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NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Date of reserved for orders
Date of pronouncement
Date of uploading
APHC010549832023
:
:
:
22.09.2026/23.09.2026
12.10.2026
12.10.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3543]
MONDAY, THE 12th DAY OF OCTOBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D.SEKHAR
WP No.28520 OF 2023
AND
WP Nos.8527, 9797, 9805, 10579, 14140, 15681, 21111, 21113,
21117, 21128, 21130, 21879, 21881, 21883, 22277, 22341,
23509, 28457 of 2024
AND
WP Nos.6096, 6161, 6162, 6317, 9069, 9131, 12560, 12731,
13479, 14655, 14675, 14685, 18278, 18732, 19157 19539,
20185, 22201, 23301, 24339, 24803, 25245, 27991 of 2025
AND
WP Nos.141, 216 234, 251, 317, 660, 737, 1023, 1074, 1082,
1089, 1092, 1151, 1196, 1205, 1218, 1424, 1440, 1464, 1482,
1535, 1538, 1574, 1586, 1593, 2013, 2024, 2070, 2083, 2571,
2690, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698, 2700,
2901, 3020, 3120, 3122, 3171, 3249, 3260, 3409, 3455, 3485,
3617, 3682, 3713, 3722, 3758, 3761, 3768, 3769, 3777, 3784,
3786, 3787, 3852, 3880, 3922, 3943, 3949, 4000, 4205, 4218,
4221, 4233, 4234, 4253, 4261, 4290, 4422, 4467, 4526, 4539,
4574, 4620, 4622, 4623, 4645, 5200, 5319, 6021, 6048, 6049,
7421, 7472, 7508, 7522, 8174, 8227, 8273, 8949, 8951, 8957,
9001, 9101, 10425, 10794, 10892, 11273, 11343, 11434, 12297,
12638, 12678, 12928, 13008, 13407, 15852, 16947, 16950,
17982, 17984, 17989, 18528, 19505, 21020, 22602, 22788,
22798, 24212, 25622, 25635, 25636, 25763 and 25803 of 2026
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
WP No.28520 of 2023
Between:
1. BALA SREENIVAS RAO SOMISETTY, S/o Venkata Swamy,
aged 56 years, Occ. Business, H. No.. 7B-12-22, Karicharla Vari
Lane, Eluru, West Godavari District - 534001, Andhra Pradesh
...Petitioner
AND
1. The Income Tax Officer, Ward 1, Eluru, Income Tax Office, 23B-4-6/4, K.K.S. Towers, R R Pet, Eluru, Andhra Pradesh - 534
2. The Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra
Pradesh and Telangana, Hyderabad Room No.. 922, 9th Floor,
'B' Block, I.T.Towers, 10-2-3, AC Guards, Hyderabad - 500 004,
Telangana.
3. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department, National eAssessment Center, New Delhi, Room No.. 401, 2nd Floor, ERamp, Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, New Delhi - 110 003.
...Respondents
!Counsel for the Petitioners
Sri A.V.A. Siva Kartikeya
Sri Kondala Rao Kotapati
Sri P.Pavan Kumar Rao
Sri Vivek Chandra Sekhar
Sri N.Rupeswar Reddy
Sri Dundu Manmohan
Sri V.Harish Kumar
Sri M.V.J.K.Kumar
Sri V Vinod k. Reddy
Sri M.Naga Deepak
Smt.Jyothi Ratna Anumolu
Sri C.Sanjeeva Rao
Sri Phani Viswanath Challa
Sri A. Sarveswar Rao
Sri L.Chandra Obul Reddy
Smt. Mallavolu Nikitha
:
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Sri P. Rama Sharana Sharma
Sri L.Chandra Obul Reddy
Sri G.V.N.Hari
Sri Phani Viswanath Challa
Sri B.Abhay Siddhanth Mootha
Sri K.P.S.Sailesh Reddy
Sri K.Ravindra Nath Tagore
Sri.Kadimisetty Sai Sreenadh
Sri Anil Kumar Bezawada
Sri P.Sravan Kumar Reddy
Sri Vivekananda Virupaksha
Sri Sreemannarayana Mallela
Sri T.Venu Gopal
Sri Sricharan Telaprolu
Sri Nuvvula Ram Babu
Sri Badranaga Seshayya
Sri B.Siva Kesava Reddy
Sri A.V.Raghu Ram
Sri T.Chaitanya Kumar
Sri Ravi Kiran Ponnuru
Smt.T.V.P.Sai Vihari
Sri T.Pradyoth
Counsel for the respondents
:
Sri N. Venkataraman, Additional Solicitor General of India
Sri T.Niranjan, Additional Solicitor General, High Court of Andhra Pradesh
Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax
Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi, Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax
The Court made the following:
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR
WP No.28520 OF 2023
AND
WP Nos.8527, 9797, 9805, 10579, 14140, 15681, 21111, 21113,
21117, 21128, 21130, 21879, 21881, 21883, 22277, 22341,
23509, 28457 of 2024
AND
WP Nos.6096, 6161, 6162, 6317, 9069, 9131, 12560, 12731,
13479, 14655, 14675, 14685, 18278, 18732, 19157 19539,
20185, 22201, 23301, 24339, 24803, 25245, 27991 of 2025
AND
WP Nos.141, 216 234, 251, 317, 660, 737, 1023, 1074, 1082,
1089, 1092, 1151, 1196, 1205, 1218, 1424, 1440, 1464, 1482,
1535, 1538, 1574, 1586, 1593, 2013, 2024, 2070, 2083, 2571,
2690, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698, 2700,
2901, 3020, 3120, 3122, 3171, 3249, 3260, 3409, 3455, 3485,
3617, 3682, 3713, 3722, 3758, 3761, 3768, 3769, 3777, 3784,
3786, 3787, 3852, 3880, 3922, 3943, 3949, 4000, 4205, 4218,
4221, 4233, 4234, 4253, 4261, 4290, 4422, 4467, 4526, 4539,
4574, 4620, 4622, 4623, 4645, 5200, 5319, 6021, 6048, 6049,
7421, 7472, 7508, 7522, 8174, 8227, 8273, 8949, 8951, 8957,
9001, 9101, 10425, 10794, 10892, 11273, 11343, 11434, 12297,
12638, 12678, 12928, 13008, 13407, 15852, 16947, 16950,
17982, 17984, 17989, 18528, 19505, 21020, 22602, 22788,
22798, 24212, 25622, 25635, 25636, 25763 and 25803 of 2026
COMMON ORDER:- (Per Hon‘ble Sri Justice T.C.D.Sekhar)
1.
As the issues involved in these writ petitions
are similar, they are being disposed of by this common
order.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
2.
All these writ petitions were filed challenging
the constitutional validity of Section 147A of the Income
Tax Act, 1961, introduced vide Finance Act, 2026 (Act No.4
of 2026) giving retrospective effect from 01.04.2021 as ultra
vires, apart from being violative of the basic structure of the
Constitution of India, including the Rule of Law and
separation of powers, inter alia the petitioners also
challenged orders passed by Jurisdictional Assessing
Officers (JAO) under Section 147 r/w. Section 144 r/w.
Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as illegal,
arbitrary, void abinitio apart from violative of Articles 14,
19(1)(g) and Article 265 of the Constitution of India and
contrary to Section 151A of the Income Tax Act,1961.
3.
Before adverting to various grounds raised in
these writ petitions, it is appropriate to discuss the factual
matrix of the case for deciding the issues on hand.
4.
Through Finance Act, 2018, a scheme namely
e-Assessment Scheme, 2019 was formulated describing a
detailed procedure to be followed for the purpose of making
assessment, which was notified on 12.01.2019. Initially, the
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
said scheme was made applicable for passing assessment
orders under Section 143(3) of the Act. Subsequently,
proceedings under Section 144 were also included in the
said scheme. Later, the said scheme was modified into
“Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019” by notifying in the
Gazette.
5.
The Finance Act, 2021 introduced Section
144B to the Income Tax Act, with effect from 01.04.2021
incorporating the Faceless Assessment Scheme directly
into the Act with certain modifications. Later, the said
provision was amended by Finance Act, 2022 by including
the proceedings under Section 147 of the Act under
Faceless Assessment Scheme. In other words, Faceless
Assessment Scheme, 2019 made inapplicable with effect
from 01.04.2021 after introduction of the said scheme as
per Section 144-B of the Act.
6.
Be that as it may, Section 151A was
introduced to the Income Tax Act, 1961 by Act 38 of 2020
with effect from 01.11.2020 for Faceless Assessment of
Income Escaping Assessment. Through which, the Central
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Government may make a scheme, by notification in the
Official
Gazette
for
the
purposes
of
Assessment,
Reassessment or Re-computation under Section 147 or
issuance of notice under Section 148 or conducting of
enquiries or issuance of show cause notice or passing of
order under Section 148-A or sanction for issue of such
notice under Section 151, so as to impart greater efficiency,
transparency and accountability. In furtherance thereto,
Union of India issued Notification dt.29.03.2022 through the
Central Board of Direct Taxes formulating the scheme for
e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme,
2022, which is reproduced hereunder.
“MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(Department of Revenue)
(CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 29th March, 2022
S.O.1466(E)-In exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (1) and (2) of section 151 A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the Central
Government hereby makes the following scheme.
1. Short title and commencement.-(1) This Scheme
may be called the e-Assessment of Income Escaping
Assessment Scheme, 2022.
(2) It shall come into force with effect from the date of
its publication in the Official Gazette.
2. Definitions.-(1) In this Scheme, unless the context
otherwise requires,-
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
(a) “Act” means the Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of
1961);
(b) “automated allocation” means an algorithm for
randomized allocation of cases, by using suitable
technological tools, including artificial intelligence and
machine learning, with a view to optimize the use of
resources.
(2) Words and expressions used herein and not
defined, but defined in the Act, shall have the
meaning respectively assigned to them in the Act.
3. Scope of the Scheme.-For the purpose of this
Scheme,(a) assessment, reassessment or re-computation
under section 147 of the Act,
(b) issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act,
Shall be through automated allocation, in accordance
with risk management strategy formulated by the
Board as referred to in section 148 of the Act for
issuance of notice, and in a faceless manner, to the
extent provided in section 144B of the Act with
reference to making assessment or reassessment of
total income or loss of assessee.
[Notification No.18/2022/F.No.370142/16/2022-TPL
(Part1)]
SHEFALI SINGH, Under Secy”.
7.
By virtue of the introduction of the above scheme, the
procedure to be followed had been laid under Section 144B of the
Income Tax Act, 1961. For brevity the procedure is extracted as
under:―(i) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall assign
the case selected for the purposes of faceless assessment
under this section to a specific assessment unit through an
automated allocation system.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
(ii) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall intimate
the assessee that assessment in his case shall be
completed in accordance with the procedure laid down
under this section.
(iii) a notice shall be served on the assessee, through the
National Faceless Assessment Centre, under sub-section
(2) of section 143 or under sub-section (1) of section 142
and the assessee may file his response to such notice
within the date specified therein, to the National Faceless
Assessment Centre which shall forward the same to the
assessment unit;
(iv) where a case is assigned to the assessment unit, under
clause (i) it may make a request through the National
Faceless Assessment Centre for
(a) obtaining such further information, documents or
evidence from the assessee or any other person, as it may
specify;
(b) conducting of enquiry or verification by verification unit;
(c) seeking technical assistance in respect of determination
of arm‘s length price, valuation of property, withdrawal of
registration, approval, exemption or any other technical
matter by referring to the technical unit.
(v) where a request under sub-clause (a) of clause (iv) has
been initiated by the assessment unit, the National
Faceless Assessment Centre shall serve appropriate
notice or requisition on the assessee or any other person
for obtaining the information, documents or evidence
requisitioned by the assessment unit and the assessee or
any other person, as the case may be, shall file his
response to such notice within the time specified therein
or such time as may be extended on the basis of an
application in this regard, to the National Faceless
Assessment Centre which shall forward the reply to the
assessment unit;‖
8.
While things stood thus, the Jurisdictional Assessing
Officer (JAO) issued notices under Sections 148A of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 to the petitioners requiring them to furnish return of
income for the relevant assessment year on the premise that
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
certain transactions chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.
Questioning the said notices, the petitioners filed writ petitions on
the ground that notices/orders have been issued by the
Jurisdictional
Assessing
Officer
deviating
the
procedure
prescribed under e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment
Scheme, 2022 which contemplates that any procedure to be
initiated under Section 147 and 148 of the Act shall be through
Faceless manner, which came into force from 29.03.2022, as the
impugned notices/orders were issued by the Jurisdictional
Assessing Officer, the same is without jurisdiction.
9.
The Revenue filed counter affidavit contending that
notification dt.29.03.2022 does not state whether the notice is to
be issued by National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) or
the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO). It was further
contended that the said notification deals with the procedure to be
followed, while exercising the powers under Section 148 of the
Act. Further, for the purpose of issuance of notice under Section
148 of the Act, the same is done in accordance with the risk
management strategy and the assessment shall be in a faceless
manner as prescribed under Section 144B of the Act.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
10.
A co-ordinate bench of this Court having considered
the respective submissions made by the counsel for the
petitioners and the Revenue, by order dt.28.10.2025, allowed the
writ petitions by setting aside the impugned notices/orders issued
under sections 148A(b), 148A(d) and 148 of Income Tax Act,
1961, holding that the same were violative of provisions of
Section
151A
of
the
Act
r/w.
Notification
No.18/2022,
dt.29.03.2022.
11.
Aggrieved by the said order, the Revenue preferred
Special Leave Petitions before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India. While pending the SLPs, the Parliament through Act No.4
of 2026 namely the Finance Act, 2026, which came into force
from 01.04.2026 introduced new provisions into the Income Tax
Act, 1961 with a view to ensure greater procedural clarity and
certainty. Through the said Act, Section 147A was introduced into
the Income Tax Act, 1961 whereunder the term “Assessing
Officer” has been expressly clarified to mean officer other than
the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) or any
assessment unit and the same is deemed to have come into
effect retrospectively from 01.04.2021. The said provision reads
as follows:-
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
“9. After section 147 of the Income Tax Act, the
following section shall be inserted and shall be
deemed to have been inserted with effect from the 1st
day of April, 2021, namely:147A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, order or decree of any Court on in Section
151A or in any scheme framed thereunder, for the
removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the
Assessing Officer for the purposes of sections 148 and
148A shall mean and shall always be deemed to have
meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the
National Faceless Assessment Centre or any
assessment unit referred to in sub-section (3) of
Section 144B.‖
12.
In view of the insertion of Section 147A into the
Income Tax Act, 1961, the Hon’ble Apex Court disposed of the
SLPs vide order dated 10.04.2026, the relevant portion of which
reads as follows:
“20. In all fairness, we may add that several other
contentions have also been raised by both sides, which
we do not consider it necessary to advert to at this stage
in light of the order we propose to pass. In the facts of
the present batch, we are of the considered view that it
is not necessary for this Court to examine the merits of
the rival submissions concerning the correctness of the
impugned judgments or the scope of the competing
precedents at this juncture.
―21. It appears to us that the assesses would be entitled
to challenge the amending provisions as elaborated
upon heretofore, for which it would only be appropriate
to relegate them to the jurisdictional High Courts. All
contentions raised before us, as well as any other
grounds available to them to question the impugned
notices, may be urged before the High Courts instead.
22. Since the High Courts have primarily quashed the
reassessment notices on the ground that the JAOs
lacked competence to initiate such proceedings, and the
very foundation of that view now stands altered by the
amending legislation, the impugned judgments in favor
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
of the assesses are set aside on this limited ground. The
matters are accordingly remitted to the respective High
Courts for fresh consideration. Ordered accordingly.
23. The assesses are granted liberty to amend their writ
petitions, if so advised, within a period of four (04) weeks
from the date of uploading of this order, so as to enable
them to lay challenge to Section 147A of the IT Act, as
introduced by Act No.4 of 2026, or to any other
connected or consequential provision.
24. Similarly, the Appellant-Revenue shall be at liberty to
file their written submissions and affidavits before the
jurisdictional High Courts within a period of three (03)
weeks thereafter.
25. No additional time shall be granted to the parties
beyond what has been granted above.
26. We make it clear that we have not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the controversy, including the
validity, scope, effect, retrospectively or applicability of
the amended provisions and all such questions are left
open to be decided by the High Courts.
27. Finally, during the pendency of the writ petitions
before the High Courts, there shall be an interim stay of
further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant
to the impugned notices, subject to such terms and
conditions as may be imposed by the High Courts.
28. The High Courts are requested to decide the matters
preferably by 30.09.2026. Learned counsel for the
parties undertake to extend full cooperation to the High
Courts in this regard. No adjournments may be granted
by the High Courts‘ on mere asking of the parties.
29. The Registry shall forthwith transmit a copy of this
order to the Registrars General of the concerned High
Courts.
30. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.”
13.
After the remand by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the
petitioners filed applications seeking to amend the prayer in the
writ petition, which is as under:-
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
―It is therefore prayed that, this Hon‘ble Court may be
pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other
appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, declaring
(a) Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961
introduced vide Finance Act, 2026 (Act No.4 of
2026) with retrospective effect from 01.04.2021, as
ultravires the Constitution of India and the Income
Tax Act, 1961, apart from being violative of the
basic structures of the Constitution of India,
including the rule of law and separation of powers;
(b) Order passed by the 1st respondent under Section
147 r/w. Section 144 r/w. Section 144B of the
Income Tax Act, 1961, dt.21.03.2024, bearing DIN
and
Notice
No.ITBA/AST/S/147/202324/1063112119(1), for the Assessment Year 201617, as arbitrary, illegal, bad in law, void-abinitio,
violative of the principles of natural justice, apart
from being violative of Articles 14, 19 (1)(g) and
265 of the Constitution of India and Section 151A
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and consequently set
aside the same in the interest of justice and pass
such other orders.
It is further prayed that, this Hon‘ble Court may be
pleased to stay all further proceedings, including
any recovery, pursuant to the order passed by the
1st respondent under Section 147 r/w. Section 144
r/w. Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961,
dt.21.03.2024,
bearing
DIN
and
Notice
No.ITBA/AST/S/147/2023-24/1063112119(1), for
the Assessment year 2016-17, pending disposal of
the above writ petition and pass.‖
14.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONERS:(i)
It is contended by the counsel for petitioners
that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) has no
power to issue notice under Section 148 of the
Income Tax Act especially after introduction of
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Section 151A of the Act and the Notification
dt.29.03.2022
[Notification
No.18
F.No:370142/16/2022-TPL(Part-I)]
Central
Board
of
Direct
of
in
issued
by
the
Taxes,
New
Delhi,
introducing a scheme called the “e-Assessment of
Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022”. It was
further contended that the said scheme came into
force with effect from 29.03.2022 i.e., the date on
which it was published in the Official Gazette. It was
further contended that as per the said scheme, the
assessment, reassessment or re-computation under
Section 147 of the Act and the issuance of notice
under Section 148 of the Act shall be done:
―(a) Through automated allocation, in accordance
with risk management strategy formulated by the
Board as referred to in Section 148 of the Act for
issuance of such notice, and
(b) In a faceless manner, to the extent provided
in Section 144B of the Act, with reference to
making assessment or reassessment of total
income or loss of Assessee.
Section 151A of the Act empowers the Central
Government to make such a scheme, on or
before 31.03.2022.‖
(ii)
It was further contented that after introduction
of the said scheme, it is mandatory for the Revenue
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
to
conduct/initiate
proceedings
pertaining
to
reassessment under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act
in a faceless manner and shall follow the procedure
prescribed thereunder.
(iii)
It was further case of the petitioners that,
initially the writ petitions were filed questioning the
jurisdiction of JAO in issuing notices under Section
148 of the Act or conducting the proceedings under
Section 148A(d) of the Act and after hearing, a
co-ordinate
bench
of
this
Court
by
order
dt.28.10.2025, allowed the writ petitions holding that
the JAO has no jurisdiction in view of Section 151A
of the Act r/w. Notification dt.29.03.2022, and in order
to nullify the said judgment, the amendment was
brought into the Act, which is not permissible under
law.
(iv)
It was further contended that, under the
scheme the cases are required to be assigned
through an “automated allocation” system defined
under
clause
2(1)(b)
as
an
algorithm-based,
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
randomized allocation using technological tools
including Artificial Intelligence and machine learning,
with a view to optimize the use of resources. Further,
it was contended that as per clause 3 of the said
scheme, for the purpose of issuance of notice under
Section 148 of the Act, the same shall be done in
accordance
with
risk
management
strategy
formulated by the Board in a faceless manner to the
extent provided in Section 144B of the Act with
reference to making assessment or reassessment of
total income or loss of assessee, whereas in the
cases on hand the same was not adhered to and the
proceedings were initiated under Section 148 and
148A by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer ignoring
the scheme.
(v)
It was contended that the Legislative intent
was explicitly mentioned under Section 151A i.e., to
impart
efficiency,
transparency,
accountability,
eliminate personal interface by introducing dynamic
jurisdiction
through
technology-driven
allocation,
whereas the notices issued under Section 148 of the
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Act by the JAO are in contravention of the statutory
mandate which speaks that the same shall be issued
by Faceless Assessing Officers (FAO), therefore all
the proceedings initiated are without jurisdiction.
(vi)
By introducing Section 147A into the Income
Tax
Act,
with
retrospective
effect,
the
Legislative intent behind the same is to nullify the
decisions rendered by this Court and various other
High Courts, which cannot be permitted inasmuch as
the Legislature has no competence to nullify the
judgment rendered by Constitutional Courts through
the present amendment.
(vii)
It was further contended that whenever a new
section is introduced to the Act with retrospective
effect, the same shall be exercised with greatest
circumspection within the limitations, but cannot
directly nullify or override a judicial decision by way
of an amendment under the guise of clarificatory in
nature for the removal of doubts.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
(viii) By introducing Section 147A into the Act, the
Legislature/Revenue is trying to encroach upon the
judicial power which is not permissible under law and
the same is unconstitutional as it is hit by doctrine of
separation of powers.
(ix)
It was further contended that when there is no
jurisdiction conferred on the JAO to initiate the
reassessment proceedings under faceless scheme,
the
same
cannot
be
conferred
upon
JAO
retrospectively by introducing Section 147A.
(x)
It was further contended that by introducing
new provision, the legislature sits in appeal as
against the Judgment rendered by this Court and
various other High Courts, which cannot be permitted
inasmuch as any judgment of the Court is to be set
aside by an Appellate Forum, but not through an
amendment to the Act itself.
(xi)
It was further contended that, a reading of
Section 147A of the Act, it is clear that the same is
not clarificatory in nature, but the same is introduced
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
so as to defeat the Legislative intent mandated under
Section 151A of the Act and the scheme formulated
thereunder.
(xii)
It was further contended that when there was
no ambiguity either under the Act or under the
scheme, question of introducing Section 147A for
removal of doubts on the premise it is claificatory in
nature does not arise.
(xiii) It was further contended that the vested and
enforceable right of the petitioners to assess them
under faceless manner was taken away by the
Legislature by giving retrospective effect and the
same is impermissible under the law and also hit by
doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation.
(xiv) By introducing Section 147A, the Revenue is
intending to exclude or limit the applicability of the
provisions of the Act and the scheme, especially
Section 151A and the scheme remained unamended.
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(xv)
It was further contended that as on the date of
introducing Section 147A to the Income Tax Act,
1961, the said Act was repealed and the Income Tax
Act, 2025 came into force from 01.04.2026 and in
such circumstances, the question of amending the
repealed Act would not arise especially Section 536
of the Income Tax Act, 2025 does not confer any
express or implied power to the Parliament to
introduce a provision to Income Tax Act, 1961, which
was already repealed by then.
(xvi) The introduction of Section 147A of the Act is
nothing but an afterthought so as to nullify the
judgments rendered by this Court and various other
High Courts.
15.
The Revenue filed counter affidavit inter alia
contending that challenge to the constitutional validity of Section
147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance
Act, 2026 is wholly misconceived, devoid of merits and not
maintainable either in law or on facts and writ petitions are liable
to be dismissed.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
16.
enacted
It was further contended that a statutory provision
by
Parliament
carries
a
strong
presumption
of
constitutionality and the burden lies heavily upon the persons
assailing its validity to establish a clear manifest violation of
constitutional limitation. It was further averred in the counter
affidavit that the said presumption operates with greater force in
matters relating to taxation and fiscal policy, whereunder the
legislature is entitled to a wider degree of latitude in classification,
prescription of procedures and formulation of measures for
assessment and collection of revenue. Therefore, the petitioners
cannot seek invalidation of a fiscal enactment merely on the basis
of hardship, inconvenience, perceived inequality or prefer
alternative legislative scheme, especially in the absence of any
demonstrable legislative in-competence.
17.
It was stated in the counter affidavit that the TOLA,
2020 [The Taxation and Other Laws (relaxation and amendment
of certain provisions) Act, 2020] inserted Section 144B and 151A
into the Income Tax Act, 1961 with effect from 01.04.2021,
providing the statutory frame work for carrying out assessments in
a faceless manner. Section 151A empowers the Central
Government to make a scheme, by notification in the official
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gazette for the purposes of assessment, reassessment or recomputation under the Act. It was further stated that under the
said scheme there are two distinct stages of reassessment which
contained in chapter-XIV of the Act. Section 147 empowers the
Assessing Officer to reassess, re-compute income chargeable to
tax, which escaped assessment for any assessment year. Section
148 provides for issuance of notice by the Assessing Officer
requiring the assessee to furnish a return of income where
income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Further that
Section 148A inserted vide Finance Act, 2021 with effect from
01.04.2021, prescribes a mandatory pre-assessment procedure
before issuance of a notice under Section 148. Under Section
148A, the Assessing Officer is required to conduct such inquiry, if
necessary, with prior approval of the specified authority, provide
an opportunity of being heard by issuing a show cause notice
along with the information suggesting escapement of income,
consider the reply furnished by the assessee and thereafter pass
an order under Section 148A (d). Further, such order is required
to be passed before issuance of notice under Section 148 and
both the order under Section 148A (d) and notice under Section
148 are issued with the prior approval of the specified authority.
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18.
It
was
further
stated
that
the
re-assessment
proceedings under the Act comprise two distinct stages. The first
stage is the pre-assessment stage governed by Sections 148A
and 148, whereunder the Assessing Officer examines whether
the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and
whether a notice under Section 148 is required to be issued. The
second stage commences after issuance of notice under Section
148 and relates to conduct of reassessment proceedings under
Section 147.
19.
The counter affidavit further reads that subsequent to
the introduction of faceless assessment provisions and the
scheme notified under Section 151A, divergent views emerged
regarding the authority competent to undertake proceedings
under
Section
148A
and
148.
While
certain
judicial
pronouncements took the view that such proceedings were
required to be undertaken through the faceless mechanism,
whereas the other decisions held that the Jurisdictional Assessing
Officer continued to be the competent authority for the purposes
of Section 148A and Section 148. Divergence of opinions, led to
uncertainty regarding the legislative intent underlying the
reassessment frame work.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
20.
It is the consistent stand of the Revenue throughout
the proceedings that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer is
empowered to issue notice under Section 148 and 148A. It was
further averred in the counter affidavit that in view of conflicting
decisions of various High Courts in this regard multiple writ
petitions are being filed before the Hon’ble High Courts which
opened the flood gates for huge pendency. It was further stated
that at the assessment level, this issue has single handedly
contributed to increasing the work load of the officers which
caused hindrance to the Assessing Officers from carrying out
reassessments for the last four (04) years. In order to reinforce
the legislative intent and to put an end to this issue, the
Parliament in its wisdom, has chosen to enact a retrospective
amendment to the Income Tax Act, 1961 with effect from
01.04.2021 vide Section 9 of Finance Act, 2026 and introduced
Section 147A, which reads as follows:―147A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, order or decree of any Court or in Section
151A or in any scheme framed thereunder, for the
removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the
Assessing Officer for the purposes of Sections 148 and
148A shall mean and shall always be deemed to have
meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the National
Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit
referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 144B.‖
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21.
By introducing Section 147A, the Parliament has
legislatively clarified that who is the proper statutory authority
having the jurisdiction to initiate action under Section 148A and
148. It was further stated that the expression “Assessing Officer”
shall be considered in the context of Section 148 and 148A as the
Jurisdictional Assessing Officer. Thus, by introducing Section
147A the legislative intent was to clarify that initiation of preassessment proceedings in issuance of notice under Section 148
falls outside the faceless assessment procedure contemplated
under Section 144B of the Act and it was clarified in the
memorandum explaining the provisions in the Financial Bill, 2026,
which is as follows:
―Clarification regarding Jurisdiction to issue notice u/s
148 where income has escaped assessment and for
carrying out pre-assessment procedure under Section
148A.‖
22.
It was further stated that the clarificatory amendment
rooted in statutory provisions and the foundation was from
statutory scheme itself inasmuch as the e-assessment of Income
Escaping Assessment (re-assessment) Scheme, 2022 divides the
re-assessment process into two stages namely, the preassessment enquiry stage and the assessment/reassessment
stage. The first stage requires the JAO to follow the procedure
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prescribed under Section 148A and determine whether a case is
fit for reassessment and upon such satisfaction, issue notice
under Section 148. The second stage relates to the conduct of
assessment/reassessment
proceedings
through
National
Faceless Assessment Centre. Consequently, once JAO reaches
the satisfaction contemplated under Section 148A, the issuance
of notice under Section 148 necessarily follows from such
satisfaction and forms part of the same statutory process.
23.
It was further averred in the counter affidavit that the
notification No.18 of 2022, dt.29.03.2022 does not provide that
notice under Section 148 is required to be issued in a faceless
manner and the same was never brought within the ambit of
faceless procedure. It was the specific case of the Revenue that
under the reassessment frame work, cases are identified through
risk management system and are flagged electronically for
consideration and in the said process the Jurisdictional Assessing
Officer has no role in selection of cases for reassessment and the
Jurisdictional Assessing Officer only performs the statutory
functions assigned under Sections 148A and 148. Introduction of
Section 147A into the Income Tax Act, 1961, with retrospective
effect is to remove the basis on which the various Hon’ble High
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Courts
have
quashed
the
respective
notices
issued
by
Jurisdictional Assessing Officers.
24.
It was further stated that through the amendment, the
Revenue has validated the Act by removing the defect in the
statute retrospectively. The twin test for Validating Acts is
1) Remove the cause of invalidity by curing the defect or lack of
authority pointed out by a Court and 2) such removal of defect
must be done through a subsequent enactment passed with
retrospective effect. The insertion of Section 147A vide Section 9
of the Finance Act, 2026 satisfies the above twin test, therefore
the same cannot be declared as ultra vires.
25.
It was further contended as a first, through a non-
obstante clause, Section 147A has expressly overridden Section
151A and the e-assessment of Income Escaping Assessments
Scheme, 2022 framed under the Section and the substance of
the judgments rendered by various High Courts been gotten over.
It was further stated that the second part of Section 148A makes
clear that the Assessing Officer for the purposes of Section 148
and 148A shall mean and shall always been deemed to have
meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the National
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Faceless Assessment Center or any other assessment unit
referred to under Sub-Section 3 of Section 144B. The
amendment was brought in after satisfying the twin test for
validation by getting over the requirements of Section 151A and
reaffirming the jurisdiction to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer
(JAO).
26.
It was further contended that it is settled law that a
retrospective validation by Parliament on the legislation is also
part of the sovereign discharge of power and within the legitimate
constitutional frame work.
27.
It was further contended that the issues raised in
these writ petitions do not involve the levy of any tax
retrospectively as it involved only providing clarification regarding
the intention of the legislature on the proper assessment process,
the principle involved that if the legislature has competence to do
something it has the natural authority to apply the principle
retrospectively provided it does not act arbitrarily.
28.
It is further averred in the counter affidavit that
Finance Act, 2026 (Act No.4 of 2026) has been gazetted on
30.03.2026 and Section 147A shall be inserted and shall be
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deemed to have been inserted with effect from 01.04.2021.
Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the amendment
was made to repealed Act is without any merit or substance.
29.
It was further contended that Section 1 of Finance
Act, 2026 i.e., “short title and commencement”, provides that the
provisions of Finance Act, 2026 come into force on 01.04.2026,
except specified otherwise. The said words would entitle that
unless specified by this Act, the provisions of Section would be
applicable from 01.04.2026 and where a provision is otherwise
provided for, such provision would come into force from the date
specifically prescribed therein.
30.
It was further stated that Section 536 of Income Tax
Act, 2026 also provides that the provision of earlier Act, would
continue to apply and nothing shall effect the previous operation
of the repealed Act and the repealed Act would continue to be
applicable in respect of pending assessments initiated before or
after the repeal of the Act.
31.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and
Sri N.Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor General of India.
32.
Perused the material available on record.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
CONSIDERATION:33.
The legislature vide Act 38 of 2020 enacted Sections
130, 135A, 144B and 151A to the Income Tax Act with effect from
01.11.2020 by permitting the Central Government to frame
schemes so as to carry out certain functions under the above
referred to provisions in faceless manner. For proper appreication
of the case on hand, the above provisons are extracted
hereunder:
Section 130:
―130. (1) The Central Government may make a scheme,
by notification in the Official Gazette, for the purposes of
—
(a) exercise of all or any of the powers and performance
of all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the case
may be, assigned to income-tax authorities by or under
this Act as referred to in section 120; or
(b) vesting the jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer as
referred to in section 124; or
(c) exercise of power to transfer cases under section 127;
or
(d) exercise of jurisdiction in case of change of
incumbency as referred to in section 129,
so as to impart greater efficiency, transparency and
accountability by—
(i) eliminating the interface between the income-tax
authority and the assessee or any other person, to the
extent technologically feasible;
(ii) optimising utilisation of the resources through
economies of scale and functional specialisation;
(iii) introducing a team-based exercise of powers and
performance of functions by two or more income-tax
authorities, concurrently, in respect of any area or
persons or classes of persons or incomes or classes of
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income or cases or classes of cases, with dynamic
jurisdiction.
(2) The Central Government may, for the purpose of
giving effect to the scheme made under sub-section (1),
by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any of
the provisions of this Act shall not apply or shall apply
with such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as
may be specified in the notification:
Provided that no direction shall be issued after the 31st
day of March, 2022.
(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (1) and
sub-section (2) shall, as soon as may be after the
notification is issued, be laid before each House of
Parliament.‖
Section 135A:“135A. (1) The Central Government may make a
scheme, by notification in the Official Gazette, for the
purposes of calling for information under section 133,
collecting certain information under section 133B, or
calling for information by prescribed income-tax authority
under section 133C, or exercise of power to inspect
register of companies under section 134, or exercise of
power of Assessing Officer under section 135 so as to
impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability
by—
(a) Eliminating the interface between the income-tax
authority and the assessee or any other person to the
extent technologically feasible;
(b) optimising utilisation of the resources through economies
of scale and functional specialization
(c) introducing a team-based exercise of powers, including
to call for, or collect, or process, or utilise, the
information, with dynamic jurisdiction
(2) The Central Government may, for the purpose of
giving effect to the scheme made under sub-section (1),
by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any of
the provisions of this Act shall not apply or shall apply
with such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as
may be specified in the notification:
Provided that no direction shall be issued after the 31st
day of March, 2022:
[Provided further that the Central Government may
amend any direction, issued under this sub-section on or
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before the 31st day of March, 2022, by notification in the
Official Gazette.]
(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (1) and
sub-section (2) shall, as soon as may be after the
notification is issued, be laid before each House of
Parliament.‖
Section 144B
―144B. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other provision of this Act, the
assessment, reassessment or recomputation under subsection (3) of section 143 or under section 144 or
under section 147, as the case may be, with respect to
the cases referred to in sub-section (2), shall be made in
a faceless manner as per the following procedure,
namely:—
(i) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall
assign the case selected for the purposes of faceless
assessment under this section to a specific assessment
unit through an automated allocation system.
(ii) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall
intimate the assessee that assessment in his case shall
be completed in accordance with the procedure laid down
under this section
(iii) a notice shall be served on the assessee, through the
National Faceless Assessment Centre, under sub-section
(2) of section 143 or under sub-section (1) of section
142 and the assessee may file his response to such
notice within the date specified therein, to the National
Faceless Assessment Centre which shall forward the
same to the assessment unit.
(iv) where a case is assigned to the assessment unit,
under clause (i), it may make a request through the
National Faceless Assessment Centre for—
(a) obtaining such further information, documents or
evidence from the assessee or any other person, as it
may specify;
(b) conducting of enquiry or verification by verification unit;
(c) seeking technical assistance in respect of determination
of arm's length price, valuation of property, withdrawal of
registration, approval, exemption or any other technical
matter by referring to the technical unit;
(v) where a request under sub-clause (a) of clause (iv)
has been initiated by the assessment unit, the National
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Faceless Assessment Centre shall serve appropriate
notice or requisition on the assessee or any other person
for obtaining the information, documents or evidence
requisitioned by the assessment unit and the assessee or
any other person, as the case may be, shall file his
response to such notice within the time specified therein
or such time as may be extended on the basis of an
application in this regard, to the National Faceless
Assessment Centre which shall forward the reply to the
assessment unit;
(vi) where a request, (a) for conducting of enquiry or verification by the verification
unit has been made by the assessment unit under subclause (b) of clause (iv), the request shall be assigned by
the National Faceless Assessment Centre to a
verification unit through an automated allocation system;
or
(b) for reference to the technical unit has been made by the
assessment unit under sub-clause (c) of clause (iv), the
request shall be assigned by the National Faceless
Assessment Centre to a technical unit through an
automated allocation system;
(vii) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall send
the report received from the verification unit or the
technical unit, as the case may be, based on the request
referred to in clause (vi) to the concerned assessment
unit;
(viii) where the assessee fails to comply with the notice
served under clause (v) or notice issued under subsection (1) of section 142 or the terms of notice issued
under sub-section (2) of section 143, the National
Faceless Assessment Centre shall intimate such failure
to the assessment unit;
(ix) the assessment unit shall serve upon such assessee,
as referred to in clause (viii), a notice, through the
National Faceless Assessment Centre, under section
144, giving him an opportunity to show-cause on a date
and time as specified in such notice as to why the
assessment in his case should not be completed to the
best of its judgment;
(x) the assessee shall, within the time specified in the
notice referred to in clause (ix) or such time as may be
extended on the basis of an application in this regard, file
his response to the National Faceless Assessment
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Centre which shall forward the same to the assessment
unit;
(xi) where the assessee fails to file response to the notice
served under clause (ix) within the time specified therein
or within the extended time, if any, the National Faceless
Assessment Centre shall intimate such failure to the
assessment unit;
(xii) the assessment unit shall, after taking into account
all the relevant material available on the record, prepare,
in writing,—
(a) an income or loss determination proposal, where no
variation prejudicial to assessee is proposed and send a
copy of such income or loss determination proposal to
the National Faceless Assessment Centre; or
(b) in any other case, a show cause notice stating the
variations prejudicial to the interest of assessee proposed
to be made to the income of the assessee and calling
upon him to submit as to why the proposed variation
should not be made and serve such show cause notice,
on the assessee, through the National Faceless
Assessment Centre;
(xiii) the assessee shall file his reply to the show cause
notice served under sub-clause (b) of clause (xii) on a
date and time as specified therein or such time as may
be extended on the basis of an application made in this
regard, to the National Faceless Assessment Centre,
which shall forward the reply to the assessment unit;
(xiv) where the assessee fails to file response to the
notice served under sub-clause (b) of clause (xii) within
the time specified therein or within the extended time, if
any, the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall
intimate such failure to the assessment unit;
(xv) the assessment unit shall, after considering the
response received under clause (xiii) or after receipt of
intimation under clause (xiv), as the case may be, and
taking into account all relevant material available on
record, prepare an income or loss determination proposal
and send the same to the National Faceless Assessment
Centre;
(xvi) upon receipt of the income or loss determination
proposal, as referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (xii) or
clause (xv), as the case may be, the National Faceless
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Assessment Centre may, on the basis of guidelines
issued by the Board,—
(a) convey to the assessment unit to prepare draft order in
accordance with the income or loss determination
proposal, which shall thereafter prepare a draft order; or
(b) assign the income or loss determination proposal to a
review unit through an automated allocation system, for
conducting review of such proposal;
(xvii) the review unit shall conduct review of the income
or loss determination proposal assigned to it by the
National Faceless Assessment Centre, under sub-clause
(b) of clause (xvi), whereupon it shall prepare a review
report and send the same to the National Faceless
Assessment Centre;
(xviii) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall,
upon receiving the review report under clause (xvii),
forward the same to the assessment unit which had
proposed the income or loss determination proposal;
(xix) the assessment unit shall, after considering such
review report, accept or reject some or all of the
modifications proposed therein and after recording
reasons in case of rejection of such modifications,
prepare a draft order;
(xx) the assessment unit shall send such draft order
prepared under sub-clause (a) of clause (xvi) or under
clause (xix) to the National Faceless Assessment Centre;
(xxi) in case of an eligible assessee, where there is a
proposal to make any variation which is prejudicial to the
interest of such assessee, as mentioned in sub-section
(1) under section 144C, the National Faceless
Assessment Centre shall serve the draft order referred to
in clause (xx) on the assessee;
(xxii) in any case other than that referred to in clause
(xxi), the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall
convey to the assessment unit to pass the final
assessment order in accordance with such draft order,
which shall thereafter pass the final assessment order
and initiate penalty proceedings, if any, and send it to the
National Faceless Assessment Centre;
(xxiii) upon receiving the final assessment order as per
clause (xxii), the National Faceless Assessment Centre
shall serve a copy of such order and notice for initiating
penalty proceedings, if any, on the assessee, along with
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the demand notice, specifying the sum payable by, or
refund of any amount due to, the assessee on the basis
of such assessment;
(xxiv) where a draft order is served on the assessee as
referred to in clause (xxi), such assessee shall,—
(a) file his acceptance of the variations proposed in such
draft order to the National Faceless Assessment Centre;
or
(b) file his objections, if any, to such various with,(I)
the Dispute Resolution Panel, and
(II)
the National Faceless Assessment Centre,
within the period specified in sub-section (2) of section
144C;
(xxv)
shall,--
the National Faceless Assessment Centre
(a) upon receipt of acceptance from the eligible assessee; or
(b) if no objections are received from the eligible assessee,
within the period specified in sub-section (2) of section
144C
intimate the assessment unit to complete the assessment
on the basis of the draft order;
(xxvi) the assessment unit shall, upon receipt of
intimation under clause (xxv), pass the assessment
order, in accordance with the relevant draft order, within
the time allowed under sub-section (4) of section
144C and initiate penalty proceedings, if any, and send
the order to the National Faceless Assessment Centre;
(xxvii) where the eligible assessee files objections with
the Dispute Resolution Panel, under sub-clause (b) of
clause (xxiv), the National Faceless Assessment Centre
shall send such intimation along with a copy of objections
filed to the assessment unit;
(xxviii) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall, in
a case referred to in clause (xxvii), upon receipt of the
directions issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel under
sub-section (5) of section 144C, forward such directions
to the assessment unit;
(xxix) the assessment unit shall, in conformity with the
directions issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel under
sub-section (5) of section 144C, complete the
assessment within the time allowed in sub-section (13)
of section 144C and initiate penalty proceedings, if any,
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and send a copy of the assessment order to the National
Faceless Assessment Centre;
(xxx) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall,
upon receipt of the assessment order referred to in
clause (xxvi) or clause (xxix), as the case may be, serve
a copy of such order and notice for initiating penalty
proceedings, if any, on the assessee, along with the
demand notice, specifying the sum payable by, or the
amount of refund due to, the assessee on the basis of
such assessment;
(xxxi) the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall,
after completion of assessment, transfer all the electronic
records of the case to the Assessing Officer having
jurisdiction over the said case for such action as may be
required under the provisions of this Act;
(xxxii) if at any stage of the proceedings before it, the
assessment unit having regard to the nature and
complexity of the accounts, volume of the accounts,
doubts about the correctness of accounts, multiplicity of
transactions in the accounts or specialised nature of
business activity of the assessee, and the interests of the
revenue, is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so, it
may, upon recording its reasons in writing, refer the case
to the National Faceless Assessment Centre stating that
the provisions of sub-section (2A) of section 142 may be
invoked and such case shall be dealt with in accordance
with the provisions of sub-section (7).
(2) The faceless assessment under sub-section (1) shall
be made in respect of such territorial area, or persons or
class of persons, or incomes or class of incomes, or
cases or class of cases, as may be specified by the
Board.
(3) The Board may, for the purposes of faceless
assessment, set up the following Centre and units and
specify their functions and jurisdiction, namely:—
(i) a National Faceless Assessment Centre to facilitate
the conduct of faceless assessment proceedings in a
centralised manner;
(ii) such assessment units, as it may deem necessary to
conduct the faceless assessment, to perform the function
of making assessment, which includes identification of
points or issues material for the determination of any
liability (including refund) under this Act, seeking
information or clarification on points or issues so
identified, analysis of the material furnished by the
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assessee or any other person, and such other functions
as may be required for the purposes of making faceless
assessment, and the term "assessment unit", wherever
used in this section, shall refer to an Assessing Officer
having powers so assigned by the Board;
(iii) such verification units, as it may deem necessary to
facilitate the conduct of faceless assessment, to perform
the function of verification, which includes enquiry, cross
verification, examination of books of account,
examination of witnesses and recording of statements,
and such other functions as may be required for the
purposes of verification and the term "verification unit",
wherever used in this section, shall refer to an Assessing
Officer having powers so assigned by the Board:
Provided that the function of verification unit under this
section may also be performed by a verification unit
located in any other faceless centre set up under the
provisions of this Act or under any scheme notified under
the provisions of this Act; and the request for verification
may also be assigned through the National Faceless
Assessment Centre to such verification unit;
(iv) such technical units, as it may deem necessary to
facilitate the conduct of faceless assessment, to perform
the function of providing technical assistance which
includes any assistance or advice on legal, accounting,
forensic, information technology, valuation, transfer
pricing, data analytics, management or any other
technical matter under this Act or an agreement entered
into under section 90 or 90A, which may be required in a
particular case or a class of cases, under this section and
the term "technical unit", wherever used in this section,
shall refer to an Assessing Officer having powers so
assigned by the Board;
(v) such review units, as it may deem necessary to
facilitate the conduct of faceless assessment, to perform
the function of review of the income determination
proposal assigned under sub-clause (b) of clause (xvi) of
sub-section (1), which includes checking whether the
relevant and material evidence has been brought on
record, relevant points of fact and law have been duly
incorporated, the issues requiring addition or disallowance
have been incorporated and such other functions as may
be required for the purposes of review and the term
"review unit", wherever used in this section, shall refer to
an Assessing Officer having powers so assigned by the
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Board.
(4) The assessment unit, verification unit, technical unit
and the review unit shall have the following authorities,
namely:—
(i) Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or Joint
Commissioner or Joint Director, as the case may be;
(ii) Deputy Commissioner or Deputy Director or Assistant
Commissioner or Assistant Director, or Income-tax
Officer, as the case may be;
(iii) such other income-tax authority, ministerial staff,
executive or consultant, as may be considered necessary
by the Board.
(5) All communications, —
(i) among the assessment unit, review unit, verification
unit or technical unit or with the assessee or any other
person with respect to the information or documents or
evidence or any other details, as may be necessary for
the purposes of making a faceless assessment shall be
through the National Faceless Assessment Centre;
(ii) between the National Faceless Assessment Centre
and the assessee, or his authorised representative, or any
other person shall be exchanged exclusively by electronic
mode; and
(iii) between the National Faceless Assessment Centre
and various units shall be exchanged exclusively by
electronic mode:
Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not
apply to the enquiry or verification conducted by the
verification unit in the circumstances as may be specified
by the Board in this behalf.
(6) For the purposes of faceless assessment—
(i) an electronic record shall be authenticated by —
(a) the National Faceless Assessment Centre by way of an
electronic communication;
(b) the assessment unit or verification unit or technical unit or
review unit, as the case may be, by affixing digital
signature;
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(c) assessee or any other person, by affixing his digital
signature or under electronic verification code, or by
logging into his registered account in the designated
portal;
(ii) every notice or order or any other electronic
communication shall be delivered to the addressee, being
the assessee, by way of—
(a) placing an authenticated copy thereof in the registered
account of the assessee; or
(b) sending an authenticated copy thereof to the registered
email address of the assessee or his authorised
representative; or
(c) uploading an authenticated copy on the Mobile App of
the assessee,
and followed by a real time alert;
(iii) every notice or order or any other electronic
communication shall be delivered to the addressee, being
any other person, by sending an authenticated copy
thereof to the registered email address of such person,
followed by a real time alert;
(iv) the assessee shall file his response to any notice or
order or any other electronic communication, through his
registered account, and once an acknowledgement is
sent by the National Faceless Assessment Centre
containing the hash result generated upon successful
submission of response, the response shall be deemed
to be authenticated;
(v) the time and place of dispatch and receipt of
electronic record shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions of section 13 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(vi) a person shall not be required to appear either
personally or through authorised representative in
connection with any proceedings before any unit set up
under this section;
(vii) in a case where a variation is proposed in the income
or loss determination proposal or the draft order, and an
opportunity is provided to the assessee by serving a
notice calling upon him to show cause as to why the
assessment should not be completed as per such income
or loss determination proposal, the assessee or his
authorised representative, as the case may be, may
request for personal hearing so as to make his oral
submissions or present his case before the income-tax
authority of the relevant unit;
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(viii) where the request for personal hearing has been
received, the income-tax authority of relevant unit shall
allow such hearing, through National Faceless
Assessment Centre, which shall be conducted
exclusively through video conferencing or video
telephony, including use of any telecommunication
application software which supports video conferencing
or video telephony, to the extent technologically feasible,
in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Board;
(ix) subject to the proviso to sub-section (5), any
examination or recording of the statement of the
assessee or any other person (other than the statement
recorded in the course of survey under section 133A)
shall be conducted by an income-tax authority in the
relevant unit, exclusively through video conferencing or
video telephony, including use of any telecommunication
application software which supports video conferencing
or video telephony, to the extent technologically feasible,
in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Board;
(x) the Board shall establish suitable facilities for video
conferencing
or
video
telephony
including
telecommunication application software which supports
video conferencing or video telephony at such locations
as may be necessary, so as to ensure that the assessee,
or his authorised representative, or any other person is
not denied the benefit of faceless assessment merely on
the consideration that such assessee or his authorised
representative, or any other person does not have access
to video conferencing or video telephony at his end;
(xi) the Principal Chief Commissioner or the Principal
Director General, as the case may be, in-charge of the
National Faceless Assessment Centre shall, with the
prior approval of the Board, lay down the standards,
procedures and processes for effective functioning of the
National Faceless Assessment Centre and the units set
up, in an automated and mechanised environment.
(7) (a) The Principal Chief Commissioner or the Principal
Director General, as the case may be, in-charge of the
National Faceless Assessment Centre shall, in
accordance with the procedure laid down by the Board in
this regard, if he considers appropriate that the provisions
of sub-section (2A) of section 142 section 142 may be
invoked in the case,—
(i) forward the reference received from an assessment
unit under clause (xxxii) of sub-section (1) to the Principal
Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal
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Commissioner or Commissioner having jurisdiction over
such case, and inform the assessment unit accordingly;
(ii) transfer the case to the Assessing Officer having
jurisdiction over such case in accordance with subsection (8);
(b) where a reference has been received by the Principal
Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner under sub-clause (i) of
clause (a), he shall direct the Assessing Officer, having
jurisdiction over the case, to invoke the provisions of subsection (2A) of section 142
(c) where a reference has not been forwarded to the
Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, having
jurisdiction over the case, in a case referred to in subclause (i) of clause (a), the assessment unit shall
proceed to complete the assessment in accordance with
the procedure laid down in this section.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2), the Principal Chief Commissioner or
the Principal Director General, as the case may be, incharge of National Faceless Assessment Centre may, at
any stage of the assessment, if considered necessary,
transfer the case to the Assessing Officer having
jurisdiction over such case, with the prior approval of the
Board.
(9) [Omitted by the Finance Act, 2022, w.r.e.f. 1-4-2021.]
(10) Omitted by the Finance Act, 2022, w.e.f. 1-4-2022.]
Explanation.—In this section, unless the context
otherwise requires—
(a) "addressee" shall have the same meaning as assigned to
it in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(b) "authorised representative" shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it in sub-section (2) of section 288
(c) ―automated allocation system" means an algorithm for
randomised allocation of cases, by using suitable
technological tools, including artificial intelligence and
machine learning, with a view to optimise the use of
resources;
(d) "automated examination tool" means an algorithm for
standardised examination of draft orders, by using
suitable technological tools, including artificial intelligence
and machine learning, with a view to reduce the scope of
discretion;
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(e) "computer resource" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in clause (k) of sub-section (1) of section 2
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(f) "computer system" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in clause (l) of sub-section (1) of section 2
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(g) "computer resource of assessee" shall include
assessee's registered account in designated portal of the
Income-tax Department, the Mobile App linked to the
registered mobile number of the assessee, or the
registered email address of the assessee with his email
service provider;
(h) "digital signature" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in clause (p) of sub-section (1) of section 2
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(i) "designated portal" means the web portal designated as
such by the Principal Chief Commissioner or the Principal
Director General, in charge of the National Faceless
Assessment Centre;
(j) "Dispute Resolution Panel" shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it in clause (a) of sub-section (15)
of section 144C;
(k) "faceless
assessment"
means
the
assessment
proceedings conducted electronically in 'e-Proceeding'
facility through assessee's registered account in
designated portal;
(l) "electronic record" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in clause (t) of sub-section (1) of section 2
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(la) "electronic verification code" means a code
generated for the purpose of electronic verification as per
the data structure and standards specified by the
Principal Director General or Director General, as the
case may be, in-charge of information technology;
(m) "eligible assessee" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to in clause (b) of sub-section (15) of section
144C;
(n) "email" or "electronic mail" and "electronic mail
message" means a message or information created or
transmitted or received on a computer, computer system,
computer resource or communication device including
attachments in text, image, audio, video and any other
electronic record, which may be transmitted with the
message;
(o) "hash function" and "hash result" shall have the same
meaning as assigned to them in the Explanation to sub-
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section (2) of section 3 of the Information Technology
Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(p) "Mobile app" shall mean the application software of the
Income-tax Department developed for mobile devices
which is downloaded and installed on the registered
mobile number of the assessee;
(q) [***]
(r) "real time alert" means any communication sent to the
assessee, by way of Short Messaging Service on his
registered mobile number, or by way of update on his
Mobile App, or by way of an email at his registered email
address, so as to alert him regarding delivery of an
electronic communication;
(s) "registered account" of the assessee means the
electronic filing account registered by the assessee in
designated portal;
(t) "registered e-mail address" means the e-mail address at
which an electronic communication may be delivered or
transmitted to the addressee, including—
(i) the e-mail address available in the electronic filing
account of the addressee registered in designated portal;
or
(ii) the e-mail address available in the last income-tax
return furnished by the addressee; or
(iii) the e-mail address available in the Permanent
Account Number
(iv) in the case of addressee being an individual who
possesses the Aadhaar number, the e-mail address of
addressee available in the database of Unique
Identification Authority of India; or
(v) in the case of addressee being a company, the e-mail
address of the company as available on the official
website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs; or
(vi) any e-mail address made available by the addressee
to the income-tax authority or any person authorised by
such authority;
(u) "registered mobile number" of the assessee means the
mobile number of the assessee, or his authorised
representative, appearing in the user profile of the
electronic filing account registered by the assessee in
designated portal;
(v) "video conferencing or video telephony" means the
technological solutions for the reception and transmission
of audio-video signals by users at different locations, for
communication between people in real-time.
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Section 151A:―151A. (1) The Central Government may make a scheme,
by notification in the Official Gazette, for the purposes of
assessment, reassessment or re-computation under
section 147 or issuance of notice under section 148 35[or
conducting of enquiries or issuance of show-cause notice
or passing of order under section 148A] or sanction for
issue of such notice under section 151, so as to impart
greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by—
(a) eliminating the interface between the income-tax
authority and the assessee or any other person to the
extent
technologically
feasible;
(b) optimising utilisation of the resources through
economies of scale and functional specialisation;
(c) introducing a team-based assessment, reassessment,
re-computation or issuance or sanction of notice with
dynamic jurisdiction.
(2) The Central Government may, for the purpose of giving
effect to the scheme made under sub-section (1), by
notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any of the
provisions of this Act shall not apply or shall apply with
such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as may be
specified in the notification: Provided that no direction shall
be issued after the 31st day of March, 2022.
(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (1) and subsection (2) shall, as soon as may be after the notification is
issued, be laid before each House of Parliament.‖
34.
Under these sections, the Central Government is
empowered to make schemes by notifying the same in the Official
Gazette for the purposes mentioned therein.
Scheme framed under Section 130 of the Act.
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(Department of Revenue)
(CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 28th March, 2022
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―S.O. 1400(E).—In exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 130 of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the Central Government hereby
makes the following Scheme, namely:1. Short title and commencement.—
(1) This Scheme may be called the Faceless Jurisdiction
of Income tax Authorities Scheme, 2022.
(2) It shall come into force with effect from the date of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
2. Definitions.–– (1) In this Scheme, unless the context
otherwise requires, ––
(a) ―Act means the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961);
(b) ―automated allocation means an algorithm for
randomised allocation of cases, by using suitable
technological tools, including artificial intelligence and
machine learning, with a view to optimise the use of
resources;
(2) words and expressions used herein and not defined,
but defined in the Act, shall have the meaning
respectively assigned to them in the Act.
3. Scope, Powers and Performance of functions of
income-tax authorities. –– For the purpose of this
Scheme, ––
(a) the exercise of all or any or the powers and
performance of all or any of the functions conferred on, or,
as the case may be, assigned to income-tax authorities,
by or under the Act as referred to in section 120 of the
Act; or
(b) vesting the jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer as
referred to in section 124 of the Act,
shall be in a faceless manner, through automated
allocation, in accordance with and to the extent provided
in––
(i) section 144B of the Act with reference to making
faceless assessment of total income or loss of assessee;
(ii) the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 notified under subsections (6B) and (6C) of section 250 of the Act with
reference to the disposal of appeals;
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(iii) the Faceless Penalty Scheme, 2021 notified under
sub-sections (2A) and (2B) of section 274 of the Act with
reference to imposition of penalty under Chapter XXI of
the Act;
(iv) the e-Verification Scheme, 2021 notified under subsections (1) and (2) of section 135A of the Act with
reference to the calling for of information under section
133 of the Act, collecting certain information under section
133B of the Act, or calling for information by prescribed
authority under section 133C of the Act, or exercise of
power to inspect register of companies under section 134,
or exercise of power of Assessing Officer under section
135 of the Act;
(v) the e-Settlement Scheme, 2021 notified under subsections (11) and (12) of section 245D of the Act with
reference to the settlement of pending applications by the
interim Board;
(vi) the e-advance rulings Scheme, 2022 notified under
sub-sections (9) and (10) of section 245R of the Act with
reference to dispute resolution for persons or class of
persons, as specified by the Board, who may opt for
dispute resolution under the Chapter XIX-AA of the Act
with reference to dispute arising from any variation in the
specified order fulfilling the specified conditions.
[Notification No. 15/2022/F. No. 370142/13/2022-TPL]
SHEFALI SINGH, Under Secy.
Scheme framed under Section 135A of the Act
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(Department of Revenue)
(CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 13th December, 2021
S.O.5187(E):-- In exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 135A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the Central Government hereby
makes the following Scheme, namely:-1. Short title and commencement.-(1) This Scheme may
be called the e-Verification Scheme, 2021.
(2) It shall come into force on the date of its publication in
the Official Gazette.
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2. Definitions.-(1) In this Scheme, unless the context
otherwise requires,-(a) ―Act‖ means the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of
1961);
(b) ―addressee‖ shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
(21 of 2000);
(c) ―authorised representative‖ shall have the same
meaning as assigned to it in sub-section (2) of
section 288 of the Act;
(d) ―automated allocation system‖ means an algorithm
for randomized allocation of cases, by using
suitable technological tools, including artificial
intelligence and machine learning, with a view to
optimize the use of resources;
(e) ―Commissioner of Income-tax (e-Verification)‖
means the prescribed income-tax authority under
section 133C of the Act read with rule 12D of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962.
(f) ―computer resource‖ shall have the same
meaning as assigned to it in clause (k) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(g) ―computer system‖ shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it in clause (I) of sub-section (1) of
section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
(21 of 2000);
(h) ―designated portal‖ means the web portal
designated as such by the Principal Director
General of Income-tax (Systems) or Director
General of Income-tax (Systems), as the case
may be;
(i)
―digital signature‖ shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it in clause (p) of sub-section (1) of
section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
(21 of 2000);
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(j)
―electronic record‖ shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it in clause (t) of sub-section (1) of
section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
(21 of 2000);
(k) "e-mail" or "electronic mail" and "electronic mail
message" means a message or information
created or transmitted or received on a computer,
computer system, computer resource or
communication device including attachments in
text, image, audio, video and any other electronic
record, which may be transmitted with the
message;
(l) "Prescribed Authority" shall mean any income-tax
authority working in the Directorate of Income-tax
(Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), who is
authorised by the Board to act as such authority
for the purposes of this Scheme;
(m) "registered account" of the assessee means the
electronic filing account registered by the
assessee in designated portal;
(n) "registered e-mail address" means the e-mail
address at which an electronic communication
may be delivered or transmitted to the addressee,
including- (i) the e-mail address available in the
electronic filing account of the addressee
registered in the designated portal; or (ii) the
e-mail address available in the last income-tax
return furnished by the addressee; or (iii)) the
e-mail address available in the permanent account
number database relating to the addressee; or (iv)
in the case of addressee being an individual who
possesses the Aadhaar number, the e-mail
address of addressee available in the database of
Unique Identification Authority of India; or (v) in the
case of addressee being a company, the e-mail
address of the company as available on the official
website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs; or (vi) any
e-mail address made available by the addressee
to the income-tax authority or any person
authorised by such authority;
(o) "registered mobile number" of the addressee
means either or both of- (i) the mobile number of
the assessee, or his authorised representative,
appearing in the user profile of the electronic filing
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account registered by the assessee in designated
portal; (ii) in the case of addressee, being an
individual who possesses the Aadhaar number,
the mobile number available with the database of
Unique Identification Authority of India.
(p) "risk management strategy" means an algorithm
for standardised examination of information, by
using suitable technological tools, including
artificial intelligence and machine learning, with a
view to reduce the scope of risk, as decided by the
Board from time to time:
(q) "rules" means Income-tax Rules, 1962;
(r) "scrutiny assessment‖ means assessment under
section 143 or section 144 or section 147 or
section 153A or section 153C of the Act:
(s) "video telephony" means the technological
solutions for the reception and transmission of
audio-video signals by users at different locations,
for communication between people in real-time.
(2) Words and expressions used herein and not
defined but defined in the Act shall have the meaning
respectively assigned to them in the Act.
3. Scope of the Scheme:- (1) The scope of the
Scheme shall be in respect of:
(i)
calling for information under section 133 of the
Act;
(ii)
collecting certain information under section
133B of the Act;
(iii)
calling for information by the prescribed
income-tax authority under section 133C of the
Act;
(iv)
exercise of power to inspect registers of
companies under section 134 of the Act; and
(v)
exercise of power of Assessing Officer under
section 135 of the Act.
(2) The Scheme shall be applicable to exercise the
functions referred to in sub-paragraph (1) for
processing or utilisation of the information which is,--
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(i)
in possession of the Principal Director General
of Income-tax (Systems) or Director General of
Income-tax (Systems), as the case may be; or
(ii)
made available to the Principal Director
General of Income-tax (Systems) or Director
General of Income-tax (Systems), as the case
may be, by- (a) the Director General of Incometax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation); (b)
the Commissioner of Income-tax in charge of
the Processing Centre for processing of
returns; (c) the Commissioner of Income-tax in
charge of the Centralised Processing Centre
(TDS) for processing of statement of tax
deducted at source; or (d) any other authority,
body or person.
4. Electronic Collection and Verification.--(1) The
Commissioner of Income-tax (e-Verification) shall
collect the information referred to in sub-paragraph (1)
of paragraph 3, in accordance with the procedure laid
down by the Principal Director General of Income-tax
(Systems) or Director General of Income-tax
(Systems), as the case may be.
(2) The Principal Director General of Income-tax
(Systems) or Director General of Income-tax
(Systems), as the case may be, shall make available
the information referred to in sub-paragraph (2) of
paragraph 3, to the Commissioner of Income-tax (eVerification)- (i) which was uploaded to the registered
account or sent on the registered mobile number,
wherever available, of the assessee and not accepted
by him or in a case where no response has been
received from the assessee within ninety days; (ii) in
respect of which no registered e-mail account or
mobile number is on record.
(3) The Commissioner of Income-tax (e-Verification)
shall process the information made available to it for
initial e-verification.
(4) The initial e-verification by the Commissioner of
Income-tax (e-verification) shall be through an
automated issuance of communication to the source
from where the information is received and the
Principal Director General of Income-tax (Systems) or
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Director General of Income-tax (Systems), as the case
may be, shall enable such automated communication.
(5) In cases where the mismatch between the amount
accepted by the assessee and the amount reported by
the reporting entity persists, the information after such
initial e-verification shall be run through a risk
management strategy laid down by the Board and the
information found to be no or low risk on such risk
criteria, where no further action is required, shall be
processed for closure.
(6) The remaining information shall be transferred
electronically by the Principal Director General of
Income-lax (Systems) or Director General of Incometax (Systems), as the case may be, to the Prescribed
Authority through a process of automated allocation
system.
(7) The verification of the information so allocated,
shall be completed by the Prescribed Authority in the
manner as per the procedure laid down in this regard
by the Director General of Income-tax (Intelligence
and Criminal Investigation), with the prior approval of
the Board.
(8) The information verified as above, shall be sent
back electronically in the form of a preliminary
verification report for verification to the Commissioner
of Income-tax (e-Verification).
(9) The Commissioner of Income-tax (e-Verification)
shall match the preliminary verification report with the
information in the return of income of the respective
assessee, where such return is available electronically
and prepare a final verification report.
(10) Based on the final verification report, the
information found to be low risk in accordance with the
criteria approved by the Board shall be considered for
closure.
(11) The remaining information in the form of final
verification report shall be processed in accordance
with sub-paragraph 12.
(12) If the information referred to in sub-paragraph
(11),- (i) pertains to a pending scrutiny assessment, it
shall be made available electronically to the Faceless
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Assessing Officer or Jurisdictional Assessing Officer,
as the case may be. (ii) does not pertain to a pending
scrutiny assessment, it shall be utilised for further
necessary action in accordance with the provisions of
the Act.
5. Random Allocation of information.--The Principal
Director General of Income-tax (Systems) or the
Director General of Income-tax (Systems), as the case
may be, shall, with the approval of the Board devise a
process to randomly allocate or transfer the
information, referred to in sub-paragraph (6) of
paragraph 4, to the Prescribed Authority
6. Issue and service of notice.-- (1) For the purpose of
verification of information, the Prescribed Authority
shall issue notice to a person requiring him to furnish
information or documents as necessary for such
verification.
(2) The notice shall be issued under digital signature
of the Prescribed Authority.
(3) The information or documents called for under
sub-paragraph (1) shall be furnished on or before the
date specified in the notice or as extended by the
Prescribed Authority on the request made by the
person.
7. Response to notice.--The Director General of
Income-tax (Systems) Shall in consultation with the
Director General of Income-tax (Intelligence and
Criminal Investigation) - (i) shall specify the procedure,
formats and standards for furnishing response to the
notices; and (i) may specify a machine readable
structured format for furnishing the information or
documents by the person in response to the notice
issued under paragraph 6.
8. No personal appearance.-(1) No person shall be
required to appear personally or through authorised
representative before the Prescribed Authority in
connection with any proceedings.
(2) In exceptional cases, where personal appearance
is requested by such person, the Prescribed Authority
may allow personal appearance through video
conferencing or video telephony, to the extent
technologically feasible.
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9. Communication exclusively by electronic mode.-For the purposes of this Scheme,- (a) all
communications between the Commissioner of
Income-tax (e-Verification) and various authorities
from whom the information is received, shall be in the
electronic mode; (b) all communications between the
Commissioner of Income-tax (e-Verification) and the
Director General of Income-tax (Intelligence and
Criminal Investigation), shall be in the electronic
mode; (c) every notice or any other communication
under this Scheme from the Prescribed Authority shall
be delivered to the person or his authorised
representative
electronically,
to
the
extent
technologically feasible; (d) the person or the
authorised representative shall furnish his response to
any notice or any other electronic communication,
under this Scheme, to the Prescribed Authority
electronically, to the extent technologically feasible;
(e) all communications between the Commissioner of
Income-tax (e-Verification) and the Faceless
Assessing Officer or the Jurisdictional Assessing
Officer shall be conducted through the Principal
Director General of Income-tax (Systems) or the
Director General of Income-tax (Systems), as the case
may be.
10. Authentication of electronic record.--For the
purposes of this Scheme, an electronic record shall be
authenticated by the - (i) Commissioner of Income-tax
(e-Verification) or the Prescribed Authority as the case
may be, by affixing its digital signature; (ii) person or
his authorised representative, by affixing his digital
signature if he is required under the rules to furnish his
return of income under digital signature, and in any
other case, by communicating through his registered
e-mail address.
11. Power to specify procedure and processes.- (1)
The Director General of Income-tax (Intelligence and
Criminal Investigation) shall, with the approval of the
Board, specify from time to time, procedures and
processes for effective implementation and functioning
of this Scheme, with respect to the following matters:(a) Standard Operating Procedures and techniques of
verification to be followed, by the prescribed
authorities while verifying such information; (b)
managing administration functions such as receipt,
scanning, data entry, storage and retrieval of
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information and documents in a centralised manner;
(c) grievance redressal mechanism for handling
grievances under the Directorate of Income-tax
(Intelligence and Criminal Investigation).
(2) The Director General of Income-tax (Systems)
shall, with the approval of the Board, specify from time
to time, procedures and processes for effective
implementation and functioning of this Scheme, with
respect to the following matters:- (a) mode and format
for issue of acknowledgment of the response
furnished by the addressee; (b) provision of web portal
facility including login facility, tracking status of
verification, display of relevant details, and facility of
download; (c) call centre to answer queries and
provide support services, including outbound calls and
inbound calls seeking information or clarification.
[Notification
No.137/2021/F.No.370142/57/2021TPL(Part-I)]
SHEFALI SINGH, Under Secy.‖
Scheme framed under Section 151A of the Act
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(Department of Revenue)
(CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 29th March, 2022
S.O.1466(E)-In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) and (2) of section 151 A of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the Central Government hereby
makes the following scheme.
1. Short title and commencement.-(1) This Scheme may
be called the e-Assessment of Income Escaping
Assessment Scheme, 2022.
(2) It shall come into force with effect from the date of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
2. Definitions.-(1) In this Scheme, unless the context
otherwise requires,(a) ―Act‖ means the Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961);
(b)
―automated allocation‖ means an algorithm for
randomized allocation of cases, by using suitable
technological tools, including artificial intelligence and
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machine learning, with a view to optimize the use of
resources.
(2) Words and expressions used herein and not defined,
but defined in the Act, shall have the meaning
respectively assigned to them in the Act.
3. Scope of the Scheme. For the purpose of this
Scheme,(a) assessment, reassessment or re-computation under
section 147 of the Act,
(b) issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act,
Shall be through automated allocation, in accordance with
risk management strategy formulated by the Board as
referred to in section 148 of the Act for issuance of notice,
and in a faceless manner, to the extent provided in
section 144B of the Act with reference to making
assessment or reassessment of total income or loss of
assessee.
[Notification No.18/2022/F.No.370142/16/2022-TPL
(Part1)]
SHEFALI SINGH, Under Secy‖.
35.
As per scheme framed under Section 130, the powers
and functions conferred on the Jurisdictional Assessing Authority as
per Section 120 or 124 as the case may be was required to be done in
a faceless manner through automated allocation to the extent provided
in Section 144B of the Act with reference to making assessment or
reassessment of total income or loss of income.
36.
Section 120 deals with the jurisdiction of Income Tax
Authorities and Section 124 deals with jurisdiction of Assessing
Authorities. For ready reference, the above provisions are extracted
hereunder:
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Section 120
―120. (1) Income-tax authorities shall exercise all or any of
the powers and perform all or any of the functions
conferred on, or, as the case may be, assigned to such
authorities by or under this Act in accordance with such
directions as the Board may issue for the exercise of the
powers and performance of the functions by all or any of
those authorities.
Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that any income-tax authority, being an authority
higher in rank, may, if so directed by the Board, exercise
the powers and perform the functions of the income-tax
authority lower in rank and any such direction issued by the
Board shall be deemed to be a direction issued under subsection (1).
(2) The directions of the Board under sub-section (1) may
authorise any other income-tax authority to issue orders in
writing for the exercise of the powers and performance of
the functions by all or any of the other income-tax
authorities who are subordinate to it.
(3) In issuing the directions or orders referred to in subsections (1) and (2), the Board or other income-tax
authority authorised by it may have regard to any one or
more of the following criteria, namely :—
(a) territorial area;
(b) persons or classes of persons;
(c) incomes or classes of income; and
(d) cases or classes of cases.
(4) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sections (1)
and (2), the Board may, by general or special order, and
subject to such conditions, restrictions or limitations as may
be specified therein,—
(a) authorise any Principal Director General or Director
General or Principal Director or Director to perform such
functions of any other income-tax authority as may be
assigned to him by the Board;
(b) empower the Principal Director General or Director
General or Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief
Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner
to issue orders in writing that the powers and functions
conferred on, or as the case may be, assigned to, the
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Assessing Officer by or under this Act in respect of any
specified area or persons or classes of persons or incomes
or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, shall be
exercised or performed by an Additional Commissioner or an
Additional Director or a Joint Commissioner or a Joint
Director, and, where any order is made under this clause,
references in any other provision of this Act, or in any rule
made thereunder to the Assessing Officer shall be deemed
to be references to such Additional Commissioner or
Additional Director or Joint Commissioner or Joint Director
by whom the powers and functions are to be exercised or
performed under such order, and any provision of this Act
requiring approval or sanction of the Joint Commissioner
shall not apply.
(5) The directions and orders referred to in sub-sections (1)
and (2) may, wherever considered necessary or appropriate
for the proper management of the work, require two or more
Assessing Officers (whether or not of the same class) to
exercise and perform, concurrently, the powers and
functions in respect of any area or persons or classes of
persons or incomes or classes of income or cases or classes
of cases; and, where such powers and functions are
exercised and performed concurrently by the Assessing
Officers of different classes, any authority lower in rank
amongst them shall exercise the powers and perform the
functions as any higher authority amongst them may direct,
and, further, references in any other provision of this Act or
in any rule made thereunder to the Assessing Officer shall
be deemed to be references to such higher authority and any
provision of this Act requiring approval or sanction of any
such authority shall not apply.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in any direction or
order issued under this section, or in section 124, the Board
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that for the
purpose of furnishing of the return of income or the doing of
any other act or thing under this Act or any rule made
thereunder by any person or class of persons, the incometax authority exercising and performing the powers and
functions in relation to the said person or class of persons
shall be such authority as may be specified in the
notification‖.
Section 124
―124. (1) Where by virtue of any direction or order issued
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120, the
Assessing Officer has been vested with jurisdiction over any
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area, within the limits of such area, he shall have
jurisdiction—
(a)
in respect of any person carrying on a business or
profession, if the place at which he carries on his business
or profession is situate within the area, or where his
business or profession is carried on in more places than
one, if the principal place of his business or profession is
situate within the area, and
(b)
in respect of any other person residing within the
area.
(2) Where a question arises under this section as to whether
an Assessing Officer has jurisdiction to assess any person,
the question shall be determined by the Director General or
the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner; or where the
question is one relating to areas within the jurisdiction of
different Director Generals or Chief Commissioners or
Commissioners, by the Directors General or Chief
Commissioners or Commissioners concerned or, if they are
not in agreement, by the Board or by such Director General
or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as the Board may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, specify.
(3) No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer—
(a) where he has made a return under sub-section (1) of
section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on
which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of
section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 143 or after the
completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier;
(b)
where he has made no such return, after the expiry
of the time allowed by the notice under sub-section (1) of
section 142 or under section 148 for the making of the
return or by the notice under the first proviso to section 144
to show cause why the assessment should not be
completed to the best of the judgment of the Assessing
Officer, whichever is earlier.
(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), where an
assessee calls in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing
Officer, then the Assessing Officer shall, if not satisfied with
the correctness of the claim, refer the matter for
determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment
is made.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or in
any direction or order issued under section 120, every
Assessing Officer shall have all the powers conferred by or
under this Act on an Assessing Officer in respect of the
income accruing or arising or received within the area, if
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any, over which he has been vested with jurisdiction by
virtue of the directions or orders issued under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) of section 120.]‖
37.
Under this Scheme the Central Government notified
the procedure to be undertaken for the purpose of assessment,
reassessment or re-computation under Section 147 of the Act
and issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act shall be
through
automated
allocation,
in
accordance
with
risk
management strategy formulated by the Board as referred to in
Section 148 of the Act for issuance of notice and in faceless
manner to the extent provided in Section 144B.
38.
For deciding the issue on hand, Sections 148 and
148A are reproduced hereunder:
―148.
(1)
Before
making
the
assessment,
reassessment or re-computation under section 147,
the Assessing Officer shall, subject to the provisions of
section 148A, issue a notice to the assessee, along
with a copy of the order passed under sub-section (3)
of section 148A, requiring him to furnish, within such
period as may be specified in the notice, 76 [not being
less than thirty days from the date of such notice but]
not exceeding three months from the end of the month
in which such notice is issued, a return of his income or
income of any other person in respect of whom he is
assessable under this Act during the previous year
corresponding to the relevant assessment year:
Provided that no notice under this section shall be
issued unless there is information with the Assessing
Officer which suggests that the income chargeable to
tax has escaped assessment in the case of the
assessee for the relevant assessment year:
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Provided further that where the Assessing Officer has
received information under the scheme notified under
section 135A, no notice under this section shall be
issued without prior approval of the specified authority.
(2) The return of income required under sub-section (1)
shall be furnished in such form and verified in such
manner and setting forth such other particulars, as may
be prescribed, and the provisions of this CWP
No.15791-2024 [25] (and other connected cases) Act
shall, apply accordingly as if such return were a return
required to be furnished under section 139:
Provided that any return of income required under subsection (1), furnished after the expiry of the period
specified in the notice under the said sub-section, shall
not be deemed to be a return under section 139.
(3) For the purposes of this section and section 148A,
the information with the Assessing Officer which
suggests that the income chargeable to tax has
escaped assessment means,—
(i) any information in the case of the assessee for the
relevant assessment year in accordance with the risk
management strategy formulated by the Board from
time to time; or
(ii) any audit objection to the effect that the assessment
in the case of the assessee for the relevant
assessment year has not been made in accordance
with the provisions of this Act; or
(iii) any information received under an agreement
referred to in section 90 or section 90A of the Act; or
(iv) any information made available to the Assessing
Officer under the scheme notified under section 135A;
or
(v)any information which requires action in
consequence of the order of a Tribunal or a Court; or
(vi) any information in the case of the assessee
emanating from survey conducted under section 133A,
other than under sub-section (2A) of the said section,
on or after the 1st day of September, 2024.
148A. Conducting inquiry, providing opportunity
before issue of notice under section 148.
The Assessing Officer shall, before issuing any notice
under section 148,—
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(a) conduct any enquiry, if required, with the prior
approval of specified authority, with respect to the
information which suggests that the income chargeable
to tax has escaped assessment;
(b) provide an opportunity of being heard to the
assessee, [***] by serving upon him a notice to show
cause within such time, as may be specified in the
notice, being not less than seven days and but not
exceeding thirty days from the date on which such
notice is issued, or such time, as may be extended by
him on the basis of an application in this behalf, as to
why a notice under section 148 should not be issued
on the basis of information which suggests that income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in his case
for the relevant assessment year and results of enquiry
conducted, if any, as per clause (a);
(c) consider the reply of assessee furnished, if any, in
response to the show-cause notice referred to in
clause (b);
(d) decide, on the basis of material available on record
including reply of the assessee, whether or not it is a fit
case to issue a notice under section 148, by passing
an order, with the prior approval of specified authority,
within one month from the end of the month in which
the reply referred to in clause (c) is received by him, or
where no such reply is furnished, within one month
from the end of the month in which time or extended
time allowed to furnish a reply as per clause (b)
expires: Provided that the provisions of this section
shall not apply in a case where,—
(a) a search is initiated under section 132 or books of
account, other documents or any assets are
requisitioned under section 132A in the case of the
assessee on or after the 1st day of April, 2021; or
(b) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior
approval of the Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner that any money, bullion, jewellery or
other valuable article or thing, seized in a search under
section 132 or requisitioned under section 132A, in the
case of any other person on or after the 1st day of
April, 2021, belongs to the assessee; or
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(c) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior
approval of the Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner that any books of account or
documents, seized in a search under section 132 or
requisitioned under section 132A, in case of any other
person on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, pertains
or pertain to, or any information contained therein,
2[relate to, the assessee; or
(d) the Assessing Officer has received any information
under the scheme notified under section 135A
pertaining to income chargeable to tax escaping
assessment for any assessment year in the case of the
assessee.] Explanation.— For the purposes of this
section, specified authority means the specified
authority referred to in section 151.]
39.
On a conjoint reading of Section 148 and 148A,
made it clear that before issuing notice under Section 148, the
Assessing Officer to conduct any enquiry, if required with the prior
approval of specified authority for taking up action on information
which suggests the income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment to provide opportunity of being heard to the
assessee by issuing show cause notice. Thereafter, upon
consideration of the reply if any is filed by the assessee, the
Assessing Officer has to decide whether or not it is a fit case to
issue notice under Section 148. If the Assessing Officer comes to
an opinion that it is a fit case for reassessment, he is required to
pass order under Section 148A(d), within a period of one month
from the end of the month in which the reply is received.
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40.
notice
Thereafter, the Assessing Officer is required to issue
under
Section
before
making
assessment,
reassessment or re-computation under Section 147, along with
order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act.
41.
In the above backdrop, notices issued by the
Jurisdictional Assessing Officers were challenged before the
respective Jurisdictional High Courts and upon consideration of
the cases, this Court had held that as per section 151A of the
Income Tax Act and the scheme made thereunder, the JAO has
no jurisdiction to issue the said notices. Later the matter was
carried to the Hon’ble Apex Court by the Revenue and pending
the Special Leave Petitions, Section 147A was brought into
Income Tax Act, 1961 with effect from 01.04.2021. Keeping in
view of the subsequent developments in the matter, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court while setting aside the orders passed by various
Jurisdictional High Courts remanded the matters for fresh
consideration by reserving liberty to the assesses to challenge
Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
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42.
The counsel for the petitioners would strenuously
contend that the amendment is unconstitutional inasmuch as the
intent of the legislature in bringing out the said provision into the
Act is to see that the judgments rendered by various High Courts
in this regard are nullified. It is contended that in order to validate
the acts done by the authorities though the same was without
jurisdiction, the present amendment was brought in. They would
further contend that in order to validate any enactment, there
should be ambiguity in the provision, that there was no such
ambiguity either in Section 151A or in the scheme made
thereunder. In such circumstances, there is no occasion for the
Central Government to bring the amendment to the Act. It is
further contended that if the legislature is allowed to make such
amendments with retrospective effect, the same would be in
violation of the Doctrine of separation of powers which is the
basic structure of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Shri Prithvi
Cotton
Mills
Ltd.
and
another
Vs.
Broach
Borough
Municipality and another1” to contend that such a validation
(1969) 2 SCC 283
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cannot be permitted especially so as to nullify the judgment
rendered by various High Courts. It is further contended that the
legislature has no competence to make such law with
retrospective effect more particularly when the rights of the
assessees are at stake. In the said decision, it was inter alia held
as follows:―4. When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared
by a Court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or
an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity
must be removed before validation can be said to take
place effectively. The most important condition, of course,
is that the Legislature must possess the power to impose
the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain
ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative competence, it
is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the
Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the
decision in exercise of judicial power which the
Legislature does not possess or exercise. A court‘s
decision must always bind unless the condition on which it
is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision
could not have been given in the altered circumstances.
Ordinarily, a Court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed
because the power to tax is wanting or the statue or the
rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the
jurisdiction. Validation of a tax do declared illegal may be
done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are
capable of being removed and are in fact removed and
the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by
providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been
properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by reenacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision
and then by fiction making the tax already collected to
stand under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the
Legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of
the law under which tax was collected and by legislative
fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The
Legislature may follow any one method or all of them and
while it does to it may neutralize the effect of the earlier
decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the
change of the law. Whichever method is adopted it must
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be within the competence of the legislature and legal and
adequate to attain the object of validation. If the
Legislature has the power over the subject matter and
competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make
such a valid law and make it retrospectively so as to bind
even past transactions. The validity of a Validating Law,
therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature
possesses the competence which it claims over the
subject-matter and whether in making the validation it
removes the defect which the courts had found in the
existing law and makes adequate provisions in the
Validating Law for a valid imposition of the tax.‖
(emphasis supplied)
43.
Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of ―State of Tamilnadu and another Vs.
M.Rayappa Gounder and others2”, the relevant portion of which
reads as follows:―3. The question as to the power of the assessing
authority to re-assess the receipts that had escaped
assessment under the Madras Entertainments Tax Act,
1939 had come up for consideration before the High
Court of Madras in WP No.513 of 1963 (Madras) R
Sundararaja Naidu V. Entertainment Tax Officer. Therein
the High Court in Madras held that there was no power to
re-asses under that Act. Thereafter the State Legislature
enacted the Act. The Act among other provisions contains
Section 7, a provision relating to validation of assessment
and collection of certain taxes. That sections reads.
―Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the
principal Act or in any judgment, decree or order of any
Court no assessment or re-assessment or collection of
any tax due on any payment for admission to any
entertainment or any cinematograph exhibition which has
escaped assessment to tax, or which has been assessed
at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable,
under Section 4 or 4-A of the principal At, made at any
(1971) 3 SCC 1
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time after the date of the commencement of the principal
Act and before the date of the publication of this Act in the
Fort St. George Gazette shall be deemed to be invalid or
ever to have been invalid on the ground only that such
assessment or re-assessment or collection was not in
accordance with law and such tax assessed or
reassessed or collected or purporting to have been
assessed or reassessed or collected, shall, for all
purposes, be deemed to be and to have been always
validity assessed or reassessed or collected and
accordingly(a) all acts, proceedings or things done or taken by the State
Government or by any officer of the State Government or
by any other authority in connection with the assessment
or reassessment or collection of such tax, shall, for all
purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been
done or taken in accordance with law.
(b) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or
continued in any Court against the State Government or
any person or authority whatsoever for the refund of any
tax so paid; and
(c) no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing the
refund of any tax so paid.‖
The effect of this provision is to overrule the decision of
the Madras High Court and not to change the law
retrospectively. What the provision says is that
notwithstanding any judgment of the Court, the
reassessment invalidity made must be deemed to be
valid. The Legislature has no power to enact such a
provision. A question similar to the one before us came up
for consideration before this Court in The Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmebad V. The New Shrock
Spg. And Wog. Co. Ltd. Civil Appeals Nos.2062 to 2064
and 2072 and 2251 of 1969 decided on April 17, 1970
AIR 1970 SC 1292. Dealing with that question this is what
this Court observed;
―This is a strange provision. Prima facie that provisions
appears to command the Corporation to refuse to refund
the amount illegally collected despite the orders of this
Court and the High Court. The State of Gujarat was not
well advised in introducing this provision. That provision
attempts to make a direct inroad into the judicial powers
of the State. The Legislatures under our Constitution have
within the prescribed limits, powers to make laws
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prospectively as well as retrospectively. By exercise of
those powers, the Legislature can remove the basis of a
decision rendered by a competent Court thereby
rendering that decision ineffective. But no Legislature in
this country has power to ask the instrumentalities of the
State to disobey or disregard the decision given by
Courts. The limits of the power of Legislatures to interfere
with the directions issued by Courts were considered by
several decisions of this Court. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills
Ltd., V. The Broach Borough Municipality, Civil Appeals
Nos.2197 and 2198 of 1966, decided on April 25, 1969,
AIR 1970 SC 192, our present Chief Justice speaking for
the Constitution Bench of the Court observed:
xxx
6. “Mahal Chand Sethia v. State of West Bengal3,
speaking for the Court stated the legal position in these
words:
“A Court of law can pronounce upon the validity of any
law and declare the same to be null and void if it was
beyond the legislative competence of the Legislature or if
it infringed the rights enshrined in Part III of the
Constitution. Needles to add it can strike down or declare
invalid any Act or direction of a State Government which
is not authorized by law. The position of a Legislature is
however different. It cannot declare any decision of a
Court of law to be void or of no effect.
7. Again Shah, J. (one of us in Janpada Sabha,
Chhindwara V. The Central Provinces Ltd., and State of
Madhya Pradesh V. Amalgamated Coal Field Ltd. Civil
Appeals Nos.125 to 134 of 1967, decided on 23rd
February, 1970 , AIR 1971 SC 57, speaking for the
Constitution Bench explained the legal position in these
words:
Proceeding further, it was observed:
―On the words used in the Act, it is plain that the
Legislature attempted to overrule or set aside the decision
of this Court. That in our Judgment is not open to the
Legislature to do under our constitutional scheme. It is
open to the Legislature within certain limits to amend the
Criminal Appeal No.75 of 1969
September 10, 1969 (SC)
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provisions of the Act retrospectively and to declare what
the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not open
to the Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court
properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its
powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to
be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be
otherwise than as declared by the Court.‖
(emphasis supplied)
In “S.R. Bhagwat and another Vs. State of
44.
Mysore”4, the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
with regard to validation of laws were as follows:
―12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this
Court that a binding judicial pronouncement between the
parties cannot be made ineffective with the aid of any
legislative power by enacting a provision which in
substance overrules such judgment and is not in the
realm of a legislative enactment which displaces the basis
or foundation of the judgment and uniformly applies to a
class of persons concerned with the entire subject sought
to be covered by such an enactment having retrospective
effect. We may only refer to two of these judgments.
13. The principle which emerged from these authorities is
that the legislature can change the basis on which a
decision is given by the Court and thus change the law in
general, which will affect a class of persons and events, at
large. It cannot, however, set aside an individual decision
inter parties and affect their rights and liabilities alone.
Such an act on the part of the legislature amounts to
exercising the judicial power of the State and to
functioning as an appellate Court or tribunal.
15. We may note at the very outset that in the present
case the High Court had not struck down any legislation
which was sought to be re-enacted after removing any
defect retrospectively by the impugned provisions. This is
a case where on interpretation of existing law, the High
Court had given certain benefits to the petitioners. That
order of mandamus was sought to be nullified by the
enactment of the impugned provisions in a new statue.
(1995) 6 SCC 16
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
This in our view would be clearly impressible legislative
exercise‖.
45.
In “State of Tamilnadu Vs. State of Kerala and
another5”, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
―99. In Mahal Chand Sethia, while dealing with the
argument that although it was open to the State
Legislature by an Act and the Governor by an Ordinance
to amend the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment
(Special Courts) Act, 1949, it was incompetent for either
of them to validate an order of transfer which had been
quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari by the High
Court and the order of transfer being virtually dead, could
not be resuscitated by the Governor or legislature and the
validating measures could not touch any adjudication by
the Court. Miter J. Speaking for the Court stated the legal
position: (UJ p.619, para4)
―4. … A legislature of a State is competent to pass any
measure which is within its legislative competence under
the Constitution of India. Of course, this is subject to the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Laws can be
enacted either by the Ordinance making power of a
Governor or the legislature of a State in respect of the
topics covered by the entries in the appropriate List in the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Subject to the
above limitations laws can be prospective as also
retrospective in operation. A court of law can pronounce
upon the validity of any law and declare the same to be
null and void if it was beyond the legislative competence
of the legislature or if it infringed the rights enshrined in
Part II of the Constitution. Needless to add it can strike
down or declare invalid any Act or direction of a State
Government which is not authorized by law. The position
of a legislature is however different. It cannot declare any
decision of a Court of law to be void or of no effect.‖
32. I may, however, observe that even though the real
object of the Act may be to set aside the result of the
mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court, yet, the
section does not mention this object at all. Probably this
was so because the jurisdiction of a High Court and the
(2014) 12 SCC 696
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
effectiveness of its orders derived their force from Article
226 of the Constitution itself. These could not be touched
by an ordinary act of Parliament. Even if Section 3 of the
Act seeks to take away the basis of the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court, without mentioning it, by enacting
what may appear to be a law, yet, I think that, where the
rights of the citizen against the State are concerned, we
should adopt an interpretation which upholds those rights.
Therefore, according to the interpretation I prefer to adopt
the rights which had passed into those embodied in a
Judgment and became the basis of a mandamus from the
High Court could not be taken away in this indirect
fashion.‖
105. The importance of power of judicial review in rule of
law has been significantly highlighted in P.Sambamurthy.
In that case, this Court while holding that provisio to
clause (5) of Article 371-D was violative of the basic
structure doctrine, observed that: (SCC p.369, para 4)
―4. … if the exercise of the power of judicial review can be
set at naught by the State Government by overriding the
decision against it, it would sound the death knell of the
rule of law.‖
Peoples union for civil liberties:
107 In people‘s union for civil liberties, the question under
consideration before the three-Judge bench of this Court
was the validity of Representation of the People
(Amendment) Ordiaence, 2002. The amendment followed
the decision of this Court in Assn. for Democratic
Reforms. M.B. Shah, J speaking for the majority noticed
the earlier decisions of this Court in P. Samba Murthy,
Cauvery reference, Municipal Corp. of the City of
Ahmedabad, Prithvi Cotton and Mahalchand Sethia and
stated : (peoples union for civil liberties case SCC p 438
para 37)
―37. … the legislature can change the basis on which a
decision is rendered by this Court and change the law in
general. However, this power can be exercised subject to
constitutional
provision,
particularly
legislative
competence and if it is violative of fundamental rights
enshrined in Para III of the Constitution, such law would
be void as provided under Article 13 of the Constitution.
The legislature also cannot declare any decision of a
Court of law to be void or of no effect.‖
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
P. Kannadasan
110. Prithvi Cotton has been followed in Hindustan Gum
and Chemicals, Vijay Mills Co. and P.Kannadasan. It is
not necessary to burden this judgment with all the three
judgments as, in our view, reference to one of them i.e.,
P.Kannadasan this Court noted that the Constitution of
India recognized the doctrine of separation of powers
between the three organs of the State, namely, the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The Court
said: (SCC pp. 685-86, para 15)
―15…. It must be remembered that our Constitution
recognizes and incorporates the doctrine of separation of
powers between the three organs of the State viz., the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Even though
the Constitution has adopted the parliamentary form of
Government where the dividing line between the
legislature and the executive becomes thin, the theory of
separation of powers is still valid. Ours is also a federal
form of Government. The subjects in respect of which the
Union and the States can make laws are separately set
out in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution respectively. (List III is, of course, a
concurrent list.) The Constitution has invested the
Supreme Court and High Courts with the power to
invalidate laws made by Parliament and the State
Legislatures transgressing the constitutional limitations.
Where an Act made by a State Legislature is invalidated
by the courts on the ground that the State Legislature is
invalidated by the courts on the ground that the State
Legislature was not competent to enact it, the State
Legislature cannot enact a law declaring that the
judgment of the Court shall not operate; it cannot overrule
or annul the decision of the Court. But this does not mean
that the other legislature which is competent to enact that
law cannot enact that law. It can. Similarly, it is open to a
legislature to alter the basis of the judgment as pointed
out by this Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., V.
Broach Borough Municipality – all the while adhering to
the constitutional limitations; in such a case, the decision
of the court becomes ineffective in the sense that the
basis upon which it is rendered, is changed. The new law
or the amended law so made can be challenged on other
grounds but not on the ground that it seeks to ineffectuate
or circumvent the decision of the Court. This is what is
meant by ‗checks and balances‘ inherent in a system of
Government incorporating the concept of separation of
powers. This aspect has been repeatedly emphasized by
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
this Court in numerous decisions commencing from Shri
Prithvi Cotton Mills. Under our Constitution, neither wing
is superior to the other. Each wing derives its power and
jurisdiction from the Constitution. Each must operate
within the sphere allotted to it. Trying to make one wing
superior to the other would be to introduce an imbalance
in the system and a negation of the basic concept of
separation of powers inherent in our system of
Government.‖
(emphasis supplied)
46.
In “Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Vatika
Township Pvt. Ltd.6” the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as
under:“31. ….our belief in the nature of the law is founded on
the bed rock that every human being is entitled to arrange
his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not
find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This
principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit : law
looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips
vs. Eyre[3], a retrospective legislation is contrary to the
general principle that legislation by which the conduct of
mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first
time to deal with future acts ought not to change the
character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of
the then existing law.
32. The obvious basis of the principle against
retrospectivity is the principle of 'fairness‘, which must be
the basis of every legal rule as was observed in the
decision reported in L‘Office Cherifien des Phosphates v.
Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd[4]. Thus,
legislations which modified accrued rights or which
impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new
disability have to be treated as prospective unless the
legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a
retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of
supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to
explain a former legislation. We need not note the
cornucopia of case law available on the subject because
aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various
decisions and this legal position was conceded by the
(2014) 367 ITR 466 (SC)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few
judgments containing this dicta, a little later.
33. We would also like to point out, for the sake of
completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a
legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is
different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some
persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment
on some other person or on the public generally, and
where to confer such benefit appears to have been the
legislators object, then the presumption would be that
such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction,
would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This
exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as
retrospective. In Government of India & Ors v. Indian
Tobacco Association [5], the doctrine of fairness was held
to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a
benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective
operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a
statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in the
case of Vijay v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [6] It was
held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of
community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision
the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature.
However, we are confronted with any such situation here.
34. In such cases, retrospectively is attached to benefit
the persons in contradistinction to the provision imposing
some burden or liability where the presumption attaches
towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso
added to section 113 of the Act is not beneficial to the
assessee. On the contrary, it is a provision which is
onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this,
we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption
against retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against
retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that
no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective
operation unless such a construction appears very clearly
in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct
implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than
a presumption, and thus could be displaced by out
weighing factors.‖
(emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
47.
In “State of Karnataka V. Karnataka Pawn
Brokers Association and others7” speaking through (Deepak
Gupta, J), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“18. The second issue is whether the effect of the
judgment in Manakchand Motilal case8 can be undone by
bringing out amendments in question. A large number of
authorities have been cited in this regard. We may refer to
a few of them.
19. In “Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., V. Borough
Municipality9”, a Constitution Bench of this Court,
dealing with the question of validity of a validation Act
passed with a view to get over the judgment of this Court,
held that even if it has competence, the Legislature
cannot merely pass a law that a decision of this Court
shall not bind. This Court held as follows: (SCC pp.28687, para 4)
―4. …. Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient
to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not
bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in
exercise of judicial power which the legislature does not
possess or exercise. A court‘s decision must always bind
unless the conditions on which it is based are so
fundamentally altered that the decision could not have
been given in the altered circumstances…‖
20.xx
21.xx
22.xx
23.xx
24. On analysis of the aforesaid judgments it can be said
that the Legislature has the power to enact validating laws
including the power to amend laws with retrospective
effect. However, this can be done to remove causes of
invalidity. When such a law is passed, the Legislature
basically corrects the errors which have been pointed out
in a judicial pronouncement. Resultantly, it amends the
law, by removing the mistakes, committed in the earlier
(2018) 6 SCC 363
Manakchand Motilal v. State of Karnataka, 1991 SCC Online Kar 139: ILR 191 Kar 1928
(1969) 2 SCC 283
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
legislation, the effect of which is to remove the basis and
foundation of the judgment. If this is done, the same does
not amount to statutory overruling.
25.However, the Legislature cannot set at naught the
judgments which have been pronounced by amending the
law not for the purpose of making corrections or removing
anomalies but to bring in new provisions which did not
exist earlier. The legislature may have the power to
remove the basis or not exist earlier. The Legislature may
have the power to remove the basis or foundation of the
judicial pronouncement but the Legislature cannot
overturn or set aside the judgment, that too
retrospectively by introducing a new provision. The
Legislature is bound by the mandamus issued by the
Court. A judicial pronouncement is always binding unless
the very fundamentals on which it is based are altered
and the decision could not have been given in the altered
circumstances. The Legislature cannot, by way of
introducing a new provision. The Legislature is bound by
the mandamus issued by the Court. A judicial
pronouncement is always binding unless the very
fundamentals on which it is based are altered and the
decision could not have been given in the altered
circumstances. The Legislature cannot, by way of
introducing an amendment, overturn a judicial
pronouncement and declare it to be wrong or a nullity.
What the Legislature can do is to amend the provisions of
the statue to remove the basis of the judgment.
26.xx
27.Therefore, the State, insofar as it has made the
amended provisions retrospective, has attempted to
nullify the writ of mandamus issued by the Court in favour
of the respondents. This mandamus could not have been
set at naught by making the provisions retrospective. This
would be a direct breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers as laid down in State of T.N.10. We are clearly of
the view that the State Legislature could not have nullified
the judgment passed in Manakchand Motilal case by
retrospectively amending the Acts. Therefore, the
validating Acts insofar as they are retrospective, are held
to be illegal.‖
(emphasis supplied)
State of T.N. v. State of Kerala (2014) 12 SCC 696
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
48.
In “Madras Bar Association Vs. Union of India
and another11”, while dealing with the independence of
Judiciary, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
Separation of powers
―20. Sir Edward Coke on being summoned by King James
I to answer why the King could not himself decide cases
which had to go before his own courts of justice,
asserted12 (Prohibitions Del Roy case, ER p.1343)
―… no King after the conquest assumed to himself to give
any judgment in any cause whatsoever, which concerned
the administration of justice within his realm, but these
were solely determined in the Courts of justice‖.
When the King said that: (ER p.1343)
―he thought the law was founded on reason, and that he
and others had reason, as well as the Judges‖
Coke answered: (ER p.1343)
―True it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with
excellent science and great endowments of nature; but
His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of
England, and causes which concern the life, or
inheritance, or gods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to
be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason
and judgment of the law, which law is an at which requires
long study and experience, before that a man can attain
to the cognizance of it; and that the law was the golden
metwand and measure to try the causes of the subjects;
and which protected His Majesty in safety and peace.
(―The Higher Law-Background of American Constitutional
Law‖ by Edward S.Corwin, pp.38-39).
26. The doctrine of separation of powers informs the
Indian Constitutional structure and is an essential
constituent of rule of law. In other words, the doctrine of
separation of powers, though not expressly engrafted in
the Constitution, its sweep, operation and visibility are
apparent from the scheme of the Indian Constitution. The
Constitution has made demarcation, without drawing
(2022) 12 SCC 455
Prohibitions Del Roy, (1607) 12 Co Rep 64: 77 ER 1342
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
formal lines between the three organs-legislature,
executive and judiciary. Separation of powers between
three organs – the legislature, executive and judiciary – is
also nothing but a consequence of principles of equality
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, breach of separation of judicial power may
amount to negation of equality under Article 14. Stated
thus, a legislation can be invalidated on the basis of
breach of the separation of powers since such breach is
negation of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
(B) Permissible Legislative overruling:
45. The judgment in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., v.
Broach Borough Municipality13 was relied upon by both
sides. The validity of the rules framed by Municipal
Corporation under Section 73 of the Bombay Municipal
Boroughs Act, 1925 for levying a rate on open lands was
the subject-matter of challenge in Patel Gordhandas
Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner14. The relevant
rule was declared ultra vires of the Act itself. Later, the
State Legislature passed a validation Act seeking to
validate the imposition of tax, the validity of which was
considred in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., This Court held
that it is not sufficient to merely declare that the decision
of the Court shall not bind as such declaration would
amount to the reversal of a decision of the Court which
the legislature cannot do. It was further observed that a
Court‘s decision must always bind unless the conditions
on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the
decision could not have been given in the altered
circumstances.
46. It is open to the legislature within certain limits to
amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to
declare what the law shal be deemed to have been, but it
is not open to the legislature to say that a judgment of a
court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its
powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to
be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall be
otherwise than as declared by the Court. The test of
judging the validity of the amending and validating
enactment is, whether the legislature enacting the
validating statue has competence over the subject-matter;
whether by validation, the said legislature has removed
(1969) 2 SCC 283
(1964) 2 SCR 608: AIR 1963 SC 1742
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
the defect which the Court had found in the previous laws;
and whether the validating law is consistent with the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution. In State of T.N. v.
State of Kerala, this Court held that any law enacted by
the legislature may be invalidated if it is an attempt to
interfere with judicial process by being in breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
47.The judgment of this Court in ―Madan Mohan Pathak v.
Union of India‖15 requires a close scrutiny as it was
adverted to and relied upon by both sides. A writ petition
was filed in the High Court of Calcutta for a mandamus
directing the Life Insurance Corporation (―LIC‖) to act in
accordance with the terms of settlement dated 24.01.1974
read with administrative instructions dated 29.03.1974.
The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge
against which a letters patent appeal (―LPA‖) was
preferred by LIC. During the pendency of the LPA, LIC
(Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 came into force.
The LPA was withdrawn in view of the subsequent
legislation and the decision of the learned Single Judge
became final. Validity of the said statute was assailed in a
writ petition filed under Article 32 by the employes of LIC.
Bhagwait, J., speaking for the majority, was of the opinion
that the judgment of the Calcutta High Court not a mere
declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax as invalid
so that a validating statute can remove the defect pointed
out in the judgment. He observed that the Judgment of
the Calcutta High Court gave effect to the rights of the
petitioners by mandamus, directing LIC to pay annual
cash bonus. As long as the judgment of the learned
Single Judge is not reversed in appeal, it cannot be
disregarded or ignored. LIC was held to be bound by the
writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court.
Beg., J. in his concurrent opinion, held that the rights
which accrued to the employees on the basis of the
mandamus issued by the High Court cannot be taken
away either directly or indirectly by subsequent legislation.
48.Thereafter, Madan Mohan Pathak came up for
discussion in ―Sri Ranga Match Industries v. Union of
India‖16. Jeevan Reddy, J. was of the opinion that Maddan
Mohan Pathak case cannot be treated as an authority for
the proposition that mandamus canot be set aside by a
legislative act. Hansaria, J. was not in agreeemtn with
such view. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in A.V.
(1978) 2 SCC 50: 1978 SCC (L&S) 103
1994 Supp (2) SCC 726
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Nachane v. Union of India17, Hansaria, J. held that the
legal stand taken by Beg, J. in Madan Mohan Pathak
case had received majority‘s endorsement and it was
because of this that retrospectivity given to the relevant
rule assailed in A.V. Nachane was held to have nullified
the effect of the writ and was accordingly invalid. In view
of the difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a
larger Bench. We are informed by the learned Amicus
Curiae that the difference of opinion could not be resolved
as the case was settled out of Court.
49. In Virender Singh Hooda, this Court did not accept the
contention of the petitioners therein that vested rights
cannot be taken away by retrospective legislation.
However, it was observed that taking away of such rights
would be impermissible if there is violation of Articles 14,
16 or any other constitutional provision. The appointments
already made in implementation of a decision of this Court
were protected with the reason that ―the law does not
permit the legislature to take away what has been granted
in implementation of the Court‘s decision. Such a course if
impermissible.‖ This Court in Cauvery Water Disputes
Tribunal declared the Ordinance which sought to displace
an interim order passed by the statutory tribunal as
unconstitutional as it set aside an individual decision inter
partes and therefore, amounted to a legislative exercise of
judicial power. When a mandamus issued by the Mysore
High Court was sought to be annulled by a legislation, this
Court quashed the same in S.R. Bhagwat v. State of
Mysore18 on the ground that it was impermissible
legislative exercise. Setting at naught a decision of the
Court without removing the defect pointed out in the
judgment would sound the death knell of the rule of law.
The rule of law would cease to have any meaning,
because then it would be open to the Government to defy
a law and yet to get away with it.
50.The permissibility of legislative override in this country
should be in accordance with the principles laid down by
this Court in the aforementioned as well as other
judgments, which have been culled out as under:
50.1 The effect of the judgments of the Court can be
nullified by a legislative act removing the basis of the
judgment. Such law can be retrospective. Retrospective
(1982) 1 SCC 205: 1982 SCC (L&S) 53
(1995) 6 SCC 16: 1995 SCC (L&S) 1334
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
amendment should be reasonable and not arbitrary and
must not be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution.
50.2. The test for determining the validity of a validating
legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect
would not have been passed, if the altered position as
sought to be brought in by the validating statute existed
before the Court at the time of rendering its judgment. In
other words, the defect pointed out should have been
cured such that the basis of the judgment pointing out the
defect is removed.
50.3.Nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be
impermissible legislative exercise (see: S.R. Bhagwat).
Even interim directions cannot be reversed by a
legislative veto (see: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal
and Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala19).
50.4 Transgression of constitutional limitations and
intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature is
violative of the principle of separation of powers, the rule
of law and of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(emphasis supplied)
49.
In “Bhubaneshwar Singh and another Vs. Union
of India and others20” while dealing with validating Act with
retrospective operation, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
―11. From time to time controversy has arisen as to
whether the effect of judicial pronouncements of the High
Court or the Supreme Court can be wiped out by
amending the legislation with retrospective effect. Many
such Amending Acts are called Validating Acts, validating
the action taken under the particular enactments by
removing the defect in the statute retrospectively because
of which the statute or the part of it had been declared
ultra vires. Such exercise has been held by this Court as
not to amount to encroachment on the judicial power of
the courts. The exercise of rendering ineffective the
judgments or orders of competent courts by changing the
very basis by legislation is a well-known device of
(2019) 13 SCC 185
(1994) 6 SCC 77
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
validating legislation. This Court has repeatedly pointed
out that such validating legislation which removes the
cause of the invalidity cannot be considered to be an
encroachment on judicial power. At the same time, any
action in exercise of the power under any enactment
which has been declared to be invalid by a court cannot
be made valid by a Validating Act by merely saying so
unless the defect which has been pointed out by the court
is removed with retrospective effect. The validating
legislation must remove the cause of invalidity. Till such
defect or the lack of authority pointed out by the court
under a statute is removed by the subsequent enactment
with retrospective effect, the binding nature of the
judgment of the court cannot be ignored.‖
(emphasis supplied)
50.
In “Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit
and others Vs. Dr. Manu and another21”, the Hon’ble Apex
Court dealt with the scope and operation of retrospective
permissibility, the relevant paras of which reads as follows:
“35. The proposition of law that a clarificatory provision
may be made applicable retrospectively is so well
established that we do not wish to burden this judgment
by referring to rulings in the same vein. However, it is
necessary
to
dilate
on
the
role
of
a
clarification/explanation to a statue and how the same
may be identified and distinguished from a substantive
amendment.
36.An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter the
scope of the original provision, vide Bita Coop.
Development Cane Mktg. Union Ltd., v. Bank of Bihar.
Merely describing a provision as an ―Explanation‖ or a
―clarification‖ is not decisive of its true meaning and
import. On this aspect this Court in Virtual Soft Systems
Ltd., v. CIT22 observed as under: (Virtual Soft Systems
case 12, SCC pp. 687-88, para 51)
(2023) 19 SCC 30
(2007) 9 SCC 665: (2007) 289 ITR 83
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
37.xx
―51. Even if the statue does contain a statement to the
effect that the amendment is declaratory or clarificatory,
that is not the end of the matter.
This Court will not regard itself as being bound by the said
statement in the statue itself, but will proceed to analyze
the nature of the amendment and then conclude whether
it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or
whether it is an amendment which is intended to change
the law and which applies to future periods.‖
38. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles
could be culled out:
38.1 If a statue is curative or merely clarificatory of the
previous law, retrospective operation thereof may be
permitted.
38.2
In
order
for
a
subsequent
order/provision/amendment to be considered as
clarificatory of the previous law, the pre-amended law
ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it
would be impossible to reasonably interpret a provision
unless an amendment is read into it, that the amendment
is considered to be clarification or a declaration of the
previous law and therefore applied retrospectively.
38.3. An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter
the scope of the original provision.
38.4 Merely because a provision is described as a
clarification/explanation, the Court is not bound by the
said statement in the statute itself, but must proceed to
analyze the nature of the amendment and then conclude
whether it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory
provision or whether it is a substantive amendment which
is intended to change the law and which would apply
prospectively.‖
(emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
51.
In “Bakhtawar Trust and others Vs. M.D.Narayan
and others23” the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the aspect of the
validating enactment with retrospective effect as under:
“26. Where a legislature validates an executive action
repugnant to the statutory provisions declared by a Court of
law, what the legislature is required to do is first to remove the
very basis of invalidity and then validate the executive action.
In order to validate an executive action or any provision of a
statute, it is not sufficient for the legislature to declare that a
judicial pronouncement given by a Court of law would not be
binding, as the legislature does not possess that power. A
decision of a Court of law has a binding effect unless the very
basis upon which it is given is so altered that the said decision
would not have been given in the changed circumstances.
―27. Here, the question before us is, whether the impugned
Act has passed the test of constitutionality by serving to
remove the very basis upon which the decision of the High
Court in the writ petition was based. This question gives rise
to further two questions - first, what was the basis of the
earlier decision; and second what, if any, may be said to be
the removal of that basis?
28. In the earlier decision of the High Court, it was found that
licence to construct the building upto 80 feet was repugnant to
the Zonal Regulations framed u/s 13 of the Planning Act which
provided a maximum height of new building as 55 feet. Thus,
the provision of Zonal Regulations which provided maximum
height of 55 feet in case of a new building was, therefore, the
basis upon which the High Court proceeded to conclude that
the construction of the building violated the prescribed norms.
It is manifest that the impugned Act has retrospectively
modified the Zonal Regulations of 1972 by raising the height
of a building from 55 feet to above 165 feet. The provision of
law upon which the High Court has placed reliance has,
therefore, undergone a material alteration. The High Court
would now find it impossible to take the view that the said
building was erected in violation of the law, and that the
licence granted therefore, was accordingly legally invalid.‖
(emphasis supplied)
(2003) 5 SCC 298
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
52.
By placing reliance on these judgments the counsel
for petitioners submit that the intent behind bringing Section 147A
by way of an amendment is not sustainable and the same is
unconstitutional. They would further submit that by inserting the
said provision into the Income Tax Act, 1961, the vested right of
the assessees to be assessed under faceless manner was taken
away so as to justify the wrong done by the Jurisdictional
Assessing Authorities with retrospective effect. Further, it is
contended if at all any judgment or decision rendered by a Court
is to be set aside, the same has to be done through process of
law by a superior Court, but not by way of an amendment with
retrospective effect, as was done in the case on hand.
53.
In “Sedco Forex International Drill.INC and others
Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Dehradun and another24”,
while explaining the scope of a provision which is in nature of
clarificatory, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“17. As was affirmed by this Court in Goslino Mario a
cardinal principle of the tax law is that the law to be
applied is that which is in force in the relevant assessment
year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary
implication. (See also Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd., v.
CIT). An explanation to a statutory provision may fulfill the
(2005) 12 SCC 717 (emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
purpose of clearing up an ambiguity in the main provision
or an Explanation can add to and widen the scope of the
main section. If it is in its nature clarificatory then the
Explanation must be read into the main provision with
effect from the time that the main provision came into
force. But if it changes the law it is not presumed to be
retrospective, irrespective of the fact that the phrases
used are ―it is declared‖ or ―for the removal of doubts‖.
18. There was and is no ambiguity in the main provision
of Section 9(1)(ii). It includes salaries in the total income
of an assessee if the assessee has earned it in India. The
word ―earned‖ had been judicially defined in S.G.
Pgnatale by the High Court of Gujarat, in our view,
correctly, to mean as income ―arising or accruing in India‖.
The amendment to the section by way of an Explanation
in 1983 effected a change in the scope of that judicial
definition so as to include with effect from 1979, ―income
payable for service rendered in India.‖
(emphasis supplied)
54.
In
“State
of
Telangana
Vs.
M/s.Tirumala
Constructions25”, while dealing with Telangana Value Added
Tax (2nd Amendment) Act, 2017 and its applicability after repeal
of VAT Act, 2005, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
―106. A subsidiary argument was that acts done in pursuance of
the ordinance cannot lapse, because they are saved, by virtue
of the repeal and savings clause (Section 17438) of the State
GST Act, all action taken pursuant to the ordinance, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 813 The relevant part of Section 174 (2) inter alia, is
as follows:
―when it was in force, would be saved. In the opinion of this
court, there is no merit in that argument. The invalidity of the
amendment by the state legislature (which conformed to the
ordinance, on 02.12.2017) went to its root of the jurisdiction of
those acting under the amended provisions of the State GST,
rendering them (as indeed, the substantive provisions) void and
(2023) 11 Centax 259 (SC) (emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
unenforceable. Furthermore, even if for some reason, there
were any doubts regarding validity and continuance of any
notice, or proceedings, initiated pursuant to the provisions of
the ordinance, their invalidity is such that they cannot be
sustained. Furthermore, as held in Krishna Kumar Singh (supra)
unless the consequences are ―irreversible‖ there is ordinarily no
question of any action- taken under an ordinance that is
rendered void, due to operation of the provisions of the
Constitution, being continued. Though the observations of this
court were in the context of ordinances lapsing due to their not
being presented before the House of the legislatures, the same
principle would, in this court‘s considered view, apply to cases,
where the legislature ceases to have competence over the
subject matter.‖
(emphasis supplied)
55. CONTENTIONS OF THE REVENUE
(i) Sri N. Venkataraman, the learned Additional Solicitor
General of India would submit that in order to eliminate
physical interface between the assessees and the officers
manning the Act, e-assessment regime was started in the
year 2019, so as to take up the assessments by converting
into technological mode, as a transition testing. Later, with
effect from 01.04.2021, the Department introduced a
scheme to take up the assessments in faceless manner
through National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC).
The said scheme was formulated as per enabling provision
provided under Section 151A of Income Tax Act, 1961.
Accordingly,
Central
Government
issued
Notification
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
No.18/2022, dt.29.03.2022, formulated the scheme called
the
e-assessment
of
Income
Escaping
Assessment
Scheme, 2022. It was further contended that under the said
scheme for the purpose of issuance of notice under Section
148 of the Act shall be through automated allocation, in
accordance with risk management strategy formulated by
the Board as referred to in Section 148 of the Act and in a
faceless manner to the extent provided in Section 144B of
the
Act
with
reference
to
making
assessment
or
reassessment of total income or loss of assessee. In other
words, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India
would contend that the intention of the Legislature is to
initiate/conduct proceedings prior to making an assessment
under Section 147 of the Act, by issuing notice under
Section 148 vests with the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer
inasmuch as the scheme in clear and unequivocal terms
indicate that “and in a faceless manner, to the extent
provided in Section 144B of the Act with reference to
making assessment or reassessment of the total income or
loss of the assessee”, meaning thereby the procedure
contemplated under Section 144B has to be undertaken for
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
making assessment in faceless manner for the purpose of
section 147.
(ii)
He would further contend that a perusal of Section
144B of Income Tax Act, 1961 refers Sections 143, 144 or
147 as the case may be with respect to the cases referred
to in sub section 2 of Section 144B. Sub Section 2 of
section 144B reads as under:
―The faceless assessment under sub section (1) shall be
made in respect of such territorial area or persons or
class of persons, or incomes or class of incomes, or
cases or class of cases as may be specified by the
board.‖
(iii) By placing reliance on Section 144B (1) & (2), it is
contended that assessment or reassessment under Section
147 of the Act shall be undertaken in a faceless manner,
but not the proceedings under Sections 148 or Section
148A of the Act. He would further submit that Section 148
or 148A were never brought under the purview of faceless
assessment, which is why, Section 148 was not referred to
in Section 144B of the Act. In the absence of enabling
provision
under
the
statute,
the
question
of
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
conducting/initiating proceedings under Sections 148 or
148A in faceless manner do not arise.
(iv) He would further submit that the intention of the
Legislature was clear from the date of formulating the
scheme under Section 151A and enacting Section 144B
was to conduct assessment under Section 147 of the Act in
faceless manner. Further under the scheme, Section 148
was mentioned only for the purpose of allocation of cases
through risk management strategy formulated by the board
for the purpose of issuance of notice under the said
section. He would further submit that a conjoint reading of
Section 144B and the scheme framed under Section 151A
would make it clear that it was never intended to take up
the proceedings in a faceless manner as far as Section 148
is concerned. He would further submit that from 01.04.2022
onwards not even a single notice was issued under Section
148 or 148A of the Act in faceless manner.
(v) While elaborating the arguments, the learned Additional
Solicitor General of India submits that it is the discretion of
the Legislature especially in policy matters and keeping in
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
view of the same, proceedings to be initiated under Section
148 or 148A, the said power was retained with the JAO. He
would further submit that the petitioners have no choice to
contend, how to assess and who to assess more
particularly, when it is not a Constitutional right.
(vi)
He would further submit that the Central Government
issued three notifications (3 schemes).
―i. Notification No.15 of 2022, dt.28.03.2022 in exercise of
powers conferred under sub sections (1) & (2) of Section
130 of the Income Tax Act (43 of 1961). The said scheme
may be called as the Faceless Jurisdiction of Income Tax
Authorities Scheme, 2022.‖
(vii) By referring to this scheme, the learned Additional
Solicitor General of India would submit that all the powers
and performance of all or any of the functions conferred on
or as the case may be assigned to Income Tax Authorities,
by or under the Act as referred to in Section 120 of the Act
or vesting the jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer as
referred to in section 124 of the Act shall be done in a
faceless
manner
through
automated
allocation
in
accordance with and to the extent provided in Section 144B
of the Act with reference to making faceless assessment of
total income or loss of income etc. The learned Additional
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Solicitor General of India by placing reliance on Section 1
i.e., short title and commencement of this scheme, would
contend that the scheme is called as “Faceless Jurisdiction
of Income Tax Authorities Scheme, 2022”. In other words,
the proceedings under this scheme have to be undertaken
in a faceless manner, meaning thereby all the proceedings
under the scheme to be initiated in complete faceless
manner.
(viii) Further, it is contended that by Notification No.137 of
2021, the Central Government in exercise of powers
conferred by sub sections (1) & (2) of Section 135A of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (43
of 1961), the e-verification
scheme, 2021 was issued which is totally non-faceless and
the proceedings are to be initiated by the Jurisdictional
Assessing Officers only. While making this submission, the
learned Additional Solicitor General of India would contend
that under this scheme e-verification would be done
electronically by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers.
Further, by juxtaposing the short title and commencement
of these two schemes, the learned Additional Solicitor
General of India draws the attention of the Court to say that
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
the scheme formulated under Section 130 is to be initiated
in complete faceless manner as the title of the scheme
itself says Faceless Jurisdiction of Income Tax Authorities
Scheme, 2022, whereas the scheme formulated under
Section 135A is called as e-verification scheme, 2021,
which shall be done in complete non-faceless manner.
(ix)
Referring to the above schemes, the learned
Additional Solicitor General of India would contend that the
scheme i.e., Notification No.18 of 2022, dt.29.03.2022 is
called as “E-assessment of Income Escaping Assessment
Scheme, 2022” and therefore the proceedings under this
scheme are to be initiated in a hybrid mode i.e., the
Jurisdictional Assessing Officers would initiate proceedings
under Section 148A and 148 and thereafter if it is a fit case,
then the case will be referred to National Faceless
Assessment Centre, so as to allot the same to Faceless
Assessing Officer through risk management strategy
through automated allocation. He would further submit that
the scheme is formulated for the purposes of initiating
proceedings in faceless manner to the extent of any income
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
chargeable to tax as escaped assessment for any
assessment year.
(x)
The learned Additional Solicitor General of India by
referring to clause 3 (b) of the scheme would contend that,
the cases shall be allotted through automated allocation in
accordance with risk management strategy formulated by
the board as referred to in Section 148 of the Act for
issuance of notice, and in faceless manner to the extent
provided in Section 144B of the Act with reference to
making assessment or re-assessment of total income or
loss of assessee. Thereafter, the proceedings will be
initiated under Section 147 in faceless manner. While
contending so, the learned Additional Solicitor General of
India emphatically submits that Legislature never intended
to initiate proceedings under Section 148 or 148A in
faceless manner and the said power is conferred on
Jurisdictional Assessing Officer. In support of his contention
he places reliance on Notification
No.23 of 2021,
dt.31.03.2021 issued in exercise of powers conferred by
sub sections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 120 of Income Tax
Act. The Central Board of Direct Taxes conferred powers
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
and functions of Assessing Officers concurrently to facilitate
the conduct of faceless assessment proceedings under
Section 144B of the Act in respect of all persons or class of
persons, or incomes or class of incomes, or cases or class
of cases in the territory of India. It is further contended that
under this notification, concurrent jurisdiction was conferred
on JAOs and FAOs to take up the matter in faceless
assessment proceedings as provided for under Sections
144B of the Act.
(xi)
He would further submit that a combined reading of
Section 151A, the scheme made thereunder, sub section
(5) of Section 120 along with Notification dt.31.03.2021
would make it clear that there is no bar for the JAOs to
initiate proceedings under Section 148 or 148A.
(xii)
He would further submit that, subsequently another
notification was issued vide Notification No.61 of 2022,
dt.10.06.2022 in exercise for powers conferred under sub
sections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 120 of Income Tax Act,
the Central Board of Direct Taxes conferred powers and
functions on the Assessing Officers concurrently, to
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
facilitate the conduct of faceless assessment proceedings
under Section 144B of the Act, in supersession of earlier
Notification No.23 of 2021, dt.31.03.2021. By placing
reliance on this notification, the learned Additional Solicitor
General of India would contend that there is no bar under
the statute, the scheme or in the notification to initiate
proceedings concurrently by the Jurisdictional Assessing
Officers.
(xiii) He would further submit that, if there is any conflict
between the statute and the scheme, it is the statute that
would prevail over the scheme. While contending so, the
learned Additional Solicitor General of India would further
submit that no procedure is contemplated under Section
144B of the Act in a faceless manner, so as to initiate
proceedings under Section 148 or 148A. With these
contentions, the learned Additional Solicitor General of
India would submit that the writ petitions are liable to be
dismissed and the amendment brought into the Act by
inserting Section 147A would also need not be gone into.
He would further submit that as an abundant caution and
for the removal of doubts, the amendment was made to the
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Act, but not to nullify the judgments rendered by various
High Courts. He would further submit that by bringing the
amendment under challenge was to achieve certainty and
clarity and to avoid litigation by giving retrospective effect
from 01.04.2021.
(xiv) He would further submit that the amendment was
passed in the Parliament and the same was gazetted on
30.03.2026, thereby Section 147A was inserted into
Income Tax Act, 1961. In so far as, the contention of the
petitioners that the amendment was made to the repeal
Income Tax Act, 1961 is concerned, he would contend that
the Income Tax Act, 1961 was repealed on 01.04.2026 by
which time the amendment was already brought into force
with retrospective effect from 01.04.2021. By placing
reliance on Section 536(2)(c) of Income Tax Act, 2025, he
would submit that the provisions of the repealed Income-tax
Act shall continue to apply to any proceeding pending on
the date of commencement of this Act and to any
proceedings initiated on or after the 1st April, 2026
(including
notices,
assessment,
re-assessment,
recomputation, rectification, penalty, reference, revision
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
and appeals) in respect of any tax year beginning before
the 1st April, 2026 and such proceedings shall be carried
out as per the procedure specified in the repealed Incometax Act are saved.
(xv)
In support of the above contentions, the learned
Additional Solicitor General of India places reliance on the
following judgments.
56.
“Rai Ramakrishna and others Vs. State of
Bihar26”, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with
the applicability of a Legislation with retrospective effect held as
under:
―10. The other point on which there is no dispute before us
is that the legislative power conferred on the appropriate
legislatures to enact laws in respect of topics covered by
several entries in the three Lists can be exercised both
prospectively and retrospectively. Where the legislature
can make a valid law, it may provide not only for the
prospective operation of the material provisions of the
said law, but it can also provide for the retrospective
operation of the said provisions. Similarly, there is no
doubt that the legislative power in question includes the
subsidiary or the auxiliary power to validate laws which
have been found to be invalid. If a law passed by a
legislature is struck down by the Courts as being invalid
for one infirmity or another, it would be competent to the
appropriate legislature to cure the said infirmity and pass
a validating law so as to make the provisions of the said
earlier law effective from the date when it was passed.
1963 SCC ONLINE SC 31
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
This position is treated as firmly established since the
decision of the Federal Court in the case of The United
Provinces V.Mst. Atiqa Begum.
11. It is also true that though the Legislature can pass a
law and make its provisions, retrospective, it would be
relevant to consider the effect of the said retrospective
operation of the law both in respect of the legislative
competence of the legislature and the reasonableness of
the restrictions imposed by it. In other words, it may be
open to a party affected by the provisions of the Act to
contend that the retrospective operation of the Act so
completely alters the character of the tax imposed by it as
to take it outside the limits of the entry which gives the
legislature competence to enact the law; or, it may be
open to it to contend in the alternative that the, restrictions
imposed by the Act are so unreasonable that they should
be struck down on the ground that they contravene his
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (f) and
(g). This position cannot be, and has not been, disputed
by Mr. Sastri who appears for the respondent, vide The
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (2) and
Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd., v. The Union of India.‖
(emphasis supplied)
57.
In “Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., and another vs.
Broach Borough Municipality and others27”, the Hon’ble Apex
Court while dealing with the validity of retrospectively validation
Act held as under:
“4. Before we examine s.3 to find out whether it is
effective in its purpose or not we may say a few words
about validating statutes in general. When a legislature
sets out to validate a tax declared by a court to be
illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law,
the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be
removed before validation can be said to take place
effectively. The most important condition, of course, is
that the legislature must possess the power to impose
the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain
ineffective
and
illegal.
Granted
legis-lative
(1969) 2 SCC 283 (emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that
the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is
tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of
judicial power which the legislature does not possess
or exercise. A court's decision must always bind unless
the conditions on which it is based are so
fundamentally altered that the decision could not have
been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a
court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the
power to' tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or
both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the
jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may
be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are
capable of being removed and are in fact removed and
the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by
providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not
been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done
by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing
provision and then by fiction making the tax already
collected to stand under the re-enacted law.
Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and
interpretation of the law under which the tax was
collected and by legislative fiat, makes the new
meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may
follow any one method or all of them and while it does
so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of
the court which becomes ineffective after the change
of the law. Whichever method is adopted it must be
within the competence of the legislature and legal and
adequate to attain the object of validation. If the
legislature has the power over the subject-matter and
competence to make a valid law, it can at any time
make such a valid law and make it retrospectively so
as to bind even past transactions. The validity of a
Validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the
legislature possesses the competence which it claims
over the subject-matter and whether in making the
validation it removes the defect which the courts had
found in the existing law and makes adequate
provisions in the Validating law for a valid imposition of
the tax.‖
(emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
58.
In “Bhubaneshwar Singh and another Vs. Union
of India and others28” the Apex Court while dealing with the
plenary powers of Legislature had held as under:
―9. The question is as to whether by introduction of subsection (2) in Section 10 with retrospective effect, i.e.,
w.e.f. 1-5-1972, the respondents are absolved of their
liability and are exonerated from the responsibility of
complying with the direction given by the High Court and
this Court in the earlier writ application filed on behalf of
the petitioner. It is well settled that Parliament and State
Legislatures have plenary powers of legislation on the
subjects within their field. They can legislate on the said
subjects prospectively as well as retrospectively. If the
intention of the legislature is clearly expressed that it
purports to introduce the legislation or to amend an
existing legislation retrospectively, then subject to the
legislative competence and the exercise being not in
violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution, such
power cannot be questioned.‖
―11. From time to time controversy has arisen as to
whether the effect of judicial pronouncements of the High
Court or the Supreme Court can be wiped out by
amending the legislation with retrospective effect. Many
such Amending Acts are called Validating Acts, validating
the action taken under the particular enactments by
removing the defect in the statute retrospectively because
of which the statute or the part of it had been declared
ultra vires. Such exercise has been held by this Court as
not to amount to encroachment on the judicial power of
the courts. The exercise of rendering ineffective the
judgments or orders of competent courts by changing the
very basis by legislation is a well-known device of
validating legislation. This Court has repeatedly pointed
out that such validating legislation which removes the
cause of the invalidity cannot be considered to be an
encroachment on judicial power. At the same time, any
action in exercise of the power under any enactment
which has been declared to be invalid by a court cannot
be made valid by a Validating Act by merely saying so
unless the defect which has been pointed out by the court
is removed with retrospective effect. The validating
(1994) 6 SCC 77 (emphasis supplied)
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
legislation must remove the cause of invalidity. Till such
defect or the lack of authority pointed out by the court
under a statute is removed by the subsequent enactment
with retrospective effect, the binding nature of the
judgment of the court cannot be ignored.‖
(emphasis supplied)
59.
In “State of Tamilnadu Vs. Arooran Sugars Ltd.29”
while dealing with the issue of Legislative competence to amend,
delete or obliterate a statute or to enactment a statute
prospectively or retrospectively, the Apex Court held as under:
―13. The legislature by different deeming clauses and
through statutory fiction requires the Court to treat that
amendments so introduced by Act 7 of 1974 had never
been introduced in the principal Act. The power of the
legislature to amend, delete or obliterate a statute or to
enact a statute prospectively or retrospectively cannot be
questioned and challenged unless the court is of the view
that such exercise is in violation of Article 14 of the
constitution. It need not be impressed that whenever any
Act or amendment is brought in force retrospectively or
any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, or any
provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, in this
process rights of some are bound to be effected one way
or the other. In every case, it cannot be urged that the
exercise by the legislature while introducing a new
provision or deleting an existing provision with
retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article
14 of the constitution. If that stand is accepted, then the
necessary corollary shall be that legislature has no power
to legislate retrospectively, because in that event a vested
right is effected; of course, in special situation this court
has held that such exercise was violative of Article 14 of
the constitution. Reference in this connection may be
made to the cases of state of Gujarat & Another V.
Raman Lal Keshav Lala Soni & others,(1983) 2 SCR
287; T.R. Kapur V. State of Haryana, 1986 (Supp) SCC
584; and Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty,
1994(5) SCC 450. In the case of state of Gujarat V.
(1997) 1 SCC 326
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Raman Lal (Supra)) a Constitution Bench on the facts and
circumstances of that case observed:
"The legislation is pure and simple, self-deceptive, if we
may use such an expression with reference to a
legislature-made law. The legislature is undoubtedly
competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take
away or impair any vested right acquired under existing
laws but since the laws are made under a written
Constitution, and have to conform to the do's and don'ts
of the constitution neither prospective nor retrospective
laws can be made so as to contravene Fundamental
Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution today taking into account the accrued or
acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say,
twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the
requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law
is dated back by twenty years. We are concerned with
today's rights and not yesterday's. A legislature cannot
legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained
twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and the
constitutional rights accrued in the course of the twenty
years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a
negation of history."
In same terms this Court expressed the opinion in the
cases of T.R. Kapur V. State of Haryana (supra) and
Union of India V. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra) in
respect of alterations in rules framed under Article 309 of
the constitution retrospectively regarding conditions of
service.‖
(emphasis supplied)
60.
In ”National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing
Federation of India Limited and another Vs. Union of India
and others30”, the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the
judicially recognized limitations to enact law with retrospective
effect held as under:-
(2003) 5 SCC 23
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―15. The Legislative power either to introduce enactments
for the first time or to amend the enacted law with
retrospective effect, is not only subject to the question of
competence but is also subject to several judicially
recognized limitations with some of which we are at
present concerned. The first is the requirement that the
words used must expressly provide or clearly imply
retrospective operation. The second is that the
retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or
harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as
unconstitutional. The third is apposite where the
legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision.
Here the power cannot be used to subvert the decision
without removing the statutory basis of the decision.
17. A validating clause coupled with a substantive
statutory change is therefore only one of the methods to
leave actions unsustainable under the un-amended
statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a
validating clause would not by itself affect the
retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such
retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.‖
(emphasis supplied)
61.
In “NHPC Ltd., vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
Secretary and others31” the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the
law with regard to the permissible extent and manner of removing
the material basis of a judgment by correcting the anomalies
pointed out by a Court in a legislation while referring to various
judgments referred to therein held as under:
―34. In the following decisions, this Court has laid down
the law with regard to the permissible extent and manner
of removing the material basis of a judgment, by
correcting the anomalies pointed out by a Court in a
legislation:
(2023) 17 SCC 1
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
―34.1. In M/s. Tirath Ram Rajendra Nath, Lucknow vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1973 SC 405, this Court
held that there is a distinction between encroachment on
the judicial power and nullification of the effect of a judicial
decision by changing the law retrospectively. The former
is outside the competence of the legislature but the latter
is within its permissible limits. In that case, the U.P. Sales
Tax Act (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 was
upheld by this Court.
―34.2. In Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of
Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 124, this Court held that it is
permissible for a competent legislature to overcome the
effect of a decision of a court setting aside the imposition
of a tax by passing a suitable Legislation, by amending
the relevant provisions of the statute concerned with
retrospective effect, thus taking away the basis on which
the decision of the court has been rendered and by
enacting an appropriate provision validating the levy and
collection of tax made before the decision in question was
rendered. In that decision, reliance was placed on Shri
Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Broach Borough Municipality,
a Constitution Bench decision of this Court, which has laid
down the requirements which a validating law should
satisfy in order to validate the levy and collection of a tax
which has been declared earlier by a court as illegal. The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:
―When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by
a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an
invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must
be removed before validation can be said to take place
effectively. The most important condition, of course, is
that the Legislature must possess the power to impose
the tax, for, if it does not, the action must ever remain
ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative competence, it
is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the
court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the
decision in exercise of judicial power which the
Legislature does not possess or exercise. A court‘s
decision must always bind unless the conditions on which
it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision
could not have been given in the altered circumstances.
Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed
because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the
rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the
jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be
done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are
capable of being removed and are in fact removed and
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the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by
providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been
properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by reenacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision
and then by fiction making the tax already collected to
stand under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the
Legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of
the law under which the tax was collected and by
legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon
courts. The Legislature may follow any one method or all
of them and while it does so it may neutralize the effect of
the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective
after the change of the law. Whichever method is adopted
it must be within the competence of the Legislature and
legal and adequate to attain the object of validation. If the
Legislature has the power over the subject-matter and
competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make
such a valid law and make it retrospectively so as to bind
even past transactions. The validity of a validating law,
therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature
possesses the competence which it claims over the
subject-matter and whether in making the validation it
removes the defect which the courts had found in the
existing law and makes adequate provisions in the
validating law for a valid imposition of the tax.‖
34.3. In ―Indian Aluminimum Co. v. State of Kerala‖, A.I.R
1996 SC 1431, the principles regarding the abrogation of
a judgment of a court of law by a subsequent legislation
were culled out in the following words:
―56. From a resume of the above decisions the following
salient principles would emerge:
(1) The adjudication of the rights of the parties is the
essential judicial function. Legislature has to lay down the
norms of conduct or rules which will govern the parties
and the transaction and require the court to give effect to
them;
(2) The Constitution has delineated delicate balance in
the exercise of the sovereign power by the Legislature,
Executive and Judiciary;
(3) In a democracy governed by rule of law, the
Legislature exercises the power under Articles 245 and
246 and other companion Articles read with the entries in
the respective Lists in the Seventh Schedule to make the
law which includes power to amend the law.
(5) The Court, therefore, need to carefully scan the law to
find out: (a) whether the vice pointed out by the Court and
invalidity suffered by previous law is cured complying with
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the legal and constitutional requirements; (b) whether the
Legislature has competence to validate the law; (c)
whether such validation is consistent with the rights
guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.
(7) The Court does not have the power to validate an
invalid law or to legalise impost of tax illegally made and
collected or to remove the norm of invalidation or provide
a remedy. These are not judicial functions but the
exclusive province of the Legislature. Therefore, they are
not the
encroachment on judicial power.
(8) In exercising legislative power, the Legislature by
mere declaration, without anything more, cannot directly
overrule, revise or override a judicial decision. It can
render judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law
on the topic within its legislative field fundamentally
altering or changing its character retrospectively. The
changed or altered conditions are such that the previous
decision would not have been rendered by the Court, if
those conditions had existed at the time of declaring the
law as invalid. It is also empowered to give effect to
retrospective legislation with a deeming date or with effect
from a particular date.
(9) The consistent thread that runs through all the
decisions of this Court is that the legislature cannot
directly overrule the decision or make a direction as not
binding on it but has power to make the decision
ineffective by removing the base on which the decision
was rendered, consistent with the law of the Constitution
and the Legislature must have competence to do the
same.‖
In the aforesaid case, the issue that arose for
consideration was as to the vires of Section 11 of the
Kerala Electricity Surcharge (Levy and Collection) Act,
1989. It was observed that the said provision was valid
and not an incursion on judicial power, notwithstanding
the fact that the effect of Section 11 was to validate
collection of tax made under an invalid law.
34.4. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of
Temilnadu vs. Aroorgan Sugars Ltd., (1997) 1 SCC 326,
summarised the law on the legislative device of
abrogation, to remove the basis of a judicial
pronouncement in the following words: (Chviti Venkanna
Yadav case, SCC p.299, para 30)
―30. From the aforesaid authorities, it is settled that there is
a demarcation between legislative and judicial functions
predicated on the theory of separation of powers. The
legislature has the power to enact laws including the power
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to retrospectively amend laws and thereby remove causes
of ineffectiveness or invalidity. When a law is enacted with
retrospective effect, it is not considered as an
encroachment upon judicial power when the legislature
does not directly overrule or reverse a judicial dictum. The
legislature cannot, by way of an enactment, declare a
decision of the court as erroneous or a nullity, but can
amend the statute or the provision so as to make it
applicable to the past. The legislature has the power to
rectify, through an amendment, a defect in law noticed in
the enactment and even highlighted in the decision of the
court. This plenary power to bring the statute in conformity
with the legislative intent and correct the flaw pointed out by
the court can have a curative and neutralizing effect. When
such a correction is made, the purpose behind the same is
not to overrule the decision of the court or encroach upon
the judicial turf, but simply enact a fresh law with
retrospective effect to alter the foundation and meaning of
the legislation and to remove the base on which the
judgment is founded. This does not amount to statutory
overruling by the legislature. In this manner, the earlier
decision of the court becomes non- existent and
unenforceable for interpretation of the new legislation. No
doubt, the new legislation can be tested and challenged on
its own merits and on the question whether the legislature
possesses the competence to legislate on the subject
matter in question, but not on the ground of over-reach or
colourable legislation.‖
34.5. In Bakhtawar Trust vs. M.D. Narayan, (2003) 5 SCC
298, this Court observed as under while laying down a
three-pronged test to determine the vires of a validating
Act: (SCC p.307, paras 14-15)
―14. The validity of any statute may be assailed on the
ground that it is ultra vires the legislative competence of
the legislature which enacted it or it is violative of Part III
or any other provision of the Constitution. It is well settled
that Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary
powers of legislation within the fields assigned to them
and subject to some constitutional limitations, can
legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. This
power to make retrospective legislation enables the
legislature to validate prior executive and legislative Acts
retrospectively after curing the defects that led to their
invalidation and thus makes ineffective judgments of
competent courts declaring the invalidity. It is also well
settled that a validating Act may even make ineffective
judgments and orders of competent courts provided it, by
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retrospective legislation, removes the cause of invalidity
or the basis that had led to those decisions.
15. The test of judging the validity of the amending and
validating Act is, whether the legislature enacting the
validating Act has competence over the subject-matter;
whether by validation, the said legislature has removed
the defect which the Court had found in the previous laws;
and whether the validating law is consistent with the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
34.6. In Cheviti Venkanna Yadav vs. State of Telangana,
(2017) 1 SCC 283, this Court considered a question
relating to the validity of an amendment with retrospective
effect after a provision of the Act was struck down by the
Court- When does it not amount to the statutory overruling
of a judgment by the legislature? This Court held that the
legislature has the power to legislate including the power
to retrospectively amend laws, thereby removing causes
of ineffectiveness or invalidity of laws. Further, when such
correction is made, the purpose behind the same is not to
overrule the decision of the court or encroach upon the
judicial turf, but simply enact a fresh law with retrospective
effect to alter the foundation and meaning of the
legislation and to remove the base on which the judgment
is founded. The order of the High Court, inter alia, holding
that the amended provisions did not usurp the judicial
power was upheld.
34.7. In Madras Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (2022) 12
SCC 455, L. Nageswara Rao J., speaking for the majority
(2:1) laid down the following principles, as regards the
permissibility of abrogation, to remove the basis of a
judgment: (SCC p. 509, para 50)
―50.The permissibility of a legislative override in this
country should be in accordance with the principles laid
down by this Court in the aforementioned as well as other
judgments, which have been culled out as under:
50.1 The effect of the judgments of the Court can be
nullified by a legislative act removing the basis of the
judgment. Such law can be retrospective. Retrospective
amendment should be reasonable and not arbitrary and
must not be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution. (Lohia Machines Ltd. And Anr. V.
Union of India.
50.2 The test for determining the validity of a validating
legislation is that the judgment pointing out the defect
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would not have been passed, if the altered position as
sought to be brought in by the validating statute existed
before the Court at the time of rendering its judgment. In
other words, the defect pointed out should have been
cured such that the basis of the judgment pointing out the
defect is removed.
50.3 Nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be
impermissible legislative exercise (See: S.R. Bhagwat
and Ors. v. State of Mysore, , (1995) 6 SCC 16). Even
interim directions cannot be reversed by a legislative veto
(See: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp (1)
SCC 96 and Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala
and Ors., (2019) 13 SCC 185).
50.4. Transgression of constitutional limitations and
intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature is
violative of the principle of separation of powers, the Rule
of law and of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
34.8. In a recent judgment of this Court in the case
of Dr.Jaya Thakur vs. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 813, this Court held that a writ of mandamus could not
be nullified by a subsequent legislation made by the
legislator. That a binding judicial pronouncement between
the parties cannot be made ineffective with the aid of any
legislative power by enacting a provision which in
substance simply overrules a judgment unless the
foundation of the judgment is removed. Referring to
several judgments of this court on the Doctrine of
Abrogation, the following principles as to the manner in
which the device of abrogation could be employed, were
identified as under: (SCC p.318, para 114)
―114. ―It could, thus, clearly be seen that this Court has
held that the effect of the judgments of this Court can
nullified by a legislative act removing the basis of the
judgment. It has further been held that such law can be
retrospective. It has, however, been held that
retrospective amendment should be reasonable and not
arbitrary and must not be violative of the fundamental
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It has been held
that the defect pointed out should have been cured such
that the basis of the judgment pointing out the defect is
removed. This Court has, however, clearly held that
nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be
impermissible legislative exercise. This Court has further
held that transgression of constitutional limitations and
intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature is
violative of the principle of separation of powers, the rule
of law and of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.‖
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
35. What follows from the aforesaid judicial precedent is,
a legislature cannot directly set aside a judicial decision.
However, when a competent legislature retrospectively
removes the substratum or foundation of a judgment to
make the decision ineffective, the same is a valid
legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any
other constitutional limitation. Such a legislative device
which removes the vice in the previous legislation which
has been declared unconstitutional is not considered to
be an encroachment on judicial power but an instance of
abrogation recognised under the Constitution of India.
The decisions referred to above, manifestly show that it is
open to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively,
provided the alteration is made in such a manner that it
would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at
the same verdict. In other words, the very premise of the
earlier judgment should be removed, thereby resulting in
a fundamental change of the circumstances upon which it
was founded.
36. The power of a legislature to legislate within its field,
both prospectively and to a permissible extent,
retrospectively, cannot be interfered with by Courts
provided it is in accordance with the Constitution. It would
be permissible for the legislature to remove a defect in an
earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court
in exercise of its powers by way of judicial review. This
defect can be removed both prospectively and
retrospectively by a legislative process and previous
actions can also be validated. However, where a
legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out
under a previous legislation which has been struck down
or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent
legislation without curing the defects in such legislation,
the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires. Such
instances would amount to an attempt to ‗legislatively
overrule‘ a Court‘s judgment by a legislative fiat, and
would therefore be illegal and a colourable legislation.‖
(emphasis supplied)
62.
In “Virender Singh Hooda and others vs. State of
Haryana and another32”, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing
(2004) 12 SCC 588
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
with power to make laws by every sovereign legislature possess
right to make retrospective legislation, held as under:
―34. Every sovereign legislature possesses the right to
make retrospective legislation. The power to make laws
includes power to give it retrospective effect. Craies on
Statute Law (7th Edn.) at page 387 defines retrospective
statutes in the following words. "A statute is deemed to be
retrospective which takes away or impairs any vested
right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new
obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability in respect to transactions or considerations
already past".
Judicial Dictionary: (13th Edition) K.J.Aiyar, Butterworth,
pg.857, states that the word 'retrospective' when used
with reference to an enactment may mean (i) affecting an
existing contract; or (ii) re-opening up of past, closed and
completed transaction; or (iii) affecting accrued rights and
remedies; or (iv) affecting procedure. Words and Phrases:
Permanent Edition: Vol.37A page 224/225. defines a
'retrospective' or retroactive law" as one which takes away
or impairs vested or accrued rights acquired under
existing laws. A retroactive law takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations
already past.
35: Harvard Law Review, page 692 it was observed that
"it is necessary that the legislature should be able to cure
inertent defects in statutes or their administration by
making what has been aptly called 'small repairs'.
Moreover, the individual who claims that a vested right
has arisen from the defect is seeking a windfall since had
the legislature's or administrator's action had the effect it
was intended to and could have had, no such right would
have arisen. Thus, the interest in the retroactive curing of
such a defect in the administration of government
outweighs the individual's interest in benefiting from the
defect."
The above passage was quoted with approval by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of The
Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax and Ors. V.
The Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd., , etc., [1969] 2
SCC 55. In considering the question as to whether the
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legislative power to amend a provision with retrospective
operation has been reasonably exercised or not, various
factors.have to be considered. It was observed in the
case of Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 284 N. W, 635,640,288
Mich. 35, (as noted in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Volume 37A, page 225) that
"The constitutional prohibition of the passage of
'retroactive laws' refers only to retroactive laws that
injuriously affect some substantial or vested right, and
does not refer to those remedies adopted by a legislative
body for the purpose of providing a rule to secure for its
citizens the enjoyment of some natural right, equitable
and just in itself, but which they were not able to enforce
on account of defects in the law or its omission to provide
the relief necessary to secure such right." Crates on
Statute Law (7th Edn.) at page 396 observes that "If a
statute is passed for the purpose of protecting the public
against some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate
retrospectively, although by such operation it will deprive
some person or persons of a vested right."
Thus public interest at large is one of the relevant
considerations in determining the constitutional validity of
a retrospective legislation.‖
(emphasis supplied)
63.
In “State Bank’s Staff Union (Madras Circle) Vs.
Union of India and others33”, the Hon’ble Apex Court dealing
with the retrospective operation of law held as under:
24. Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn.) at p. 396
observes that:
"If a statute is passed for the purpose of protecting the
public against some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to
operate retrospectively, although by such operation it
will deprive some person or persons of a vested right."
(emphasis supplied)
(2005) 7 SCC 584
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64.
In “Rohtas Project Ltd., through Director Shri
Paresh Rastogi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)34”
while dealing with vested right in an assessee to be assessed by
a particular Assessing Officer the Hon’ble High Court of
Allahabad held as under:
―24. So far as Section 127(1) is concerned, there is no
dispute about this position. The twin requirement under
Section 127(2) has some complication. It is true that
under Act, 1961 i.e. Section 120 read with Section
124, Assessing Officer is vested with jurisdiction over
an area where any person carrying on the business or
profession resides. Therefore, in normal course, an
Assessee is entitled to be assessed by Assessing
Officer having jurisdiction as stated in the aforesaid
provisions but there is no such vested right in an
Assessee to be assessed by a particular Assessing
Officer. In given case, Competent Authority may
transfer a matter from one Assessing Officer to
another, may be having effect of change of place also
but that will not affect any substantial right of
Assessee.
25. On this aspect, we find support from judgment in
Panna Lal Binjraj Vs. Union of India, AIR 1957 (SC)
397, wherein Court held that infringement of right to be
assessed by Assessing Officer having jurisdiction in a
particular area by transferring case to another cannot
be said to be an infringement, material in nature. It is
only a deviation of a minor character from general
standard and does not necessarily involve a denial of
equal rights for simple reason that even after such
transfer, case is dealt with under the normal procedure
which is prescribed in the Act, 1961. Production and
investigation of books of account, enquiries to be
made by Income Tax Officer are same in a transferred
case as in others which remain with Assessing officer
of area in which other Assessee resides or carries on
business. There is thus no differential treatment and
2017 SCC ONLINE All 5480
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no scope for argument that particular Assessee is
discriminated with reference to other Assessees
similarly situated whose cases are not transferred,
therefore, transfer of case from one place to another is
a matter which may disturb some convenience of
Assesseee but if other factors of importance of higher
degree are available, an order of transfer otherwise
validly passed, is not to be assailed as something
which has caused no serious prejudice to Assessee.‖
(emphasis supplied)
65.
In
“Gammon
India
Ltd.,
vs.
Special
Chief
Secretary and anothers35”, while dealing with savings clause,
the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
―72. In the instant cases, there is a simultaneous repeal
and the reenactment and the A.P.V.A. Tax Act clearly
saves the earlier provisions in toto. Consequently, rights
and liabilities accrued or incurred under the A.P.G.S. Tax
Act shall continue even after it is repealed.
73. On critical analysis and scrutiny of all relevant cases
and opinions of learned authors, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that whenever there is a repeal of an
enactment
and
simultaneous
reenactment,
the
reenactment is to be considered as reaffirmation of the
old law and provisions of the repealed Act which are thus
reenacted continue in force uninterruptedly unless, the
reenacted enactment manifests an intention incompatible
with or contrary to the provisions of the repealed Act.
Such incompatibility will have to be ascertained from a
consideration of the relevant provisions of the reenacted
enactment and the mere absence of saving clause is, by
itself, not material for consideration of all the relevant
provisions of the new enactment. In other words, a clear
legislative intention of the reenacted enactment has to be
inferred and gathered whether it intended to preserve all
the rights and liabilities of a repealed statute intact or
modify or to obliterate them altogether.
74. On the touchstone of the principles of law culled out
from the judgments of various courts applied to the facts
2006 3 SCC 354
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of these cases lead to a definite conclusion that the
Assistant Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Warangal
Division was fully justified in initiating and completing the
proceedings under the A.P.G.S. Tax Act even after it is
repealed.‖
(emphasis supplied)
66.
In “State of Telangana and others Vs. Tirumala
Constructions36”, while dealing with the validity of amendment
to a repealed Act, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
―C. Validity of Telangana Act tested from the touch stone
of its originating as an ordinance
103. Telangana had argued that although with effect from
1st July 2017, due to the enactment of the CGST Act, its
state legislature could not per se enact a new law on a
subject matter contained within the original entry 54 of the
State list, nevertheless, the approval of the ordinance
which amended the existing State - law on 02.07.2017
had the effect of relating back to the original date when in
fact it was validly amended. This is sought to be
supported by the theory of the relating back of the law to a
date when the power to enact existed. The argument in
support was that in terms of its effect there is no
difference between an ordinance [which is merely a
product of a different procedure i.e., or executive law
making] as compared to enactment of law by the
legislature. An ordinance may have a limited life but once
confirmed, or enacted, it acquires permanence. Even
during the time it is in force, it is as effective and as
binding on the subject matter and the State as an enacted
law. The effect of an ordinance was explained in A.K.
Roy (supra), in the following terms:
―[..] the Constitution makes no distinction in principle
between a law made by the legislature and an ordinance
issued by the President. Both, equally, are products of the
exercise of legislative power and, therefore, both are
2023 15 SCC 578
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equally subject to the limitations which the Constitution
has placed upon that power‖.
110. In the present case, the Telangana ordinance was
promulgated on 17.6.2016. The Telangana State GST Act
was enacted and received the assent of the Governor on
25.05.2017; it was brought into force on 01.07.2017. The
state GST Act contained a savings and repeal law, which
sought to save acts done, privileges and rights accrued
under the repealed enactment, i.e. the State VAT Act. It
was sought to be argued that once the State Legislature
approved the ordinance and enacted the amendment, in
conformity with it, the provisions of the Ordinance became
part of the act. The question of legislative competence
would not arise, because the mere confirmation of an
ordinance is within the competence of the State
legislature. Since the law was introduced through a
different procedure, i.e. ordinance, the effect of that law,
empowering the VAT officials to reopen or complete
assessments, was no different.
113. The state of Telangana had argued to the contrary,
and explained that when the ordinance was issued, there
was no doubt about the state possessing legislative
competence. As of that date (17.06.2017) the power to
amend existing laws, was permissible under Section 19 of
the Amendment. However, that argument is not tenable,
because the ordinance‘s validity and effect might not have
been suspect on the date of its promulgation; yet, the
issue is that on the date when it was in fact, approved and
given shape as an amendment, the State legislature had
ceased to possess the power. By that time, the State GST
and the Central GST Acts had come into force (on
01.07.2017). Therefore, Section 19 ceased to be
effective. The original entry (Entry 54 of the State List)
ceased to exist. In the circumstances, the state legislature
had no legislative competence to enact the amendment,
which approved the ordinance, which consequently was
rendered void.‖
(emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
In “Cherukuri Kutumbayya Vs. The Municipal
67.
Council, Vijayawada37”, this Court while dealing with the
expression “save as otherwise provided”, held as under:
“6.The expression "save as otherwise provided" in Subsection (2) means 'except to the extent specific provision
is made'. In other words, Sub-section (2) will come into
play only in cases which are not governed by any other
specific provisions of law. Therefore, it is only where there
is no other special provision in respect to any other type
of land this sub-section is attracted. Since the Legislature
has enacted a specific provision in regard to agricultural
lands, it is reasonable to infer that that category of lands
contemplated by that sub-section should be governed by
it.‖
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of “Lalu Prasad Yadav and another Vs.
68.
State of Bihar and another38”, the Hon’ble Apex Court while
dealing with the expression “save as otherwise provided”, held as
under:
―35. We have surveyed Section 378 in its entirety to have
complete conspectus of the provision. The opening words
- "save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2)" - are in
the nature of exception intended to exclude the class of
cases mentioned in sub-section (2) out of operation of the
body of sub-section (1). These words have no other
meaning in the context but to qualify the operation of subsection (1) and take out of its purview two types of cases
referred in sub-section (2), namely, (i) the cases in which
offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police
Establishment constituted under 1946 Act and (ii) the
cases in which the offence has been investigated by any
other agency empowered to make investigation into an
offence under any Central Act other than 1973 Code. By
1958 SCC ONLINE AP 200
2010 5 SCC 1
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
construing Section 378 in a manner that permits appeal
from an order of acquittal by the state government in
every case, except two class of cases mentioned in subsection (2), full effect would be given to the exception
(clause) articulated in the opening words.
36. As noticed above, the words - "save as otherwise
provided in sub-section (2)" - were added in 1973 Code;
Section 417 of 1898 Code did not have these words. It is
familiar rule of construction that all changes in wording
and phrasing may be presumed to have been deliberate
and with the purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge the preexisting law as the changes of the words employ. Any
construction that makes exception (clause) with which
section opens unnecessary and redundant should be
avoided.‖
(emphasis supplied)
69.
In “Commissioner of Customs Vs. Canon India
Pvt. Ltd.39”, while dealing with the validating provision, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is a mere surplusage and the
relevant paragraphs are as under:
“166.7. Therefore, the validating provision under Section
97 of the Finance Act, 2022 is a mere surplusage with
respect to validation of the show cause notices issued by
DRI officers under Section 28. It cannot be challenged on
the ground that it does not cure the defect pointed out
in Canon India (supra) when no defect can be made out
therein as a result of this review petition.
167. The contention that Section 97 could not have
overruled the finding of fact relating to the actual exercise
of jurisdiction in Canon India (supra) is untenable for the
following reasons:
167.1 The argument that once a particular officer has
exercised the function of assessment, it is a jurisdictional
fact that has occurred to the exclusion of all other groups
in the Customs Department and therefore, only that officer
or his superiors, who had undertaken assessment
under Section 17 in the first place, shall have the
(2025 ) 4 SCC 509
NJS,J & TCDS, J
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jurisdiction to issue notices for recovery of
under Section 28, does not hold water.
duty
167.2 As discussed above, the functions of assessment
and re-assessment under Section 17 and the recovery of
duty under Section 28 are distinct. Therefore, the exercise
of functions under Section 17 can only act as a
―jurisdictional fact‖ for the purpose of excluding the
jurisdiction of other proper officers empowered under that
section for the exercise of the rest of the functions
specified therein. Similarly, the exercise of the function of
issuing show cause notices under Section 28 by a
particular proper officer serves as a jurisdictional fact
which would exclude the jurisdiction of other proper
officers empowered under Section 28.
167.3 Canon India (supra) proceeded on an erroneous
assumption that the jurisdiction of the proper officer
under Sections 17 and 28 is linked. This is due to the
erroneous understanding of the provisions of Act, 1962
that functions under Section 28 involve re-assessment.
167.4 Therefore, the very basis of the determination of
jurisdictional fact for exercise of functions under Section
28 has been clarified by us. Thus, we are of the
considered view that the challenge to Section 97, on the
ground of inability of a validating Act to overrule a finding
of fact, is unfounded and liable to be dismissed.
183.5 Section 97 of the Finance Act, 2022 which, interalia, retrospectively validated all show cause notices
issued under Section 28 of the Act, 1962 cannot be said
to be unconstitutional. It cannot be said that Section
97 fails to cure the defect pointed out in Canon
India (supra) nor is it manifestly arbitrary, disproportionate
and overbroad, for the reasons recorded in the foregoing
parts of this judgment. We clarify that the findings in
respect of the vires of the Finance Act, 2022 is confined
only to the questions raised in the petition seeking review
of the judgment in Canon India (supra). The challenge to
the Finance Act, 2022 on grounds other than those dealt
with herein, if any, are kept open.‖
(emphasis supplied)
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
70.
Upon
analyzing
the
various
contentions
and
judgments relied on by both the parties, the consideration of this
Court is as under:
Section 147A of Income Tax Act, 1961 was inserted vide
Finance
Act,
with
retrospective
effect.
For
proper
appreciation, Section 147A is reproduced as under:Assessing Officer for purposes of Sections 148 and 148A.
―147A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, order or decree of any Court on in Section
151A or in any scheme framed thereunder, for the
removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the Assessing
Officer for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A shall
mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be
an Assessing Officer other than the National Faceless
Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in
sub-section (3) of Section 144B.‖
71.
A perusal of Memorandum explaining the provisions
in the Finance Bill, 2026, it is stated therein that “with the notice
under Section 148, the case gets transferred to National Faceless
Assessment Centre (NFAC) for carrying out the assessment in
faceless manner as per Section 144B.” It further reads that the tax
payer does not know the identity of officers, who are part of the
assessment unit in NFAC. All communications with the tax payer
at this stage are carried out by NFAC. It is further stated that the
assessment units are provided powers of the Assessing Officers
by virtue of section 144B (3), which provides that the “assessment
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unit”, wherever used in said section shall refer to an Assessing
Officer having powers so assigned by the Central Board of Direct
Taxes (CBDT).
72.
It is further observed in the Memorandum of the
scheme that, the legislature has clearly demarcated the line
between the assessment and pre-assessment enquiry process
which culminates in issuing of notice under section 148. By
referring to this Memorandum, it was never the intention of the
Legislature to mandate the assessment units in NFAC to involve
in pre-assessment enquiry in any manner, whether for issuance of
notice under Section 148A or under section 148. It was specifically
contended that the faceless assessment for re-assessment under
Section 147 was only required to be carried out to the extent
provided under Section 144B and the objective of the scheme
framed under Section 151A was also the same.
73.
The Revenue relied on judgment rendered by Hon’ble
Gujarat High Court in the case of “Snehdham Trust Vs.
Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax40”
“27. On perusal of Section 148 of the Act, it is clear that
the same is subject to the provisions of Section 148A of
(2026) 485 ITR 24 (Guj) (emphasis supplied)
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
the Act except certain eventualities enumerated therein.
In the regular course, when an information is made
available as per the Explanation 1 of Section 148 of the
Act through Risk Management Strategy formulated by the
Board, the case is required to be allocated through
automated allocation as defined under the Scheme, 2022.
We are concerned with Clause (b) of the Scope of the
Scheme as the assessment and reassessment are
already taken care of by the provisions of Section 144B of
the Act in itself.
28. So far as the issuance of notice under Section 148 of
the Act is concerned, after the information is collected
through Risk Management Strategy formulated by the
Board as referred to under Section 148 of the Act for
issuance of notice, the case is allocated through
automated allocation to the Assessing Officer. Therefore,
the question arises as to who the Assessing Officer
should be, whether the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer or
the Assessing Officer of an assessment unit as per
Section 144B of the Act. If we peruse Section 144B of the
Act, there is no Assessing Officer as such, but it also only
refers to the ―assessment unit‖ which comprises of
various Assessing Officers. If we peruse clause (i) of Subsection (1) of Section 144B of the Act, it stipulates that the
National Faceless Assessment Centre shall assign the
case selected for the purpose of faceless assessment
under Section 144B of the Act to a specific ―assessment
unit‖ through automated allocation system prior to
selection of the case to be allocated to the specific
assessment unit through automated allocation system
and Section 144B of the Act has no role to play for the
purpose of faceless assessment.
29. Therefore, if we read paragraph No.(3) of the
Scheme, 2022, which refers to the issuance of the notice
through automated allocation in accordance with the Risk
Management Strategy formulated by the Board only. The
contention on behalf of the petitioners that the issuance of
notice also should be in a faceless manner is also
required to be considered from the subsequent prefix after
the words ―and in faceless manner‖ which is further
qualified by the words ―to the extent provided in Section
144B of the Act with reference to making assessment or
reassessment of total income or loss of assessee‖. If we
further analyse the provisions of Section 144B of the Act,
it provides that National Faceless Assessment Centre
shall intimate the assessee that assessment in his case
shall be completed in accordance with the procedure laid
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
down in Section 144B of the Act. Both the clauses (i) and
(ii) of section 144B of the Act which have come into
operation with effect from 01.04.2022 only refer to
assessment proceedings and thereafter, from clause (iii)
onwards, the proceedings prescribed for assessment
starts by referring to the issuance of notice under
Sections 142(1) and 143(2) of the Act. Therefore, the
procedure prescribed under Section 144B of the Act only
refers to the faceless assessment and it nowhere
provides for the notice to be issued under Section 148 of
the Act in a faceless manner. Therefore, the words ―and in
faceless manner‖ as appears in the Scheme, 2022 is
further qualified ―to the extent provided in Section 144B of
the Act with reference to making assessment or
reassessment of total income or loss of the assessee‖. A
submission is also made that to the extent in Section
144B of the Act with reference to making assessment or
reassessment would also include that the procedure
which is prescribed for assessment or reassessment
should also be applicable for issuance of the notice under
Section 148 of the Act. Taking such contentions to its
logical conclusion, it appears that if the procedure
prescribed under Section 144B of the Act for assessment
is to be applied also for the notice to be issued under
Section 148 of the Act, then it would also lead that the
provisions of Section 148A of the Act which provide for
inquiry by the Assessing Officer and passing of order by
the Assessing Officer to come to a prima-facie conclusion
that whether it is a fit case to reopen is not available in the
Scheme, 2022. If we read the Scheme literally as
canvassed before us by learned advocates for both the
sides, as it is unambiguous and plain in language, no
further interpretation is required to be made by reading
the provisions of Section 148A of Act in the Scheme,
2022. If the Scheme is also applied to the procedure
prescribed under Section 148A of the Act, the same shall
be altered by adding the procedure of discarding which is
not intended by the legislature. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that the decision of the Bombay High Court in
case of Kairos Properties (P.) Ltd. (Supra) wherein, the
Scheme, 2022 is also extended to the procedure
prescribed in Section 148A of the Act, would amount to
alter the Scheme, 2022 itself.
30. The Hon‘ble Bombay High Court while considering
the provisions of Section 148A of the Act has held that the
scope of scheme as defined in paragraph No.3 by
excluding the applicability of Section 148A of Act from the
scope of the scheme would lead to an absolute absurdity
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
and would amount to alter the Scheme. In such
circumstances, we are with due respect not in agreement
with the Bombay High Court to insert the provisions of
Section 148A of the Act to be read in the scope of the
scheme. Therefore, the logical conclusion which comes
that if Section 148A of the Act is not part of the Scheme,
2022, then issuance of notice under Section 148 of the
Act by the Faceless Assessing Officer would be an empty
formality because issuance of notice under Section 148 of
Act is consequence of the order which is passed under
Section 148A(d) of the Act. As held by the this Court in
case of Talati and Talati LLP (Supra), the notice issued
under Section 148 of the Act by the Jurisdictional
Assessing Officer in search cases is held to be a valid
notice and would also justify our view that the notice
under Section 148 of the Act has to be issued by the
Assessing Officer who has passed the order under
Section 148A (d) of the Act. If the notice is issued by the
Faceless Assessing Officer under Section 148 of the Act
on the basis of the order which has been passed by the
Jurisdictional Assessing Officer under Section 148A (d) of
the Act, the same would result into absurdity.
31. Therefore, the logical conclusion which can be
deduced from reading of the provisions of the Act together
with the intention of the legislature and the Scheme, 2022,
we are of the opinion that so far as issuance of notice
under Section 148 of the Act is concerned, the contention
raised on behalf of the Revenue based upon the Office
Memorandum of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated
20th February, 2023 which is even considered by the
Hon‘ble Bombay High Court would be in line of the
legislative intent so as to operate the two aspects
separately, one by issuance of notice under Section 148
of the Act by automated allocation and other by
conducting assessment or reassessment proceedings
under Section 147 of the Act in a faceless manner to the
extent as provided under Section 144B of the Act.
(emphasis supplied)
74.
In this connection, it is pertinent to extract clause 3 of
the scheme dated 29.03.2022.
―3. Scope of the Scheme.-For the purpose of this
Scheme,-
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
(a) assessment, reassessment or re-computation under
section 147 of the Act,
(b) issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act,
Shall be through automated allocation, in accordance with
risk management strategy formulated by the Board as
referred to in section 148 of the Act for issuance of notice,
and in a faceless manner, to the extent provided in
section 144B of the Act with reference to making
assessment or reassessment of total income or loss of
assessee.‖
75.
A close perusal of clause 3 of the scheme makes it
clear that for the purpose of the scheme, issuance of notice under
Section 148 of the Act, shall be through automated allocation in
accordance with risk management stagey formulated by the
board. Admittedly, in all these matters, the cases are identified by
the respective Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, so as to initiate
proceedings under section 148A and 148 of the Act. Further, this
aspect of the matter was not disputed by the Revenue inasmuch
as it was categorically submitted during the course of hearing that
no such arrangement was made so as to identify the cases for the
purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 148A and 148.
With this admission made by the Revenue, it is clear that the
cases were identified by the JAOs’ which cannot be permitted as
the same runs contrary to the scheme formulated as per section
151A of the Act.
NJS,J & TCDS, J
WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
76.
Though, the learned Additional Solicitor General of
India has argued that automated allocation would be done while
initiating the proceedings under Section 147 of the Act, the said
contention cannot be appreciated inasmuch as, in clear and
unambiguous terms the scheme spelt out the manner in which the
allocation shall be made i.e., through automated allocation.
Further, the word “shall” was used immediately after clause 3(b),
meaning thereby JAOs’ are ousted to exercise the powers under
Section 148 of the Act, and the same has to undertaken in
faceless manner.
77.
Further a perusal of the memorandum explaining the
provisions in the Finance Bill, 2026 w.r.t. the insertion of new
Section 147A of Income Tax Act, 1961, it is stated therein, that
with the issuance of notice under Section 148, the case gets
transferred to the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC)
for carrying out the assessment in a faceless manner to initiate
further action as per Section 147. It is pertinent to note that as per
this memorandum, upto the stage of issuance of notice under
Section 148, the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer is entitled to
initiate action and thereafter the case gets transferred to NFAC for
carrying out assessment under Section 147 in a faceless manner
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
to the extent provided under Section 144B. This would mean that
upto the stage of Section 148, the JAO can initiate action and
thereafter the proceedings under Section 147 would be initiated in
faceless manner. In other words, the case identified for reassessment will be dealt with by two (02) different officers i.e., by
JAO upto the stage of Section 148 and thereafter the case get
transferred to NFAC, to initiate action under Section 147, in
faceless manner.
78.
In this connection Section 127 of the Income Tax Act,
1961 assumes importance as it deals with the power to transfer
cases. For ready reference Section 127 is extracted hereunder:
―(1) The Director General or Chief Commissioner or
Commissioner may, after giving the assessee a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter,
wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his
reasons for doing so, transfer any case from one or more
Assessing Officers subordinate to him (whether with or
without concurrent jurisdiction) to any other Assessing
Officer or Assessing Officers (whether with or without
concurrent jurisdiction) also subordinate to him.
(2)Where the Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers
from whom the case is to be transferred and the
Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers to whom the case
is to be transferred are not subordinate to the same
Director
General
or
Chief
Commissioner
or
Commissioner,(a)where the Directors General or Chief Commissioners
or Commissioners to whom such Assessing Officers are
subordinate are in agreement, then the Director General
or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner from whose
jurisdiction the case is to be transferred may, after giving
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
that matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after
recording his reasons for doing so, pass the order;
(b) where the Directors General or Chief Commissioners
or Commissioners aforesaid are not in agreement, the
order transferring the case may, similarly, be passed by
the Board or any such Director General or Chief
Commissioner or Commissioner as the Board may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, authorise in this behalf.
(3)Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be
deemed to require any such opportunity to be given
where the transfer is from any Assessing Officer or
Assessing Officers (whether with or without concurrent
jurisdiction) to any other Assessing Officer or Assessing
Officers (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction)
and the offices of all such officers are situated in the same
city, locality or place.
(4) The transfer of a case under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) may be made at any stage of the proceedings,
and shall not render necessary the re-issue of any notice
already issued by the Assessing Officer or Assessing
Officers from whom the case is transferred.
Explanation. - In section 120 and this section, the word
"case", in relation to any person whose name is specified
in any order or direction issued thereunder, means all
proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which
may be pending on the date of such order or direction or
which may have been completed on or before such date,
and includes also all proceedings under this Act which
may be commenced after the date of such order or
direction in respect of any year.‖
79.
Under this provision, procedure is contemplated to
transfer any case from one or more Assessing Officers to any
other assessing officer or assessing officers. Therefore, if a case
is to be transferred from one officer to another officer (in the case
on hand, from JAO to FAO) the procedure contemplated under
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
the said provision has to be necessarily followed. Further, the
assessee is entitled to reasonable opportunity of being heard in
the matter and after recording the reasons for doing so, the
officers mentioned in Section 127 can transfer the case to any
other officer or officers. Admittedly, this is not being followed by
the Revenue while transferring the case to National Faceless
Assessment Centre (NFAC) after issuance of notice under
Section 148. Thereby, the transfer is being effected by taking
shelter under Section 130 of the Act under which faceless
jurisdiction of Income Tax Authorities was conferred. For proper
appreciation, at the cost of repetition, it is relevant to extract
Section 130 of the Act.
―130. (1) The Central Government may make a scheme,
by notification in the Official Gazette, for the purposes
of—
(a) exercise of all or any of the powers and performance
of all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the case
may be, assigned to income-tax authorities by or under
this Act as referred to in section 120; or
(b) vesting the jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer as
referred to in section 124; or
(c) exercise of power to transfer cases under section 127;
or
(d) exercise of jurisdiction in case of change of
incumbency as referred to in section 129,
so as to impart greater efficiency, transparency and
accountability by—
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(i) eliminating the interface between the income-tax
authority and the assessee or any other person, to the
extent technologically feasible;
(ii) optimising utilisation of the resources through
economies of scale and functional specialisation;
(iii) introducing a team-based exercise of powers and
performance of functions by two or more income-tax
authorities, concurrently, in respect of any area or
persons or classes of persons or incomes or classes of
income or cases or classes of cases, with dynamic
jurisdiction.
(2) The Central Government may, for the purpose of
giving effect to the scheme made under sub-section (1),
by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any of the
provisions of this Act shall not apply or shall apply with
such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as may
be specified in the notification:
Provided that no direction shall be issued after the 31st
day of March, 2022.
(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (1) and
sub-section (2) shall, as soon as may be after the
notification is issued, be laid before each House of
Parliament.‖
(emphasis supplied)
80.
Thus, under Section 130 (1) (a) of the Act the Central
Government may make a scheme by Notification in the Official
Gazette for the purposes of exercise of all or any of the powers
and performance of all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as
the case may be, assigned to Income Tax Authorities by or under
this Act as referred to in Section 120. In tune with Section 130,
the Central Government issued Notification No.15 of 2022, dated
28.03.2022 formulating scheme called as “Faceless Jurisdiction
of Income-Tax Authorities Scheme, 2022”. Under this scheme as
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per clause 3(a), the exercise of all or any or the powers and
performance of all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the
case may be, assigned to Income Tax Authorities, by or under the
Act as referred to in Section 120 of the Act, shall be in a faceless
manner through automated allocation, in accordance with and to
the extent provided in Section 144B of the Act.
81.
In other words, all the powers conferred under
Sections 120, 124 and Section 127 of the Act on the Income Tax
Officers shall be done in faceless manner as per Section 130.
The Revenue contended that since there is no Notification issued
conferring power on Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO), the
question of exercising the powers by FAO under Sections 148A
or 148 do not arise. If the argument of the Revenue is to be
accepted, then it is for the Revenue to show that after issuance of
notice under Section 148, there is an order passed by the proper
officers mentioned under Section 127 of the Act, so as to transfer
the case from Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) to National
Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), inasmuch as, it is not in
dispute that according to Revenue the re-assessment or recomputation is undertaken by two (02) different officers i.e., by
Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) upto the stage of section
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148 and thereafter by FAO to conduct proceedings under Section
147. From the above, it is clear that the Revenue is blowing hot
and cold in the matter, so as to suit its convenience. Therefore,
the contention of the Revenue that there is no corresponding
Notification issued conferring power on FAO cannot be
countenanced.
82.
Further the contention of the Revenue that by virtue
of Notification No.61 of 2022, dt.10.06.2022, which was issued in
supersession of notification No.23 of 2021, dt.31.03.2021 issued
by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, directing the Income Tax
Authorities of units specified in column (2) of the schedule
mentioned therein, having their head quarters at the places
mentioned in column (3) therein, shall exercise the powers and
functions of assessing officers concurrently, to facilitate the
conduct of faceless assessment proceedings under Section 144B
of the Act in all respects and the same would enable the
Jurisdictional Assessing Officers (JAOs) to initiate proceedings
under Sections 148A and 148 of the Act, cannot be accepted
inasmuch as the said Notification runs contrary to Section 130,
Section 151A of the Act and the scheme made thereunder. In
other words, when the Act and the scheme specifically state that
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proceedings are to be initiated in a faceless manner, the same
cannot be allowed to be exercised by the Jurisdictional Assessing
Officer (JAO) through the Notification referred to herein above.
Accordingly, the contention of the Revenue in this regard is liable
to be rejected.
83.
In view of the findings recorded above, with great
respect, we are not in agreement with the opinion expressed by
the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in Snehdham Trust case.
84.
Apart from the same, the scheme was brought into
force so as to eliminate the interface between the tax authorities
and the assessees to impart greater efficiency and transparency.
By allowing the JAOs to exercise power under section 148, the
very purpose of bringing the scheme would be defeated
inasmuch as the intent of the Legislature is to undertake the
entire proceedings in faceless manner.
85.
Further, absolutely no explanation whatsoever is
forthcoming from the Revenue, as to why Section 148 is included
in the scheme, if the same is not intended to proceed in faceless
manner. Unless appropriate amendment is made to the scheme,
the JAO has absolutely no role to play Under Section 148 of the
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
Act. In the absence of any such amendment, the argument that
the JAOs have concurrent jurisdiction under the Notification
dt.10.06.2022 merits no appreciation, inasmuch as the same is
contrary to Sections 130 and 151A of the Act. Viewed from any
angle, the contention of the Revenue cannot be countenanced
and it is incumbent for the authorities to initiate proceedings
under Section 148A and 148 of the Act in faceless manner alone
and the same cannot be given a go by to suit the convenience of
the Revenue.
86.
As
an
alternative
submission,
the
Revenue
contended that Section 148A of the Act was not included in the
scheme dated 29.03.2022 and this would mean that JAO can
initiate proceedings under Section 148A. To answer this
submission, it is pertinent to note that the very intent of the
Legislature in bringing the scheme is to conduct re-assessment or
re-computation in a faceless manner. Further, unless inquiry is
conducted by providing opportunity to the assessee, under
Section 148A, no notice can be issued under Section 148.
Further, proceedings under Section 147 would not be initiated,
unless the procedure contemplated under Sections 148A and 148
are exhausted. Therefore, the very purpose of initiating
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proceedings under Section 148A is to assess or re-assess such
income or re-compute the loss as provided for under Section 147
of the Act. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that merely
because Section 148A is not included in the scheme, thereby it
gives powers to JAOs to exercise its jurisdiction under this
section. Accordingly, the said contention of the Revenue is liable
to be rejected.
87.
The Revenue further contended that even as per the
scheme, the proceedings are to be undertaken in a faceless
manner to the extent provided in Section 144B of the Act with
reference to making assessment or re-assessment of total
income or loss of income. Emphasizing this aspect, the Revenue
contends that Sections 148 and 148A were not included in
Section
144B and
therefore the question
of conducting
proceedings in faceless manner as far as Sections 148A and 148
do not arise. In this connection, it is appropriate to refer to subsection (1) of 151A of the Act. Under this section, the Central
Government may make a scheme, by notification in the official
gazette for the purposes of assessment, re-assessment or recomputation under section 147 or issuance of notice under
Section 148 or conducting of enquiries or issuance of show cause
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notice or passing of order under Section 148A or sanction for
issue of such notice under Section 151. Further, a perusal of sub
section (2) of Section 151A would make it clear that, for the
purpose of giving effect to this scheme made under sub-section
(1), the Central Government may by notification in the official
gazette, direct that any of the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961,
shall not apply or shall apply with such exceptions, modifications
and adaptations as may be specified in the notification. On a
conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 151A with the
scheme framed there under, it is succinctly clear that the Central
Government in its wisdom decided to include Section 148 into the
scheme. Having included the same into the scheme, it is
incumbent for the authorities to issue notice under Section 148 in
a faceless manner. Whereas, in all these cases, in complete
defiance of the scheme, the JAOs have initiated proceedings
under Section 148 which is not permissible under law. Therefore,
the contention of the Revenue in this regard is also liable to be
rejected.
88.
Further, provisio to sub section (2) of Section 151A of
the Act specifically states that no direction shall be issued after
31.03.2022. In other words, the intention of the Central
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Government was never to initiate proceedings under Section 148
in faceless manner, the said Section ought to have been removed
from the scheme on or before 31.03.2022 in terms of provisio to
Section 151A(2) of the Act. Therefore, the amendment brought in
through Section 147A with retrospective effect without excluding
Section 148 from the scheme, is not sustainable under law.
89.
Further, the Revenue contended that as per clause
(1) of the scheme, it is only an e-assessment scheme and not a
faceless scheme. It was further contended that however the
expression “faceless” occurs in the last segment of the scheme
and for a completely different purpose. In this regard, as already
observed supra, having included Section 148 into the scheme,
the Revenue cannot contend that the expression in faceless only
relates to initiation of proceedings under Section 147. A plain
reading of the scheme would make it clear that no discretion is
given to the authorities manning the Act to conduct proceedings
in non-faceless manner.
90.
The Parliament through Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of
2026) introduced Section 147(A) into the Income Tax Act, 1961.
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Section 147A, at the cost of repetition, for ready reference is
reproduced hereunder:
“147A.Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, order or decree of any court or in section 151A
or in any scheme framed thereunder, for the removal of
doubts, it is hereby clarified that the Assessing Officer for
the purposes of sections 148 and 148A shall mean and
shall always be deemed to have meant to be an
Assessing Officer other than the National Faceless
Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in
sub-section (3) of section 144B‖.
91.
A perusal of the memorandum would show that the
said Section was introduced so as to clarify jurisdiction to issue
notice
under
Section
148,
where
income
has
escaped
assessment and for carrying out pre-assessment procedure
under Section 148A. By placing reliance on the Memorandum,
the Revenue would contend that, the Legislature has clearly
demarcated the line between assessment and re-assessment
process which culminates in issuing of notice under Section 148.
The Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) carries out preassessment inquiry and thereafter reaches a conclusion whether
it is a fit case for re-assessment or not. If it is a fit case, in his
opinion, notice under Section 148 would be given to the assessee
and thereafter the proceedings are carried out in a faceless
manner by NFAC. It was further contended that the legislature
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had no intention to involve the NFAC in pre-assessment inquiry in
any manner whether for issuance of notice under Section 148A or
under Section 148. The faceless assessment for re-assessment
under Section 147 was only required to be carried out to the
extent provided under Section 144B and the intent of the scheme
framed under Section 151A was also the same. Further, the
amendment was brought in to achieve certainty, clarity and to
avoid litigation, as divergent views have been expressed on this
issue by various High Courts. Therefore, in order to remove the
doubts, the amendment is made with retrospective effect from
01.04.2021.
92.
On a conjoint reading of the Memorandum and
Section 147A of the Act makes it clear that, the amendment was
brought in to achieve certainty, clarity and to avoid litigation.
However, a plain reading of the scheme made under Section
151A, it is apparently clear that Section 148 is brought under the
said scheme, so as to initiate proceedings in faceless manner as
aforesaid. By introducing Section 147A, admittedly the scheme
made under Section 151A remained un-amended. Without
amending the said scheme, any clarification or validation through
amendment cannot be permitted especially when the basis is not
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removed. Therefore, by introducing Section 147A of the Act, the
Legislature is trying to over reach the judgments rendered by
various High Courts in this regard, in direct conflict with Doctrine
of separation of powers, which is the basic structure of the
Constitution.
93.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
“Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd., Vs. Boroach Borough
Municipality & others41” had held that a Court’s decision must
always bind, unless the conditions on which it is based are so
fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given
in the altered circumstances. If the Legislature has the power
over the subject matter and competence to make a valid law, it
can at any time make such valid law and make it retrospectively,
so as to bind even the past transactions. While holding so, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the validity of a
validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature
possesses the competence which it claims over the subject
matter and whether in making the validation, it removes the
defect which the Courts had found in the existing law and makes
adequate provisions in the validating law for a valid imposition of
(1969) 2 SCC 283
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tax. In the cases on hand, no doubt the Legislature has got
plenary power to validate any law, but the same is subject to
certain limitations, viz., while validating the law it shall remove the
defect which the Courts had found in the existing law. Admittedly,
in all these cases, no defect whatsoever was expressed by
various High Courts either in the scheme or in the Act in the
earlier round of litigation. All that the Courts have held that JAOs
have no jurisdiction to exercise powers under Section 148 of the
Act. In such circumstances, without amending the scheme made
under Section 151A of the Act, insertion of Section 147A into
Income Tax Act, 1961 in the name of clarification or validation
cannot be permitted.
94.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
“State of Tamilnadu and another vs. M.Rayappaiah Gounder
and another42” while referring to the case of “The Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad vs. The New Shrock
Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd.,43” had held that the Legislature under
our constitution have within the prescribed limits, powers to make
laws prospectively as well as retrospectively. By exercise of those
(1971) 3 SCC 1
AIR 1970 SC 1292
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
powers the legislature can remove the basis of a decision
rendered by a competent Court, thereby rendering that decision
ineffective. But, no Legislature in this Country has power to ask
the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the
decision given by Courts.
95.
From the above judgments it is clear that, if any law
enacted by Legislature, if it is found beyond the Legislative
competence, the Courts have got powers to declare the same to
be null and void and it can strike down the same, especially if the
Legislature tries to over reach any decision rendered by the
Court. In other words, the Legislature cannot nullify the judgment
rendered by any Court by enacting law without removing the
basis.
96.
Further, in the earlier round of litigation either this
Court or any other High Court found fault with the scheme made
under Section 151A. It was held that having included Section 148
into the scheme, the JAOs have no jurisdiction to issue notices
under Section 148. Admittedly, even as on today, Section 148
remains in the scheme and without making amendment to the
scheme, incorporation of any provision to nullify the judgments
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rendered by various High Courts, is beyond Legislative
competence and legally impermissible. Such acts of Legislature
over reach which unsettle the decisions of Courts and lead to
chaos cannot be allowed.
97.
Further, Section 147A starts with non-obstante
clause, for the removal of doubts, it was clarified that the
assessing officer for the purposes of Sections 148 and 148A shall
mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be an
assessing officer other than faceless assessment centre or any
assessment unit referred to in sub-section (3) of section 144B. As
already observed supra, the amendment was brought in so as to
nullify the judgments rendered by various Hon’ble High Courts.
Further, through the aforesaid judgments, the respondents were
directed to follow their own scheme framed under section 151A,
while holding that JAOs have no jurisdiction
to initiate
proceedings under Section 148A or 148. In the aforesaid
situation, without amending Section 151A or the scheme made
there under, the impugned amendment inserted through Section
147A does not stand for judicial scrutiny.
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
98.
The Revenue filed additional affidavit setting out the
factual and statistical position, on an All India basis in relation to
the returns of the Income filed in respect of assessment years
2016-17 to 2025-26, notices issued under Section 148 of the Act
for Income Escaping Assessment as against 8,82,146 assessees,
i.e., 0.127% of notices issued out of the total assessees of
69,40,62,325 who filed returns. The additional affidavit further
reads that re-assessment orders were passed under Section 147
as against 6,46,897 assessees and the remaining 1,46,544
assessees cases remain pending at various stages, after
excluding the re-assessment proceedings dropped against some
of the assesees. By drawing attention of this Court to the
averments made in the additional affidavit, the Revenue would
contend that the income assessed on re-assessment totals to
Rs.21,74,803/- crores (Rs.21.71 lakh crores), therefore in view of
public interest especially when most of the assessees against
whom the reassessment proceedings have been initiated
subjected themselves to the inquiry under Section 148A without
questioning the jurisdiction, no interference is warranted. The
Revenue would further submit that any adverse orders at this
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stage, will have far reaching consequences adversely effecting
National and public interest.
99.
We have considered the submission of the Revenue
and in view of the findings recorded supra, additional submissions
will not have any bearing in the matter, inasmuch as, merely
because there was no challenge to the proceedings initiated
under Section 148 by most of the assessees, that by itself, will
not give any right to the Revenue to undertake assessment in
non-faceless manner, contrary to the statutory provisions already
discussed at length.
100. During the course of hearing, it is brought to the
notice of this Court that the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh rendered its decision on the issue on
hand by judgment dated 10.09.2026, whereunder after referring
to various contentions raised by the assessees and the revenue,
Section 147A of Income Tax Act was held to be unconstitutional.
We have perused the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble High
Court of Punjab and Harayana, the operation of which stayed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide order dt.18.09.2026 in
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
SLP (Civil) No.33196 of 2026. However, we have dealt with the
matter independently and recorded reasons as aforesaid.
101. Further, as per Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026),
through Section 9, after Section 147 of Income Tax Act, 1961,
Section 147A was inserted and it shall be deemed to have been
inserted with effect from the 1st day of April, 2021. In this
connection, the petitioners have contended that as per Section
2(a), Sections 2 to 129, clause (b) of section 152 and section 156
shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 2026. It was further
contended that Income Tax Act, 1961 was repealed on
31.03.2026 and Income Tax Act, 2025 has come into force with
effect
from
01.04.2026,
in
such
circumstances,
any
amendment/insertion cannot be made to a Repealed Act and
would contend that Section 147A cannot be given effect to from
01.04.2021.
102. On the contrary, the Revenue would submit that
Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026) has received the assent of the
President on 30.03.2026 and was published in the gazette,
therefore the contention of the petitioners is without basis
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inasmuch as, as on 30.03.2026, Income Tax Act, 1961 was not
repealed.
103. In order to deal with the ground raised by the
petitioner, it is appropriate to refer Section 1 (3) of Income Tax
Act, 2025, which reads “save as otherwise provided in this Act, it
shall come into force on 1st day of April, 2026”. Similarly, as per
section 2 (a) of the Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026) “Sections 2
to 129, clause (b) of Section 152 and Section 156 shall come into
force on the 1st day of April, 2026”. From the above, it is clear that
the Income Tax Act, 1961 got repealed on the mid night of
31.03.2026 and Income Tax Act, 2025 has come into force from
01.04.2026. Though, it is contended by the Revenue that the
Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026) received the assent of the
President on 30.03.2026, on a reading of Section 2(a) of the said
Act, it is mentioned therein, that it would come into force from
01.04.2026 and Section 147A shall be deemed to have been
inserted with effect from 01.04.2021. Further Section 536 of
Income Tax Act, 2025 deals with repeal and savings. Section
536(2)(c) provides that the provisions of the repealed Income Tax
Act shall continue to apply to any proceeding pending on the date
of commencement of this Act and to any proceedings initiated on
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or after the 1st April, 2026 (including notices, assessment, reassessment, re-computation, rectification, penalty, reference,
revision and appeals) in respect of any tax year beginning before
the 1st April, 2026 and such proceedings shall be carried out as
per the procedure specified in the repealed Income Tax Act.
Further, clause (u) of sub-section (2) of 536 provides that any
scheme which has been notified under the provisions of the
repealed Income Tax Act with a view to eliminate the interface
with the assessee or any other person, the said scheme shall be
deemed to have been made (i) under the corresponding
provisions of this Act or (ii) under section 532 where there is no
such corresponding provision and shall continue in force
accordingly. Therefore, in terms of Section 536 (2) (c) and (u), the
proceedings initiated under the Repealed Act shall be done in
accordance with the provisions of the Repealed Act and the
scheme made thereunder.
104. On an overall consideration of the respective
submissions, it is clear that Income Tax Act, 1961 was repealed
on the mid night of 31.03.2026. Therefore insertion of Section
147A to Income Tax Act, 1961 is not sustainable especially
Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026) clearly says that it shall come
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
into force on 01.04.2026. Further, it is specifically contended by
the Revenue that the Finance Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026) received
assent of the President on 30.03.2026 as on that date, the
Income Tax Act, 1961 was not repealed. In this connection, it is
relevant to refer section 5 of General Clauses Act, as it assumes
importance, which reads thus:
―5. Coming into operation of enactments. –(1) Where any
Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a
particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day
on which it receives the assent,(a) in the case of a Central Act made before the
commencement of the Constitution, of the Governor
General, and
(b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.
(2) omitted
(3) Unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or
regulation shall be construed as coming into operation
immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its
commencement.‖
105. On a reading of section 5 of General Clauses Act, it
is clear that, if any Act does not express the date of which it come
into operation, then it will come into force from the date on which
it received assent of the President. In the case on hand, Finance
Act, 2026 (No.4 of 2026), though received the assent of the
President on 30.03.2026, as per Section 2 (a) of the Act, it shall
come into force from 01.04.2026. Since, Finance Act, 2026 has
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expressly provided 1st day of April, 2026, it cannot be said that
the same has come into force on 30.03.2026, the date on which it
received the assent of the President. Further, our view is fortified
by judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Common
Cause Vs. Union of India and others44”, wherein Hon’ble Apex
Court at para 28 held as under:―28. The submission that by virtue of Section 5 of General
Clauses Act, the Act has come into force is misconceived.
Section 5 of the General Clauses Act has no application.
Section 5 is applicable only when the Act does not
express any date with effect from which the Act would
come into force. It will apply to such cases where there is
no provision like Section 1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of
the 44th Constitutional Amendment. When the Legislature
itself provides that the date of coming into force of the Act
would be a date to be notified by the Central Government,
Section 5 of the General Clauses Act will have no
application. It is plain and evident from the language of
the provision. Section 5(1) provides that 'where any
Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on
particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day
on which it receives the assent'. Sub-clause (3) provides
that 'unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or
Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation
immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its
commencement'.' In simple words it would mean that
unless otherwise provided a Central Act would come into
operation on the date it receives Presidential assent and
is construed as coming into operation immediately on the
date preceding its commencement. Thus, if a Central Act
is assented by the President on 23.8.1995 then it would
be construed to have come into operation on the midnight between 22nd and 23rd August, 1995. Sub-section
(3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1). Subsection (1) provides that the Act would come into
operation on the date it receives the assent of the
President where a particular day w.e.f. which the Act
would come into force is not prescribed whereas sub44
(2003) 8 SCC 250
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section (3) provides the exact time of the day/night when
the Act would come into force. It would not apply to cases
where the legislature has delegated the power to the
executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be
notified by publication in the Official Gazette.‖
(emphasis supplied)
106. From the above judgment, it can be culled out that
any enactment shall come into force from the date on which, it is
expressly provided under that enactment. If the enactment does
not express a particular day as to coming into its operation, in
such case, the date on which the said Act received assent from
the President would be the date on which the said Act would
come
into
force.
amendment/insertion
In
that
made
to
view
of
the
the
Repealed
matter,
any
Act
not
is
sustainable under law and it has no legal sanctity, accordingly the
same is liable to be struck down from the date of its inception or
nativity.
107. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the
considered opinion that Section 147A of the Income Tax Act,
1961 is unconstitutional and the same is accordingly struck down.
Further, as we held that Section 147A as unconstitutional, all the
proceedings initiated by the respective Jurisdictional Assessing
Officers (JAOs) under Sections 148A and 148 are without
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jurisdiction and are liable to be set aside, inasmuch as the same
have to be undertaken in faceless manner. Accordingly the writ
petitions are allowed and impugned proceedings/orders are set
aside.
There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending
applications, if any shall stand closed.
___________________________
JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
______________________
JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR
12.10.2026
DR
Whether the order is :
Speaking Yes/No / Reasoned Yes/No
Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No
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WP Nos.28520 of 2023 and batch
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.C.D. SEKHAR
WP No.28520 of 2023 & BATCH
Date 12.10.2026
U
DR
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