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(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 741 of 2025
1. The Director, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, Project Bhawan, Dhurwa,
Ranchi having its office at Dhurwa, P.O & P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi,
Jharkhand
2. The District Superintendent of Education-cum-District Programme
Officer, Palamau, having its office at Palamau, P.O & P.S.
Palamau, Ranchi, Jharkhand
...
…
… Respondents
Versus
1. Patel Singh, aged about …. Years, S/o Ram Lakhan Singh, R/o
Village Dundu, P.O. Sildilia Kala & P.S. Tarhasi, District Palamau,
Jharkhand
2. The Deputy Commissioner-cum-President Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan,
Palamau having its office at Palamau, P.O & P.S. Palamau, Ranchi,
Jharkhand
3. The Block Education Officer-cum-Block Programme Officer,
Manatu, P.O + P.S. Manatu, Palamau, Jharkhand
4. The President, Gram Shiksha Samiti, Upgraded Primary School,
Dundu, P.O + P.S. Dundu, Tarhasi, Palamau, Jharkhand
5. The Secretary, Gram Shiksha Samiti, Upgraded Primary School,
Dundu,
P.O
+
P.S.
Dundu,
Palamau,
Jharkhand
...
…
….
Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Krishna Murari, Advocate
Mr Raj Vardhan, Advocate
For the Respondent No. 1:
Mr Jai Shankar Tripathi, Advocate
--------03/Dated: 16.06.2026
I.A. No. 10765 of 2025
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 552 days in filing an
appeal against the learned single Judge’s order dated 12.04.2023
disposing of W.P (S) No. 5635 of 2014.
3. In paragraph-6 of this interim application, seemingly innocuous
statement has been made that the ‘certified copy for the order dated
(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
12.04.2023 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge / Writ Court was
supplied on 05.09.2024, since applied on 15.08.2024 at the instance
of Jharkhand Education Project Council, which came to know about
this order off late, as inspite of being party to the writ petition, copy
/ notice was not served and thus not granted opportunity of hearing
although it is the necessary party being regulator of SSA
Programme’.
4. The above statement gives the impression that, although the
impugned order was passed on 12.04.2023, its certified copy was
supplied only on 05.09.2024, based on anapplication dated
15.08.2024. The averment
also suggests
that the present
applicants/appellants were not granted any opportunity of hearing in
the matter.
5. On perusal of the order dated 12.04.2023, it is evident that Mr
Manish Mishra, G.P-V, appeared on behalf of all the respondents,
including the 7th respondent. That apart, it is not as if the 7th
respondent is some private party. Therefore, thevague statement in
paragraph-6 that the order dated 12.04.2023 was only known to the
petitioner after its copy was supplied on 05.09.2024 cannot be
accepted.
6. In fact, the applicants should have been candid with the Court and
stated the true and correct facts. Based upon the pleadings, therefore,
no case is made out to condone the delay of 552 days in filing the
accompanying appeal.
(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
7. The other reasons relate to routine administrative procedures, which
are both unverifiable and inspire no confidence. However, the main
excuse cited is that referred to in paragraph6 of the I.A., which we
have quoted above. Based on the same, we are satisfied that no case
for condonation of delay is made out.
8. Based upon the above pleadings, we are afraid that no case
whatsoever has been made out for condoning the inordinate delay of
552 days. This is a case of utter lethargy, tardiness and indolence to
borrow the phrases used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of State of Odisha and Others vs. Managing Committee of
Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191.
9. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the
distinction between ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ proffered as a
ground for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
also referred to its earlier decisions, in which it is held that there is a
point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant, even if
the litigant is the Government, which is itself shackled by
bureaucratic indifference. Since the law of limitation binds
everybody, beyond a particular point no indulgence can be shown,
even to the Government, which functions through an impersonal
machinery.
10. In Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media India
Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be condoned where the
(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
Government Department or the persons concerned have not evinced
diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The
Court has held that in the absence of a plausible and acceptable
explanation, the delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks
condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be
invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and
available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody, including the Government.
11. In Union of India &Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D),
through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 489, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant
factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications
for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or
approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their
own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the
law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party
has lost its right to have the matter considered on the merits because
of its own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed that the
delay was not deliberate, and in such circumstances the party cannot
be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred
against technical considerations.
(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
12. The Court also held that, when considering a plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter.
The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if
the cause assigned by the litigant is sufficient and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring the merits
of the matter into aid for the purpose of condoning the delay.
Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of
sound public policy and equity.
13. The Hon’ble Court held that the ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be
kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period
of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that
the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be
condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen
due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay
cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.
14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that
(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds,
until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the Statemachinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and
remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice,
as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical
attitude.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not
give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State
authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra
cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and neverexhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of
(2026:JHHC:17415-DB)
at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the
State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of
delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another
round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As
courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is
not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be
permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.
17. Applying the above principles to the gross facts of the present case,
we dismiss this I.A. seeking condonation of the 552-day delay in
instituting the accompanying appeal.
18. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and other I.As, if any, will
not survive and are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 16, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp.2
Uploaded on 20.06.2026
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