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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 07th January 2026
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MAC.APP. 273/2013 & CM.APPL. 1929/2024
THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
Through:
.....Appellant
Ms. Shruti Jain, Advocate
versus
TANUJ SEHRAWAT & ORS.
Through:
.....Respondent
None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J (Oral)
1.
This appeal has been filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles
Act (“MV Act”) assailing award dated 15th January 2013 passed by the
Judge, Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (“MACT”), Dwarka Courts, New
Delhi in MACT No.144/12/10 titled as “Shri Tanuj Sehrawat v. Shri Jas
Karan Singh & Others”. Vide the said judgment a total compensation of
Rs.1,51,525/- along with interest @7.5% per annum from date of filing of
the claim was awarded to respondent no.1.
2.
While injured Tanuj Sehrawat has been arrayed as respondent no.1,
Jas Karan Singh, driver of vehicle is respondent no.2, Smt. Anshu, owner
of vehicle is respondent no.3, Dinesh Kumar Monga, Superdar is
respondent no.4 and Indian Railways has been arrayed as respondent no.5
in the instant appeal.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR
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MAC.APP. 273/2013
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3.
As noted in order dated 26th November 2025 of the Joint Registrar,
substituted service of respondent no.5 has been accomplished and citations
in that regard have been placed on record.
4.
By order dated 10th February 2020, this appeal was admitted on the
limited issue whether the appellant was entitled to recovery rights against
Railways on the basis of contributory negligence.
5.
Since Railways was not a party in the original appeal, by order dated
25th July 2022, the Court directed for impleadment of Railways as a
respondent and thereafter Railways has been arrayed as respondent no.5.
6.
Considering that process of substituted service stands completed but
no one has appeared on behalf of respondent no.5/Indian Railways, the
matter is being heard ex parte.
Factual Background
7.
The matter pertains to an accident that took place on 8 th March 2008
when respondent no.1/ Tanuj Sehrawat was traveling in a tourist bus No.
RJ-13-PA-0052 from Hissar to Delhi and when the said bus reached near
Brahi-Bahadurgarh Railway Crossing, at about 8:00 AM, the railway
crossing gate was apparently left open by mistake of the gateman. At that
time, Awadh Assam Express No.5610 that was coming from Rohtak side,
struck the tourist bus resulting grievous injuries to the respondent no.l/
Tanuj Sehrawat.
8.
It is stated that the respondent no.1/claimant suffered fracture of
mandible (multiple) (comminuted), fracture of maxilla, fracture of orbit
floor, fracture of scapular, loss of lower molar teeth (left side), bruises and
muscular spasms on back and abdomen, 2 clear cut lacerated wounds below
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chin and below mandible left side, clear, cut lacerated wound on post
aspect of right forearm just below the elbow.
9.
It is stated that firstly the respondent no.1/claimant was taken to
General Hospital, Bahadurgarh. Thereafter, he was referred to PGI Rohtak
and thereafter to M.A. Medical College and Hospital, Agroha and finally to
Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, Rajender Nagar, New Delhi for treatment.
10.
Claimant/respondent no.1 stated that an FIR No.32/2008 under
Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (IPC)
and under Section 175 of The Railways Act, 1989 was registered at Police
Station Rohtak regarding accident in question.
11.
It is stated that the respondent no.1/claimant was 24 years of age and
was a final year student of MBBS at the time of accident. Respondent
no.1/claimant has stated that he had spent Rs.1,50,000/- on his treatment
from 08th March 2008 to 12th March 2008. It is stated that due to this
accident the claimant lost one academic year and was on liquid diet for two
months which resulted in severe weakness. Respondent no.1/claimant
claims that he has spent Rs. 50,000/- on conveyance and Rs. 20,000/- on
special diet. Respondent no.1/claimant has stated that the accident was
caused due to rash and negligent driving of the driver Jas Karan
Singh/respondent no. 2 [respondent no. 1 in MACT No.144/12/10].
12.
The Insurance Company, appellant herein, was arrayed as respondent
no.4 before the Tribunal, who filed the written statement taking an
objection that it had to be proved that the alleged offending vehicle bus was
having a fitness certificate and valid permit to ply said vehicle in Delhi and
till that is proved, no liability can be fastened upon appellant/Insurance
Company. The other objection raised by the appellant/Insurance Company
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was that on the date of accident, driver of the offending vehicle was not
holding a valid and effective driving license.
Analysis
13.
The MACT, in paragraph 20 the impugned judgment, noted the
deposition of respondent no.1/claimant who categorically denied that the
accident had occurred due to any negligence on the part of the Railways.
He also denied having received any claim from the Railways Tribunal or
having knowledge of any inquiry report suggesting negligence of the
Railway Guard. For ease of reference the said paragraph is extracted as
under:
“20. In cross examination, claimant deposed that he has
not received any claim from the Railways Tribunal. He
denied any knowledge regarding inquiry conducted by
Railways Tribunal as per which it was held that the
accident took place due to negligence of Railways Guard.
He denied a suggestion that the accident took place due
to negligence of employees of railways. He deposed that
he had passed final year of MBBS Exam in the same year
in which he had met with the accident and he has not
placed on record any documentary evidence to show that
he had to remain absent for three months from his
regular classes due to accidental injuries.”
(emphasis added)
14.
Further in paragraph 35 of the impugned judgment, Tribunal noted
that basis the FIR which was registered, ultimately culminating into a
charge sheet, charges were framed against driver of vehicle, respondent
no.1/Jas Karan Singh [respondent no.2 herein] and Sube Singh, Gateman of
Railways under Section 175 of the Railways Act, there would be an issue of
contributory negligence of Sube Singh, Gateman of Railways. Since the
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respondent no.1 had not taken defence of contributory negligence,
therefore, no order had been passed against them.
15.
Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company when confronted with
this, could not cite any documentation placed on record to state that they
had taken plea of contributory negligence of Railways which is now sought
to be canvassed in this appeal.
16.
In these circumstances, no evidence having been placed on record or
a plea being taken of contributory negligence before the MACT Court, this
Court does not find any infirmity in order passed by the Court.
17.
Before adverting to the legal position, it may be noted that
contributory negligence, in tort law, contemplates a situation where a
person’s own negligence has materially contributed to the harm suffered,
thereby warranting apportionment of liability to the extent of such
negligence. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Laxman Iyer, 2003 (8) SCC 731, explained the term
‘negligence’, ‘composite negligence’ and ‘contributory negligence’. For
ease of reference relevant paragraph is extracted as under:
“6. The plea which was stressed strenuously related to
alleged contributory negligence. Though there is no
statutory definition, in common parlance “negligence”
is categorised as either composite or contributory. It is
first necessary to find out what is a negligent act.
Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an
omission to do something which a reasonable man
guided upon those considerations, who ordinarily by
reason of conduct of human affairs would do or be
obligated to, or by doing something which a prudent or
reasonable man would not do. Negligence does not
always mean absolute carelessness, but want of such a
degree of care as is required in particular
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circumstances. Negligence is failure to observe, for the
protection of the interests of another person, the degree
of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. The idea of negligence and duty
are strictly correlative. Negligence means either
subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively
careless conduct. Negligence is not an absolute term,
but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. No
absolute standard can be fixed and no mathematically
exact formula can be laid down by which negligence or
lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case.
What constitutes negligence varies under different
conditions and in determining whether negligence exists
in a particular case, or whether a mere act or course of
conduct amounts to negligence, all the attending and
surrounding facts and circumstances have to be taken
into account. It is absence of care according to
circumstances. To determine whether an act would be or
would not be negligent, it is relevant to determine if any
reasonable man would foresee that the act would cause
damage or not. The omission to do what the law
obligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner,
mode or method envisaged by law would equally and
per se constitute negligence on the part of such person.
If the answer is in the affirmative, it is a negligent act.
Where an accident is due to negligence of both parties,
substantially there would be contributory negligence
and both would be blamed. In a case of contributory
negligence, the crucial question on which liability
depends would be whether either party could, by
exercise of reasonable care, have avoided the
consequence of the other's negligence. Whichever party
could have avoided the consequence of the other's
negligence would be liable for the accident. If a person's
negligent act or omission was the proximate and
immediate cause of death, the fact that the person
suffering injury was himself negligent and also
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contributed to the accident or other circumstances by
which the injury was caused would not afford a defence
to the other. Contributory negligence is applicable
solely to the conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there
has been an act or omission on the part of the plaintiff
which has materially contributed to the damage, the act
or omission being of such a nature that it may properly
be described as negligence, although negligence is not
given its usual meaning. (See Charlesworth on
Negligence, 3rd Edn., para 328.) It is now well settled
that in the case of contributory negligence, courts have
the power to apportion the loss between the parties as
seems just and equitable. Apportionment in that context
means that damage is reduced to such an extent as the
court thinks just and equitable having regard to the
claim shared in the responsibility for the damage. But in
a case where there has been no contributory negligence
on the part of the victim, the question of apportionment
does not arise. Where a person is injured without any
negligence on his part but as a result of the combined
effect of the negligence of two other persons, it is not a
case of contributory negligence in that sense. It is a case
of what has been styled by Pollock as injury by
composite negligence. (See Pollock on Torts, 15th Edn.,
p. 361.)”
(emphasis added)
18.
In motor accident claim proceedings, the Tribunal is required to
assess negligence on the touchstone of the preponderance of probabilities,
adopting a holistic and pragmatic view of the evidence rather than insisting
upon strict proof as in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court in Bimla Devi v.
Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530, stated that strict proof of the manner
of the accident is seldom possible and that once the claimants place
material such as the FIR, site plan or eyewitness account, the Tribunal must
accept the occurrence on a ‘preponderance of probabilities’. Relevant
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paragraphs are extracted as under:
“11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal
stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the
parties; its function being to determine the amount of
fair compensation in the event an accident has taken
place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor
vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having
regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the
Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition
but that would not mean that despite evidence to the
effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken
place by reason of an accident caused by a motor
vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of
a post-mortem report vis-à-vis the averments made in a
claim petition.
………
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly
taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to
be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused
by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be
possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants
were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability. The standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.
For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken
into consideration the respective stories set forth by both
the parties.”
(emphasis added)
19.
Similarly, in Kusum Lata v. Satbir, (2011) 3 SCC 646, the Supreme
Court cautioned that the Tribunal and the High Court must not discard
otherwise reliable evidence on hyper-technical grounds, such as nonmention of an eyewitness in the FIR, given the traumatic circumstances in
which such accidents occur. The Court held that MACT proceedings do not
Digitally Signed
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require the strict proof applicable in criminal trials and that the evidence
must be appreciated in a realistic and humane manner. Relevant
observations are as follows:
“8. Both the Tribunal and the High Court have
refused to accept the presence of Dheeraj Kumar as
his name was not disclosed in the FIR by the brother
of the victim. This Court is unable to appreciate the
aforesaid approach of the Tribunal and the High
Court. This Court is of the opinion that when a
person is seeing that his brother, being knocked
down by a speeding vehicle, was suffering in pain
and was in need of immediate medical attention, that
person is obviously under a traumatic condition. His
first attempt will be to take his brother to a hospital
or to a doctor. It is but natural for such a person not
to be conscious of the presence of any person in the
vicinity especially when Dheeraj did not stop at the
spot after the accident and gave a chase to the
offending vehicle. Under such mental strain if the
brother of the victim forgot to take down the number
of the offending vehicle it was also not unnatural.
9. There is no reason why the Tribunal and the High
Court would ignore the otherwise reliable evidence
of Dheeraj Kumar. In fact, no cogent reason has
been assigned either by the Tribunal or by the High
Court for discarding the evidence of Dheeraj
Kumar. The so-called reason that as the name of
Dheeraj Kumar was not mentioned in the FIR, so it
was not possible for Dheeraj Kumar to see the
incident, is not a proper assessment of the fact
situation in this case. It is well known that in a case
relating to motor accident claims, the claimants are
not required to prove the case as it is required to be
done in a criminal trial. The Court must keep this
distinction in mind.”
(emphasis added)
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20.
On the aspect of contributory negligence, the principle consistently
applied by the Supreme Court is that such a defence must be specifically
pleaded and supported by some material indicating that the claimant’s own
act or omission had a proximate role in the accident. In Jiju Kuruvilla v.
Kunjujamma Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 166, the Court held that
apportionment of liability arises only when there exists tangible material to
infer contributory negligence, and mere conjectures cannot dilute the
tortfeasor’s responsibility. Relevant paragraph is extracted as under:
“21. In view of the aforesaid, we, therefore, hold that
the Tribunal and the High Court erred in concluding
that the said accident occurred due to the negligence
on the part of the deceased as well, as the said
conclusion was not based on evidence but based on
mere presumption and surmises.”
(emphasis added)
21.
In Sunita v. Rajasthan SRTC, (2020) 13 SCC 486, the Supreme
Court reiterated that once the foundational fact of the accident stands
established, the Tribunal’s task is to determine just compensation on the
basis of the material placed before it and that the Tribunal is not strictly
bound by the pleadings of the parties. The Court emphasised that the
standard of proof in motor accident claims is one of preponderance of
probabilities, and not the strict standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt
that applies in criminal proceedings. Relevant paragraph is extracted as
under:
“22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident
claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the
actual occurrence of the accident, has been
established, then the Tribunal's role would be to
calculate the quantum of just compensation if the
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accident had taken place by reason of negligence of
the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the
Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the
pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding
cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the
standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of
preponderance of probability and not the strict
standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt
which is followed in criminal cases.”
(emphasis added)
22.
This approach was strengthened in Anita Sharma v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171, where the Court held that hypertechnical rejection of evidence is impermissible and the Tribunal must give
primacy to the overall probabilities emanating from the record. Relevant
paragraph is extracted as under:
“21. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the
High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict
principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a
criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The
standard of proof in such like matters is one of
preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond
reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the
approach and role of courts while examining evidence in
accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with
non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may
happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to
analyse the material placed on record by the parties to
ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely
than not true.”
(emphasis added)
23.
Similarly, in Rajwati v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1699, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Motor Vehicles
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Act is a beneficial legislation and the Tribunal is not bound by strict
pleadings; absent any plea or evidence of contributory negligence, the
Tribunal is not required to frame or decide such an issue. Relevant
paragraphs are extracted as under:
“19. Similarly, in the case of Kusum Lata v. Satbir, this
Court observed that it is well known that in a case
relating to motor accident claims, the claimants are
not required to prove the case as it is required to be
done in a criminal trial. The Court must keep this
distinction in mind.
20. It is well settled that Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a
beneficial piece of legislation and as such, while
dealing with compensation cases, once the actual
occurrence of the accident has been established, the
Tribunal's role would be to award just and fair
compensation. As held by this Court in Sunita (Supra)
and Kusum Lata (Supra), strict rules of evidence as
applicable in a criminal trial, are not applicable in
motor accident compensation cases, i.e., to say, “the
standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of
preponderance of probability and not the strict
standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is
followed in criminal cases”.
(emphasis added)
24.
Applying these principles, it is evident that the appellant/Insurance
Company did not raise any plea of contributory negligence of the Railways
before the MACT nor adduce any evidence to lay the foundation for such a
defence. In these circumstances, the Tribunal correctly refrained from
examining contributory negligence.
25.
The Supreme Court in Prabhavathi & Ors. v. Managing Director,
BMTC, 2025 INSC 293, reaffirmed that a finding of contributory
negligence cannot be inferred in the absence of direct or corroborative
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evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in reversing
the Tribunal’s conclusion where the Tribunal had rightly found no material
to indicate negligence on the part of the deceased. The Court reiterated,
following Jiju Kuruvilla (supra), that negligence cannot be presumed on
mere allegation. It further restated that MACT proceedings are governed by
the standard of preponderance of probabilities, and strict rules of criminal
evidence do not apply. Relevant paragraph is extracted as under:
“10. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the
High Court on the 25% contributory negligence of the
deceased and 75% upon the driver of the bus. We find
ourselves to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal
on this issue. The Tribunal rightly, after considering
the evidence on record and on perusal of the Ex. P3
Spot Mahazar, came to the conclusion that there
wasn’t any sufficient evidence on record, indicating
that the accident occurred due to negligent driving on
the part of the deceased, and after considering the oral
evidence of P.W.1, held the cause of the accident to be
rash and negligent on the part only of the offending
vehicle.
11. Thus, in our considered view, the contributory
negligence taken by the High Court at 25% of the
deceased is erroneous. We advert to the principles laid
down in Jiju Kuruvila v. Kunjujamma Mohan, where
it was held that in the absence of any direct or
corroborative evidence on record, it cannot be
assumed that the accident occurred due to the rash and
negligent driving of both the vehicles. This exposition
came to be followed in Kumari Kiran v. Sajjan Singh
and Ors. In the present case, therefore, on an
allegation simpliciter, it cannot be presumed that the
accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of
both vehicles, for having driven at high speed.
………
13. It is the settled law that under the Motor Vehicle
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Act, 1988 it is established that in compensation cases,
the strict rules of evidence used in criminal trials do
not apply. Instead, the standard of proof is based on
the preponderance of probability. This Court in Sunita
v. Rajasthan SRTC (2020) 13 SCC 468 observed that:
“22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident
claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely,
the actual occurrence of the accident, has been
established, then the Tribunal's role would be to
calculate the quantum of just compensation if the
accident had taken place by reason of negligence
of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing
so, the Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the
pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding
cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the
standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of
preponderance of probability and not the strict
standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt
which is followed in criminal cases.”
The exposition came to be reiterated in Rajwati alias
Rajjo & Ors. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.
& Ors.2022 SCC Online SC 1699, wherein it was
observed that :
“20. It is well settled that Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is a beneficial piece of legislation and as
such, while dealing with compensation cases,
once the actual occurrence of the accident has
been established, the Tribunal's role would be to
award just and fair compensation. As held by this
Court in Sunita (Supra) and Kusum Lata (Supra),
strict rules of evidence as applicable in a criminal
trial, are not applicable in motor accident
compensation cases, i.e., to say, “the standard of
proof to be borne in mind must be of
preponderance of probability and not the strict
standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt
which is followed in criminal cases”.”
(emphasis added)
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26.
Accordingly, in the absence of any plea or evidence before the
Tribunal, the contention of contributory negligence on the part of the
Railways cannot be examined at this stage. The record clearly reflects that
neither the driver nor the appellant/Insurance Company ever raised a
defence attributing negligence to the Railway authorities, nor was any
material placed before the MACT to suggest that the gateman’s conduct
was a proximate or contributing cause of the accident.
27.
The other issue which has been argued relates to amount of
Rs.45,000/- awarded towards pain and suffering and Rs.10,000/- towards
conveyance and special diet and attendant charges. Counsel for appellant
states that the victim/injured suffered no permanent disability and was
hospitalised only for three days.
28.
It is however noted from the impugned award that the appellant
(injured) had suffered fracture left body of mandible and fracture left
scapula. Discharge summary from Sir Ganga Ram Hospital is extracted as
below, which also finds note in paragraph 41 of the impugned judgment:
“41. Claimant was treated at Maharaja Agrasen
Hospital, Agroha, Hissar from 08.03.06 to 10.03.08 and
thereafter he was treated at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital
from 11.03.08 to 12.03.08. He has suffered fracture left
body of mandible and fracture left scapula. Operation
carried out at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital is as under:
“IMF + ORIF done on 11.03.08: Part painted and
draped. Ehrlich arch bar fixation and IMF done.
Teeth in occlusion. Local anesthesia infiltrated in
lower gingivobuccal sulcus opposite 3rd molar. Left
mandibular 3rd molar extracted. Incision given in
mucosa. Fracture site exposed, reduced and fixed
with a 5-hole titanium plate using 4 screws. Mucosal
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incision closed with vicryl 3-0, Chin lacerations
sutured with PDS 5-0 and prolene
4-0. Chin dressing done.”
(emphasis added)
29.
On the basis of estimation of nature of injuries, this Court does not
find any exaggeration in granting compensation of Rs.45,000/- towards
pain and suffering. Medical bills were for Rs.76,525/- as costs of treatment
which was granted and conveyance was granted since injured had to be
shifted from Hisar to Delhi for treatment and Rs.10,000/- each for
conveyance, special diet and attendant charges.
30.
Therefore the total compensation awarded of Rs.1,51,525/- along
with interest @7.5% per annum from date of filing of the claim was
proportionate and reasonable and does not require any interference by this
Court.
31.
The Tribunal was not amiss in awarding compensation; the amounts
granted under pain and suffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special
diet and attendant charges were founded on the medical record and
treatment summaries placed on record, and reflect a fair and proportionate
assessment consistent with the principles in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar
(2011) 1 SCC 343.
32.
In this view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed.
33.
Pending applications are also rendered infructuous.
34.
Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
ANISH DAYAL, J
JANUARY 7, 2026/sm/tk
Digitally Signed
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