The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and neverexhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic 2026:JHHC:8092-DB and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.
17. For all the above reasons, we decline to condone the delay for want of any sufficient cause. I.A. No.11761 of 2023 is dismissed without any order for costs.
18. As a consequence of the dismissal of the aforesaid I.A., the accompanying appeal does not survive and is disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 23rd March, 2026 Sanjay/AKT Uploaded on 24.03.2026
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.752 of 2023
With
I.A. No.11761 of 2023
----1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Director General, Home Guard, Jharkhand, Rajendra Chowk,
P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Ranchi.
3. Commandant, Home Guard Headquarter, Jharkhand, Project
Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi.
4. Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro.
5. Superintendent of Police, Bokaro.
6. District Commandant, Home Guard, Bokaro.
7. The District Election Officer-cum-Deputy Commissioner,
Palamau.
.......... Appellants.
-VersusChandan Kumar Prasad, son of Late Jaglal Prasad, resident of
City Center, Sector IV/B, P.O. & P.S. Sector IV, District Bokaro.
.......... Respondents.
----CORAM :
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
----For the Appellants :
Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. SC-II
Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, AC to Sr. SC-II
For the Respondent:
Mr. Ranjan Kumar, Advocate
----Order No.11
Date: 23.03.2026
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
I.A. No.11761 of 2023 seeks condonation of delay of 306 days in
instituting the letters patent appeal.
3.
The original application contained no reasons whatsoever offering
any explanation to show sufficient cause. Therefore, liberty was
granted to the appellants to file supplementary affidavit.
4.
The supplementary affidavit was filed on 23rd September, 2025
but upon perusing the same, we are satisfied that mostly routine
and some irrelevant circumstances have been roped in to make
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
out a case that there was sufficient cause for condoning this
delay.
5.
There are several gaps in the original application as well as the
supplementary affidavit purporting to support the I.A. for
condonation of delay.
6.
The period up to the issuance of a certified copy of the order may
be excluded. However, after the certified copy was received on
25th February, 2023, it was forwarded to the Principal Secretary,
Department
of
Home,
Jail
and
Disaster
Management,
Government of Jharkhand, on 29th March, 2023, seeking
instructions in the matter. This was responded to after almost five
months, i.e. on 2nd August, 2023. The response was also neither
positive nor negative. The response only required the furnishing
of grounds of appeal.
7.
Thereafter, the file has been moved back and forth unnecessarily.
One of the reasons given concerns elections in Madhya Pradesh,
where some Home Guards had to be sent for election duty. Now,
this reason has nothing to do with the filing of the present appeal.
It is not as if the Home Guards were themselves involved in either
preparing the appeal memo or filing the appeal.
8.
Routine administrative reasons, which inspire no confidence
whatsoever, have been cited to explain the substantial delay. The
averments are casual and do not constitute sufficient cause.
9.
In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living
Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3
SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :2
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
“25.
We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned
in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak,
SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to
note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself
mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief
Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even
according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the
certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the
same was received by the Department on the very same day.
There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy
of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a
reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was
applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four
months.
26.
In spite of affording another opportunity to file better
affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department
nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not
applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The
other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already
extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and
except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the
decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay
had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that
the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine
difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department
or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in
prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate
steps.
27.
It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim
that they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons familiar
with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28.
Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter
of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence
or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession
has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim
on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies being used and available. The
law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.”
10.
In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:“25.
It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse
of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of
the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay
being condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43
years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent
has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It
would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of
12 years and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26.
The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed
a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on merits because
of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to
be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations.
While
considering
the
plea
for
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may bring
into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27.
We are of the view that the question of limitation
is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
35.
In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a matter
of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants
have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning
the delay is not satisfied in this case.”
11.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the rules of limitation
are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The
length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation
of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing
the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and
casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds
of doing substantial justice.
12.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that
a government department cannot claim a separate period of
limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone,
including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view
of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found
from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the
officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in
the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for
condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.
13.
In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board
& Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that
“administrative lethargy and laxity” can never stand as a sufficient
ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
para 261 observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to
all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous
and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is
made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that
it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But
courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not
to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due
to its own lackadaisical attitude.”
14.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the
State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain
extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed
in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.
15.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to
reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until
sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult
to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of
the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of
law”.
16.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and neverexhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed
of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against
the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it
reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are
obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post
to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
2026:JHHC:8092-DB
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse
the process of law.
17.
For all the above reasons, we decline to condone the delay for
want of any sufficient cause. I.A. No.11761 of 2023 is dismissed
without any order for costs.
18.
As a consequence of the dismissal of the aforesaid I.A., the
accompanying appeal does not survive and is disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
23rd March, 2026
Sanjay/AKT
Uploaded on 24.03.2026
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