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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 3451 of 2026
In / And
L.P.A. No. 162 of 2026
The Deputy Development Commissioner Deoghar-cum-Chief
Executive Officer, Zila Parisad, Deoghar, P.O. & P.S. – Deoghar, Dist.
– Deoghar.
...
Respondent/Appellant
Versus
1. Sukhdeo Rao aged about son of- Late Shibu Rao, resident of Village
+ P.O. + P.S. Malaypur, District Jamui (Bihar), presently residing at
Mohalla Chattisi, Ward No. 4 (new Ward No. 27), P.O. Bilasi Town,
P.S. and District Deoghar.
… Writ Petitioner/Respondent
2. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary Rural Development
Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. &
P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi.
3. Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Directorate, Government of Jharkhand,
Ranchi, P.O. & P.S- Dhurwa, Dist. – Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. Director Panchayati Raj Directorate, Government of Jharkhand,
Project Building, P.O. & P.S. – Dhurwa, Dist. – Ranchi.
...
Respondents/Performa Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
--------For the Appellant:
Mr Ashutosh Anand, Addl. A.G.-III
Mr Sahbaj Akhtar, A.C. to A.A.G.-III
For the State:
Mr Ashwini Bhushan, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II
--------Reserved on: 22.06.2026
Pronounced on: 25 /06/2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2.
This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 762 days in filing the
appeal against the Learned single judge’s judgment dated
25.07.2023 disposing of W.P.(S) No. 1753 of 2017.
3.
From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., it is evident that no
case has been made out by the Appellants to explain this delay of
762 days. The I.A. simply lists routine steps, the movement of
files, the obtaining of a legal opinion, internal processing, and then
states that the appeal was drafted, grounds were prepared,
documents were collected, and the appeal was filed. There is no
attempt to explain why any of these steps took as long as they did,
particularly when the limitation period was well known by all
concerned in the process.
4.
Paragraphs 3-8 of the I.A. show that the impugned judgment was
passed on 25.07.2023. The first step mentioned in the application
is dated 08.05.2024, and even this step was not taken on the
appellants' own initiative but only after contempt proceedings had
been initiated against them by the writ petitioner (the respondent
no. 01 in the instant case). Nevertheless, what happened in those
nine months between the date of the judgment and this first step is
left entirely unexplained in the I.A. by the Appellants.
5.
Moving forward, the I.A. states that the Government Advocate's
response was received on 10.07.2024. After that, nothing of
substance appears to have been done until the file was sent to the
Principal Secretary on 28.05.2025, a hiatus of nearly ten months.
The I.A. has nothing to say about this period, and no material has
been placed on record to show that any effort was made to advance
the matter during this time.
6.
Taken together, these two unexplained periods of inaction,
spanning approximately nine and ten months respectively,
constitute a major part of the delay sought to be condoned. The
I.A. furnishes no explanation for these prolonged periods of
inactivity; rather, it merely recounts the steps that were eventually
taken thereafter.
7.
It is a well-settled principle of law that an applicant seeking
condonation of delay must account for each period of delay with
specific, cogent, and satisfactory reasons. However, in the matrix
of the present facts, it would not be incorrect to observe that the
appellants have meticulously explained everything regarding the
bureaucratic movement of files across various governmental
departments, save for the essential "sufficient cause" mandated by
Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a belatedly filed
application.
8.
In cases of this nature, it is to be stated that it is well settled that
applications filed with casual averments and routine bureaucratic
explanations cannot be accepted as showing sufficient cause. In the
present case, nothing has been demonstrated to show any real or
substantive reason for the delay. Merely stating that the matter was
under consideration, that notes were moved, and that the grounds
of appeal were ultimately prepared, cannot by itself justify
condonation of delay of this unusual magnitude.
9.
In this regard, reliance can be placed on the dictum of the Hon’ble
SC in Postmaster General and Others v. Living Media India
Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563. In the said
case, the Hon’ble Court held that Government departments staffed
with legally conversant personnel cannot claim any special or
extended period of limitation. Mere recitation of dates of file
movement, without explaining the reason for each interval, does
not constitute sufficient cause. The Court categorically rejected the
excuse of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology,
particularly in the age of modern technology, and held that delay
cannot be condoned mechanically solely because the applicant is
the Government or a wing thereof.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants tries to point out that the State
has a good case on the merits. There is nothing to prima facie
support this argument, which, we note, is advanced in practically
every matter where appeals are filed after considerable and
unexplained delay. Be that as it may, in any event, merely having a
good case on merits cannot be a sole consideration for condoning
the delay of 762 days, when no sufficient cause is shown.
11. The Hon’ble SC in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in
2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, held that before adverting to the
merits, the court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation
offered; merits may be taken into aid only where the explanation
and the opposition are evenly balanced. Reiterating that limitation
is grounded in public policy and equity, the Hon’ble Court held
that delay cannot be excused as a matter of generosity. The status
of a litigant, whether private or State, is immaterial when
condoning gross delay. Prolonged inaction cannot be presumed
non-deliberate, and in such circumstances, a plea of substantial
justice cannot override the bar of limitation.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that the
rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and equity. The length of the delay is a relevant
consideration in the condonation of delay in filing an appeal. If it is
found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the
party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay may not be
condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that a
government department cannot claim a separate period of
limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone,
including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on
account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view
of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found from
the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the
officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in
the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for
condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.
14. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. In Karnataka Housing Board
& Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has once again made it abundantly clear that “administrative
lethargy and laxity” can never constitute sufficient ground for
condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 261
observed “we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and
superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made
out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted
with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is
a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more
particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the
bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.”
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts
ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the
State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain
extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State
authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the
apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed
in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “We are at pains to
reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient
cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury,
more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC,
wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law”.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation
periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to
attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what
worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State and its elaborate and neverending paraphernalia.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because,
if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable
to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present
case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation and leaves
such a litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts
are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post
to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, let alone be permitted by the courts to misuse the
process of law.
19. Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances
of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has
been shown, and consequently, we dismiss this I.A., seeking
condonation of the delay of 762 days in filing the accompanying
appeal.
20. Consequently, the accompanying appeal and the I.A. therein do not
survive and are disposed of.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
June 25th, 2026
N.A.F.R.
Manoj/Cp.2
Uploaded on 25.06.2026
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