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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 3rd August, 2026.
Pronounced on: 17th September, 2026
Uploaded on: 17th September, 2026
+
CRL.A. 461/2018 & CRL.M.A. 14242/2024
THE STATE NCT OF DELHI
..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP with
Ms. Divya Yadav, Adv. with SI
Pradeep Singh.
versus
RAJENDER SINGH & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sakesh Kumar and Ms. Gitanjali
N. Sharma Advs.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGEMENT
Prathiba M. Singh, J.
1.
This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2.
The present appeal has been filed by the State under Section 378 (1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘Cr.P.C’) assailing the
judgment dated 19th July, 2017 passed by the ld. Additional Sessions Judge03(East), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in Sessions Case No. 1628/2016. The
case arises out of FIR No. 15/2005 registered at PS. New Ashok Nagar.
Background
3.
The incident in this case occurred on 12th January 2005 when a call was
received, as recorded in Daily Diary No. 24A i.e., Ex. PW-6/A, that one Mr.
Rakesh Kumar Gupta had suffered gunshot injuries at his Shop No. C-1/218
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New Kondli, Mangal Bazar Chowk, Delhi by two persons.
4.
After causing gunshot injuries to Mr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta, the said
persons fled from the site, leaving behind one country-made pistol, i.e., katta,
at the site. Thereafter, ASI Mohd. Aftab and Ct. Upender visited and inspected
the site and prepared the seizure memo of the country-made pistol.
5.
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta was taken to Metro Hospital wherein the
MLC was prepared i.e., Ex. PW-3/A. At that stage, the doctor had certified
that the injured was unfit for making a statement due to excessive bleeding
and severe pain. The injuries recorded in the MLC of the injured are as under:1)
Entry wound in the left Zygoma with haemotoma left check;
2)
Entry and exit wound posterior upper 1/3 of left humerus; and
3)
Entry wound right forearm below left condyl of humerus with a
palpable bullet, one bullet was also found among the patient's clothes.
6.
Thereafter, the stained clothes of the injured were seized from the
Metro Hospital along with the bullets. Two days later i.e., on 14th January
2005, the injured gave his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Pursuant to
the said statement, the Respondents, namely Rajender Singh and Virender
Singh Rawat were arrested on 15th January 2005. Both the Respondents are
stated to be residents of New Ashok Nagar and were known to the injured.
7.
The charge-sheet was filed against the Respondents for offences
committed punishable under Sections 307/452/34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter, ‘IPC’) and Sections 27/54/59 of the Arms Act, 1959 . The
order-on-charge was passed on 26th February 2009 and charges were framed
under the abovementioned provisions. A separate charge under Section 27 of
the Arms Act, 1959 was also framed against Virender Singh Rawat.
8.
Both the Respondents pleaded not guilty and the trial was then
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conducted. The prosecution had examined 26 witnesses including the injured
himself who appeared as PW-2. PW-7: Deepak@Manoj
and PW-14:
Saleem@Sunil are stated to be the eye-witnesses.
9.
The Trial Court analyzed the evidence of PW-2, i.e., the injured and
came to the conclusion that his testimony was not credible, as there were
several contradictions and improvements in comparison to his initial
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the supplementary statements.
According to the Trial Court, various new facts were added by PW-2 in his
supplementary statements. A detailed analysis was done by the Trial Court of
the three statements made by PW-2 dated 14th January 2005, 2nd June 2005
and 20th September 2005
10.
The Trial Court ultimately came to the conclusion that the testimony of
PW-2 does not inspire confidence. Relevant portions of the impugned
judgment of the Trial Court on this aspect are set out below:40.
On being confronted, PW-2 improved his
version in material particulars and contradicted from
his earlier statement recorded as Ex.PW2/DA dated
14.01.2005. He improved his version from his
supplementary statements Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW2/B
dated 02.06.2005 and 20.09.2005 respectively. In his
supplementary statements, PW-2 introduced a new story
by stating that the accused persons had made demands
for effecting compromise in case FIR no.42/03 u/s 302
IPC. In Ex.PW2/DA and PW2/A, PW-2 stated that
accused Rajender Singh and his father Karan Singh
created obstacles at the time of construction of his (PW2) school. He stated that in the year 1991, accused
Rajender Singh and his father had verbal altercation
with his (PW-2) brothers and he (PW-2) was falsely
named by them but lateron, issue was settled. He stated
that since then, he came to know about accused
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Rajender Singh and his father. He stated that it was
habit of Karan Singh to quarrel and then to present
himself as witness to quarrel and later to withdraw after
receiving money. He stated that the accused Rajender
Singh and his father had falsely involved him (PW-2) in
murder case in case FIR no.42/03 u/s 302/34 IPC. He
stated that to end that case, accused Rajender Singh
demanded Rs.12.00 lakh from him (PW-2). On
17.11.2004, Karan Singh sent accused Rajender Singh
and Virender Singh to the court to discuss regarding
compromise in that case, but PW-2 refused to give
money. PW-2 stated that this was the reason of the
assault upon him on 12.01.2005. PW-2 did not state all
these facts in his evidence. He stated that he had given
many complaints to the police regarding the money
demands of accused persons. Despite opportunities
given to him, he could not produce any of his alleged
complaints prior to 12.01.2005 with police regarding
such money demands. Thus, PW-2 blatantly failed to
substantiate his version of money demands at the hands
of the accused persons to effect compromise, which as
per him had resulted into the assault upon him by them.
He improved his version in evidence by stating facts,
which were not earlier mentioned. While it is true that
every improvement is not fatal to the prosecution case,
in cases where the improvement create a serious doubt
about the truthfulness or credibility of a witness, the
same goes in favour of defence. [Ashok Vishnu Davare
Vs. State of Maharastra, (2004) 9 SCC 431; Radha
Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, (now Jharkhand), (2005) 10
SCC 216 & recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 453].
41.
PW-2 introduced new facts in his subsequent
statements Ex.PW2/DA and Ex.PW2/A, reason for
which remained inexplicable. The testimony of PW-2
raises doubts as to the veracity of the facts on account
of improvements and contradictions. This is particularly
so, when the dubious character of PW-2 has been
assailed on the ground of his antecedents. Under such
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circumstances, his evidence cannot be considered to be
safe to rely on as it does not pass the test of credibility.
…
XXXX
47.
In such circumstances, I find that the
testimony of injured-PW-2 does not inspire confidence
and he seems to be an interested witness. His testimony
required independent corroboration, which the
prosecution has failed to bring forth on record.”
11.
The Trial Court also analyzed the evidence of PW-7, who was from the
neighbourhood and PW-14, who was the driver of PW-2. The Trial Court
further analyzed the statement of PW-13: Mukesh Gupta i.e., brother of the
injured. According to the Trial Court, the testimony of PW-25: SI (Retd.)
Mohd. Aftab, i.e., the Investigation Officer, was in contradiction with the
testimony of PW-13. The Trial Court also castigates the Investigating Officer
to the effect that no public person was made to join the investigation to give
independent evidence though there were several members of the public who
were present at the site.
12.
The Trial Court also records certain discrepancies in the FSL reports
and the custody of the materials which were sent to the FSL for examination.
The Trial Court then observes that there is a strong doubt of manipulation of
the case property and possibility of foul play.
13.
Further, the Trial Court also records that the alleged family rivalry,
arising out of the death of Shri Balbir Singh, brother of Shri Virender Singh,
would have no bearing as it is a double edged sword. By itself it may not be
enough to establish the guilt of the Respondents. The overall conclusions of
the Trial Court are as under:“60. The plea of Ld. Addl. P.P. that the accused persons
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were nursing a grudge against the injured for revenge
is of no help. The admitted position of law is that enmity
is a double edged weapon which can be a motive for the
crime as well as the ground for false implication of the
accused persons. Having scrutinized the testimony of
witnesses with anxious care and in view of my findings
as discussed above, I hold that the evidence on record is
not sufficient to bring home the guilt of both accused.
The weapon of offence could not be connected to
accused persons. There is no material on record to
connect that the gunshot injuries suffered by injured
were due to the shot fired from the firearm Ex.P-1. The
matter remained in the realm of suspicion. The
suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot take place of proof.
It is well settled proposition of law that when genesis
and manner of the incident is in doubt, the accused are
entitled for benefit of doubt.
61.
The result of the aforesaid discussion is that
prosecution has not been able to establish the guilt of
accused persons beyond reasonable doubts. As such,
both accused are entitled to get benefit of doubt.”
14.
The Trial Court, thus, vide the impugned judgment acquitted the
Respondents, Virender Singh Rawat and Rajender Singh. This impugned
judgment dated 19th July, 2017 has been challenged by the State in the present
appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the Parties
15.
The submission of Mr. Bahri, ld. APP for the State is that the incident
in the present case took place on 12th January, 2005 and the prosecution had
examined more than 26 witnesses, out of which PW-2 was himself the injured.
Ld. APP submits that PW-7 and PW-14 were the two eye witnesses, PW-17
was a witness from the FSL and PW-3 and PW-4 were the doctors, who
proved the two MLCs of the injured.
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16.
It is his submission on behalf of the State that PW-2 was a property
dealer and he has given the following statements:
● Statement dated 14th January, 2005 before the Police (Ex. PW.2/DA);
● Statement dated 20th September, 2005 before the Police (Ex. PW.2/B);
● Statement dated 02nd June, 2005 before the Police (Ex. PW.2/A); and
● Statement dated 9th February, 2010 before the Trial Court.
17.
Ld. APP submits that the Trial Court has held that PW-2, in all his
statements, has made immense improvements and there are several
contradictions. However, the common thread in all his statements is that he
was fired upon and suffered three bullet injuries. PW-2 fell unconscious after
the first two gunshots and consequently, did not know who had fired the third
shot. According to PW-2, the first shot was fired by Mr. Virender Singh
Rawat, the second shot was fired by Mr. Rajender Singh and he is not aware
as to who had fired the third shot.
18.
Further, ld. APP submits that PW-14, who was the driver of PW-2 also
gave evidence stating that he was an eye-witness to the incident. PW-14 in
his statement states that he was having tea across the shop of the injured when
the incident took place and he had seen both the assailants running away from
the site. PW-14 is also stated to have seen the weapon i.e., katta having been
dropped by the Respondents, who fled on a bike after firing the gunshots.
Moreover, PW-14 claims to have taken his master to the hospital.
19.
It is also the submission on behalf of the State that PW-7 was a
salesman in the neighbourhood and he saw two persons coming out from the
shop of the injured. PW-7 also claims to have seen PW-2 in an injured
condition.
20.
Finally, the submission of Mr. Bahri, ld. APP, is that, in paragraphs 40
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and 42 of the impugned judgment, the Trial Court has rejected the evidence
on record and held that the substratum of the case has not been corroborated
by the gunshot injuries, the past involvement or the allegations against the
Respondents.
21.
On the other hand, Mr. Sakesh Kumar, ld. Counsel appearing for the
Respondents submits that the allegations against the Respondents were totally
concocted and there was no evidence to implicate the Respondents. Ld.
Counsel further submits that the investigation was also not done in a proper
manner with any independent persons being present at the time of the
investigation.
22.
Ld. Counsel for the Respondent urges that the evidence recorded by the
prosecution is only of interested persons i.e. the injured, his brother and his
driver, who supported the case of the injured. Ld. Counsel highlights that even
the forensic evidence does not support the accusations and allegations against
the Respondents. No public witness was examined, in such a busy area. Thus,
it is submitted that the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the Respondents.
Analysis and Findings
23.
The occurrence of the incident itself and the injured being shot at is not
in dispute as the MLC clearly records that the injured had suffered injuries. In
fact, Dr. Vivek Tandon, Senior Consultant, General Surgery, Metro Hospital
who appeared as PW-3 confirms that the injured was brought to him on 12th
January, 2005 and had suffered 3 injuries. Thus, the injuries which were
suffered by the injured are proved on record.
24.
PW-3 was able to sustain cross-examination as well. One relevant part
of the cross-examination of PW-3 is that he admits that the injured was one
of his old patients and that he had operated upon him on an earlier occasion.
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PW-3 in his cross-examination further stated that he did not have any recollection about whether the name of the assailants were disclosed to him or
not. The relevant portion of the cross-examination of PW-3 is set out below:“It is correct that R.K Gupta is my old patient as once 1
had operated upon R.K. Gupta. Voltd. prior to that
operation I had never treated him. It is correct that after
operation, he used to come me for a brief period. It is
wrong to suggest that during this period R.K Gupta had
developed friendship with me. It is correct that 1 have
mentioned in my examination in chief that patient was
conscious and oriented. It is correct that for determining
whether a person is conscious or oriented there is a test
i.e. asking the patient few simple questions. 1 have
declared him conscious and oriented after putting him
few questions. 1 cannot recollect whether the injured or
any of the accompanying person disclosed the name of
assailant to me.
Q. I put to you that it is stated in the MLC that the firing
was done by some unknown person and thus I ask you as
to who has stated this to you ?
Ans
This fact was not disclosed to me neither the
same was disclosed in my presence.
Voltd. the MLC has been prepared by Dr. Akhilesh and
he can answer this query.
It is wrong to suggest that I never examined the injured
or that that is the reason why f am unable to answer this
question. It is wrong to suggest that the injured had told
me that some unknown person had fired upon him or
that that is the reason why this has been recorded in the
MLC. It is correct that there is overwriting in date and
time column of the MLC ex.PW3/A at encircled portion
Y. 1 cannot say if the observations "as per accompanying
people" figuring above the alleged history has been
added subsequently….”
25.
From the above testimony of PW-3, it is clear that the MLC was
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prepared by one Dr. Akhilesh, Casualty Medical Officer at the Metro
Hospital. PW-3 recognized Dr. Akhilesh’s signatures in the MLC, however,
Dr. Akhilesh was not produced by the prosecution. As per the MLC, it is
relevant to note that the injured was accompanied by Shri Mukesh Gupta,
brother of the injured i.e., PW-13 and Sunil i.e., PW-14. The MLC of the
injured records the history of the incident as under:“As per accompanying people
Alleged gunshot injury at about 8.10 pm at C-1217 New Kondli,
Delhi
Fired by some unknown persons”
26.
As per the MLC i.e., Ex. PW-3/A, the names of the Respondent are not
named as the assailants. It appears that this recording in the MLC was based
upon the information given by the persons who had accompanied the injured
and not the injured himself.
27.
For whatever reasons, an attempt was also made to get another MLC
prepared from the Lal Bahadur Shastri Hospital, Delhi on 7th March 2005,
wherein the names of the Respondents are mentioned. The relevant portion of
the said MLC reads as under:
28.
This MLC dated 7th March, 2005 being Ex. PW-4/A was signed by Dr.
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Vinay Kumar Singh, Junior Specialist, Forensic Medicine, Lal Bahadur
Shastri Hospital, Delhi. Dr. Vinay Kumar Singh was examined as PW-4. In
this MLC, apart from the names of both the Respondents, the opinion is given
that the injuries caused to PW-2 are ‘Dangerous’. The relevant portion of the
MLC reads as under:
29.
Sufficient doubt is raised against the testimony of PW-4 as the MLC
was prepared by PW-4 in March 2005 i.e. almost 2 months after the incident.
Moreover, in the opinion of this Court, when the initial MLC was prepared in
Metro Hospital, there was no need for a second MLC to have been obtained
by the injured or the Investigating Officer.
30.
Insofar as the testimony of PW-2 is concerned, apart from the initial
statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C on 14th January 2005, two
supplementary statements were also recorded namely on 2nd June 2005 and
20th September 2005. The final evidence was given by PW-2 in the Court on
9th February 2006. The first three statements of the injured are extracted
below:-
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Statement dated 14th January 2005
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Statement dated 2nd June 2005
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Statement dated 20th September 2005
31.
In the testimony given before the Court on 9th February 2010, PW-2
firstly claimed that there were three shots fired at him. The first one by
Virender Singh Rawat which hit his right arm near the elbow. The second shot
was fired by Rajender Singh which hit PW-2 at the left arm near the shoulder.
Insofar as the third shot is concerned, PW-2 claimed that he was not aware as
to who fired the third shot. The said shot had hit the injured below the left eye
i.e., above the cheek. Even in cross-examination, an attempt was made to
bring out the contradictions in the testimony of PW- 2 by the ld. Counsel
appearing for the Respondents.
32.
The Trial Court, however, analysed all the four statements of the
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injured and brought out various contradictions and improvements in the said
statements.
33.
This Court has also analysed all the four statements of PW-2. The
following are the summaries of all the statements of PW-2 from which
contradictions and improvements emerge:Statement dated 14th January, 2005
● As per the testimony of PW-2, on 12th January, 2005, at about 8:00
P.M., one Virender Singh Rawat, who was known to PW-2, entered his
shop and stated, “tune mere bhai ko mara hai, aaj tujhe zinda nahi
chodunga”. Thereafter, Virender Singh Rawat pointed a revolver at
PW-2 and fired a shot, which struck PW-2 on his right elbow. He
thereafter fired a second shot, which hit PW-2 near his left shoulder.
When PW-2 stood up in an attempt to save himself, one Rajender Singh
entered the shop and fired a third shot, which struck PW-2 below his
left eye. PW-2, thereafter, became unconscious and regained
consciousness only at Metro Hospital, Noida, U.P. PW-2 further stated
that he was having prior enmity with the assailants.
Statement dated 2nd June 2005
● As per this statement of PW-2, he had enmity with Rajender Singh and
his father namely, Karan Singh, since 1991, when an altercation had
taken place between them, pursuant to which PW-2 was allegedly
falsely implicated in a case. PW-2 further stated that Karan Singh
would often initiate an altercation or fight, thereafter accuse the other
person, and subsequently appear as a witness to depose against such
person. PW-2 stated that, consequently, Karan Singh had falsely
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implicated him in the murder of one Balbir Singh, vide FIR No.
42/2003 dated 14th February, 2002, registered at P.S. New Ashok
Nagar. According to PW-2, Karan Singh had offered to compromise
the said FIR upon payment of Rs. 12 lakhs to him. In this regard, on
17th November, 2004, Rajender Singh and Virender Singh had met
PW-2 in Court, however, PW-2 refused to make the payment. PW-2
further stated that, owing to the aforesaid enmity, on 12th January,
2005, Rajender Singh and Virender Singh entered his shop, whereafter
Virender Singh fired a shot at him and Rajender Singh also fired a shot
at him.
Statement dated 20th September 2005
● As per the testimony of PW-2, on 12th January, 2005, at about 8:00
P.M., Virender Rawat, who was known to PW-2, entered his shop,
pointed a revolver at him, and fired a shot. PW-2 further deposed that
Rajender Singh fired a shot at him from a country-made pistol, which
struck him below his eye. PW-2, thereafter, became unconscious and
regained consciousness only at Metro Hospital. PW-2 further stated
that Virender Rawat had demanded money from him for compromising
the case relating to the murder of his brother, which PW-2 had refused
to pay.
Statement dated 9th February, 2010 before the Court
● As per the testimony of PW-2, on 12th January, 2005, at about 8:00
P.M., Virender Singh, accompanied by Rajender Singh, entered his
shop and stated, “tune mere bhai ko mara hain, aaj tujhe zinda nahi
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chodunga, jaan se maar dunga”. Thereafter, Virender Singh pointed a
revolver at PW-2 and fired a shot, which struck him on his right arm
near the elbow. Rajender Singh thereafter fired a second shot, which
struck PW-2 near his left hand and shoulder. Subsequently, another
shot was fired at PW-2, which struck him beneath his left eye. PW-2
stated that he was unable to identify the person who had fired the said
shot. PW-2 further stated that he had been falsely implicated in the
murder case relating to Balbir.
● During his cross-examination, PW-2 did not admit having stated to the
police that the shot fired by Rajender Singh had struck him beneath his
eye. PW-2 further deposed that Rajender Singh and Virender Singh
had, on multiple occasions, demanded money from him for effecting a
compromise in the murder case relating to Balbir. According to PW-2,
Rajender Singh and Virender Singh had demanded Rs. 12 lakhs and Rs.
20 lakhs, respectively, from him. PW-2 further admitted that, apart
from the murder case relating to Balbir, two other FIRs had also been
registered against him.
● PW-2 further clarified that he did not have any enmity with the
assailants and was not aggrieved by his implication in the murder case
relating to Balbir. PW-2 also stated that Rajpal Singh, the brother-inlaw of Virender Singh, had approached him for initiating talks for a
compromise in the said murder case. PW-2 further stated that he had
lodged complaints against Rajender Singh and Virender Singh.
● According to PW-2, on the date of the incident, the assailants were
wearing monkey caps, although the same covered only their foreheads.
During his cross-examination, PW-2 stated that Virender Singh had
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made a demand for money from him on 17th November, 2004, in the
premises of the High Court.
34.
In view of the changing stand of the injured, the Trial Court held that
the testimony lacks credibility.
35.
Insofar as PW-7 is concerned, he was a salesman working in a
neighbourhood shop who, upon hearing the sound of firing, claims to have
seen two persons exiting from the shop of the injured. However, he was not
an eye-witness to the incident, and the assailants are stated to have escaped
on a motorcycle, with one of the katta allegedly falling from the hand of one
of the assailants. Thereafter, PW-7, before the Court identified the
Respondents as the assailants. PW-7 also claimed that he can identify the katta
i.e., revolver.
36.
However, in his cross-examination, PW-7 admits that he could not see
anything from his office towards the shop of the injured. PW-7 claims to have
been the first person to have reached the office of the injured. He had initially
stated to the police that he had not seen the faces of the assailants fully but
only partially, and had also stated that the assailants were wearing monkey
caps though their faces were not covered. PW-7 agreed that he identified the
Respondents for the first time during his examination-in-chief, while denying
that the Respondents had been shown to him prior to his deposition before the
Court. PW-7 further admitted that the Respondents were not arrested in his
presence.
37.
Insofar as PW-14 is concerned, he was the driver of the injured.
According to him, the two assailants were wearing monkey caps and they fled
on a motorcycle. He claimed that the pillion rider was aged about 35 to 40
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years. A similar statement was made by PW-7 as well.
38.
PW-14, in his testimony, stated that he had gone to a tea shop to get tea
and upon returning, witnessed the two assailants. PW-14 further stated that
the country-made pistol i.e., katta was found lying on the road and was,
thereafter, seized by the police.
39.
The witness from the FSL, Mr. Puneet Puri, Senior Scientific Officer
(Ballistics), Rohini Delhi, who appeared as PW-17 initially deposed that he
had received three cartridges from the laboratory maintained by the FSL
which were test fired for comparing it with the bullet which was retrieved
from the crime scene. According to him, when he fired the same, the pistol
was found in working order. The test fired cartridge case was exhibited and
the recovered test fired bullet was also exhibited. He deposed that the
individual characteristics of the firing pin marks which were on the fired
empty cartridge and the test fired cartridge case were identical. The relevant
portion of the testimony of PW-17 is set out below:“On examination, I found that the countrymade pistol
marked Ex. F-1 was in working order. Test fire was
conducted successfully by using one 8 mm/.315 inch
cartridge from laboratory stock. The test fired cartridge
case was marked as TC-1 and the recovered test fired
bullet was marked as TB-1.
The cartridge case marked as Ex. EC-1 was a fired
empty cartridge and had been fired through the
countrymade pistol marked Ex. F-1 as the individual
characteristics of firing pin marks present on Ex. EC1 and on test fired cartridge case marked TC-1 were
found identical when examined under the comparison
microscope. The bullet marked Ex. EB-1 was
corresponding to the bullet of 8 mml.315 inch cartridge
and had been discharged through the countrymade
pistol marked Ex. F-1 as the individual characteristics
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of striations present on Ex. EB-1 and on test fired bullet
marked TB-1 were found identical when examined
under the comparison microscope. The bullet marked
Ex. EB-2 was corresponding to the bullet of .32 inch
cartridge. The countrymade pistol marked Ex. F-1 was
a fire arm, the cartridge case marked Ex. EC-1 and the
bullets marked Ex. EB-1 and EB-2 were ammunition as
defined in Arms Act 1959. The exhibits were resealed in
the seal of PP FSL DELHI. My detailed report in this
regard is EX.PW17/A bearing my signatures at point A
on both sides of my report. My report is correct.”
40.
In cross-examination, however, it was revealed by the PW-17 that the
3 live cartridges were, in fact, received from the Police Station New Ashok
Nagar and not from the Ballistics Division of the FSL. In fact, PW-17
conceded that the three live cartridges may have been received from the police
station, thereafter sent to the Ballistics Division, and subsequently received
by him from the Laboratory Stock of the Ballistics Division.
41.
The three live cartridges were received by one, Mrs. Prerana Lakra,
Senior Scientific Assistant (Ballistics), FSL, Rohini, who was deposed as
DW-1 by the defence. The relevant portion of the testimony of DW-1 reads
as under:“1 have brought the summoned record i.e. the Receipt
Register dated 06.06.2005 regarding receipt of three
cartridges at FSL from PS New Ashok Nagar in case
FIR No. 15/2005. Copy of the same is Ex, DW1/A.
(OSR). The relevant entry is made at serial no. 8 (a)
between serial no. 8 & 9 at point X on Ex. DW1/A.
I have also brought the Cartridges Consume Register
dated 23.11.2006 regarding issuance of one live
cartridge to the expert for test fire. The copy of the same
is Ex .DW1/B (OSR). The relevant entry, is at serial no.
39. The name of the PS is written above the white fluid
correction at point X and white fluid correction is also
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used at point Y on FIR number mentioned therein. The
relevant entry is at point A.
I am not aware about the remaining two cartridges out
of the three received in the lab on 06.06.2005.
I am posted in the Ballistics Division since 2004. The
cartridges are always carrying identification mark of
manufacturer.
1 have been shown Ex. PW19/1which bears my
signature at point A. I have also been shown the receipt
already Ex.PW19/DX-4 which also bears my signature
at point A.”
42.
The register wherein the receipt of the 3 live cartridges was mentioned
is set out below:-
43.
On the basis of this, the allegation was that there was an interpolation
in the register and serial number ‘8(a)’ was actually inserted later.
44.
PW-8: Chiddi Khan also claimed to be an eye-witness who was present
at the site when the incident in the present case occurred. PW-8 was running
an office in the name of Janta Properties when the incident occurred and
claims to have seen two persons, who had arrived on a motorcycle, fleeing
towards Kondli village. He claimed that he was later informed that firing was
done on PW-2. In fact, his statement was contrary to his statement under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C and he had actually turned hostile. In his statement
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before the ld. Court Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C, PW-8 stated
as under:“I have been running an office in the name of Janta
Properties since 1993 at the given address and I have
been dealing in Timber. On 12.01.2005 at about 8 pm I
was standing in front of Bharti Public School at Mangal
Bajar Chowk, New Kondli. I saw that two persons came
on a motorcycle and were running towards Kondli
village. Some public persons were raising alarm at the
chowk. I reached the chowk near R.K. Properties office
and there I came to know that some persons had fired
upon R.K. Gupta and injured him and ran away from the
motorcycle. Two police officers were also present at the
spot and they asked about the offenders from me. I told
them about the two persons who had run away towards
Kondli village on the motorcycle. I had seen Rakesh
Kumar Gupta in injured condition and blood was oozing
out from his left hand and he was being taken to some
hospital by his driver in the vehicle. I also saw a
countrymade pistol/deshi katta was lying on the spot. I
informed to the police after taking a mobile phone from
a public person there and the police had reached the
spot. I could not see the faces of the offenders running
on the motorcycle due to evening time and darkness.
Lateron I came to know that police had arrested two
persons in this case resident of New Ashok Nagar.
I could not noted down the number of the motorcycle.
45.
At this stage, ld. Addl. PP wants to cross examine this
witness as he is resiling from his previous statement”
A perusal of the testimony of PW-2, the injured himself, given before
the Court in comparison with his earlier statements under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C reveals that there are several improvements and contradictions which
have already been captured in paragraph 33 of this judgment.
46.
Insofar as the eye-witnesses are concerned, none of them appeared to
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have actually seen the assailants though they tried to cover up this fact during
their testimonies before the Court
47.
Doubts have been raised by the eye-witnesses who claimed that the
assailants were wearing monkey caps, therefore, it is unclear whether the
assailants were even visible to the eye-witnesses or not as it was night time
and the incident occurred around 8.00 P.M. Thus, it appears that the Trial
Court’s finding that none of the testimonies of the eye-witnesses can in fact
be believed, would be correct.
48.
The discrepancies in the FSL reports and the manner in which the
register of the FSL appears to be having an insertion of the receipt of three
live cartridges raises enormous doubts as to the credibility of the FSL report
as well. Moreover, the incident took place in a busy commercial area and there
ought to have been some independent eye-witnesses. However, the evidence
of no such eye-witnesses has been led by the prosecution.
49.
In the opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to establish the
guilt of the Respondents beyond reasonable doubt.
50.
In this case, though, the charges were framed under Section 307 of the
IPC, owing to the connected case being FIR No. 42/2003 registered at PS.
New Ashok Nagar which involved the demise of Shri. Balbir Singh i.e.,
brother of Virender Singh Rawat, the case was sent to the Sessions Court. The
possibility of false implication of the Respondents, therefore, cannot be ruled
out.
51.
It is a well-settled principle in law that the Appellate Court is not to
substitute its judgment, especially, in the case of an acquittal. When there is
an acquittal, the Appellate Court should be reluctant in interfering with the
same unless there is perversity in the judgment of the Trial Court. The
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Supreme Court in the decision in Mohan v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 12
SCC 619 while discussing the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate
Court against an order of acquittal held as under:
“20. Section 378CrPC enables the State to prefer an
appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384CrPC
speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the
appellate court. When the trial court renders its decision
by acquitting the accused, presumption of innocence
gathers strength before the appellate court. As a
consequence, the onus on the prosecution becomes more
burdensome as there is a double presumption of
innocence. Certainly, the court of first instance has its
own advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see
the witnesses in person while they depose. The appellate
court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied
scrutiny of not only the evidence before it, but is dutybound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial
court is both possible and plausible view. When two views
are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of
acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty
along with the advantage of having seen the witnesses.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India also aids the
accused after acquittal in a certain way, though not
absolute. Suffice it is to state that the appellate court
shall remind itself of the role required to play, while
dealing with a case of an acquittal.
21. Every case has its own journey towards the truth and
it is the Court's role to undertake. Truth has to be found
on the basis of evidence available before it. There is no
room for subjectivity nor the nature of offence affects its
performance. We have a hierarchy of courts in dealing
with cases. An appellate court shall not expect the trial
court to act in a particular way depending upon the
sensitivity of the case. Rather it should be appreciated if a
trial court decides a case on its own merit despite its
sensitivity.
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22. At times, courts do have their constraints. We find
different decisions being made by different courts, namely,
the trial court on the one hand and the appellate courts on
the other. If such decisions are made due to institutional
constraints, they do not augur well. The district judiciary
is expected to be the foundational court, and therefore,
should have the freedom of mind to decide a case on its
own merit or else it might become a stereotyped one
rendering conviction on a moral platform. Indictment and
condemnation over a decision rendered, on considering
all the materials placed before it, should be avoided. The
appellate court is expected to maintain a degree of caution
before making any remark.
23. This Court, time and again has laid down the law on
the scope of inquiry by an appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC.
We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except
placing reliance on a recent decision of this Court in
Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P.,
(2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] : (SCC pp.
182-85, para 14)
“14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a
court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and
considered in para 20 of the aforesaid decision,
which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of
Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
1179] , SCC p. 199)
‘20. The findings of fact recorded by a
court can be held to be perverse if the
findings have been arrived at by ignoring
or excluding relevant material or by
taking
into
consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The
finding may also be said to be perverse if
it is “against the weight of evidence”, or
if the finding so outrageously defies logic
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as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.
(Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi
Admn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi
Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC
(L&S) 131] , H.B. Gandhi, Excise &
Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [H.B.
Gandhi, Excise & Taxation Officer-cumAssessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons,
1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber
& Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665]
, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya
Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC
501] , Arulvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009)
10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288]
and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State
of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v.
State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010)
1 SCC (Cri) 372] )’
It is further observed, after following the decision
of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of
Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police,
(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , that if
a decision is arrived at on the basis of no
evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and
no reasonable person would act upon it, the order
would be perverse. But if there is some evidence
on record which is acceptable and which could
be relied upon, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with.
14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh
[Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5
SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] , this Court
again had an occasion to consider the scope of
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Section 378CrPC and the interference by the High
Court (State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh
[State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013
SCC OnLine Kar 10732] ) in an appeal against
acquittal. This Court considered a catena of
decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In
para 31, it is observed and held as under : (Vijay
Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of
Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
586] , SCC pp. 447-49)
‘31. An identical question came to be considered
before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai
[Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1
SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] . In the case before
this Court, the High Court interfered with the order
of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on
reappreciation of the entire evidence on record.
However, the High Court, while reversing the
acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the
learned trial court while acquitting the accused.
Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this
Court observed and held in para 10 as under : (SCC
p. 233)
“10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained
against the order of acquittal, the High Court was
entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence
independently and come to its own conclusion.
Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge
if the same were arrived at after proper
appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not
be applicable in the present case where the
Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong
assumption of a very material and clinching
aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the
case.”
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31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of
Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320]
, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal
passed by the learned trial court and held the
accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire
evidence on record, however, the High Court did
not record its conclusion on the question whether
the approach of the trial court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions
arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming
the order passed by the High Court convicting the
accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the
learned trial court, after being satisfied that the
order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court
was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this
Court declined to interfere with the order of
conviction passed by the High Court. While
confirming the order of conviction passed by the
High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under
: (SCC p. 416)
“8. We have perused the judgment under appeal
to ascertain whether the High Court has
conformed to the aforementioned principles. We
find that the High Court has not strictly
proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court
in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the
question whether the approach of the trial court
in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal
or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly
untenable, which alone will justify interference in
an order of acquittal though the High Court has
rendered a well-considered judgment duly
meeting all the contentions raised before it. But
then will this non-compliance per se justify
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setting aside the judgment under appeal? We
think, not. In our view, in such a case, the
approach of the court which is considering the
validity of the judgment of an appellate court
which has reversed the order of acquittal passed
by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the
approach of the trial court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal or conclusions
arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable
and whether the judgment of the appellate court
is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the
trial court judgment warranted interference. In
such a case, there is obviously no reason why the
appellate court's judgment should be disturbed.
But if on the other hand the court comes to the
conclusion that the judgment of the trial court
does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but
be held that the interference by the appellate
court in the order of acquittal was not justified;
then in such a case the judgment of the appellate
court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable
views, the one in support of the acquittal alone
has to stand. Having regard to the above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine the
judgment of the trial court in this case.”
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K.
Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999)
3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] , after observing
that though there is some substance in the grievance
of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused that the High Court has not adverted to all
the reasons given by the trial Judge for according
an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside
the order of conviction passed by the High Court
after having found that the approach of the Sessions
Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not
proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned
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Sessions Judge on several aspects was
unsustainable. This Court further observed that as
the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding
the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the
accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully
entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its
own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence
of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons
adduced by the trial court for discarding the
testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound.
This Court also observed that as the evaluation of
the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly
erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High
Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed
by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC
807] , in para 5, this Court observed and held as
under : (AIR pp. 809-10)
“5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for
the appellant that the judgment of the trial court
being one of acquittal, the High Court should not
have set it aside on mere appreciation of the
evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless
it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the
trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not
correct to say that unless the appellate court in
an appeal under Section 417CrPC came to the
conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under
appeal was perverse it could not set aside that
order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion, of course, keeping in view the wellestablished rule that the presumption of innocence of the
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accused is not weakened but strengthened by the
judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had
the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses
whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the
presumption of innocence with which the accused person
starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate
stage and that the appellate court should attach due
weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded
the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion,
the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in
this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely,
Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC
1207] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v.
State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no
substance in the contention raised on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court was not justified in
reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own
conclusions.”
31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of
A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this
Court has observed that where the trial court allows
itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects
creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a
view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is
the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the
interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be
brought to ridicule.’”
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52.
The Supreme Court in the decision in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai
Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523 observed as under:
“6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal,
the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After
re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs
to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view
taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could
have been taken based on evidence on record. Perusal of
the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this
question has not been adverted to. Appellate Court can
interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied
after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible
conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been
established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court
cannot overturn order of acquittal only on the ground that
another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of
acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate
Court records such a finding, no interference can be made
with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the
well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further
strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused.
After having perused the judgment, we find that the High
Court has not addressed itself on the main question.”
53.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in the decision in Jafarudheen v.
State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 observed as under:
“Scope of appeal filed against the acquittal
25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by
invoking Section 378CrPC, the appellate court has to
consider whether the trial court's view can be termed as a
possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been
analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to
the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus,
the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the
order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the
presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened
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but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that
enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by
thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
54.
In the decision in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC
755, the Supreme Court has also observed as under:
“16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while
exercising the powers in appeal against the order of
acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere
with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower
court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the
conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the court below.
However, the appellate court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the
court below is perverse and the court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such
circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to
find out whether any of the accused is connected with
commission of the crime he is charged with.”
55.
From the above decisions it is clear that the Appellate Court may re-
appreciate the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, however, interference
is warranted only where the view taken by the Trial Court is not a plausible
view on the evidence on record or where the finding of guilt is the only
possible conclusion. A mere possibility of another view does not justify
interference and an order of acquittal can be overturned only if the finding of
acquittal is perverse.
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56.
Under such circumstances, the Trial Court having acquitted the
Respondents, which is a possible opinion on the facts and evidence in the
present case, this Court is not inclined to reverse the same.
57.
Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. Pending applications, if
any, are also disposed of.
58.
Personal/Bail bond and surety of the Respondents are discharged.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 17, 2026/MR/ck
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