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* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
+WRIT PETITION Nos.24641 OF 2014 & 1094 OF 2016
%
22.09.2026
# The Govt., of A.P., rep. by its Prl.
Secretary to Govt. Home Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others.
……Petitioners
And:
$1.M.V. Durga Rao and others.
….Respondents.
!Counsel for the appellant
: Add. Advocate General
^Counsel for the respondents
: CORPUS JURIS LAW PANEL LLP
WRIT PETITION NO: 1094 of 2016
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others
...Petitioner(s)
Vs.
B M Chalam Babu S/o Narasimhulu and Others
...Respondent(s)
Advocate for Petitioner:
Advocate for Respondent:
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
2001 SCC OnLine AP 501
1987 Supp SCC 345
(1989) 1 SCC 101
Unreported WP.No.17833/2014
APHC, Decided on 05.03.2018
Unreported WP No.12190 of 2021
APHC Decided on 07.05.2025
(2019) 4 SCC 376
(2000) 6 SCC 359
(2019) 6 SCC 270
(2011) 4 SCC 602
10 (2022) 17 SCC 568
11 (2011) 11 SCC 441
12.2025 SCC OnLine SC 304
13. (2007) 11 SCC 10
14.(2011) 2 SCC 429
15.(2006) 4 SCC 1
16.(2007) 15 SCC 129
17.(2019) 19 SCC 626
ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL
M R TAGORE
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
****
WRIT PETITION Nos.24641 OF 2014 & 1094 OF 2016
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 22.09.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the Yes/No
fair copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA,J
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
Date of reserved for orders : 01.07.2026
Date of pronouncement
:22.09.2026
Date of uploading
:22.09.2026
APHC010634522014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
[3562]
WRIT PETITION NO: 24641 of 2014
The Govt Of Ap., Home Dept., & 2 Others and Others
Vs.
M V Durga Rao 3 Others and Others
...Petitioner(s)
...Respondent(s)
**********
Present:
Advocate for Petitioner:
Advocate for Respondent:
ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL
CORPUS JURIS LAW PANEL LLP
WRIT PETITION NO: 1094 of 2016
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others
Vs.
B M Chalam Babu S/o Narasimhulu and Others
...Petitioner(s)
...Respondent(s)
**********
Advocate for Petitioner:
Advocate for Respondent:
ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL
M R TAGORE
CORAM : SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
DATE
: 22.09.2026
COMMON JUDGMENT: (per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri K. Kirthi Teja, learned Government Pleader attached to
learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the petitioners and Sri
M. V. Raja Ram, learned counsel appearing for respondents in
W.P.No.24641 of 2014 and Sri R. V. Mallikarjuna Rao, learned counsel
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
appearing on behalf of Sri M. R. Tagore, learned counsel for the
respondents in W.P.No.1094 of 2016.
I. Facts:
2. Respondents No.1 to 3 in W.P.No.24641 of 2014 (applicants)
filed O.A.No.3350 of 2012 (O.A) seeking direction to the petitioners
(respondents in O.A.) to count their services on the post of Reserve SubInspectors of Police (RSI) to their services on the post of Sub-Inspector of
Police (SI) (Civil) of Eluru Range to which post they were subsequently
appointed through Direct Recruitment in the year 2004. The O.A.No.3350
of 2012 was disposed of in terms of the Order issued in a previous
O.A.No.6168 of 2011 which was disposed of by the Andhra Pradesh
Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (Tribunal) on 27.03.2014. The
O.A.No.6168 of 2011 filed by different applicants had been allowed by the
Tribunal. The proceedings impugned therein dated 29.06.2011 were set
aside. By those proceedings, those different applicants, who were also
the direct recruits to the post of SI (Civil) and previously they had been
appointed as RSI in the direct recruitment, their past services as RSI
were not counted for seniority and for other service benefits to the post of
SI on direct recruitment.
The Tribunal after setting aside those
proceedings, directed the respondent-State Authorities to accord all
seniority and promotions as a result of the Orders of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court passed in WP No.22176 of 2004 and batch, dated 01.03.2007
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
and of the Hon‟ble Apex Court dated 16.03.2010 in C.A.No.7372-7374
and batch with SLP No.19858-19862 of 2007.
3. Respondents No.1 to 9 in W.P.No.1094 of 2016 (applicants)
who are working as Head Constables filed O.A.No.2943 of 2011 (O.A)
seeking direction to the petitioners (respondents in O.A.) to count their
services on the post of Armed Reserve Police Constable (ARPC) to their
services on the post of Civil Police Constables of Anantapur District. The
applicants raised the claim of seniority after lapse of 15 years from the
date of their appointment as PCs (Civil). The O.A.No.2943 of 2011 was
allowed vide Orders dated 26.04.2013 directing the respondents therein
to fix their seniority rendered in the cadre of AR Police constables from
the date of their initial appointment as ARPCs by applying the principle as
applied
in
respect
of
Sub-Inspectors
of
Police
(Civil)
in
Rc.No.1152/E1/2010, dated 08.12.2010. Challenging the orders of the
Tribunal dated 26.04.2013, the petitioners filed W.P.No.1094 of 2016.
4. The respondents (applicants) were initially appointed as PCs
(AR) and thereafter selected and appointed as Police Constables (Civil)
through direct recruitment.
5. In W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch i.e., W.P.Nos.22176, 22180
of 2004, 19618/2005 and 25871/2006, decided on 01.03.2007, the Order
of the Tribunal in another O.A.No.1693 of 2002 along with O.A.No.3991
of 2001 and O.A.No.3654 of 2004, dated 02.08.2004 was under
challenge. The proceedings of the State Authorities to the same effect
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
i.e., not counting the past service on the post of RSI for the seniority and
other benefits to the post SI (Civil) on the appointment through direct
recruitment to the post of SI (Civil) were in question. The O.A.No.3991 of
2001 and the connected O.As were dismissed maintaining the State
proceedings. In O.A.No.3991 of 2001 and others, the applicants therein
had requested to extend the benefit of the judgment of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in WP No.2120 of 2000 and batch. The Tribunal held
that the judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 was different and those
applicants were not entitled for the benefit of that judgment for counting
their past services as RSI in the cadre of SI (Civil).
The Tribunal
observed that, that was a case of SI (Civil) appointed by transfer to the
post of SI (Civil) from their previous service as RSI. That was not a case
of direct recruitment to the post of SI (Civil). So, Rule 15 (c) of A. P.State
Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1996 (in short „Rules 1996/Special
Rules‟) which was attracted and applied in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 had no
application to the case of the applicants in O.A.No.3991 of 2001 & batch.
Their appointment was through direct recruitment and not by transfer.
6. The WP No.22176 of 2004 and batch were allowed in view of the
judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch, by judgment dated
01.03.2007, “as it was agreed by the learned counsel for the petitioners
and also the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents
in those writ petitions that the issue involved was same as covered by a
decision in WP No.2120 of 2000 and batch.” The unofficial respondents in
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
writ petition No.22176 of 2024 as also the State preferred Civil Appeal
Nos.7370, 7375, 7368, 7378 & 7369 of 2002 and SLP (C) Nos.1985819862 of 2007.
The Civil Appeals were dismissed and in view of
dismissal of the civil appeals, SLPs filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh
were also dismissed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court on 16.03.2010.
The
Review Petitions were also dismissed on 18.11.2020 on the ground of
delay as also on merits by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.
7. Now coming to the Order dated 27.03.2014 impugned in the Writ
Petition No.24641 of 2014, the Tribunal in effect granted the benefit of the
judgment of the High Court in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch, dated
15.06.2001. It is to be mentioned that the benefit of the judgment in
W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch was extended, in the batch of the
subsequent writ petitions i.e., W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch, on the
concession granted by the then learned Government Pleader that the
controversy was squarely covered by the judgment dated 01.03.2007 in
WP.No.2120 of 2000 and batch.
8. The impugned Order dated 26.04.2013 in W.P.No.1094 of 2016
passed by the Tribunal is on the same grounds as the Order impugned in
W.P.No.24641 of 2014. There is difference of posts only but the Rules
applicable are same.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
II. Submissions of the learned Government Pleader for the
Petitioners:
9. Learned Government Pleader for the petitioners submitted that
the controversy in WP.No.2120 of 2000 was different.
There, the
petitioners to whom the benefit of past services as RSI was allowed to be
added or counted in their services as SI (Civil) they were appointed to the
post of SI (Civil) by transfer and not by direct recruitment. So, in the case
of the petitioners of W.P.No.2120 of 2000 Rule 15 (c) was attracted and
in view of that Rule, the benefit of past service on the post of RSI was
granted. He submitted that in the case of RSI appointed subsequently
directly to the post of SI (Civil) as is the case of the Applicants
(respondents), Rule 15 (c) of the Rules is not attracted. Rule 15 (a) is
attracted. Under Rule 15 (a) they are not entitled for the grant of benefit
of past services as RSI.
The WP.No.22176 of 2004 and batch was
decided granting the benefit of the judgment in WP No.2120 of 2000 and
batch, on the concession of the learned counsel for the State who
appeared in that writ petition and as recorded had stated that the
controversy was covered. Learned Government Pleader submitted that
on merits the petitioners of W.P.No.22176 of 2014 were not so entitled,
however the benefit came to them on the concession granted, which was
not correct.
10. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that in
W.P.No.1094 of 2016 that the same Rules are applicable, so, the same
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
submission is also advanced in W.P.No.1094 of 2016. The Tribunal erred
in appreciating the Rule 15 (c) of A.P.Police Subordinate Service Rules in
right perspective as the applicants were not transferred from AR PC to
PC (civil) and they were not appointed by transfer from ARPC to PC
(civil). They were selected afresh as PC (civil) by direct recruitment.
III. Submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondents:
11. Learned counsel for the respondents (applicants in the OA)
submitted that the judgment of this Court dated 01.03.2007 passed in WP
No.22176 of 2004 and batch was challenged in the Hon‟ble Apex Court.
The Civil Appeal of the unofficial respondents was dismissed. The SLP
filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh was dismissed by the common
order. The review petition was also dismissed. So, the Order passed in
WP No.22176 of 2004 and batch attained finality. Subsequently in many
O.As the benefit of the judgment in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 was given. In
the present O.A also the same benefit has been extended. There is no
illegality in the Order of the Tribunal.
agitated and reopened.
The same point cannot be re-
In the cases of the other applicants the
Government implemented the Order by issuing G.Os, granting the
seniority and other benefits, adding to their services to the post of SI
(Civil), their past services on the post of RSI. Even in the cases of some
other applicants in whose favour the Order of the Tribunal was on the
same lines, those have also been extended the same benefit. So, the
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
present respondents (Applicants) cannot be denied the same benefit on
the principle of equality as also the finality on the same subject.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in SLPs and the Civil Appeals as
aforesaid, shall operate as a binding precedent to be followed in the
present case. The State is bound by the finality attached and it also
implemented the said order, and so it shall also implement the impugned
order of the Tribunal in the case of the present respondents.
IV. Points of Consideration:
13. In our view, for decision of the present writ petition, we are
required to consider the rule position; the main judgment dated
15.06.2001 in WP.No.2120 of 2000 and batch, to determine if the
controversy as in the present writ petition is covered by the judgment in
WP No.2120 of 2000 and batch. If it is so covered, there would be no
difficulty and the impugned Order of the Tribunal would not require any
interference. But if the present respondents are not covered by Rule 15
(c) of the Rules, but by Rule 15 (a) and so the judgment in W.P.No.2120
of 2000 is inapplicable, then whether such benefit could be extended,
only because benefit of the judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 was given
to the different applicants in different O.A(s) based on the judgment in
W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch, which judgment was passed not on
consideration on merits, but on the submissions advanced by both the
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
sides that the controversy was squarely covered by judgment in
W.P.No.2120 of 2000.
14. We are then also required to consider the effect of the dismissal
of the Civil Appeals of the unofficial respondents, and the dismissal of the
SLP filed by the State against the judgment in WP.No.22176 of 2004 and
batch. In other words, whether in view of the judgment of the Hon‟ble
Apex Court in SLPs and the Civil Appeals as aforesaid, notwithstanding
that the respondents case is not covered by Rule 15 (c) nor by the
judgment dated 15.06.2001 in W.P.No.2120 of 2000, still we have to
maintain the impugned Order of the Tribunal.
V. Analysis & Consisderation:
15. The 1st respondent (Applicant No.1 in OA) was initially
appointed as RSI in the direct recruitment of 1996 and the 2nd and 3rd
respondents (Applicants No.2 & 3 in OA) were appointed in the direct
recruitment in the year 2003. Thereafter, they participated in 2004 direct
recruitment process for the post of SI of Police (Civil).
They were
selected and appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) on 02.05.2005.
Subsequently, they were promoted as Inspectors of Police on
14.03.2014, 13.07.2012 and 13.07.2012 respectively. So, it is not in
dispute that the respondents (Applicants) were appointed to the post of SI
of Police (Civil) by direct recruitment. Their appointment to the post of SI
(Civil) is not an appointment by transfer from the post of RSI.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
V (a). Rule position and the Citations:
16. Before coming to the judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and
batch, viz., E. Shankar Reddy v. Government of A.P.1 it is to be
mentioned that the services of the respondents (applicants) are governed
by the Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules.
17. Rule 2 of the Special Rules provides for the method of
appointment and promotion. The appointment is by direct recruitment, by
promotion and also by transfer.
18. On the point of seniority, Rule 15 provides for determination by
the date of the first appointment to a class or category or grade.
However, transfer of a person from one class or category of the service to
another class or category carrying the same scale of pay, shall not be
treated as first appointment to the latter for the purpose of seniority. The
seniority of person so transferred shall be determined with reference to
the date of first appointment to the class or category from which he was
transferred.
19. Rule 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service
Rules reads as under:
“Rule – 15. Seniority:
(a)
The seniority of a person in the class or category or grades shall,
unless he has been reduced to lower rank as a punishment be
determined by the date of his first appointment to such class or category
or grade. If any portion of the service of such persons does not count
2001 SCC OnLine AP 501
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
towards his probation under the general rules his seniority shall be
determined by the date of commencement of his service which counts
towards probation:
[Provided that in the case of Sub-Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors
(Intelligence) and Reserve Sub-Inspectors], the seniority inter-se shall
be fixed on completion of training in the Police Training College or
with the Andhra Pradesh Special Police, as the case may be, instead of
at the time of selection in accordance with the list which shall be
arranged in order of merit, which shall be determined in accordance
with the aggregate of marks obtained by each probationer.
(i)
in respect of his record in the Police Training College
or with the Andhra Pradesh Special Police, as the case
may be; and
(ii)
at the final examination.
In determining such order of merit, no account shall be taken of marks
awarded to a probationer in any subject in which he has failed. But such
seniority shall be liable to revision by the Deputy Inspector-General of
Police concerned if he considers it necessary, before completion of
probation.
This sub-rule shall not affect the seniority of any members of the
service which may have been fixed expressly or by implication before
the 19th November, 1941 or any orders so as to seniority which may
have been passed by competent authority before the 19th November,
1941.
["Provided that in the case of directly recruited Sub-Inspectors of
Police (Intelligence), the inter-se-seniority shall be fixed on
completion of training in t the he Police Training College/Andhra
Pradesh Police Academy, instead of at the time of selection, in
accordance with the list which shall be arranged in order of merit,
which shall be determined in accordance with the aggregate of marks
obtained by each probationer in the tests and examinations prescribed
for them in the training modules conducted at these Institutions.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
The seniority of the Sub-Inspectors of Police (Intelligence) appointed
by transfer from among Sub-Inspectors of Police (Civil) or equivalent
ranks of this service carrying the same scale of pay shall not be treated
as first appointment but shall be determined with reference to the date
of his seniority in the Class or Category from which he was
transferred."]
["Provided further that the inter-se-seniority of the Sub-Inspectors
selected from among the Reserve Sub-Inspectors of Armed Reserve
and Andhra Pradesh Special Police Battalions by transfer shall be
fixed in the order of merit for each Range (Zone) separately based on
the aggregate marks obtained by them in the final examination
conducted at Police Training College at the end of six months
training. In determining such order of merit, the marks secured in the
failed subjects need not be taken into account; Their past service and
seniority in the category from which their seniority shall be reckoned
from the date of appointment as Sub-Inspector (Civil) for all
purposes".]
(b)
The appointing authority may, at the time of passing an order
appointing two or more persons simultaneously to a class or category
fix for any reason the order of preference among them; and where such
order has been fixed, seniority shall be determined in accordance with
it.
(c)
The transfer of a person from one class or category of the service to
another class or category carrying the same pay or scale of pay shall not
be treated as first appointment to the latter for purposes of seniority and
the seniority of person so transferred shall be determined with reference
to the date of his first appointment to class or category from which he
was transferred. Where any difficulty or doubt arises in applying this
sub-rule, seniority shall be determined by the appointing authority.
(d) Where a member of the service in any class, category or grade is
reduced to a lower class, category or grade, he shall be placed at the top
of the latter unless the authority ordering such reduction directs that he
shall take rank in such lower class, category or grade next below any
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
special member thereof.
(e)
The seniority of qualified Special Policemen appointed by transfer as
Constables in this service shall be determined by the date of their first
appointment in this service for purposes of confirmation in vacancies in
this service.
(f)
The seniority of the Prohibition staff absorbed in this service shall be
determined on the basis of their pay fixed with reference to
Fundamental Rules 22 and 31, in the service:
Provided that the inter-se-seniority of these at the same stage of the
time-scales of pay of the service will be determined by the dates on
which they began to draw pay at that stage; and
Provided further that no member of the Excise and Prohibition
Department will, on appointment to this service, be senior to any
member of the service who has put in the same or more period of
service than himself.
In the case of members of such ranks in the Excise and
Prohibition Department, the scales of pay which correspond to
the scales of pay of the ranks in this service, the date of their first
appointment in the Excise and Prohibition Department shall
determine their seniority.”
20. It is not in dispute that impugned Order of the Tribunal has
been passed only in view of the previous Order of the Tribunal in O.A.No.
3350 of 2012 and the judgment in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 which granted
the benefit of the judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 proceeding, on the
statement made by the learned counsel for both the sides that the
controversy was squarely covered by judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000.
21. So, finally it rests on the judgment dated 15.06.2001 in
W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch, viz., E. Shankar Reddy (supra).
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
(i). E. Shankar Reddy v. Government of A.P.:
22. In E. Shankar Reddy (supra) the facts were that the 1985
batch RSIs questioned the legality and validity of an executive instruction
issued by G.O.Ms.No.188, dated 30.06.1999. They prayed for reckoning
their seniority from the date of initial appointment in the category of RSI in
terms of the statutory rules issued under G.O.Ms.No.35 (Police)
Department, dated 11.02.1999 with retrospective effect from 15.05.1992,
in terms whereof, the last paragraph in G.O.Ms.No.638, dated 05.09.1994
was deleted.
The petitioners therein were appointed directly as RSIs
pursuant to the examination conducted in February 1985. One batch of
SI (Civil) was also appointed in the year 1985. Rules 15 (a) and (c) of the
A.P.State Police Subordinate Service Rules (Special Rules) framed in
terms of the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, were for
consideration and applicability.
By reason of G.O.Ms.No.270 Home
(Police-C) Department, dated 02.04.1990 the Special Rules were
amended. In terms whereof a channel of transfer was provided to the SI
(Civil), limited to 5% of the personnel from RSI cadre. Such provision had
been made also for the posts of constable. The petitioners therein (RSIs)
gave representation requesting, counting of their past service also for the
purpose of seniority. A policy decision was taken by the State to amend
Rule 15 (a) of the special rules, which was amended vide G.O.Ms.No.35
dated 11.02.1999 with retrospective effect from 15.05.1992, providing
after amendment that „inter se seniority of the Sub-Inspectors selected
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
from among the Reserve Sub-Inspectors of Armed Reserve and Andhra
Pradesh Special Police Battalions by transfer shall be fixed in the order of
merit for each Range (Zone) separately based on the aggregate marks
obtained by them in the final examination conducted at the Police
Training College, at the end of six months training. In determining such
order of merit, the marks secured in the failed subjects need not be taken
into account.” The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued Memo
No.7067/Pol.C/AI/99-1, dated 25.02.1999 whereby and whereunder the
Director General of Police was asked to regulate the seniority of the RSIs
transferred to SI (Civil) as per Rule 15 (c) obviously keeping in view the
amendment issued to Rule 15 (a) in G.O.Ms.No.35, dated 11.02.1999,
inter alia, it provided that “the seniority of RSIs transferred to Civil S.I.
category shall be regulated as per clause (c) of Rule 15 of Andhra
Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules.”
23. In E. Shankar Reddy (supra) the issue concerned the inter se
seniority between the direct recruits of 1985 and 1989 batch of SubInspectors of Police (Civil) vis-à-vis Reserve Sub-Inspectors of Police,
who were appointed by way of transfer to the post of SI of Police (Civil)
under 5% of quota of such post {SI (Civil)} for appointment by transfer,
which is one of modes of appointment recognized under Rule 2 of the
Rules.
24. In E. Shankar Reddy (supra), this Court observed that the
moot question for consideration was as to whether Rule 15 (c) would be
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
applicable in the case of Reserve Sub-Inspectors of Police.
It was
observed that Rule 15 (a) deals with the determination of seniority or
grade by the date of the first appointment.
Appointment by way of
transfer for RSI and SI of Police (Civil) was not a first appointment under
A.P.Police Subordinate Service Rules. Thus, the appointment by way of
transfer being not the first and initial appointment, there was no
impediment in application of Rule 15 (c), in that case. This Court further
held that Rule 15 (c) in no uncertain terms protected the past seniority of
such categories of persons from the date of their first appointment to the
class or category of service from which they had been transferred.
25. Placing reliance in K. Rajaiah v. State of A.P.2 it was observed
and held in E. Shankar Reddy (supra) that by reason of Rule 15 (c), the
applicability of Rule 15 (a) was clearly taken away having regard to the
fact that thereby a legal fiction had been created that such appointment
by transfer shall not be treated as first appointment inter se for the
purpose of seniority. Such legal fiction must be given full effect. With
respect to Rule 15 (a) it was clearly held that it dealt with the
determination of seniority or grade by the date of the first appointment.
26. Paragraph Nos.48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 and 58 of E. Shankar
Reddy (supra) read as under:
“48. The moot question which now arises for consideration is as to whether
Rule 15(c) would be applicable in the case of RSIs.
1987 Supp SCC 345
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
50. Rule 15(a) deals with the determination of seniority or grade by the date
of his first appointment. Appointment by way of transfer for RSI and SI (civil)
is not a first appointment under A.P. Police Subordinate Service Rules. Thus
the appointment by way of transfer being not the first and initial appointment,
there is no impediment in application of Rule 15(c) in this case. Furthermore,
the induction training done by the RSI is different from the initial training
contemplated under 3rd proviso to Rule 15(a). By reason of the third proviso
appended to Rule 15(a) as per G.O.Ms. No. 638, dated 5-9-1994 the past
service and seniority in the category of the RSI from which they are transferred
as SI (civil) was not protected and their seniority has to be reckoned from the
date of appointment as SI (civil) for all purposes.
53. Furthermore, the third proviso, as it now stands, relates to the inter
se seniority of the SI (Civil) from amongst the RSI and A.P. Special Police
Battalions by transfer. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the inter
se seniority of the appointees would depend upon the marks obtained by them
in the special training held for that purpose. In this case we are not concerned
with the inter se seniority between the SI (Civil), RSI and A.P. Special
Battalions by transfer but we are concerned with the inter se seniority between
the direct recruits of 1995 and 1999 batch of SI (Civil) vis-a-vis the RSI who
were appointed by way of transfer to the first mentioned category having regard
to the 5% of quota mentioned therein.
54. The submission of Mr. Surender Rao that Rule 15(c) does not take
within its purview an appointment by transfer is wholly misplaced.
Appointment by transfer is a valid mode of recruitment. Such a transfer having
regard to the special rules, can be made from one class or category of services
to another class or category of services.
55. In K. Rajaiah's case (17 supra) the apex Court was not concerned with
the question of seniority. It is true that appointment by transfer and transfer
simpliciter do not stand on the same footing. But Rule 15(c) contemplates
computation of inter se seniority between the persons who had been transferred
from one class or category of the services to another class. In this case, this
Court is concerned with appointments made by transfer. Such appointments are
protected in terms of Rule 15(c) of the Rules. By reason of the said rule 15(c),
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
the applicability of rule 15(a) is clearly taken away having regard to the fact
that thereby a legal fiction has been created that such appointment by transfer
shall not be treated as first appointment inter alia for the purpose of seniority.
Such legal fiction must be given full effect.
56. Rule 15(c) in no uncertain terms protects the past seniority of such
categories of persons from the date of his first appointment to the class or
category of service from which he has been transferred. To the said extent the
decision of the Apex Court in K. Jagannadha Rao's case (1 supra) shall
squarely apply. In the said decision it has been observed:
We do not however think it necessary to decide whether appointments to
category 2 from category 3 amount to transfer attracting Rule 33(c) of the
Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Services Rules. Under Rule 3(a) of the
Andhra Pradesh Police Service Rules, 1966, appointment from category 3 is
one method of recruitment to category 2 and the only question is whether
giving credit to such appointees for past service in another category in the State
Service is justified. We have mentioned the above points of similarity in
matters of recruitment and promotion to the two respective categories. It has
been noticed also that they carry the same scale of pay. Whether or not some
credit should be given for past service in such circumstances is a matter of
policy resting with Government. We do not find anything arbitrary or absurd in
what Rule 3(d) prescribes, and that being so, the Court cannot examine the
matter and come to its own conclusion about what should be the length of past
service for which credit should be given……..
57. Once it is held that rule 15(c) applies to the instant case, the submission
of the learned Counsel for the parties to the effect that rule 15(a) being special
rule, the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant shall apply, cannot
also be accepted.
58. For the self-same reasons, the question of the effect of the persons borne
in the cadre for the first time takes a back seat in view of the fact that although
the RSIs, Irving been appointed on transfer to the posts of Sis (Civil) were
borne on a new cadre, their seniority is protected by reason of a statutory rule.”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
27. E. Shankar Reddy (supra) is an authority / law, for two
propositions;
(i) in the case of direct recruitment from RSI to SI of Police (Civil) the
date of first appointment in the cadre of SI of Police (Civil) is the
relevant date for counting the seniority. In other words, the service
rendered in RSI post, prior to their direct recruitment to SI of Police
(Civil), shall not count towards the seniority on the post of SI of
Police, under Rule 15 (a), and
(ii) In case of appointment by way of transfer to SI of Police (Civil) from
the post of RSI, the date of appointment by transfer as SI of Police
(Civil) will not be the date of the first appointment. The date of first
appointment is such a case would be the appointment on the post
of RSI. So, in case of appointment by transfer, the seniority would
be from the date of first appointment in the post of RSI under Rule
15 (c).
(ii). K. Rajaiah v. State of A.P.:
28. We shall also refer the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in K. Rajaiah (supra). The facts were that K. Rajaiah was appointed to
the post of RSI on 30.12.1968. He was under-graduate at that time and
during service, he graduated in April 1971. Pursuant to an advertisement
inviting applications for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil), he
applied and was selected and appointed on 14.12.1976 on probation and
after completion of probationary period, he was confirmed on 29.11.1978.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
His request to take into account the period of his service as RSI in
computing his seniority in the new post of Sub-Inspector of Police (civil),
was not accepted by the Inspector General of Police.
He made a
representation to the Government which issued G.O.Ms.No.344 dated
11.06.1982 taking the view that the entire period of service as RSI should
be counted under Rule 15 (c) of the A.P.State Police Subordinate Service
Rules and permitted to accord the seniority from the date of his first
appointment to the post of RSI. The person aggrieved filed applications
before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The question before
the Tribunal was, whether K. Rajaiah who was appointed to the post of
Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) as direct recruit or was recruited in that
post by transfer or was simply transferred to that post from the post of
RSI following his selection as direct recruit. The Government had taken
the view in the Government Order that he was transferred to the post
from RSI to that of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) under Rule 15 (c) of the
A.P.State Police Subordinate Service Rules. The Tribunal, however, took
the view that the appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil)
was not by way of transfer under Rule 15 (c) nor was it by way of
recruitment by transfer. The Tribunal had pointed out that Rule 2(a) read
with Annexure-1 of the A.P.Police Subordinate Service Rules provided for
two modes of appointment; (1) By promotion, and (2) By Direct
Recruitment or Recruitment by Transfer from any other service. Finally
the matter approached the Hon‟ble Apex Court.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
29. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Rajaiah (supra) held that K.
Rajaiah had applied pursuant to an advertisement in the newspaper
issued by the Police Department inviting the applications for appointment
to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police by direct recruitment in pay scale of
RS.150-300.
He had undergone the entire procedure prescribed for
selection by direct recruitment. He was appointed on probation for two
years and on satisfactory completion of his probationary period, he was
confirmed in the post of Sub-Inspector of Police. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
concluded that in view of the manner in which he was appointed to the
post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) it was difficult to accept any
contention that he was transferred to that post and therefore, held that the
appointment of K. Rajaiah was a case of direct recruitment and not a
case of transfer.
The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that although a
government servant can be transferred from one post to another, but
when he chooses to get himself recruited to that another post after
subjecting himself to all requirements and formalities of direct recruitment
along with other independent candidates and is confirmed after
satisfactory completion of the probationary period, his appointment as a
direct recruit cannot be substituted by an order of transfer to the prejudice
of the other direct recruits in the matter of computation of seniority. The
Hon‟ble Apex Court held that it may be that he had not resigned from the
post of Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police, and also that the government
allowed him the last pay drawn as Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police on his
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
appointment as Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil), that would not wipe out
the appointment as a direct recruit. The Hon‟ble Apex Court upheld the
judgment of the Tribunal, holding that K. Rajaiah was directly recruited to
the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil), and that his seniority should be
computed from the date of such appointment.
30. So, the law has been well settled in the case of K. Rajaiah
(supra) by the Hon‟ble Apex Court that in the case of direct recruitment of
a person holding the post of Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police, to the post
of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) by undergoing the procedure for the
direct recruitment is an appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police
(Civil) by direct recruitment and in such a case, his seniority shall be
counted only from the date of the appointment to the post of SubInspector of Police (Civil) and in such a case, Rule 15 (c) would not be
attracted as it would not be a case of appointment by transfer.
31. It is appropriate to reproduce paras-7 to 12 of K. Rajaiah
(supra) as under:
“7. The Tribunal has taken the view that appointment of the appellant to the
post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) was not by way of transfer under Rule
15(c), nor was it by way of recruitment by transfer. It has been pointed out by
the Tribunal, and that rightly, that Annexure I read with Rule 2(a) of Andhra
Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules provides for two modes of
appointment which are—
“(1) by promotion, and
(2) by direct recruitment or recruitment by transfer from any other service.”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
8. It is not disputed that Sub-Inspectors of Police (Civil) and Reserve SubInspectors of Police both belong to Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service.
Recruitment by transfer can only be made from “any other service”. As both the
posts of Sub-Inspectors of Police (Civil) and Reserve Sub-Inspectors of Police
are under the same Service, the question of recruitment in the post of SubInspector of Police (Civil) by transfer from the post of Reserve Sub-Inspector of
Police does not arise. Mr Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, has not made any attempt to substantiate that the appellant's
appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) was by way of
recruitment by transfer. We are, therefore, left with the question whether the
appellant's appointment was by way of direct recruitment or it was really a case
of transfer of the appellant from the post of Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police to
that of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil). While it is strenuously urged on behalf
of the appellant that he was transferred from the post of Reserve Sub-Inspector
of Police to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) under Rule 15(c) of the
Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules, it is submitted by Mr P.P.
Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the appellant
was directly recruited to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil)
9. It has been already noticed that the appellant applied for the post of SubInspector of Police (Civil) pursuant to an advertisement in the newspaper issued
by the Police Department inviting applications for appointment to the said post
by direct recruitment in the pay scale of Rs 150-300. The minimum academic
qualification required for the post was graduation. The vacancies to be filled up
were 140 in number. The appellant succeeded in the preliminary interview and
he was directed to appear at the written test. Thereafter, he was also called upon
to appear at the final interview before the Selection Board on 25-2-1976 and
was asked to bring with him original certificates, evidence of his date of birth,
school/college conduct certificate, no objection certificate in original, if he was
a Government servant, etc. In other words, the appellant had to undergo the
entire procedure prescribed for selection of direct recruits. It has also been
noticed earlier that the appellant was appointed on probation for two years and
after the satisfactory completion of his probationary period, he was confirmed
in the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil). In view of the manner in which
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
the appellant was appointed to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil), it is
difficult to accept any contention that the appellant was transferred to that post.
When a Government servant is transferred from one post to another, the
question of his selection after a written and a viva voce test does not at all arise.
If the appellant had been transferred simpliciter, the appellant would not have
been directed to appear at the written test and the interview for the purpose of
selection along with other candidates, who also applied for the posts of SubInspectors of Police (Civil) pursuant to the said advertisement in the local
newspaper. It is not disputed that the said advertisement was published for
filling up the posts of Sub-Inspectors of Police (Civil) by direct recruitment. We
are, therefore, unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant
that it was a case of transfer and not of direct recruitment.
10. It is true that the Government has power to transfer under Rule 15(c) of
the Andhra Pradesh Subordinate Police Service Rules. The question, however,
is whether the government intended to transfer the appellant from the post of
Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police to that of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil). It has
been rightly pointed out that such transfer can be made only in the public
interest, but there was no question of any public interest so far as the appellant
was concerned. Indeed, in the impugned government order, it was directed that
the same would not be treated as a precedent. If the appellant's appointment to
the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) was by way of transfer in exercise of
the power under Rule 15(c), there was no necessity for a direction that the order
would not be treated as a precedent for others. The impugned order was not
made by the government out of its own, but on the representation of the
appellant which was made after the appellant's request to take into account his
period of service as the Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police in computing his
seniority in the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) was turned down by the
Inspector General of Police.
11. In support of the case for transfer, the appellant has strongly relied upon
two facts, namely, (1) that he did not submit any resignation from the post of
Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police; and (2) that he was allowed to draw last pay
as Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police even on his appointment as the SubInspector of Police (Civil). These two facts have also been relied upon by the
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
government in the impugned order. These two circumstances are no doubt the
criteria of a transfer, but merely because of the presence of these circumstances,
it will not justify a finding that the appellant was transferred, as contended by
him, having regard to the manner in which the appellant was appointed to the
post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil). Although a government servant can be
transferred from one post to another, but when he chooses to get himself
recruited to that another post after subjecting himself to all requirements and
formalities of direct recruitment along with other independent candidates and is
confirmed after satisfactory completion of the probationary period, his
appointment as a direct recruit cannot be substituted by an order of transfer to
the prejudice of the other direct recruits in the matter of computation of
seniority. It may be that the appellant had not resigned from the post of Reserve
Sub-Inspector of Police, and that the government allowed him the last pay
drawn as Reserve Sub-Inspector of Police on his appointment as Sub-Inspector
of Police (Civil), that would not, in our opinion, wipe out the appointment of
the appellant as a direct recruit. The Tribunal, in our view, is perfectly justified
in holding that the appellant was directly recruited to the post of Sub-Inspector
of Police (Civil), and that his seniority should be computed from the date of
such appointment.
12. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed. There will, however,
be no order as to costs.”
32. So, from a plain reading of Rules 15 (a) and 15 (c) of the
Special Rules as also the law as laid down by the Coordinate Bench in E.
Shankar Reddy (supra), which followed the Hon‟ble Apex Court
judgment in K. Rajaiah (supra), it is settled that in the case of direct
recruitment, the seniority shall be from the date of the appointment in that
grade, class or category of service. So, it is settled that,
(i) a person who was already working on the post of RSI but applied
for the post of SI of Police (Civil), in the process for direct
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
recruitment and got selected and appointed to the post of SI of
Police (Civil), his seniority shall be determined under Rule 15 (a)
from the date of his appointment on the post of SI of Police (Civil).
The past service rendered as RSI and the seniority on that post
shall not be available nor counted on appointment on new post of
SI of Police (Civil) pursuant to the direct recruitment, and
(ii) when it comes to the appointment of RSI, in service, to the post of
SI of Police (Civil) by way of transfer permissible under Rule 2 of
the Rules, under the quota prescribed, for that, Rule 15 (c) comes
into play for determination of seniority and in view thereof, the
appointment by transfer to SI of Police (Civil) shall not be the first
appointment, so as to attract Section 15 (a). His seniority or past
service on the post of RSI has been saved for the purposes of
determination of seniority by creating a legal fiction that his
appointment is not the first appointment.
33. The respondents‟ case, on which there is no dispute, is not the
case of appointment by transfer. It is an appointment on the post of SI of
Police (Civil) through direct recruitment.
34. We are therefore of the view that the respondents are not
entitled for counting of their past services on the post of RSI for the
purposes of seniority to the post of SI of Police (Civil) on which post they
have been recruited directly through the direct recruitment process.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
V(b). Order on wrong concession given by learned
counsel:
35. The Tribunal has granted the benefit of the services on the post
of RSI for the purposes of seniority to the post of SI of Police (Civil),
simply, by passing the Order in view of the orders passed by the Tribunal
in the other OA.
The benefit has been given of the judgment dated
15.06.2001 in WP.No.2120 of 2000 and batch (supra), read with
Judgment dated 01.03.2007 in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 which was on the
concession granted by the then learned Government Pleader that the
matter of the respondents herein (Applicants), was squarely covered by
judgment dated 15.06.2001 in W.P.No.2120 of 2000.
36. We are of the view that the matter in W.P.No.22176 of 2004
(judgment dated 01.03.2007) is not covered by judgment dated
15.06.2001 in W.P.No.2120 of 2000.
37. When it comes to the applicability of E. Shankar Reddy (supra)
to a case of RSIs appointed by way of transfer to the post of SI of Police
(Civil), Rule 15 (c) would govern the seniority and when it comes to the
appointment of RSI to the post of SI of Police (Civil) through direct
recruitment, the date of appointment on the post of SI of Police (Civil)
shall be the date for counting the seniority. Rule 15 (a) would apply.
38. The case of the claimants/respondents is that their appointment
to the post of SI of Police (Civil) was by direct recruitment and not by
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
transfer. Then, Rule 15 (a) would govern their seniority, from the date of
first appointment in the post of SI of Police (Civil).
39. Consequently, the concession granted by the learned
Government Pleader in WP.No.22176 of 2004 and batch was not correct.
40. Consequently, further, the benefit granted to by the writ
petitioners of W.P.No.22176 of 2004 could not be extended to the
respondents herein. Under law, they are not so entitled and not even
applying the judgment dated 15.06.2001 in W.P.No.2120 of 2000. The
matter of the respondents was not considered on merit by the Tribunal,
nor of the writ petitions in W.P.No.22176 of 2004. The Order was passed
merely on the contention of the petitioners‟ counsel therein and the
concession
granted
by the
learned
Government
Pleader
which
concession that the matter was consequently covered, was not correct.
41. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur3 on which
the learned Government Pleader placed reliance, the Hon‟ble Apex Court
has held that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties,
the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor does it lay
down any principle. Quotability as „law‟ applies to the principle of a case,
its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a judge‟s decision binding as an
authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case
was decided.
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Gurnam Kaur (supra) are
reproduced as under:
(1989) 1 SCC 101
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
“9. We find it rather difficult to sustain the judgment of the High Court. The
learned Judges failed to appreciate that this Court in Jamna Das case [ Writ
Petitions Nos. 981-82 of 1984] made a direction with the consent of parties and
with the reservation that it should not be treated as a precedent. It expressed no
opinion on the question whether there was any statutory obligation cast on the
Municipal Corporation to provide alternative site to a person making illegal
encroachment on a public place like any public street etc. contrary to Section
320 of the Act, as a condition precedent to the exercise of its powers under
Section 322 of the Act for the removal of such encroachment on any public
street, footpath or pavement. That apart, the High Court, could not have made
the impugned direction contrary to the provisions contained in Sections 320 and
322 of the Act. Section 320(1) in terms creates a statutory bar against illegal
encroachment on any portion of a public street. It provides that: “No person
shall, except with the permission of the Commissioner granted in this behalf,
erect or set up any booth or other structure whether fixed or movable or whether
a permanent or temporary nature, or any fixture in or upon any street etc.”
Having regard to this express provision, the High Court failed to see that the
respondent Gurman Kaur had no legally enforceable right to the grant of a writ
or direction in the nature of mandamus. The High Court could not obviously
issue any such direction which would tantamount to a breach of the law.
Furthermore, the High Court could not also make the impugned direction in
view of the provision contained in Section 322(a) of the Act, which expressly
confers power on the Commissioner to cause the removal of any structure
which constitutes an encroachment on a public place like a street which is
meant for the use of the pedestrians.
10. It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of
the parties, the court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor
does it lay down any principle. Quotability as “law” applies to the principle
of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a judge's decision binding as an
authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case was
decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished
as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is
fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, as in the
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
present case, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought
to be made as a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction made by
this Court in Jamna Das case [ Writ Petitions Nos. 981-82 of 1984] could not
be treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to realise that the
direction in Jamna Das case [ Writ Petitions Nos. 981-82 of 1984] was made
not only with the consent of the parties but there was an interplay of various
factors and the court was moved by compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate
hardship which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. The court no doubt
made incidental observation to the Directive Principles of State Policy
enshrined in Article 38(2) of the Constitution and said:
Article 38(2) of the Constitution mandates the State to strive to minimise,
amongst others, the inequalities in facilities and opportunities amongst
individuals. One who tries to survive by one's own labour has to be encouraged
because for want of opportunity destitution may disturb the conscience of the
society. Here are persons carrying on some paltry trade in an open space in the
scorching heat of Delhi sun freezing cold or torrential rain. They are being
denied continuance at that place under the specious plea that they constitute an
obstruction to easy access to hospitals. A little more space in the access to the
hospital may be welcomed but not at the cost of someone being deprived of his
very source of livelihood so as to swell the rank of the fast growing
unemployed. As far as possible this should be avoided which we propose to do
by this short order.
This indeed was a very noble sentiment but incapable of being implemented in
a fast growing city like the Metropolitan City of Delhi where public streets are
overcrowded and the pavement squatters create a hazard to the vehicular traffic
and cause obstruction to the pedestrians on the pavement.
42. Learned counsels for the respondents placed much reliance in
the judgment of this Court in The Government of Andhra Pradesh v.
Ch. Srinivasa Rao4 and some other Orders passed previously based on
Unreported WP.No.17833/2014
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
the Order dated 01.03.2007 in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch. In the
said case also one O.A.No.6170 of 2011 was allowed vide Order dated
08.10.2013 by the Tribunal basing on its previous common judgment
dated 02.08.2004 passed in O.A.Nos.3991 of 2001, 1693 of 2002 and
3654 of 2004, which in their turn were allowed basing on the judgment in
W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch, which were allowed on 01.03.2007,
referred to above, in view of the concession granted that the judgment in
W.P.No.2120 of 2000 squarely covered the controversy.
In Ch.
Srinivasa Rao (W.P.No.17833 of 2014) (supra), in para-9, this Court
observed and held as under:
“9. It is not in dispute that aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal in
O.A.Nos.3991 of 2001, 1693 of 2002 and 3654 of 2004, dated 2nd August 2004,
the matters were carried to this Court in W.P.Nos.22176 and 22180 of 2004,
19618 of 2005 and 25871 of 2006. This Court, relying on the earlier order
dated 15th June 2001, allowed the above writ petitions by order dated 1st March
2007, holding that the subsequently selected candidates are also entitled for
counting their seniority in the category of Sub-Inspectors with effect from the
date of their initial appointment as RSIs. This Court categorically held that all
the posts are equivalent in all aspects and the service rendered as RSIs, has to
be counted. This Court further held that these re-selected/converted RSIs are
entitled to be considered for promotion, taking into account their entire service
as Inspectors of Police. As discussed above, being aggrieved, the petitioners
filed SLPs before the Supreme Court and the same were dismissed.
The
petitioners filed review petition before the Supreme Court and the same was
also dismissed.”
APHC, Decided on 05.03.2018
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
43. We are of the view that for the discussion made above, as also
the law laid down in K.Rajaiah (supra) by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the
benefit of judgment dated 01.03.2007 in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 or of any
other judgment based on W.P.No.22176 of 2004, cannot be extended to
the respondents.
44. Learned counsel for the respondents placed much emphasis in
P. Shankaraiah v. R. Sreenivasulu5 to contend that in the said case,
which was also a case of RSI directly recruited to SI of Police (Civil) and
the judgment of the Tribunal granting the benefit of seniority to the post of
SI of Police (Civil), by including the services on the post of RSI and that
Order was challenged by the third parties claiming to be affected by the
Order of the Tribunal and who were not parties in the OA nor in the writ
petition, the Coordinate Bench dismissed W.P.No.12190 of 2021, vide
judgment dated 07.05.2025 and held that the matter could not be
reopened on the petition of third parties though they might not be party in
O.A and might be the affected persons, by filing the writ petition and
particularly, when the Order of the Tribunal stood affirmed by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court.
45. So far as the aforesaid judgment dated 07.05.2025 in P.
Shankaraiah (supra) (W.P.No.12190 of 2021) is concerned, in which,
one of us (RNT, J) was the member and the author of the judgment, the
Unreported WP No.12190 of 2021
APHC Decided on 07.05.2025
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
Coordinate Bench dismissed the writ petition of the third parties on the
ground that even at the instance of the third parties by way of writ petition
the matter could not be reopened. It was observed that the remedy, if
any, may be elsewhere.
The reason, as mentioned in that judgment
itself, was that, the Order of the Tribunal which was challenged by the
third party, the very same Order in the very same O.A had attained finality
up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. So, when the same Order had attained
finality between the same parties, it was held that it could not be
reopened at the instance of the third parties by filing the writ petition and
the remedy, if any, to those third parties was elsewhere, which certainly
meant, in the higher Forum where the SLP was dismissed i.e., Hon‟ble
Supreme Court. After dismissal of the SLP against the same judgment,
the writ petition was considered as not maintainable to reopen the matter
by the High Court.
46. Paragraph No.30 of the judgment in P. Shankaraiah (supra)
W.P.No.12190 of 2021 reads as under:
“30. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that after such
round of litigation, the petitioners though may not be party and may be effected
persons, as submitted, those proceedings cannot be reopened on their petition
by this Court, and particularly, when the same impugned Order stand affirmed
by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. The submission of the petitioners‟ counsel that
these petitioners were not party, may be correct, but even then at their instance,
we are of the view that, by way of the present writ petition, the matter cannot be
reopened. The remedy, if any, may be elsewhere.”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
47. In P. Shankaraiah (supra), the challenge was to the same
judgment of the Tribunal passed in the same O.A which had attained
finality by dismissal of the State Appeal in the Hon‟ble Apex Court. So far
as the judgment of the Tribunal impugned in the present writ petition is
concerned, the matter is pending and the challenge by the State is
surviving. So, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal in the present case
has not attained any finality. Consequently, the ground and the reason on
which W.P.No.12190 of 2021 at the instance of the third party was
dismissed, is not available in the present case. In the present case, we
have to decide the controversy on the merits of the judgment, under
challenge, keeping in view if the respondents were legally entitled as per
the rules for the relief they have been granted as also in view of the
judgment dated 15.06.2021 in W.P.No.2120 of 2000, {E. Shankar Reddy
(supra)} which was a case of recruitment, by transfer and not of direct
recruitment whereas the present case is of a direct recruitment, i.e., the
modes of Recruitment and the determination of seniority depending on
the mode of recruitment being different under the same Special Rules.
V (c). Law of precedent; on dismissal of SLP and Civil Appeals
by the Hon’ble Apex Court:
48. Learned counsels for the respondents laid much emphasis that
the judgment in WP.No.22176 of 2004 and batch, dated 01.03.2007
attained finality by dismissal of Civil Appeal Nos.7372-7374/2002 and
batch, as also the dismissal of the Review Petition (c) No.1853-57/2010
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. Consequently, now, it cannot be said that the
respondents are not entitled for the benefit of the judgment in
W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch. The same is to be followed. It has
been rightly followed by the Tribunal. No case for interference is made
out. In their submission, this Court is bound by the principle of finality
attached to the judgment in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 and batch, as also by
Article 141 of the Constitution of India that, the law declared by the
Hon‟ble Apex Court shall be binding.
49. In view of the submissions advanced based on the dismissal of
the SLP and the Civil Appeals by the Hon‟ble Apex Court and that this
Court is bound by Article 141 of the Constitution of India to follow the
same, we consider it appropriate firstly to reproduce the Orders passed in
the CA.No.7372-7374 and batch with SLP.No.19858-19862 of 2007,
dated 16.03.2010 (filed against the judgment and order dated 01.03.2007 in
WP No. 4770 of 2007 & WP No. 19618 of 2005 & WP No. 22176 of 2004 & WP
No. 22180 of 2004 & WP No. 25871 of 2006 of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad) as under, and then to consider the legal position on
„precedent‟ & „declaration of law‟ binding under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India:
“Heard learned appearing counsel for the parties.
We find no merits in the Civil Appeals.
The Civil Appeals are dismissed accordingly. No costs.
In view of dismissal of Civil Appeals, the special leave petitions filed by the
State of Andhra Pradesh are also dismissed.”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
50. We also reproduce the Order dated 18.11.2010 passed in
Review Petition No.1853-57 of 2010 by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.
“There is a delay of 175 days in filing the review petition seeking review of
this Court‟s order dated March 18, 2010.
We are not satisfied with the explanation offered. Although this ground is
sufficient to dismiss the review petition, yet we have carefully gone through the
review petition and the connected papers. We do not find any error apparent on
the face of the record which calls for review of the aforesaid order.
The Review Petitions are dismissed both on the ground of delay as also on
merits.”
51. In Khoday Distilleries Limited (now known as Khoday India
Limited) v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited,
Kollegal (under Liquidation)6 the Hon‟ble Apex Court (3-Judge Bench)
considered the question of the effect of the dismissal of SLP and also of
the Civil Appeal, and held in paragraphs 26 to 29 as under:
“26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments, we sum up the
legal position as under:
26.1. The conclusions rendered by the three-Judge Bench of this Court
in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] and
summed up in para 44 are affirmed and reiterated.
26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under :
(Kunhayammed case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] ,
SCC p. 384)
“(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order
or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the
(2019) 4 SCC 376
RNT, J & SS, J
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order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to
exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons
for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the
statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme
Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other
than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings
recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also
the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of
judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country.
But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or
authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting
the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only
order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the
doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely
affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to
appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as
provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”
26.3. Once
we
hold
that
the
law
laid
down
in Kunhayammed [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] is to
be followed, it will not make any difference whether the review petition was
filed before the filing of special leave petition or was filed after the dismissal of
special leave petition. Such a situation is covered in para 37 of Kunhayammed
case [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359] .
27. Applying the aforesaid principles, the outcome of these appeals would
be as under.
Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 490 of 2012
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
28. In the instant case, since special leave petition was dismissed in limine
without giving any reasons, the review petition filed by the appellant in the
High Court would be maintainable and should have been decided on merits.
Order dated 12-11-2008 [Sri Mahadeswara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane
Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 824] passed by the
High Court is accordingly set aside and matter is remanded back to the High
Court for deciding the review petition on merits. The civil appeal is disposed of
accordingly.
Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 13792 of
29. In this case, we find that the special leave petition was dismissed with
the following order passed on 5-1-2012 [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian
Tea Provisions, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1183] :
“We find no ground to interfere with the impugned order [Indian Tea
Provisions v. Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra, Writ Appeal No. 367 of 2011,
decided on 27-10-2011 (Ori)] . The special leave petition is dismissed.”
Here also, the special leave petition was dismissed [Ram Krushna
Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1183] in limine
and without any speaking order. After the dismissal of the special leave
petition, the respondent in this appeal had approached the High Court with
review petition. The said review petition is allowed by passing order dated 1212-2012 [Ram Krushna Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, Review
Petition No. 74 of 2012, order dated 12-12-2012 (Ori)] on the ground of
suppression of material facts by the appellant herein and commission of fraud
on the Court. Such a review petition was maintainable. Therefore, the High
Court was empowered to entertain the same on merits. Insofar as appeal of the
appellant
challenging
the
order
dated
12-12-2012
[Ram
Krushna
Dasmohapatra v. Indian Tea Provisions, Review Petition No. 74 of 2012, order
dated 12-12-2012 (Ori)] on merits is concerned, the matter shall be placed
before the regular Board to decide the same.”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
52. The conclusions reached by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in 3-Judge
Bench judgment in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala7, were affirmed
and reiterated in Khoday India Limited (supra).
As per the
pronouncement, an order refusing Special Leave for Appeal may be by
non-speaking order or speaking order, it does not attract the doctrine of
merger and an order refusing to special leave of appeal does not stand
substituted in place of the Order under challenge. All that it means was
that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion
so as to allow the appeal being filed. The Hon‟ble Apex Court reiterated
that if the Order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e., giving
reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two
implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the Order is a
declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141
of the Constitution of India. Secondly, other than the declaration of law,
whatever is stated in the Order are the findings recorded by the Supreme
Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or
authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial
discipline. But this does not amount in saying that the order of the court,
tribunal or authority below stood merged in the order of the Supreme
Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme
Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings
between the parties.
(2000) 6 SCC 359
It follows therefore what clearly binding is on
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
dismissal of SLP by a speaking order if the order contains a declaration of
law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the
Constitution. That declaration of law would be binding notwithstanding the
dismissal at the stage of SLP, and other than declaration of law, shall be
binding between the parties and also on the court, tribunal or authority in
any proceedings subsequent thereto.
53. We are of the view in our understanding of the aforesaid that,
the proceedings subsequent thereto would certainly be the proceedings
between the parties in the SLP, in which the findings have been recorded
or whatever was stated in the order, other than the declaration of law. The
declaration of law would be binding in other cases between different
parties which may arise in future or even to the pending cases, by virtue
of Article 141 of the Constitution as precedent. But so far as other than
declaration of law is concerned, that would be binding only between the
parties, and between the parties also in the subsequent proceedings
before the tribunal, court or authority. So, what is binding as precedent is
the law declared, when a SLP is dismissed at that stage, recording the
reasons. When those reasons amount to declaration of law, then that
shall be binding.
Dismissal of the SLP without recording reasons or
recording the reasons, but no declaration of law, there would be no
question of binding precedent or the applicability of Article 141 of the
Constitution of India.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
54. In State of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sundar Das8 the Hon‟ble
Apex Court held that the dismissal of SLP in limine simply implies that the
case before the Hon‟ble Apex Court was not considered worthy of
examination for a reason which may be other than the merits of the case.
Such in limine dismissal at the threshold without giving any detailed
reasons, does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent
under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraphs 9.26
& 9.27 of Dhirendra Sundar Das (supra) read as under:
“9.Discussion and analysis
9.1 to 9.25………..
9.26. Finally, the High Court had relied upon the decision in Mukti Ranjan
Acharya v. State of Orissa [Mukti Ranjan Acharya v. State of Orissa, WP (C)
No. 19827 of 2009, decided on 16-4-2012 (Ori)] to hold that promotions could
be given under the repealed OAS Class II Rules, 1978 and the OAS Class II
Regulations, 1978. The SLP against this judgment had been simply dismissed
[State of Odisha v. S.N. Mahakul, 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1186] . The counsel
for the contesting respondents prayed for dismissal of the present civil appeals
by submitting that the said decision had been affirmed by this Court vide order
dated 28-9-2012 [State of Odisha v. S.N. Mahakul, 2012 SCC OnLine SC
1186].
9.27. It is a well-settled principle of law emerging from a catena of decisions
of this Court, including Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of
India [Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4
SCC 187, paras 22 and 23 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] and State of
Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh
Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770, paras 112 and 113 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1034 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 496 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 208] , that the dismissal of an
SLP in limine simply implies that the case before this Court was not considered
(2019) 6 SCC 270
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
worthy of examination for a reason, which may be other than the merits of the
case. Such in limine dismissal at the threshold without giving any detailed
reasons, does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent under
Article 141 of the Constitution.”
55. In Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer9 the
Hon‟ble Apex Court held that a precedent is a decision which lays down
some principle of law. It was further observed, “a mere stray observation
of this Court, in our opinion, would not amount to a precedent”.
Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Gangadhara Palo (supra) read as under:
“10. We have carefully perused SCC para 4 of the aforesaid judgment. What
has been observed therein is that if the review petition is filed in the High Court
after the dismissal of the special leave petition, “it would be treated as an
affront to the order of the Supreme Court”. In our opinion, the above
observations cannot be treated as a precedent at all. We are not afraid of
affronts. What has to be seen is whether a legal principle is laid down or
not. It is totally irrelevant whether we have been affronted or not.
11. A precedent is a decision which lays down some principle of law. In
our view, the observations made in SCC para 4 of the aforesaid judgment,
quoted above, that “[if a review petition is filed after the dismissal of the special
leave petition] it would be treated as an affront to the order of the Supreme
Court” is not a precedent at all. A mere stray observation of this Court, in
our opinion, would not amount to a precedent. The above observation of this
Court is, in our opinion, a mere stray observation and hence not a precedent.”
56. Recently, in V. Senthur v. M. Vijayakumar10 the Hon‟ble Apex
Court again considered the effect of dismissal of SLP on merits and
reiterated the same principle as laid down in the case of Khoday India
(2011) 4 SCC 602
(2022) 17 SCC 568
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
Limited (supra). It was reiterated that if the Order of dismissal of SLP is
supported by reasons, then also the doctrine of merger would not be
attracted. Still, the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability
of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, if there is a law declared by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on all the
courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. No court,
tribunal or party would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view
contrary to one expressed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.
57. Paragraphs 23 to 27 of V. Senthur (supra) read as under:
“23. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms has held that if the
order of dismissal of SLPs is supported by reasons, then also the doctrine of
merger would not be attracted. Still the reasons stated by the court would attract
applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, if there is a law
declared by this Court which obviously would be binding on all the courts and
the tribunals in India and certainly, the parties thereto. It has been held that no
court, tribunal or party would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view
contrary to the one expressed by this Court. Such an order would mean that it
has declared the law and in that light, the case was considered not fit for grant
of leave.
24. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs against the first judgment, has
clearly held that after the emergence of the judgment in Bimlesh
Tanwar [Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 604 : 2003 SCC
(L&S) 737] , the fundamental principle governing the determination of
seniority was that, it should be based on merit list of selection and that the list
made on the basis of roster point, would not be permissible in law. It could thus
be seen that while dismissing the SLPs, this Court has reiterated the legal
position as laid down in Bimlesh Tanwar [Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana,
(2003) 5 SCC 604 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 737] to the effect that while determining
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
seniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection list and not the
roster point.
25. It is pertinent to note that though, the then learned Attorney General had
raised an issue with regard to a contrary view taken by the Madurai Bench of
the same High Court, this Court clearly held that since the issue was now
covered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar [Bimlesh
Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 604 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 737] , the
pendency of the SLPs challenging the judgment of Madurai Bench, would be of
no consequence inasmuch as the said SLPs would be governed by the judgment
of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar [Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5
SCC 604 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 737] .
26. It is thus clear that though it cannot be said that the second judgment of
the Madras High Court has merged into the order of this Court dated 22-1-2016
[T.N. Public Service Commission v. State of T.N., 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1950] ,
still the declaration of law as made in the said order, would be binding on all
the courts and tribunals in the country and in any case, between the parties.
27. In that view of the matter, the respondents were bound to follow the law
laid down by this Court and determine the inter se seniority on the basis of
selection by TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point.”
58. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rekha Rani11 the Hon‟ble Apex
Court held that in the previous Order of the Hon‟ble Apex Court passed in
the SLP there was no discussion on the merits of the case and so it was
held that the said decision did not amount to precedent and no benefit
could be derived there from. Para-10 of Rekha Rani (supra) reads as
under:
“10. We have perused the order of this Court dated 19-2-1996 passed in the
SLP filed against the judgment and order of the High Court in Writ Petition No.
4886 of 1990 and we find that there is no discussion on the merits of the
(2011) 11 SCC 441
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
case. Thus, the aforesaid decision of this Court does not amount to a
precedent and the respondent can take no benefit from the same.”
59. In Gurnam Kaur (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court further held
that the judgment delivered without argument, without reference to the
relevant provisions of the Act and without any citation or authority, is not
an authoritative pronouncement of law.
Paragraphs-11 and 12 of
Gurnam Kaur (supra) read as under:
“11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are
classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned
Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das case [ Writ Petitions Nos. 981-82 of
1984] and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that
this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without
reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on
the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any
public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of
authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High
Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified
by the terms of the relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given
per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule
having the force of a statute. So far as the order shows, no argument was
addressed to the court on the question whether or not any direction could
properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation to construct a stall at
the pitching site of a pavement squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of the
Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. explains the concept of sub silentio at p.
153 in these words:
A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be
attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision
is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. The court may consciously
decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and
pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the court should not
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in
his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the court. In such
circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and
although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not an authority on
point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio.
12. In Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (k). [(1936) 2 All ER 905 (CA)] , the
only point argued was on the question of priority of the claimant's debt, and, on
this argument being heard, the court granted the order. No consideration was
given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an
account standing in the name of the liquidator. When, therefore, this very point
was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor
Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. [(1941) 1 KB 675] , the court held itself not
bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said that he could not
help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio
by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to
say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could
make the order which it did; nevertheless, since it was decided “without
argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and without
any citation of authority”, it was not binding and would not be followed.
Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule
has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of
precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decided should
not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the
type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every
passing expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex
cathedra statement, having the weight of authority.”
60. Learned counsel for the respondents/applicants placed reliance
in P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas12.
The same is not on the
controversy as involved in the present writ petitions. In P. Rammohan
2025 SCC OnLine SC 304
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
Rao (supra) different rules were for consideration. On the construction or
interpretation of the special rules as involved in the present cases, they
are direct authorities in the case of K. Rajaiah (supra) of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court and of this Court in E. Shankar Reddy (supra).
61. Learned counsel for the respondents/applicants further placed
reliance in Union of India v. A.K.Narula13 on the point of doctrine of
doctrine of „merger‟. In the said case it was held that the decision of the
Single Judge get merged with the judgment of the Division Bench in the
Letter Patent Appeal. There cannot be any dispute on the doctrine of
„merger‟.
But no benefit can be derived based on the judgment, for the
reason that in the present case the dismissal of the Civil Appeals by the
Hon‟ble Apex Court of the third parties and in consequence thereof
dismissal of the SLP, though may result in the merger of the judgment
under challenge before the Hon‟ble Apex Court, but on that principle of
merger that judgment would be binding between the parties, and only if
any law has been declared that the declaration of law shall be followed as
a binding precedent.
In the orders dismissing the Civil Appeals and
also the SLPs by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, there was no declaration of law
on the special rules. Under the same circumstances as in the present
case as to when the appointment is by direct recruitment from the post of
RSI to SI of Police (Civil) and not by way of transfer, Rule 15 (a) shall
apply and not Rule 15 (c) which is the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex
(2007) 11 SCC 10
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
Court in K. Rajaiah (supra) and that is binding on this Court as precedent
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
V (d). No negative parity/No equality in illegality:
62. It is further well settled in law that an illegality cannot be
permitted to be perpetuated. There cannot be a negative parity. If some
benefit has been conferred on concession which concession was not
correct, the others cannot claim the same benefit on such a wrong
concession on the ground of parity that they are similarly situated.
63. In Rekha Rani (supra), it was held that in view of the judgment
of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Daya
Lal14 following the Constitution Bench decision in State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi15 the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 could
not regularize an employee. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that merely
because some others had been regularized did not give any right to the
respondent therein. An illegality cannot be perpetuated. Para-12 of the
Rekha Rani (supra) reads as under:
“12. It has been held in a recent decision of this Court in State of
Rajasthan v. Daya Lal [(2011) 2 SCC 429 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 340]
following the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] that the
High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 cannot regularise an
employee. Merely because some others had been regularised does not give any
right to the respondent. An illegality cannot be perpetuated.”
(2011) 2 SCC 429
(2006) 4 SCC 1
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
64. Similarly, in State of Orissa v. Prasana Kumar Sahoo16 it was
held that only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot
be directed to be perpetuated by a court of law. It is well settled that
there cannot be equality in illegality.
Article 14 contains a positive
concept. Paras-20 and 21 of Prasana Kumar Sahoo (supra) read as
under:
“20. It may be that some other persons similarly situated have been
appointed. But Article 14 as is well known contains a positive concept. A
writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only when there exists
a legal right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation in the
State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be
directed to be perpetuated by a court of law.
21. It is also well settled that there cannot be equality in illegality.
See Sushanta Tagore v. Union of India [(2005) 3 SCC 16] , State v. Sashi
Balasubramanian [(2006) 13 SCC 252 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 337 : (2006) 10
Scale 541] and U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Sant Raj Singh [(2006) 9 SCC
82 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1610 : (2006) 6 Scale 205] .”
65. In State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati17 the Hon‟ble
Apex Court reiterated that there is no concept of negative equality under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In case the person has a right,he
has to be treated equally, but where right is not available a person cannot
claim rights to be treated equally as the right does not exist. Negative
equality, when the right does not exist, cannot be claimed. Paras-39 to
48 of Anup Kumar Senapati (supra) read as under:
(2007) 15 SCC 129
(2019) 19 SCC 626
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
“39. It was lastly submitted that concerning other persons, the orders have
been passed by the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court and grantsin-aid have been released under the 1994 Order as such on the ground of parity
this Court should not interfere. No doubt, there had been a divergence of
opinion on the aforesaid issue. Be that as it may. In our opinion, there is no
concept of negative equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case
the person has a right, he has to be treated equally, but where right is not
available a person cannot claim rights to be treated equally as the right
does not exist, negative equality when the right does not exist, cannot be
claimed.
40. In Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] , it was
held thus: (SCC p. 85, para 8)
“8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not
meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong
decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage
negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other
similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit
inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right
on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an
earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be
claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a
negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour
of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed
by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or
superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or
illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in
favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim
benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot
be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration
impossible.
(Vide Chandigarh
Admn. v. Jagjit
Singh [Chandigarh
Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of
Haryana [Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164] , K.K.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
Bhalla v. State of M.P. [K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581]
and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11
SCC 455] .)”
41. In Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab [Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab,
(2014) 15 SCC 715 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 678] , it was observed as under:
(SCC pp. 720-21, para 16)
“16. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not
envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred
upon someone inadvertently or otherwise, it may not be a ground to grant
similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO,
(2013) 14 SCC 81] considered this issue and held as under: (SCC p. 85, para 8)
„8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not
meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions
made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but
has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have
been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does
not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is
committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which
cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or
court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed
in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been
passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or
superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or
for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any
particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of
the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for
otherwise
it
would
make
functioning
of
administration
impossible.
(Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh,
(1995) 1 SCC 745] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana [Anand Buttons
Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164] , K.K. Bhalla v. State of
M.P. [K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581] and Fuljit Kaur v. State
of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455] .)‟ ”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
42. In Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010)
11 SCC 455] , it was observed thus: (SCC p. 462, para 11)
“11. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Longia v. State of
Punjab [D.S. Longia v. State of Punjab, 1992 SCC OnLine P&H 1027 : AIR
1993 P&H 54] , in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the
Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality. Article 14 is not
meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a
positive concept. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and
therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an
illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a
group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum,
others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for
repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a
wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not
entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.
Even otherwise Article 14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would make
function of the administration impossible. (Vide Coromandel Fertilizers
Ltd. v. Union of India [Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. v. Union of India, 1984
Supp SCC 457 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 225] , Panchi Devi v. State of
Rajasthan [Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 589 : (2009) 1
SCC (L&S) 408] and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India [Shanti Sports
Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 707] .)”
43. In Doiwala
Sehkari
Shram
Samvida
Samiti
Ltd. v. State
of
Uttaranchal [Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd. v. State of
Uttaranchal, (2007) 11 SCC 641] , this Court in the context of negative
equality observed thus: (SCC pp. 655-56, para 28)
“28. This Court in Union of India v. International Trading Co. [Union of
India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437] has held that two
wrongs do not make one right. The appellant cannot claim that since
something wrong has been done in another case, directions should be given
for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right but could
be perpetuating another wrong and in such matters, there is no
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article
14 cannot be pressed into service in such cases. But the concept of equal
treatment presupposes existence of similar legal foothold. It does not
countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring wrongs on a par. The
affected parties have to establish strength of their case on some other basis
and not by claiming negative quality. In view of the law laid down by this
Court in the above matter, the submission of the appellant has no force. In case,
some of the persons have been granted permits wrongly, the appellant
cannot claim the benefit of the wrong done by the Government.”
44. In Bondu Ramaswamy v. BDA [Bondu Ramaswamy v. BDA, (2010) 7
SCC 129 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] , this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 194, para
146)
“146. If the rules/scheme/policy provides for deletion of certain categories
of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will be entitled to
relief. But if under the rules or scheme or policy for deletion, his land is not
eligible for deletion, his land cannot be deleted merely on the ground that
some other land similarly situated had been deleted (even though that land
also did not fall under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would
amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents of land of
others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant
relief, if on account of such deletions, the development scheme for that area has
become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme.”
45. In Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab [Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State
of Punjab, (2016) 6 SCC 532 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 102] , this Court while
relying upon State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma [State of U.P. v. Rajkumar
Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 565] , observed as under:
(Kulwinder Pal Singh case [Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 6
SCC 532 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 102] , SCC pp. 539-40, para 16)
“16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the other
candidates were appointed in the post against dereserved category, the same
benefit should also be extended to the appellants. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage
negative
equalities.
In State
of
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
U.P. v. Rajkumar
Sharma [State
of
U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 565] it was
held as under: (SCC p. 337, para 15)
„15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or
wrongly, that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the
Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the
mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See Sneh
Prabha v. State of U.P. [Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., (1996) 7 SCC 426]
; Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain [Jaipur Development
Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 35] ; State of Haryana v. Ram
Kumar Mann [State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 321 : 1997
SCC
(L&S)
801]
; Faridabad
CT
Scan
Centre v. D.G.
Health
Services [Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services, (1997) 7 SCC
752]
; Jalandhar
Improvement
Trust v. Sampuran
Singh [Jalandhar
Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, (1999) 3 SCC 494] ; State of
Punjab v. Rajeev Sarwal [State of Punjab v. Rajeev Sarwal, (1999) 9 SCC 240 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 1171] ; Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Yogesh
Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346]
; Union of India v. International Trading Co. [Union of India v. International
Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437] and Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari
Sanstha
Maryadit v. Indore
Development
Authority [Kastha
Niwarak
Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Indore Development Authority,
(2006) 2 SCC 604] .)”
Merely because some persons have been granted benefit illegally or by
mistake, it does not confer right upon the appellants to claim equality.”
46. In Rajasthan
State
Industrial
Development
&
Investment
Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society [Rajasthan State Industrial
Development & Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society,
(2013) 5 SCC 427 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 121] , this Court held as under: (SCC
p. 436, para 19)
“19. Even if the lands of other similarly situated persons have been released,
the Society must satisfy the Court that it is similarly situated in all respects, and
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
has an independent right to get the land released. Article 14 of the Constitution
does not envisage negative equality, and it cannot be used to perpetuate any
illegality. The doctrine of discrimination based upon the existence of an
enforceable right, and Article 14 would hence apply, only when invidious
discrimination is meted out to equals, similarly circumstanced without any
rational basis, or to relationship that would warrant such discrimination.
[Vide Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P. [Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., (1996) 7
SCC 426] , Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Yogesh Kumar v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2003) 3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346] , State of
W.B. v. Debasish Mukherjee [State of W.B. v. Debasish Mukherjee, (2011) 14
SCC 187 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 869] and Priya Gupta v. State of
Chhattisgarh [Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433 : (2012)
2 SCC (L&S) 367] .]”
47. In Arup Das v. State of Assam [Arup Das v. State of Assam, (2012) 5
SCC 559 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 24] , this Court observed as under: (SCC pp.
564-65, para 19)
“19. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in State of U.P. v. Rajkumar
Sharma [State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 565] , this Court once again had to consider the question of filling up of
vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised. Referring to the
various decisions rendered on this issue, this Court held that filling up of
vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be
violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and that selectees could not claim appointments as a matter of
right. It was reiterated that mere inclusion of candidates in the select list does
not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained
unfilled. This Court went on to observe further that even if in some cases
appointments had been made by mistake or wrongly, that did not confer
any right of appointment to another person, as Article 14 of the
Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State had
committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake.”
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
48. In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty [State of Orissa v. Mamata
Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 83] , it was observed: (SCC
p. 458, para 56)
“56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to
perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if
some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit
inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on
the petitioner to get the same relief. [Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit
Singh [Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745] , Yogesh
Kumar v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [Yogesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003)
3 SCC 548 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 346] , Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of
Haryana [Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164] , K.K.
Bhalla v. State of M.P. [K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., (2006) 3 SCC 581]
, Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K [Krishan Bhatt v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC
24 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 783] , State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan
Singh [State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65 : (2009) 1
SCC (L&S) 1019] and Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal [Union of
India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal, (2010) 2 SCC 422 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S)
385] .]”
66. Learned counsel for the respondents further placed much
emphasis that the Government implemented those orders by granting
seniority to directly recruited SIs of Police (Civil) from the date of their
initial appointment on the post of RSI.
Learned Government Pleader
submitted that since those orders attained finality between the parties, the
Government had to comply with those orders. But, since the Government
is contesting these matters in which the Order of the Tribunal by now has
not attained finality and as the clear case of the State is that these
respondents are not entitled for the seniority contrary to the rule position
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
nor in terms of the judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch, merely
because the Government implemented the Orders passed in the previous
petitions because the judgment attained finality, the State cannot be
bound to confer the benefit of those orders, contrary to the rules, when
the present matter is pending for consideration and adjudication before
this Court.
67. In the present case, there is no dispute that the appointment of
the respondents is by direct recruitment. Once the respondents were
appointed through the direct recruitment process, on the post of SubInspector of Police (Civil), their seniority shall be counted from the date of
their appointment on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) under Rule
15 (a) of the Special Rules and the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in K. Rajaiah (supra) which considered the same Rules.
VI. Conclusions:
68. We are of the considered view that;
(i)
Only for the judgment in W.P.No.22176 of 2004, dated
01.03.2007 the Tribunal has allowed the claim of the
respondents;
(ii)
The judgment in W.P.No.22176 of 2004 was based on the
statement of the petitioners‟ counsel as also the learned
Government Pleader that the controversy was squarely covered
by the judgment in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch, dated
15.06.2001 {E.Shankar Reddy (supra)}.
(iii)
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
There is no consideration on merit of the right of the
claimants/respondents for the seniority, prior to the date of their
appointment on the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil), under
the Special Rules.
(iv)
In the absence of any right under the Special Rules for claiming
the seniority counting their past service as RSI (s), as has been
granted to them, which in the undisputed facts, is contrary to
Rule 15 (a) of the Special Rules, the judgment in E. Shankar
Reddy (supra) was not attracted nor any benefit was available
in terms of the judgment in E. Shankar Reddy (supra).
(v)
When only concession was granted, which concession was
against the legal position as per the law laid down in
W.P.No.2120 of 2000 and batch E. Shankar Reddy (supra), as
also the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Rajaiah
(supra), merely on the ground that others had been granted the
benefit in different proceedings, the respondents could not be
granted that benefit, on the ground of any alleged parity as it is
settled in law that the illegality cannot be permitted to be
perpetuated and as there is no concept of negative parity under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(vi)
The judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Rajaiah (supra) is
directly on the point of seniority under Rule 15 of the A. P.
Police Subordinate Service Rules, in which it has been laid
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
down that in the case of the direct recruitment to the post of
Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil), of those who were working as
Reserve Sub-Inspectors of Police, they would be entitled for the
seniority only from the date of appointment on the post of SubInspector of Police (Civil) under Rule 15 (a).
(vii)
The present is also a case of direct recruitment and not of
recruitment by transfer.
(viii) In view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in K.
Rajaiah (supra) which is binding on this Court under Article 141
of the Constitution of India, the judgment of the Tribunal cannot
be sustained and deserves to be set aside.
(ix)
The Applicants/respondents are not entitled for the benefit of the
judgments in W.P.No.2120 of 2000 & batch, dated 15.06.2001,
which was a case of appointment by transfer attracting rule 15
(c) whereas the present is a case of direct appointment –
attracting rule 15 (a).
(x)
The respondents are also not entitled for the benefit of the
judgment
in
W.P.No.22176
of
and
batch,
dated
01.03.2007, even if affirmed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court by
dismissal of the SLP in limine, of the State & the Civil Appeal of
third parties.
(xi)
The dismissal of the SLP against the judgment in W.P.No.22176
of 2004, did not contain any declaration of law on the
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
interpretation of Rule 15 of the Special Rules. On such Rules
and under the same circumstances as in the present case of the
direct recruitment to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil),
there is a direct authority of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in K.
Rajaiah (supra) declaring the law.
(xii)
In those cases where the SLP was dismissed and Civil Appeals
were also dismissed, the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
K. Rajaiah (supra) does not find consideration.
So, simple
dismissal of SLP without reasons, or without declaration of law,
without considering the rule position as also the authoritative
pronouncement of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court itself in K.
Rajaiah (supra), we are of the view, it cannot be said that any
law has been declared in the SLP (s) or the Civil Appeals, which
though was dismissed observing on merit, but without any such
consideration, such dismissal would be binding on the parties to
those proceedings on the doctrine of merger & finality but shall
not be binding as a precedent under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India.
(xiii) We are bound by the declaration of law on the same Rules by
the Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Rajaiah (supra) as binding
precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
RNT, J & SS, J
WP. No.24641 of 2014 & Anr.
(xiv) Following K. Rajaiah (supra) judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, the writ petitions deserve to be allowed, the Orders
passed by the Tribunal deserve to be set aside.
VII. Result:
69. In the result,
(i) W.P.No.24641 of 2014 is allowed, judgment dated 01.04.2014 in
O.A.No.3350 of 2012 with V.M.A.No.1127 of 2012 passed by the
Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad is set aside.
(ii) W.P.No.1094 of 2016 is allowed, judgment dated 26.04.2013 in
O.A.No.2943
of
passed
by
the
Andhra
Pradesh
Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad is set aside.
70.
No order as to costs
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in
consequence.
______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
_______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
Date:22.09.2026
Dsr
Whether the order is:
Reasoned „Yes‟
Reportable „Yes‟ (LR copy to be marked)
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