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Serial Nos.1 to 5
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Arb.A. No. 1/2023 with
MC(Arb.A.) No. 1/2023
MC(Arb.A.) No. 7/2023
Arb.A. No. 2/2023 with
MC(Arb.A.) No. 2/2023
MC(Arb.A.) No. 12/2023
Arb.A. No. 3/2023 with
MC (Arb.A.) No. 3/2023
MC(Arb.A.) No. 13/2023
Arb.A. No. 4/2023 with
MC (Arb.A.) No. 4/2023
MC(Arb.A.) No. 14/2023
Arb.A. No. 5/2023 with
MC (Arb.A.) No. 5/2023
MC(Arb.A.) No. 15/2023
Heard on: 22.05.2023, 23.05.2023,
24.05.2023 and 25.05.2023
Date of Judgment: 30.05.2023
The North Eastern Electric
Vs.
M/s Patel Engineering Limited
Power Corporation Limited
The North Eastern Electric
Vs.
M/s Advance Construction
Power Corporation Limited
Pvt. Ltd.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
:
For the Respondents :
Mr. H. A. Ahmadi, Sr Adv. with
Mr. V.K. Jindal, Sr Adv.
Mr. K. Lahiri, Adv.
Mr. R. Sharma, Adv.
Mr. A. Atreya, Adv.
Mr. V. Kumar, Adv.
Mr. A. Dholakia, Sr Adv. with
Mr. A. Bhan, Adv.
Mr. K. Gaur, Adv
Mr. R. Dangwal, Adv
Mr. R. Chawla, Adv
Ms. A. Kulshrestha, Adv
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT
Hon’ble, the Chief Justice:
The challenge here is to five arbitral awards – three of them
made on August 21, 2016 and the other two on October 14, 2016 –
pertaining to three lots of work in respect of the Turial Hydro Electric
Power Project on the Turial river system in the Aizawl district of
Mizoram and two connected road construction contracts. The ultimate
work involved the setting-up of a power station with two 30 MW hydroturbines.
2.
The appeals are directed against a common judgment and order
of September 12, 2022 as corrected by a further order of October 26,
2022. The parties agree that since the disputes pertaining to the several
lots of work and the two connected road construction projects were
dealt with together by taking up the five references analogously, the
appeals arising out of the distinct awards may be dealt with by a
common order.
3.
Two fundamental grounds of challenge are fashioned by the
North-Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited which had engaged
respondent Patel Engineering Limited for setting up the power project.
According to the appellant, two sets of references arose pertaining to
different periods of time and covering the same project. The order for
references passed by the Gauhati High Court, for all intents and
purposes, required both sets of references pertaining to different periods
of time to be taken up and adjudicated simultaneously. The appellant
asserts that since the second set of references can no longer be taken up
by the arbitral tribunal which rendered the awards impugned herein,
these awards must go and the entirety of the matter referred to the
tribunal considering the references pertaining to a later period as such
references are at an advanced stage of hearing. The second fundamental
objection taken to the awards is that the arbitral tribunal was biased as it
had obtained hospitality from the respondent and had put up at the
respondent’s guesthouse in New Delhi. On such count, the appellant
maintains that before the second set of references got underway in right
earnest, it came to the knowledge of the appellant that the arbitrators
had accepted the hospitality of the respondent herein and, possibly,
shared meals with officers of the respondent, whereupon the appellant
applied for the mandate of the arbitral tribunal to be terminated.
Following such application by the appellant, the arbitral tribunal
voluntarily declined to take up the second set of references.
4.
According to the appellant, since the arbitral tribunal voluntarily
surrendered its mandate following the application alleging bias filed by
the appellant, the impugned awards should not be allowed to stand
particularly as there is a possibility of conflict of orders in the
interpretation of the clauses of the common contracts in the two sets of
references.
5.
The appellant explains that it was necessary to make five
references culminating in a common hearing of the references since
there were five different contracts; the first of them pertaining to civil
works for the diversion and tunnel, for the dam and for the power
house; the second for supply and installation of the hydro-mechanical
equipment for the project; the third for the supply and installation of the
electrical and mechanical equipment for the generating units; and the
two others for constructing a 17-km stretch and another 13-km stretch
of road. In terms of the impugned awards, the respondent is to get in
excess of Rs.56 crore in principal together with pre-reference and
pendente lite interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum simple from
December 18, 2005 till August 21, 2016 and post-award interest from
October 22, 2016 at 12 per cent per annum simple.
6.
On merits, the appellant has challenged the awards on the claims
made and the sums awarded in respect of interest; delay in supply of
explosives; delay and short supply of cement and steel; damages on
account of collapse of tunnel; damages on account of deviation in the
rock strata in the tunnel; additional costs incurred for extraction of
boulders; additional costs for preparing the access road; and, damages
for delay in issuing the construction drawings.
7.
The appellant complains that in respect of the several impugned
heads of claim, as in the claims of interest, delay in supply of explosives
and delay or short supply of cement and steel, the arbitrators have acted
in excess of their authority and have ignored express provisions of the
contracts prohibiting any award on such heads. In respect of the
challenges to the other heads of the award, the appellant claims that on a
meaningful reading of the relevant provisions of the overarching matrix
contract, it will be evident that there were express provisions prohibiting
any claim to be made in respect of such matters or, at least, the
prohibition ought to have been reasonably implied from the terms of the
individual contracts. The further ground of challenge is that in awarding
sums under several heads, there is patent illegality writ large in the
arbitral tribunal’s conduct as it noticed the appellant’s objections in
such regard but neither dealt with such objections nor did it assign any
reasons for awarding huge sums in favour of the contractor.
8.
Before launching the challenge in respect of the several
identified heads of claim allowed by the impugned arbitral award, the
appellant submits that notwithstanding the commencement of the
arbitral references in these cases being prior to the 2015 amendment to
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the amended provisions
would apply. For such purpose, the judgments of the Supreme Court
reported at (2018) 6 SCC 287 (Board of Control for Cricket in India v.
Kochi Cricket Private Ltd); (2020) 7 SCC 167 (Patel Engineering Ltd v.
North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd); and, (2020) 17 SCC
324 (Hindustan Construction Company Ltd v. Union of India) have
been relied upon. Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2015 and Section 87 of the Act of 1996 as brought
in by a 2019 amendment have been struck down and such judgments
have extended the amended provisions to the pre-amendment
references.
9.
The appellant asserts that by virtue of such judgments, even
though the references in these cases commenced prior to the 2015
amendment coming into effect, the appellant is entitled to rely on
amended Section 34 of the 1996 Act to assail the arbitral awards.
Indeed, there is little doubt that in Kochi Cricket it was expressly held
that the 2015 amendment would be available to all Section 34 petitions
filed after October 23, 2015 notwithstanding Section 26 of the
amending Act providing otherwise and the relevant arbitral proceedings
having commenced prior to the amendment coming into effect.
10.
Indeed, at paragraph 78 of the judgment in Kochi Cricket, it was
observed that the then proposed amendment by which Section 87 of the
Act was to be introduced did not appear to be legally sound. Quite
expectedly, upon Section 87 being incorporated in the 1996 statute, in
the judgment of Hindustan Construction Company it was struck down.
11.
In the other judgment of Patel Engineering Ltd, a matter
between the same parties as in the present case, not only was the
applicability of the 2015 amendment found to be in order in respect of
subsequent challenges to arbitral awards rendered in references that had
commenced prior to the amendment, but the aspect of what would
amount to patent illegality in terms of Section 34(2A) of the 1996 Act,
that was introduced by the 2015 amendment, was also discussed at
length. In short, such judgment concluded, by referring to, inter alia, the
judgments in Associate Builders [(2015) 3 SCC 49] and Ssangyong
Engg [(2019) 15 SCC 131] that when an arbitrator construes a contract
in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would, such that
the arbitrator’s view is not even a possible view to take in the
circumstances, or if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals
with matters not allotted to him or beyond his purview, he would
commit an error of jurisdiction which is capable of being challenged
under new Section 34(2A) of the Act.
12.
On the challenges to the various heads awarded, the appellant
first questions the propriety of interest being awarded. The relevant
clause (from Book II, conditions of contract) may first be noticed:
“55. Time for payment and interest
No claims for interest or damages will be entertained by the
Corporation with respect to any money or balance which may be
lying with the Corporation owing to any dispute, difference or
misunderstanding between the Engineer-in-Charge on the one
hand and the contractor on the other or with respect to any delay
on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge making periodical or final
payments or in any other respect whatsoever.”
13.
The contention of the appellant qua the above provision of the
contract is that not only does it prohibit the payment of interest or
damages in respect of the matters specifically referred to therein, but the
prohibition applies also “in any other respect whatsoever.” The
appellant refers to Section 31(7) of the said Act and submits that the
authority conferred on the arbitral tribunal to provide for pre-award
interest is subject to the agreement between the parties. The appellant
suggests that unlike under the 1940 Act where the authority of a party
and the authority of an arbitrator could be distinctly seen, in view of the
party autonomy having been given primacy under the 1996 Act, when a
certain thing is prohibited qua the parties, such thing is also prohibited
for the arbitrator.
14.
In such context, the appellant relies on a judgment reported at
(2019) 17 SCC 786 (Jaiprakash Associates Ltd v. Tehri Hydro
Development Corporation (India) Ltd). In that case, clause 51.0 read
substantially similar to clause 55 quoted above in this case as such
provision dealt with certain specific situations and contained the very
same seemingly omnibus expression “or in any other respect
whatsoever” at its end.
15.
Upon referring to several judgments, both under the 1940 Act
and under the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court concluded in Jaiprakash
Associates that the relevant provisions in the contract prohibited the
arbitral tribunal from awarding any interest. However, the prohibition
was confined only to pre-award period since, for the post-award period,
Section 31(7)(b) of the Act mandates that the arbitral award shall carry
interest as specified in the provision unless the award directs otherwise.
In such a scenario, the parties cannot contract out of post-award interest.
16.
Apropos the sum awarded on account of delay in supply of
explosives, the appellant first refers to a clause from the general
conditions in the supplementary agreement executed by the parties and
a similar clause from the general conditions in Book II, Appendix VI of
the main contract. The relevant provisions are identical:
“However, if any item of materials as mentioned above cannot
be provided by the Corporation in any time, that cannot be
claimed as cause of delay by the contractor and compensation or
extra benefit whatsoever except granting of time extension will
(not) be entertained by the Corporation.”
17.
At the outset, the appellant suggests that the word “not”
indicated in italics above should be read into the provision as it would
not make any sense otherwise. The appellant submits that the identical
clause in the general conditions appended to the supplementary
agreement and also forming a part of the general conditions in the main
agreement implies that the delay on the part of the employer to supply
any material that it is obliged to make available to the contractor may
result only in the time for completion of the contract being extended but
such delay would not entitle the contractor to any compensation or other
extra benefit apart from the extension of time.
18.
The appellant cites the aforesaid clause to question the propriety
of the findings rendered in the award under several heads of delay
attributed to the appellant in the supply of the material or drawings. In
respect of the finding pertaining to delay in the supply of explosives, the
appellant refers to the recording at page 70 of the impugned award of
the contentions raised by the appellant in course of the reference to
resist the relevant head of claim. The appellant demonstrates that the
appellant had also asserted that supplies of explosives made were not
used by the contractor and there were letters in such regard that had
been issued by the appellant. The appellant, then, refers to the findings
on such aspect of delay recorded at pages 95 to 97 of the impugned
award and suggests that the argument put forth on behalf of the
appellant was not even dealt with.
19.
The appellant attacks the breach attributed to the appellant on
account of perceived delay and short supply of cement and steel on
identical lines. It refers to the contentions on the appellant’s behalf
recorded at pages 70-71 of the impugned award and the findings
rendered at pages 97 to 99 thereof to demonstrate that the grounds of
objection were not dealt with and no reasons were proffered by the
arbitral tribunal to justify any finding on such aspect of delay claimed
by the contractor or to discredit the objections raised by the appellant.
20.
A further ground is asserted by the appellant in respect of the
finding on the delay and short supply of explosives and of cement and
steel. The appellant maintains that the mandate of Section 31 of the Act
is for reasons to be furnished by an arbitrator in making an award. The
appellant insists that there cannot be a general set of reasons indicated
for different heads of claim, particularly when the different heads of
claim are taken up for adjudication separately.
21.
What the appellant seeks to suggest is that in view of Section 31
of the Act requiring every arbitral award to be reasoned, the several
heads of claim allowed by an arbitrator should also be supported by
reasons unless it is obvious that a general set of reasons would cover the
entire gamut of claims. The appellant goes so far as to suggest that the
lack of reasons in support of any head of claim would amount to patent
illegality within the meaning of that expression in Section 34(2A) of the
Act since an award without reasons would be, in the absence of any
agreement to such effect between the parties, contrary to Section 31 (3)
of the Act; and, equally, every head of claim allowed upon noticing an
objection but not dealing with the objection or furnishing any reason in
awarding any part of the claim under such head would be contrary to the
express provision of the statute.
22.
In respect of the arbitral tribunal finding the appellant herein
liable for the collapse of the support structure during tunnelling, the
appellant contends that there is no basis to such finding. In dealing with
the delay due to the collapse of tunnel support on different occasions,
the tribunal disregarded the submission of the appellant herein that such
part of the claim had not been pressed.
23.
Indeed, the tribunal noticed the contractor’s assertion that the
tunnelling was held up due to collapse of steel rib supports as a result of
the faulty design thereof. The tribunal did not miss the fact that the
design for the steel rib supports was subsequently modified. The
tribunal found, as a matter of fact, that the collapses occurred repeatedly
and found that the oral evidence of a witness called by the appellant
herein to be contrary to the admitted records. The tribunal reasoned that
since the design for the structural support in the tunnels had been
prepared by the appellant herein and such support failed and gave in on
numerous occasions, the consequent delay was attributable to the
employer.
24.
On the aspect of rock strata deviation, the appellant refers to
pages 72-73 of the volume containing the principal impugned award
pertaining to Lot 1 and points out that clause 6.6 of Book II of the
tender papers that formed a part of the contract, clearly required the
bidders to acquaint themselves with the geological conditions along the
diversion channels and also indicated that the rock strata described in
the relevant clause was based on field-mapping carried out by the
Geological Survey of India on the evaluation of drill-hole data. The
appellant submits that the weak rock conditions and the frequent shear
zones were clearly indicated and the underlying caveat in the clause was
that the rough description of the rock strata was not based on any
comprehensive study.
25.
What the appellant seeks to suggest is that in terms of the
agreement between the parties, it was for the contractor to ascertain the
nature of the rock strata and plan its course of action accordingly.
26.
The appellant also relies on clause 7 from Book II of the tender
documents. The appellant submits that though clause 6.6 of the
instructions to bidders (ITB) was noticed by the arbitral tribunal, clause
7 of the same document had been clearly adverted to in the written
submissions filed by the appellant at the end of the reference. Such
clause advised bidders to inspect and examine the site and its
surroundings and satisfy themselves before submitting their bids. In
particular, the clause categorically instructed the bidders to acquaint
themselves with the geological, meteorological, topographical and other
general features of the site and its surroundings, obtain information as to
the risks and contingencies which could affect the work or the cost
thereof and not merely rely on the information in such regard furnished
by the appellant since such information “has been given merely to assist
the bidders and is not warranted to be complete.” The appellant refers to
the disclaimer contained in clause 7(ii) of the same document to the
effect that the employer would bear no responsibility for the lack of
acquaintance with the site and no charges or claims whatsoever
consequent upon the lack of information, knowledge or understanding
would be entertained or payable by the employer.
27.
The appellant seeks to interpret the relevant clause to imply that
it was for the bidders and, ultimately, for the contractor, to ascertain the
rock strata and prepare accordingly. The appellant maintains that it had
no obligation to give any information at all regarding the conditions
prevailing at the site and if the contractor suffered because it submitted
its bid or went into the execution of the contract without taking due care
or caution, the employer could not be held liable therefor.
28.
The arbitral tribunal noticed the contractor’s contention that the
construction programmes submitted by the contractor, both at the
inception and later, during the execution, were accepted by the
employer without any reservation. The arbitrators held that once the
detailed information as to the rock strata had been supplied by the
employer on the basis of field-mapping by the Geological Survey of
India, a prospective bidder, which had to submit its bid within a finite
time, could not be faulted for not carrying out extensive tests to
ascertain the nature of the rock structure.
29.
The next ground urged by the appellant pertains to the finding of
the tribunal that the delay in obtaining boulders for the project site was
attributable to the appellant. In such regard, the appellant refers to its
contentions recorded at page 72 of the separate volume containing the
principal award and the findings rendered by the tribunal at pages 101103 thereof.
30.
The appellant places clause 13 from Book IA containing the
detailed work order. The relevant clause provided that the appellant
herein would “assist the contractor” for obtaining permission to operate
quarries for stone and sand. The appellant says that it took necessary
steps in such regard and it is evident that the Chief Minister of Mizoram
held a meeting with the Chief Minister of Assam, whereupon, the Chief
Minister of Assam instructed officials in that State to facilitate the
extraction of boulders by the contractor. The appellant says that once
the appellant had rendered assistance as aforesaid and continued to aid
the contractor in obtaining fresh licenses or permission to extract
boulders and sand, whenever necessary, the contractor’s allegation that
adequate supply of boulders or sand may not have been available could
never have been counted against the employer.
31.
The arbitral tribunal has dealt with such aspect of the matter at
length. It noticed that pursuant to the instructions of the Chief Minister
of Assam, the contractor was allowed to extract 12,000 cu m of
boulders on ad hoc basis and this was a rather meagre amount compared
to the total requirement. The tribunal noticed that the contractor had
requested the employer to obtain requisite permission for 1,36,000 cu m
of boulders in financial year 2003-04, against which permits were
obtained for 10,000 cu m of boulders and 3000 cu m of sand on March
17, 2004.
32.
The arbitrators also referred to a revised construction
programme submitted on August 16, 2002 where the contractor had
raised the issue pertaining to shortage of boulders and the timelines
indicated were subject to the resolution of the impediments to obtaining
adequate quantities of boulders and sand.
33.
In such circumstances, the arbitrators found that the assistance
rendered by the employer to the contractor in such regard was wholly
inadequate as the commensurate amounts of boulders and sand could
not be obtained by the contractor. Accordingly, the tribunal was of the
opinion that there was considerable delay in adhering to the planned
programme due to the employer for non-receipt by the contractor of
administrative permissions for obtaining boulders and sand.
34.
In respect of the breach attributed by the arbitral tribunal to the
appellant herein on account of access roads being inadequate or
unavailable, the appellant refers to its contentions recorded at pages 67
to 69 of the volume containing the principal award and the findings
rendered thereon at pages 90 to 93 of the same volume.
35.
As to the guiding provisions in respect of access roads, the
appellant relies on clauses 1.3, 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 of Book II containing the
instructions to bidders. Further, the appellant places reliance on clause
15 from Book IA containing the detailed work order. Clause 1.3 of
Book II informed the bidders that the principal access road to the
project site was a State highway upto a village by the name of
Bilkhawthlir which was on the main road connecting Silchar with
Aizawl. From Bilkhawthlir, the access road crossed the villages of
Saiphai and Saiphum, the latter being about 13 km from the work site.
The information furnished by the employer referred to an access road
being improved by the employer in conjunction with the Border Roads
Orgainsation. The clause further indicated that all local access roads
“are to be constructed and maintained by the contractor to facilitate
execution of the Project.”
36.
Clause 3.2.2 of Book II stipulated that the existing access roads
in the project area had to be accepted by the contractor on “as is where
is” basis. Clause 3.2.4 of the same document advised bidders to inspect
the entire access roads and apprise themselves of their status and the
need to upgrade the roads and bridges. Finally, clause 15 of Book IA
indicated than an alternate road from Sherkhan on NH-54 to Saiphum
could be used for the initial mobilisation without any extra claim to the
employer.
37.
In dealing with the delay due to non-availability of access road
and its bad conditions, the arbitral tribunal drew a rough sketch of the
roads leading up to the project site. The arbitral tribunal noticed that the
construction programmes submitted by the contractor indicated three
salient conditions: that an all-weather access road capable of use by
vehicles bearing load of 20 mt should be ready by October, 2001; that
such access road should be constructed and maintained by the employer
throughout the year such that heavy vehicles could ply at a speed of 25
to 30 kmph; and, that all roads should have a gradient less than 10
degrees.
38.
The tribunal found that the pitiable condition of the principal
access road was repeatedly brought to the notice of the employer by the
contractor, including the fact that the alternate route on NH-54 was not
available. Indeed, the arbitrators came to a finding that since the
employer could not provide the access road as per the agreed terms of
reference contained in the construction programme, the contractor
“could complete only 21.40% of the total contract work within the
original stipulated period of 24 months …”
39.
The tribunal also found that the access roads were incapable of
bearing the load of heavy machinery and though the contract
commenced on September 28, 2001, no access road had been made
available even till the expiry of the extended period of the contract of
April 30, 2005. The arbitrators found that due to the bad condition of
the principal access road “prevailing over the entire contract period up
to 27.09.2003 and continuing beyond till as late as June, 2005, the
claimant could complete only 21.4% of the value of the contract.”
40.
The final ground of challenge pertains to the delay attributed by
arbitrators to the appellant for its failure to issue construction drawings
in a phased and timely manner. No specific clause of the agreement
between the parties is placed in such context, but the appellant asserts
that adequate reasons were not assigned by the arbitrators for finding
the appellant at fault on such count.
41.
The tribunal noticed that though the contract commenced with
effect from September 28, 2001, construction drawings had not been
furnished by the employer to the contractor and the contractor
complained accordingly in its letters of November 6 and November 15,
2001. The tribunal found that the first set of construction drawings
arrived only on November 21, 2001 but there was delay in finalising the
tunnel alignment and other structures which resulted in reliable
construction drawings not being available till even in March, 2002. The
arbitrators also found that there was no response in such regard from the
employer despite the contractor’s repeated demands for the complete
construction drawings.
42.
There are several other counts on which the arbitral tribunal
found the appellant herein to be in breach. It is fairly submitted on
behalf of the appellant that given the limited scope of Section 34 of the
Act, a meaningful challenge on such counts may not be possible.
However, the appellant says that it invoked the force majeure principle
to justify why work was suspended from June 9, 2004 to January 13,
2011, but the arbitral tribunal did not accept such justification. The
project was finally completed in 2017.
43.
The one general ground that is emphatically canvassed by the
appellant is that even if it were to be accepted that the fault on several
counts lay with the appellant, the arbitral tribunal was obliged to
quantify the damages. The appellant alleges that though the arbitrators
did not allow the entirety of the claims made by the contractor in respect
of several heads, the awards do not indicate any general basis for
quantification and, certainly, do not go into the quantification for the
individual heads of claim. The appellant asserts that apart from the
quantum awarded on account of interest, it is difficult to assess from the
awards as to what amount has been awarded for alleged delay in
furnishing construction drawings or what other amount for collapse of
the rib structure in the tunnel or the quantum of compensation for the
delay in obtaining boulders and sand or even for the access roads not
being in place.
44.
The appellant submits that since it is evident on a plain reading
of the awards that several of the appellant’s objections with regard to
the various heads of claim were not considered and several other heads
of claim were dealt with without assigning any or adequate reasons, if
this Court were to set aside the awards and the findings in respect of
such individual heads – or even require a fresh reference on such
limited aspects to be taken up – this Court will not be able to extricate
the quantum in terms of money awarded that ought be set aside or
considered afresh. The appellant exhorts that for such reason, and the
opacity of the awards in such regard, the entirety of the awards should
be set aside particularly as the identical issues are being considered in
the second set of references by another arbitral tribunal and it may be
convenient for the matters in issue covered by the first set of references
to be referred to such other panel.
45.
The respondent explains that there is a firm basis spelt out in the
awards to allow a percentage of what had been claimed by the
contractor and, in the absence of the respondent having challenged the
awards, such reduced amounts ought not to be interfered with by the
Court in exercise of the limited authority available in this jurisdiction.
The respondent submits that apart from the claims made under various
heads and sub-heads in the elaborate statements of claims and the
voluminous calculations running into thousands of pages filed in
support thereof, the contractor had indicated eight specific areas of
hindrances as a result whereof the work could not progress as
contemplated and the contractor attributed breach in each of the eight
cases to the employer. The contractor seeks to deconstruct the awards
by asserting that eight heads of hindrances were also cited by the
employer to suggest that it was the contractor which was to blame for
the inordinate delay in the execution of the work.
46.
The contractor says that claims were not made on account of the
grounds of hindrance cited and claims were made under specific
monetised heads and sub-heads which have all been duly dealt with by
the arbitrators. The contractor points out that a substantial counter-claim
was made by the employer, but that is of no relevance in the present
context since the entirety thereof has been disallowed and the challenge
in the present proceedings does not extend to the rejection of the
counter-claim.
47.
According to the respondent, even though the arbitral tribunal
found that out of the eight aspects of hindrance that the contractor had
highlighted in course of the references, seven of them were justified and
were attributable to the employer, no monetisation of damages as a
consequence of such hindrances was attempted by the tribunal as that
would have been an exercise in futility.
48.
The contractor exhorts that the several hindrances in the
execution of the work that were of the employer’s doing operated
simultaneously and had a cumulative effect. The contractor points out
that since the five references in this case were in respect of finite
periods covering till a part of the time when the work remained
suspended, there were similar claims in respect of Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot
3 just as there were similar claims in respect of the two other references
pertaining to the construction of a 17-km road and another 13-km road.
49.
The contractor places several passages from the awards to
demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal reckoned that the primary delay or
principal hindrance in the progress of the work was the failure on the
part of the employer to provide access roads which had a cascading
effect and which resulted in not only the delay on the part of the
contractor to bring its heavy-duty machinery to the project site but also
in the employer bringing the supplies that the employer was obliged to
make over to the contractor. The contractor seeks to demonstrate from
the award that such cascading effect led to even boulders and sand not
arriving in time, quite apart from the fact that the requisite quantities of
boulders and sand had not even been arranged for within reasonable
time.
50.
In such regard, the contractor places several passages from the
award pertaining to the first lot and submits that the findings and
observations of the arbitral tribunal on such aspect cover the entire
gamut of the five references and must be seen in such light:
(i) At page 93 of the volume containing the main award, the
arbitrators observed as follows:
“AT states that the Respondent was obliged to provide access
roads as required under the construction programme and nonfulfilment of this fundamental and essential requirement – which
are in the nature of contractual stipulations – will result in
fundamental breach of Contract.
(ii) At page 97 of the award volume, the arbitrators recorded as
follows:
“The three issues – Delay due to non-availability of the Principal
Access Road being constructed and maintained by the
Respondent. Delay in issue of Construction drawings and the
Non-supply/Short supply of explosives have a cascading effect on
the progress of construction, i.e. planned use of cement being not
possible.
(iii) At page 106 of the award volume the arbitrators recorded the
following upon appreciating the entire perspective of the matter:
“The bad road conditions existing right from the contract was
awarded and delay in providing the Principal Access Road and
other Access Road as per the contract conditions, of which the
Construction Programme is an integral part has a major
contribution in the delaying the project beyond the original time
limit of 24 months. This situation has a cascading effect on
further activities in mobilization of machinery & manpower. The
Claimant has also pleaded that it was compelled to revise the
Construction Programme on 4 (four) occasions.”
(iv) Similarly, at page 110 of the award volume the arbitrators
laid great emphasis on the bad or unready access roads to the
project site being the overarching reason for the delay in the
execution of the work. The following passages bring out such
sentiment:
“The AT also notes the Claimant’s reference to letter dated
07.06.2004 wherein the access roads issue has been raised and
said to be affecting the transport of construction materials.”
“The AT finds that once again it is the bad road conditions
causing problems of mobilisation/transportation not only for the
Claimant but also for the Respondent, who had the contractual
obligation to supply construction materials like cement and steel
to the works as per the construction programme. The
administrative requirements to get the permission from the Forest
Department of neighbouring State of Assam delayed the
extraction and transportation of boulders/stone/sand. In view of
these interdependent conditions the delay is primarily on account
of reasons attributable to the Respondent.”
(v) Finally, while dealing with the legal submission and referring
to the precedent cited, the arbitrators observed as follows at page
240 of the award volume:
“The Tribunal finds that the Claimant has not pleaded frustration
of a contract, but has stated that the Respondent has failed to keep
up its promise to provide the Principal Access Road and the
Access Road to the standard stipulated in the Construction
Programme forming part of the Contract resulting into delay in
performance for which the Respondent alone is responsible.
Needless to say that without approach road in place
Machinery/Materials cannot be brought to the site by the
Claimant to perform as per the Construction Programme, and for
the consequential delays in performance of the Contract the
Respondent alone is responsible.”
51.
The contractor suggests that in the case of a works contract as the
present one and in assessing the disputes that are raised, the commercial
terms of a contract cannot be divorced from the reality for a
dispassionate adjudication merely on the basis of the cold print. The
contractor cites the example of tunnelling work being undertaken with
sufficient explosives being available and men and machinery ready to
complete the work within the envisaged schedule. According to the
contractor, tunnelling work would involve the initial act of blasting the
rock and then insert supports to prop of the roof and stop it from caving
in before cement plastering is undertaken to keep the roof in place. The
contractor laments that in the present case upon the initial blasting being
conducted and before the roof could be cement-plastered, it had to be
supported by steel rib structures. However, upon the steel rib structures,
which were designed and supplied by the employer, not being able to
bear the load, the availability of adequate men, machinery and
explosives became meaningless since the work of plastering the ceiling
could not be undertaken without the support structure holding up the
roof.
52.
As to the quantification of the several heads of claim by the
arbitrators, the contractor refers to the first of the tables in the award
appearing in the main award volume at page 129 thereof. In the relevant
table, the two major amounts awarded are Rs.4,77,35,052/- on account
of rental charges on idle and under-utilised plant and equipment during
the contract period and a further sum of Rs.8,55,53,933/- on account of
payment made to manpower deployed through sub-contractors who
were rendered idle or under-utilised during the contract period.
53.
The relevant table indicates the claim on account of such idle
machinery to be in excess of Rs.14.06 crore and the claim on account of
idle manpower to be in excess of Rs.11.81 crore for the stipulated
period of the contract. The arbitrators dealt with the two claims as per
the calculations and basis therefor indicated in Appendix-I which
contains two tables running into several pages and detailing various
items of machinery and manpower in respect of different parts of the
work.
54.
The contractor next refers to page 161 of the main award volume
which is the last page of the table pertaining to divers items of
machinery. In the note at the foot of the table at page 161 of the main
award volume, the arbitrators indicate that the basis for assessing
amounts under the individual sub-heads for machinery was the “Central
Water Commission Guidelines for Preparation of Project Estimates for
River Valley Projects, March, 1997 (Second Revised Edition) & Central
Water Commission Guide Book on Use Rate Hire Charges and Transfer
Value of Equipment and Spare Parts, December, 1988 (Third Edition).”
The contractor asserts that depreciation, interest, multiplier factors and
other parameters indicated in the relevant tables pertaining to idle
machinery are on the basis of the Central Water Commission guidelines
and the same is evident from the relevant appendix.
55.
Similarly, the contractor refers to page 163 of the main award
volume where the arbitrators clearly indicate the contractual terms on
the basis of which payment required to be made for the labour
component is ascribed 25 per cent of the value of the work achieved
during the stipulated contract period. The contractor next places from
the body of the award that it was the admitted position in course of the
references that during the 24-month period from the date of issuance of
the letter of intent on September 28, 2001 till September 27, 2003 only
21.4 per cent of the value of the work had been executed. The total
value of the work was slightly in excess of Rs.67.52 crore and there can
be no dispute that the total work done during the original period of two
years was of value of Rs.14.42 crore. Thus, the contractor points out,
that the shortfall in the execution of work was to the extent of 78.6 per
cent and it is the quantum of shortfall that was taken as the guiding
factor by the arbitrators for assessing the quantum of loss occasioned to
the contractor during the stipulated period of the contract and the
consequent damages that the contractor was entitled to. The respondent
is quick to demonstrate the copious references in the award to the
“Hindrance Register” that was maintained by the parties and had been
produced in course of the references.
56.
As to the perceived failure on the part of the arbitral tribunal to
deal with some specific objections raised by the employer or furnish
adequate reasons for rendering a finding that the employer was in
breach, the respondent places copiously from the award to maintain that
basic reasons were furnished while dealing with every instance of
hindrance cited by the contractor and accepted by the arbitrators. The
contractor also submits that in the limited exercise that the Court is
required to perform at this stage, the adequacy of reasons cannot be
gone into once it is noticed that there are some reasons which have been
furnished.
57.
On the issue of interest and the meaning and purport of clause 55
of Book II, the respondent claims that such clause was not cited in the
statement of defence as a bar; nor was the relevant clause pressed into
service at the hearing stage of the references. Upon the appellant
revealing that the relevant clause was quoted in its voluminous written
submission filed before the arbitrators, the respondent suggests that if a
point of prohibition is not indicated at the outset or urged at the hearing
but it is surreptitiously included in the written notes submitted at the
conclusion of the hearing, such ground taken for the first time after the
conclusion of the hearing has to be discarded.
58.
For such purpose, the respondent first relies on a judgment
reported at (2018) 2 SCC 182 (Union of India v. Susaka Private Ltd). At
paragraph 17 of the report, the submission on behalf of the awardholder claimant before the Supreme Court is recorded to the effect that
the ground of prohibition in the contract to entertain a particular head of
claim was neither urged before the arbitral tribunal nor before the Single
Bench or the Division Bench of the High Court and, as such, such
ground could not be permitted to be raised for the first time in
proceedings arising under Article 136 of the Constitution. As to the
ratio decidendi of the judgment, the respondent refers to paragraphs 20
to 22 of the report:
“20. On the other hand, we find that in Section 11(5) proceedings,
the appellant did not raise this objection in their reply and instead
gave their express consent to refer the issue of award of interest
payable on various claims (1 to 17) to the Arbitral Tribunal
considering the said claim to be arbitrable under the contract.
“21. In our opinion, the appellant could have registered their
objection before the Single Judge at the time of making a
reference to the Arbitral Tribunal by pointing out Clause 13(3) of
GCC or could have reserved their right to raise such objection
before the Arbitral Tribunal. It was, however, not done.
“22. Not only that, we further find that the appellant, in their
reply, filed before the Arbitral Tribunal also did not raise this plea
and allowed the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate the said issue on
merits.”
59.
With respect, paragraph 20 of the judgment is an observation that
may not be seen to be a part of the ratio decidendi rendered in the
judgment. In course of paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment, the
Supreme Court merely noticed that at a stage when a request was before
the Chief Justice of the relevant High Court or his designate to order a
reference, no objection on the ground that interest was not payable in
terms of the contract had been taken. However, the observation in such
regard cannot be read to imply that simply because a claim included an
interest component and at the pre-reference stage the respondent had not
asserted the clause in the contract prohibiting payment of interest, it was
precluded from urging the ground in course of the reference.
60.
What the respondent seeks to assert by referring to paragraphs 20
and 21 of the judgment defies logic. For a start, requests under Section
11 of the Act do not require the entire claim to be elaborately indicated.
Further, the right to object to a request under Section 11 of the Act has
more to do with the existence of the arbitration agreement or the
entitlement to seek a reference than the merits of the claim that may be
carried to the reference. As a matter of fact, a fair-minded opponent
may concede to a request made under Section 11 of the Act, but that
would not imply an admission of the claim as a consequence of the fair
concession to go to a reference.
61.
The ratio in Susaka must be confined to paragraphs 22 and 24 of
the report where the Supreme Court declined the ground to be urged in
course of an appeal with special leave since such ground had not been
canvassed before the arbitral tribunal or in course of the two stages
before the High Court.
62.
The respondent has next carried a judgment reported at (1985) 2
SCC 670 (Daman Singh v. State of Punjab) for the observation at
paragraph 13 of the judgment by a Constitution Bench:
“13. The final submission of Shri Ramamurthi was that several
other questions were raised in the writ petition before the High
Court but they were not considered. We attach no significance to
this submission. It is not unusual for parties and counsel to raise
innumerable grounds in the petitions and memoranda of appeal
etc., but, later, confine themselves, in the course of argument to a
few only of those grounds, obviously because the rest of the
grounds are considered even by them to be untenable. No party or
counsel is thereafter entitled to make a grievance that the grounds
not argued were not considered. If indeed any ground which was
argued was not considered it should be open to the party
aggrieved to draw the attention of the court making the order to it
by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The time
of the superior courts is not to be wasted in enquiring into the
question whether a certain ground to which no reference is found
in the judgment of the subordinate court was argued before that
court or not?”
63.
The principle enunciated in the passage quoted above would not
apply in the present case because, in the scheme of arbitration law, an
application in the nature of review or clarification cannot be carried
back to an arbitral tribunal which has rendered an award and has
become functus officio. It is true that in accordance with Section 33 of
the Act, an award may be corrected after it is pronounced, but there is
no provision for seeking a review or a clarification from the arbitral
tribunal in respect of the contents of an award. Such limitation arises out
of the very nature of the arbitral tribunal which is a consensual forum
and has only so much authority as is conferred by contract or statute
unlike the overwhelming sovereign authority exercised by a regular
court which has the power to review, correct, clarify and modify its
orders unless its authority to do complete justice in such regard is
curbed or curtailed by any express provision or by unavoidable
necessary implication.
64.
It would be dishonest to suggest that every footy-little ground
urged in course of a matter is invariably recorded in the judgment and
dealt with. Though the larger grounds canvassed ought to be recorded
and dealt with, some insignificant grounds are ignored by judges in the
usual course and some others may be, accidentally or otherwise, missed
out. But merely because a ground that was urged, or is claimed to have
been urged, is not reflected in the judgment, it should not be a stumbling
block for a deserving litigant; particularly, when the judgment in
question is an arbitral award.
65.
In the present case, the arbitral tribunal referred to the objection
taken by the appellant herein on the ground of interest but observed that
there was no specific provision in the matrix contract that the arbitrators
discovered which took away their authority to grant pre-reference or
pendente lite interest. However, whether or not clause 55 from Book II
was specifically raised in course of the hearing in the references, it is
evident that the arbitral tribunal invited written submissions to be filed
and accepted such documents. Once the arbitral tribunal agreed to
accept written submissions and the prohibitory clause was specifically
referred to therein, since the ground went to the very authority of the
arbitral tribunal to grant pre-award interest, due cognizance thereof
ought to have been taken. Indeed, a copy of the appellant’s written
submission must have been forwarded to the respondent herein and
there is no denial by the respondent of the receipt thereof. It was then
incumbent on the respondent upon noticing the ground taken in the
written submission that had not been urged in course of the hearing to
request the arbitrators to allow the respondent to deal with such ground
since the award was not pronounced immediately upon receipt of the
written submissions. In the respondent failing to adopt such course of
action despite the ground of prohibition of pre-award interest being
squarely taken in the appellant’s written submission, the respondent’s
present submission that the ground was not canvassed at the hearing
cannot be countenanced. The essence of the matter is whether the
prohibitory clause was brought to the notice of the arbitrators and the
respondent prior to the award being passed. And the answer is squarely
in favour of the appellant. As such, it is exceptionable that the appellant
would now be estopped from relying on the relevant provision on the
ground that the point was not expressly taken in course of the hearing in
the references.
66.
The alternative argument of the respondent on interest is that the
relevant provision did not prohibit interest being awarded at all for the
pre-award period. In furtherance of such contention, the respondent first
relies on a judgment reported at (1999) 1 SCC 63 (State of UP v. Harish
Chandra and Co). The relevant clause is found at paragraph 9 of the
report and requires to be set out:
“1.9 No claim for delayed payment due to dispute etc.– No claim
for interest or damages will be entertained by the Government
with respect to any moneys or balances which may be lying with
the Government owing to any dispute, difference; or
misunderstanding between the Engineer-in-Charge in marking
periodical or final payments or in any other respect whatsoever.”
67.
Such clause was interpreted at paragraph 10 of the report on the
following lines:
“10. A mere look at the clause shows that the claim for interest by
way of damages was not to be entertained against the
Government with respect to only a specified type of amount,
namely, any moneys or balances which may be lying with the
Government owing to any dispute, difference between the
Engineer-in-Charge and the contractor; or misunderstanding
between the Engineer-in-Charge and the contractor in marking
periodical or final payments or in any other respect whatsoever.
The words “or in any other respect whatsoever” also referred to
the dispute pertaining to the moneys or balances which may be
lying with the Government pursuant to the agreement meaning
thereby security deposit or retention money or any other amount
which might have been with the Government and refund of which
might have been withheld by the Government. The claim for
damages or claim for payment for the work done and which was
not paid for would not obviously cover any money which may be
said to be lying with the Government. Consequently, on the
express language of this clause, there is no prohibition which
could be culled out against the respondent-contractor that he
could not raise the claim for interest by way of damages before
the arbitrator on the relevant items placed for adjudication...”
68.
Though the judgment in Harish Chandra was rendered in the
context of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the respondent submits that it
relies on such judgment for the interpretation of a provision that is
similar to clause 55 of Book II on which the appellant relies in the
present case. The respondent suggests that since the Supreme Court
interpreted the similar provision with the identical words in the end of
“or in any other respect whatsoever” to imply that such words of
restriction had to be confined to the words preceding them in the
provision and not read as a universal bar on account of interest, it
matters little that the arbitral tribunal in the present case did not refer to
clause 55 of Book II or discuss the matter since the law established in
such regard would go to demonstrate that such a provision cannot be
inferred to be a provision prohibiting interest being awarded at all.
69.
The respondent has also carried a judgment rendered under the
1996 Act and reported at (2009) 12 SCC 26 (Sayeed Ahmed and
Company v. State of UP) to demonstrate how the interpretation of
another similar provision in such case was a complete departure from
the decision in Harish Chandra by virtue of a few additional words
being present in the relevant clause. The provision from the contract
that was cited as prohibiting any interest till the date of the award is
found at paragraph 7 of the report:
“7. G. 1.09. No claim for interest or damages will be entertained
by the Government with respect to any money or balance which
may be lying with the Government or any become due owing to
any dispute, difference or misunderstanding between the
Engineer-in-Charge on the one hand and the contractor on the
other hand or with respect to any delay on the part of the
Engineer-in-Charge in making periodical or final payment or any
other respect whatsoever.”
70.
In Sayeed Ahmed, the Court noticed that the words “or any
become due owing” did not appear in the relevant clause in Harish
Chandra and the Court held as follows at paragraph 19 of the report:
“19. But in the present case, Clause G1.09 is significantly
different. It specifically provides that no interest shall be payable
in respect of any money that may become due owing to any
dispute, difference or misunderstanding between the Engineer-inCharge and contractor or with respect to any delay on the part of
the Engineer-in-Charge in making periodical or final payment or
in respect of any other respect whatsoever. The bar under Clause
G1.09 in this case being absolute, the decision in Harish Chandra
will not assist the appellant in any manner.”
71.
The respondent has brought a judgment reported at (2012) 12
SCC 10 (Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd v. Jaiprakash
Associates Ltd) which was a case between the same parties as in the
later Jaiprakash Associates judgement of 2019 cited by the appellant. In
both cases of Jaiprakash Associates of 2012 and 2019, the judgments
relied on not one, but two clauses from the contract to maintain that the
combined effect of the two clauses was that pre-award interest could not
be granted.
72.
In the 2019 case of Jaiprakash Associates, the Supreme Court
recorded the appellant’s submission, at paragraph 8 of the report, to the
effect that the words “or any other respect whatsoever” occurring in the
second of the two clauses ought to be read ejusdem generis and should
take their colour from the earlier part of the clause. The same paragraph
also recorded the appellant’s contention that the second of the two
clauses was similar to the relevant clause in Harish Chandra where it
was interpreted to not preclude the arbitrators from granting pre-award
interest. At paragraph 9 of the report in the 2019 Jaiprakash Associates
case, the alternate submission on behalf of the appellant is noticed: that
since almost identical clauses had been differently interpreted in the
2012 case of Jaiprakash Associates and in Harish Chandra, there was a
conflict which required resolution.
73.
It may do well at this stage to see the two relevant clauses from
Jaiprakash Associates which were numbered differently in 2012 and in
2019. The numbers indicated below are from the 2019 judgment:
“Clause 50.0 Interest on money due to the contractor
No omission on the part of the Engineer in charge to pay the
amount due upon measurement or otherwise shall vitiate or make
void the contract, nor shall the contractor be entitled to interest
upon any guarantee or payments in arrears nor upon any balance
which may on the final settlement of his account, be due to him.”
“Clause 51.0 No claim for delayed payment due to dispute, etc.
No claim for interest or damage will be entertained or be payable
by the corporation in respect of any amount or balance which
may be lying with the corporation owing to any dispute,
difference or misunderstanding between the parties or in respect
of any delay or omission on the part of the Engineer in charge in
making intermediate or final payments or in any other respect
whatsoever.”
74.
The respondent submits that since both Sayeed Ahmed and the
2019 case of Jaiprakash Associates noticed Harish Chandra and did not
detract therefrom but distinguished it on the relevant clause in Harish
Chandra being somewhat different, the present scenario should be
governed by the dictum in Harish Chandra which is closer to clause 55
of Book II than the two clauses conjointly read as a bar in Jaiprakash
Associates. The respondent also suggests that the additional words
found in the middle of the Sayeed Ahmed clause is absent in the present
case.
75.
On the other hand, the appellant refers to paragraph 22 from the
2019 case of Jaiprakash Associates to indicate why the principle of
ejusdem generis was inapplicable in that case and the same reasoning
should hold good in the present case:
“22. Insofar as argument based on the principle of ejusdem
generis is concerned, the Division Bench has held that is not
applicable in the present case. We find that it is rightly so held.
Ejusdem generis is the rule of construction. The High Court has
negated this argument in the following manner: (Jaiprakash
Associate case, SCC OnLine Del para 18)
“18. The rule of ejusdem generis guides us that where two
or more words or phrases which are susceptible of
analogous meaning are coupled together, a noscitur a
sociis, they are to be understood to mean in their cognate
sense and take colour from each other but only if there is a
distinct genus or a category. Where this is lacking i.e.
unless there is a category, the rule cannot apply.”
As rightly held, the rule of ejusdem generis would be applied
only if there is distinct genus or a category, which is lacking in
the instant case. This rule is applicable when particular words
pertaining to a clause, category or genus are followed by general
words. In such a situation, the general words are construed as
limited to things of same kind as those specified. In that sense,
this rule reflects an attempt “to reconcile incompatibility between
the specific and general words in view of the other rules of
interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if
possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no
words in a statute were presumed to be superfluous. [See Lokmat
Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Shankarprasad.]”
76.
It must be clarified at this stage that the work pertaining to the
three lots – Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3 – was allotted to Patel Engineering
Ltd and the two road construction contracts – for 17 km and 13 km –
were awarded to a joint venture by the name of Advance Construction
Private Ltd which was formed by Patel Engineering Ltd along with
another entity. There is no conflict of interest between Patel
Engineering Ltd and Advance Construction Private Ltd.
77.
The claims carried by the relevant contractor in respect of the
three lots – Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3 – and in respect of the two road
construction contracts – one for 17 km and the other for 13 km –
pertained to the similar matters and heads over different periods of time
for the most part. Thus, in respect of Lot 1 a similar claim was made for
the contractual period of September 28, 2001 to September 27, 2003 as
was made for the extended period from October 1, 2003 to May 31,
2004. Then came the period of suspension but the entirety of the period
of suspension is not covered in the first set of five references made and
the claims pertaining to the remainder of the period of suspension of
work up to the completion of the project are the subject-matter of other
pending or proposed references.
78.
In respect of Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3, compensation for loss or
extra expenses incurred due to suspension of works had been claimed,
first for the period of June 9, 2004 till March 31, 2005, next from April
1, 2005 to June 20, 2005 and, finally, from July 1, 2005 to September
30, 2005. In addition, two further similar claims were carried for
reimbursement of extra cost on account of transportation and
reimbursement of cost of excess cement. In the two roads construction
contracts, the three periods of claim were from June 9, 2004, when the
suspension of work commenced, till March 31, 2005; from April 1,
2005 to June 30, 2005 and from July 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005.
For the first period in either case of road construction, the claim was on
account of additional expenses for suspension of work. The added
claims for the two other periods were on account of additional rental
charges for machinery, interest on mobilisation, additional expenses for
keeping bank guarantees alive, overhead expenses and loss of profit and
the like. In the five awards covering Lots 1, 2 and 3, the 17-km road and
the 13-km road, the principal sums awarded in the independent awards
rendered upon all the references being heard analogously were
approximately Rs.31.06 crore, Rs.19 crore, Rs.3.62 crore, Rs.1.90 crore
and Rs.1.32 crore, respectively. In each case, pre-reference and
pendente lite interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum has been
awarded and in each of the first four references, the amount of interest
for such period has been quantified. Further, the entire principal and
interest as the adjudged sum awarded carries interest in each case at 12
per cent per annum post-award after affording some time for payment.
79.
The parties submit that in accordance with a policy now in vogue,
75 per cent of the awarded amounts, inclusive of interest till the date of
payment, has been paid by the appellant to the relevant contractor
against bank guarantees for the amounts that have been released.
80.
On the issue of bias, the appellant claims that it was unaware in
course of the references and the several hearings held in New Delhi, that
some or all the arbitrators had accepted the hospitality of the contractor
and had been accommodated in the contractor’s guesthouse in the
capital. The underlying suggestion is that the arbitrators may have dined
and more with officials of the contractor and, thus, were more
favourably disposed towards the contractor while making the
adjudication.
81.
The appellant extols the virtues of independence and
impartiality in adjudication and lectures that justice must not only be
done but must also be seen to be done. The appellant claims that it had
no inkling of the arbitrators putting up at the contractor’s guesthouse in
New Delhi and the matter accidentally came to the knowledge of the
appellant in course of a hearing in the second set of references on or
about November 26-27, 2016. By such time, the individual awards had
already been rendered following the common hearings. The awards
pertaining to the work covered by Lots 1, 2 and 3 were rendered on
August 21, 2016 and the two awards in respect of the road constructions
were made on October 14, 2016.
82.
At this stage a point of principle may be made: that allegations
of bias or prejudice ought not to be allowed to be made casually or,
upon being made, ought not to be overlooked or disregarded. The robust
charge made by the appellant in this case is that since the arbitrators
stayed at the contractor’s guesthouse in New Delhi and rubbed
shoulders with the contractor’s officials, the arbitrators may have been
influenced thereby or felt obliged to favour the contractor. It is a frontal
charge on the conduct of the arbitrators and a finger raised against their
integrity. When a charge of such kind is made with the insinuation that
extraneous considerations led to the making of an award or influenced
the considerations that went into the process of adjudication, the court
must sit up and take notice.
83.
In such a scenario it is the duty of the court to ensure that the
charges are made with a degree of responsibility since reputations of the
arbitrators are at stake. Every person, whatever may be his status or
position in society or financial ability, is entitled to his reputation and a
blot on a person’s integrity would be a serious matter and an affront to
the ordinary dignity that he is entitled to.
84.
Upon the appellant being queried by the Court as to whether the
appellant picked up the bills for the arbitrators’ travel and
accommodation, it is submitted by the appellant that no break-up for
travel or accommodation was available with the appellant since the
contractor as the claimant would pay the entire fees of the arbitrators
and reimburse their costs and forward bills indicating the appellant’s
share therein. The appellant also informs the Court that the bills on such
account have not yet been paid by the appellant.
85.
It appears that the petitions challenging the five independent
awards in respect of the three lots of work were filed on or about
October 26, 2016 in respect of Lot 1; November 28, 2016 in respect of
Lot 2 and December 2, 2016 in respect of Lot 3. In respect of the road
construction orders, the petitions challenging the two awards were filed
on December 9, 2016 and December 20, 2016.
86.
Despite the appellant’s assertion that the appellant came to be
aware of the arbitrators having accepted the hospitality of the contractor
on or about November 26-27, 2016, none of even the later petitions
challenging the awards contains a ground of bias on such account. Since
the relevant discovery is alleged to have been made after the petition
challenging the award in respect of Lot 1 was filed on October 26, 2016
and a day or two shy of the award in respect of Lot 2 being challenged
on November 28, 2016, it is understandable that such petitions did not
contain the ground of bias that is fashioned here. However, the three
other petitions challenging the awards were filed in early, mid and endDecember, 2016. The ground of bias upon the arbitrators enjoying the
hospitality of the contractor is not expressly taken in any of such
petitions. Indeed, such ground of bias was sought to be incorporated
only by way of an amendment to each of the petitions filed under
Section 34 of the Act only in June, 2019. It is clear that such ground
was taken as an afterthought and amounted to a drowning man clutching
at straws.
87.
In support of the appellant’s contention that bias need not be
proved to the hilt and a party may only indicate the likelihood of bias
for the Court to accept the same, a decision reported at AIR 1962 Bom
274 (Air Corporations Employees’ Union v. DV Vyas) has been carried
by the appellant. In that case certain disputes were referred for
adjudication pursuant to an agreement under Section 10A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent before the Bombay High
Court, a retired Judge of that Court, was nominated as the independent
chairman of the committee of arbitration. The matter pertained to Air
India International Corporation and the chairman of the arbitral
committee and his wife took the inaugural Boeing flight from the then
Bombay to the United States of America at the invitation of Air India.
An award came to be made which was challenged before the Bombay
High Court. One of the grounds canvassed was that since the chairman
of the arbitral committee and his wife availed free air passage from
Bombay to New York and back and even hospitality during their sevenday stay in the US, the award should be annulled. The Court held that
courts have always zealously upheld the principle that is not merely
sufficient that justice is done but that justice must be seen to be done.
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court expressed its opinion
that by accepting hospitality from one of the parties to the dispute
before him, the chairman of the arbitration committee “rendered himself
incompetent to be a Judge of the cause before him.”
88.
The dictum may not be applicable in the present context. The
appellant and its officials were aware that the arbitrators may not have
been from Delhi and were required to obtain accommodation in Delhi to
conduct the hearings in the references. It is the duty of a party to an
arbitral reference to not only pay the fees of the arbitrators but to also
reimburse the expenses incurred by the arbitrators on account of travel
and accommodation. With reasonable diligence, the appellant and its
officials could have discovered where the arbitrators had been
accommodated and it appears to be somewhat difficult to believe that it
was only after the protracted hearings in the first set of references were
over and the second set of references had commenced that the appellant
or its officials came to know of the arbitrators being put up at the
contractor’s guesthouse in New Delhi during some of the hearings. This
was not a situation where an adjudicator had accepted a freebie from
one of the parties and then sat to adjudicate a dispute between such
party and another.
89.
An incidental ground of prejudice is also introduced, the
insinuation again being that the arbitrators were too mixed up with the
contractor in this case for the awards rendered by them to be accepted.
The allegation in such regard is that upon some unpleasant exchange
taking place in course of an initial hearing in the second set of
references, the arbitrators applied to the court for punitive measures to
be taken against the officials of the appellant herein for such officials
having attributed motives to the arbitrators. The more important point
made in such regard is that the relevant application was filed through
Advocate-on-Record representing the contractor in the arbitral
references or the subsequent proceedings in court.
90.
The arbitrators in this case were engineers or technocrats and
may not have been lawyers or retired Judges. But just as the Court
would throw an award procured by corrupt means into the nearest
dustbin, it must not allow its platform to be abused by the derelict and
the recalcitrant to launch an unsubstantiated tirade against the reputation
of any person. Just as the reputation of a Judge ought, presumably, to be
the highest badge that he wears, the court must also guard against the
reputation of any other being sullied by desperate litigants.
91.
In the light of the cumulative effect of the point of bias and the
attendant prejudice sought to be canvassed, this Court deemed it
appropriate to indicate it to the appellant that the appellant was well
within its right to pursue the grounds, but it had to be done responsibly
since it involved the reputations of arbitrators, including the one
possibly nominated by the appellant.
92.
At such stage, Counsel appearing for the appellant takes
responsibility and, without obtaining instructions from client, submits
that the ground of bias is not pressed by the appellant. Since senior
Counsel representing a client has a degree of implicit authority, when a
considered submission is made to abandon a ground, the court may
accept the ground to have been abandoned by the client itself.
93.
Accordingly, no finding of this Court need be rendered on the
ground of bias but it must be observed that courts should be wary in
allowing such grounds to be taken recklessly. A ground of bias of the
present kind pertains to a matter of moral turpitude and the courts have
to guard against its open forum being used for irresponsible
mudslinging.
94.
This may also be the appropriate place to deal with the other
overarching submission of the appellant that the Gauhati High Court
order of April 30, 2010 intended both set of references to be taken up by
a common arbitral tribunal. There is no doubt that paragraph 14 of the
relevant order recorded that the parties had agreed that in case of other
disputes which may arise in future in respect of the same contracts, they
would be jointly referred for arbitration to the same panel of arbitrators.
95.
It must not be lost sight of that the recusal by the panel of
arbitrators which rendered the awards impugned herein was as a
consequence of an allegation of bias being brought against them by the
appellant herein and some rude words used against them in course of a
hearing in the second set of references. Indeed, if the arbitrators had
some ill-motive, they would have stuck to their ground, contested the
flimsy charge of bias levelled and waited for the order of Court in such
regard. But these arbitrators may not have been thick-skinned judges or
career lawyers and deemed it fit to give up their mandate since their
integrity had been called into question.
96.
In the light of the ground of bias having been consciously
abandoned after it was belatedly taken by way of an afterthought and
the second set of references going to a completely new arbitral tribunal,
there does not appear to be any good reason to undo the impugned
awards on the specious pretext that all the disputes were required to be
taken up by one panel of arbitrators in the order of reference. Indeed, it
is the appellant which has brought about this unusual situation and the
appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage thereof. At any rate,
there is no ground of such kind under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, to
which all source of authority in this jurisdiction must be traced, to annul
the impugned awards and require the elaborate exercise to be
undertaken afresh.
97.
Apart from the ground of bias that was initially argued and, later,
given up and the appellant’s suggestion that since all the references
could not be dealt with by the same panel of arbitrators, the impugned
awards should be set aside and all disputes referred to a panel already in
seisen of similar references, which ground has been repelled as
indicated earlier in this judgment, the remainder of the challenge is
founded on the arbitrators having exceeded their authority in
overlooking express or implied provisions in the contract to allow
certain heads of claim and the ground of patent illegality for there being
no basis, justification or reasons being furnished for quantification of
the sums allowed under divers heads and sub-heads of claim.
98.
At the initial stage, the heads of challenge fashioned by the
appellant coupled with the submission that there was no quantification
of the sums awarded on the basis of the several heads of breach
perceived to have been committed by the appellant, appeared to be
attractive. After all, even though it is accepted that while assessing
damages a certain degree of guesswork based on rough estimations
would occur, it was difficult to comprehend as to how the delay
attributed to the appellant on account of supply of materials or faulty
design of tunnel support or deviation in rock strata or the lack of a
proper access road and the like could be quantified in money terms.
99.
However, as it turns out, there were eight aspects that were
highlighted by the contractor as being the main grounds for the very
limited extent of work being completed during the 24-month
contemplated period of the contract. At the same time, the appellant
herein also carried eight grounds of perceived delay on the part of the
contractor that resulted in only a little over a fifth of the value of the
work to be completed within the original contractual period till
September 27, 2003.
100. It is evident on a plain reading of the award and the discussion on
such aspects, that the arbitral tribunal was satisfied that on seven of the
eight counts of delay cited by the contractor, there was breach on the
part of the employer and the delays on such accounts were attributable
to the employer. Likewise, the eight counts of delay attributed by the
employer to the contractor were found not to hold any water and were
rejected. No specific challenge has been canvassed on the rejection of
the several counts of breach on the part of the contractor as alleged by
the employer.
101. In respect of each of the heads of challenge on merits asserted by
the appellant, pertaining to delay in supply of explosives, delay and
short supply of cement and steel, tunnel collapse, rock strata deviation,
extraction of boulders and sand, access roads and delay in issuing
construction drawings, despite certain clauses of the contract being
placed by the employer, there does not appear to be any specific clause
of prohibition for the breach alleged under the several heads to be
disregarded.
102. For instance, on account of tunnel collapse, rock strata and access
roads, the contracts specifically required the bidders to acquaint
themselves with the existing conditions and to factor in the time for
executing the work and the expenses therefor, accordingly. At the same
time, the description of the access road and the nature of the rock
composition were also furnished albeit with the relevant disclaimers. In
a commercial contract, the disclaimers must not be read to a point of
absurdity. The nature of the composition of the rock was indicated and
the data supplied was said to be on the basis of information furnished by
the Geological Survey of India by drilling holes into the rock and
assessing its structure and composition. If every bidder were to carry
out comprehensive examinations of the rock strata before furnishing
their bids, which had to be done within a finite period of time, it would
have been an impossible exercise. Again, even though the poor
condition of the access roads could be seen by the bidder, yet there was
a promise of one road being constructed by the employer along with the
Border Roads Organisation. Further, the plans submitted by the
contractor in this case for moving its men and machinery clearly
stipulated the minimum standards for the access roads so that heavy
vehicles could ply at a regular, if somewhat reduced, speed and did not
have too much of an incline to negotiate. As the arbitrators found, the
access road never adhered to the required standards nor was the other
road constructed even by the end of the initial extended period of
contract or even the date of suspension of the work.
103. As the arbitrators rightly observed, the overarching problem for
the work being undertaken at the project site was the absence of an
access road that prevented, impeded and grossly delayed the reaching of
material and machinery at the project site, not only by the contractor,
but also by the employer in respect of the material that the employer
was obliged to supply to the contractor.
104. In case of none of the seven grounds – delay in supply of
explosives; delay and short supply of cement and steel; tunnel collapse;
rock strata deviation; extraction of boulders; access roads; and, delay in
issuing construction drawings – has the appellant been able to show any
clause in the contract that absolved the appellant of the consequences of
its breach in such regard. In any event, the claims carried by the
contractor were only indirectly based on such grounds which were cited
as hindrances or impediments to the work being carried out and not as
heads of claim. Ordinarily, a prohibitory clause in a contract would
preclude a particular claim being made in monetary terms and not a
charge being brought as a ground for the delay in the execution of the
work.
105. Even if it is accepted that a contract may contain a clause that
prohibits a contractor from claiming any damages on account of any
loss in respect of a particular matter, the same has to be spelt out
clearly. In the present case the endeavour on the part of the appellant
has been to rely on contractual provisions that implied that necessary
care and caution ought to have been taken by the bidders for assessing
various aspects before making a bid or drawing up their estimates of
expenses therefor. There is no doubt that the relevant provisions cast a
responsibility on the bidders and, ultimately, the contractor; but a
prohibition has to be clear, categorical and unambiguous since a
prohibition on such account would be contrary to the natural right of a
contractor to claim damages for breach upon putting the employer on
notice and proceeding with the work notwithstanding the breach.
Further, the arbitral tribunal reckoned that the poor access road was
such an overwhelming impediment to the work being taken up or
executed in a timely manner, that it based its finding of delay primarily
on such account despite finding delay attributable to the employer on
six other aspects of hindrance that the contractor had cited.
106. In commercial contracts, particularly in respect of power projects
and the like where a private contractor is dependent on the public
employer for licenses, permissions, concessional supplies and the like, it
must be recognised that there are reciprocal obligations to be discharged
as in a well-oiled machine for such machine to function smoothly and
produce optimal results. As rightly noticed by the arbitrators, when the
project site could not be approached because of the lack of a proper
access road, all other grounds paled into insignificance.
107. Nonetheless, adequate reasons have been furnished by the
arbitrators in finding the appellant in breach on the seven counts of
hindrances pertaining to delay in supply of explosives, delay and short
supply of cement and steel, tunnel collapse, rock strata deviation,
extraction of boulders, access road and delay in issuing construction
drawings. In respect of tunnel collapse, the arbitrators found that the
steel ribs structure designed by the employer was faulty and required
several modifications. The obvious did not require to be stated
thereafter. If the structure could not support the ceiling or the roof to
afford the contractor sufficient time to apply cement plaster for the roof
to be firmed up, the delay on such count was attributable solely to the
appellant upon noticing that the support structure caved in.
108. Similarly, the arbitrators acknowledged that the contractor could
not have had access to boulders and sand without being given the
requisite assistance in such regard. As much as the appellant flaunts the
assistance rendered through the Chief Minister of Mizoram, it cannot be
missed that only a small percentage of extraction was allowed. Even in
the later periods, meagre amounts of boulders and sand could be
obtained. Given the reality of the situation, it would not do for the
appellant to wash its hands off in such regard and claim that it had
rendered assistance but it was not its obligation to extract the boulders
and sand necessary for the project. What cries out loud is that the
assistance rendered fell woefully short of what was necessary.
109. As to the delay in handing over construction drawings, it appears
to be the fairly admitted position that the appellant failed miserably in
such regard and the ground has been urged more in hope than with any
expectation.
110. That leaves only the ground of interest.
111. Apart from the rival submissions of the parties on the matter
pertaining to interest recorded earlier in this judgment, the legal issue
that the respondent has raised pertains to the amendment in Section
28(3) of the 1996 Act. The respondent submits that the original Section
28(3) has been turned on its head by the amendment as would be
evident from how it read before the amendment and how it now reads as
indicated hereinbelow:
Before amendment
“28(3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance
with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the
usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.”
After amendment
“28(3) While deciding and making an award, the arbitral tribunal
shall, in all cases, take into account the terms of the contract and
trade usages applicable to the transaction.”
112. There is no denying that the provision has undergone a sea
change and, as a consequence, the extent of intervention that the court
can make in respect of an arbitral award is narrowed down from what
was possible when the seminal judgment in ONGC Ltd v. Saw Pipes Ltd
reported at (2003) 5 SCC 705 was delivered.
113. However, it still begs the question despite the qualitative
transformation of what an arbitral tribunal is required to do under
Section 28(3) of the Act, whether the arbitral tribunal in this case
referred to the possible prohibition in clause 55 of Book II of interest
being awarded in respect of any claim under the contract.
114. It is elementary on a plain reading of Section 31 of the Act that
the statute recognises party autonomy in the matter of interest, but only
till the pre-award stage. For the post-award period, the arbitral tribunal
has full authority, subject to an outer limit that has been prescribed in
Section 31(7) of the Act. Thus, it is possible for a contract to contain a
clause that would prohibit any interest to be awarded for the prereference and pendente lite periods. Further, the distinction that courts
made under the 1940 Act of the authority of an arbitrator to award
interest despite a prohibitory clause precluding the parties to the matrix
contract from claiming or granting interest, is no longer relevant under
the present statute. It is clear that in terms of the 1996 Act, if interest is
prohibited or restricted in the agreement between the parties the
prohibition or restriction will apply equally to the arbitrators.
115. Clause 55 of Book II is not referred to at all in the impugned
awards. It, thus, appears that arbitrators had no occasion to interpret or
comprehend the effect of such provision on the permissibility or the
arbitrator’s authority to grant any pre-reference or pendente lite interest.
116. This is a case of not only the arbitrators not deciding the issue in
accordance with the terms of the contract but where the arbitral tribunal
failed to take into account a relevant term crucial in the matter of
adjudication and award of pre-award interest.
117. Though the parties have laboured on the issue by referring to
similar clauses in Harish Chandra, Sayeed Ahmed and the 2012 and the
2019 cases of Jaiprakash Associates, it is evident that the impugned
award has been made without reference to a crucial term in the contract
that was pointed out in the written submission filed on behalf of the
appellant herein. It is one thing for the court, in seisin of a petition
challenging an award, to conclusively decide on the interpretation of a
provision upon a view in such regard being expressed by the arbitral
tribunal and quite another for the court to embark on such exercise
when no opinion on such aspect is expressed in the arbitral award itself.
The matter is of greater significance in the present context particularly
since any conclusive finding on the interpretation of the relevant clause
as to whether it prohibits or permits pre-award interest would operate as
issue estoppel and would have an overarching impact in the other
pending and proposed references.
118. It is only for such reason that in the light of the arbitrators in the
present case not having decided the issue with reference to the relevant
provision that was cited in such regard by the appellant, that the court
desists from undertaking such exercise in the limited scope available
under Section 34 of the Act and the rarified atmosphere of an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act against the dismissal of a challenge to an
award.
119. Accordingly, the grant of pre-reference and pendente lite interest
made in each of the five impugned arbitral awards is set aside without
expressing any opinion as to the efficacy of clause 55 of Book II and by
leaving it open to the contractor in each case to carry the claim further
in accordance with law. The challenges brought on all other heads stand
repelled. There is sufficient justification for the grant of the limited
amounts under the several heads and sub-heads of claim and the
impugned awards indicate basis for the quantification in the several
appendices. The arbitrators have referred to the applicable Central
Water Commission guidelines, the terms of the contract and the
formulae and principles in Hudson’s venerable treatise on Building and
Engineering Contracts in arriving at the quantification.
120. As to the adequacy or sufficiency of reasons, the matter falls
entirely within the exclusive domain of the arbitrators. It may do well to
remember that the degree of superintendence that a court exercises in
matters pertaining to arbitral awards has more to do with correcting
errors of jurisdiction, where the arbitrators stray beyond the authority
they derive from the contract, and does not extend to errors within
jurisdiction, unless such errors lead to an absurd conclusion or result in
manifest miscarriage of justice.
121. It is often said that a court does not sit with a fine tooth-comb to
look for the i’s that have not been dotted or the t’s that have not been
crossed in an arbitral award. When it comes to sufficiency of reasons, as
long as the discussion reveals the application of the mind to the matter
in issue and the finding has reasonable nexus therewith, the court will
not interfere. Indeed, embarking on an exercise to ascertain whether
adequate reasons have been furnished may result in a re-appreciation of
the evidence, which the court is neither required nor authorised to do in
this jurisdiction. As long as the reasons furnished are not outlandish or
patently absurd, even the subjective satisfaction based on some
discernible objective criteria would pass muster. The underlying basis
for the limited jurisdiction granted to court in arbitration law is that
since the parties had chosen a consensual forum, they must abide by the
result obtained in such private forum, unless there is egregious injustice
caused by the impugned award of the kind that would shock the
conscience of the court.
122. After all, the arbitrators were engineers and not trained lawyers or
judges. Judges often use legal jargon and Latin expressions to convey
certain reasons without elaborating thereon. And that it is not to speak
of the modern trend of churning out judgments that are heavier by
weight than in content, what with page after inane page of intellectual
rubbish sought to be embellished with bombastic words – oftentimes
reeking of malapropism – and littered with obscure Latin expressions to
camouflage the complete lack of substance therein. Engineers may find
certain observations made to be wholesome enough not to require any
further explanation.
123. Since 75 per cent of the amount awarded in each reference,
inclusive of interest, has been received by the relevant award-holder
respondent, the appellant will not be entitled to claim immediate refund
of any amount notwithstanding this order, if appropriate steps in
pursuance of the claim for pre-award interest are taken by the
contractors in accordance with law within the period of limitation.
124. Since the appellant has succeeded in part as indicated above and
the issue as to entitlement to pre-award interest remains wide open, the
parties will pay and bear their own costs.
125. Arb.A. No. 1/2023 with MC (Arb.A.) No. 1/2023 and MC
(Arb.A.) No. 7/2023; Arb.A. No. 2/2023 with MC (Arb.A.) No. 2/2023
and MC (Arb.A.) No. 12/2023; Arb.A. No. 3/2023 with MC (Arb.A.)
No. 3/2023 and MC (Arb.A.) No. 13/2023; Arb.A. No. 4/2023 with MC
(Arb.A.) No. 4/2023 and MC (Arb.A.) No. 14/2023; and, Arb.A. No.
5/2023 with MC (Arb.A.) No. 5/2023 and MC (Arb.A.) No. 15/2023 are
disposed of accordingly.
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
I agree.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
Meghalaya
30.05.2023
“Lam DR-PS”
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