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable
to be rejected.
12.In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative lethargy
and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation
of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261 observed “we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that
delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds,
until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the
State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and
remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to
justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation
from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.”
13.The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the
State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.
14.The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to reiterate
this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to
reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as
by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more
particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”.
15.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and never-ending
paraphernalia.
16.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, if
a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to
contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it
reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves such a
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are
obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to
seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and
apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the process
of law.
17.Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances
of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been
shown and, consequently, we dismiss this I.A., which seeks
condonation of the delay of 356 days in filing the accompanying
appeal.
18.As a consequence, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do
not survive and are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 17, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Manoj/Cp.2
Uploaded on 17.06.2026
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