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WA No. 2126 of 2025
C/W WA No. 2137 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
WRIT APPEAL No. 2126 OF 2025 (T-RES)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL No. 2137 OF 2025 (T-RES)
IN WA No. 2126/2025
BETWEEN:
1.
THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (HPU)
CGST COMMISSIONERATE, MYSORE,
OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER
GST COMMISSIONERATE, VINAYA MARGA,
SIDDHARTHA NAGAR, MYSORE - 570 011.
2.
Digitally signed
by VINUTHA B S
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
THE SUPERINTENDENT (PREVENTIVE AND INTELLIGENCE)
CENTRAL TAX, GST COMMISSIONERATE,
VINAYA MARGA, SIDDHARTHA NAGAR,
MYSORE - 570 011.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI ARAVIND V. CHAVAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
M/S. KUM INTERNATIONALS
SY.NO.439/2, 9TH KM, BADANAGUPPE VILLAGE,
MYSORE ROAD, CHAMARAJANAGARA,
KARNATAKA - 571 313.
GSTIN: 29AAIFK8226C1ZA
(PARTNERSHIP FIRM REGISTERED UNDER
THE INDIAN PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1932,
REPRESENTED BY SRI A SRIGIRI PARTNER).
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI HARISH B. NARASAPPA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI Y.C. SHIVAKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
*Page Nos.1 to 19 are retyped & replaced vide chamber order dated 09.04.2026.
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WA No. 2126 of 2025
C/W WA No. 2137 of 2025
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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP No. 26885/2024 (T-RES) DATED
13.10.2025.
IN WA No. 2137/2025
BETWEEN:
1.
THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (HPU)
CGST COMMISSIONERATE, MYSORE,
OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER
GST COMMISSIONERATE, VINAYA MARGA,
SIDDHARTHA NAGAR, MYSORE - 570 011.
2.
THE SUPERINTENDENT
(PREVENTIVE AND INTELLIGENCE)
CENTRAL TAX, GST COMMISSIONERATE,
VINAYA MARGA, SIDDHARTHA NAGAR,
MYSORE - 570 011.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI ARAVIND V. CHAVAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
M/S. B. G. GRANITES,
SY.No.430/3, MYSORE ROAD,
BADANAGUPPE VILLAGE,
CHAMARAJANAGARA,
KARNATAKA-571 313.
GSTIN: 29AAIFK8226C1ZA
(PARTNERSHIP FIRM REGISTERED
UNDER THE INDIAN PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1932,
REPRESENTED BY SRI A SRIGIRI PARTNER).
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI HARISH B. NARASAPPA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI Y.C. SHIVAKUMAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP No.26515/2024
DATED 13.10.2025.
THESE APPEALS COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
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C/W WA No. 2137 of 2025
HC-KAR
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND)
Heard Sri Aravind V. Chavan, learned Senior Standing
Counsel
for
the
appellants-Revenue
and
Sri
Harish
B.
Narasappa, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Sri Y.C.
Shivakumar, learned counsel for the respondent-Assessee.
2.
Writ Appeal No.2126/2025 is filed under Section 4 of the
Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, by the Revenue, impugning
the order dated 13.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge
in Writ Petition No.26885/2024. Writ Appeal No.2137/2025 is
filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, by
the Revenue, impugning the order dated 13.10.2025 passed by
the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.26515/2024.
2.1
The sequence of events, the facts involved, and the
reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge in both the cases
are identical. Learned counsel on both sides addressed common
arguments. Since the issues involved are identical, both the
appeals are disposed of by this common order.
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3.
The facts in Writ Appeal No.2126/2025 are referred to for
the sake of convenience.
4.
An inspection was conducted at the business premises of
the respondent on 03.06.2024. In the course of the inspection,
an ineligible claim of Input Tax Credit (ITC) was noticed. The
respondent–assessee voluntarily reversed the ineligible ITC and
thereafter paid interest and penalty on 10.06.2024.
4.1
In the meantime, summons was issued to the respondent
under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act,
2017 (for short, ‘the Act’). By letter dated 05.06.2024, the
respondent sought extension of time. On 10.06.2024, the
respondent submitted a letter requesting closure of the
proceedings. The tax along with interest and penalty was paid
under Section 74(5) of the Act. The statement of the
representative of the respondent–assessee was recorded on
11.06.2024. Thereafter, the Proper Officer passed an order of
closure under Section 74(6) of the Act on 27.08.2024.
4.2
The respondent filed a writ petition before this Court on
20.09.2024 seeking to set aside the closure order and for
refund of the taxes paid, contending that the payments were
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made involuntarily due to coercion and pressure exerted by the
appellant–authorities. Acknowledgments for payment of the
interest and penalty were also issued by the authorities.
4.3
The learned Single Judge, holding that the payment of
tax, interest, and penalty, as well as the letter submitted under
Section 74(5) of the Act, were involuntary and made under
pressure and coercion, set aside the closure order and directed
the appellant–authorities to refund the claimed amount along
with interest. However, the learned Single Judge observed that
all
contentions
pursuant
to
the
show-cause
notice
and
adjudication proceedings are kept open and that no opinion has
been expressed in that regard.
5.
Sri Aravind V. Chavan, learned Senior Standing Counsel
appearing for the appellants, submits that an inspection was
conducted on 03.06.2024 and the ineligible ITC was detected.
Before proceeding under Section 74 of the Act, summons under
Section 70 of the Act was issued. The respondent, realizing the
illegality in claiming ineligible ITC, reversed the same on the
day of inspection, paid interest and penalty, and submitted a
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letter seeking closure of the proceedings under Section 74(5) of
the Act.
5.1
It is submitted that the reversal of ITC, filing of the letter
under Section 74(5), and payment of interest and penalty were
made voluntarily. It is further submitted that after the closure
order was passed under Section 74(6) of the Act, at such
length of time, and particularly when the limitation available for
initiating proceedings under Section 74 of the Act had not fully
run out, it is not open to the respondent to challenge the
closure order. It is contended that the learned Single Judge,
without appreciating that the respondent had prevented the
Proper Officer from proceeding under Section 74 of the Act, has
erroneously set aside the closure order and directed refund.
5.2
It is submitted that the statement recorded from the
representative
of
the
respondent
and
other
attending
circumstances clearly demonstrate that the respondent had
availed ineligible ITC. It is further submitted that even
assuming that coercion was exerted on 03.06.2024, the
request for closure was made after seven days. The respondent
had sufficient time to report such alleged coercion to the higher
authorities.
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5.3
It is contended that the mere allegation of coercion is not
sufficient to accept such allegation and set aside the closure
order. It is further submitted that if such baseless allegations
are entertained, the very purpose of Sections 74(5) and 74(6)
of the Act would stand defeated.
5.4
It is also submitted that the tax period involved is from
January 2021 to February 2024. It is contended that the
permissible actions pursuant to the inspection conducted on
03.06.2024 and the summons dated 04.06.2024, which would
have been available had the request for closure not been made,
ought to be made available if the order of closure is to be set
aside.
6.
Sri
Harish
B.
Narasappa,
learned
Senior
Advocate
appearing for Sri Y.C. Shivakumar, learned counsel for the
respondent, submits that an inspection was conducted on
03.06.2024 and that coercion and pressure were exerted on
the representatives of the respondent to reverse the ITC. It is
submitted that the search commenced on 03.06.2024 and
concluded on 04.06.2024. The reversal of ITC was made during
the period of search and in the presence of the authorities. It is
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further submitted that the reversal of ITC was made to avoid
the threat of arrest.
6.1
The learned Senior Advocate further submits that the
letter dated 10.06.2024 filed under Section 74(5) of the Act
also indicates the above aspect, which has not been rebutted.
It is submitted that the contents of the letter sufficiently
indicate that the reversal of ITC was made at the instance of
the officers and that the payment of tax was made only to buy
peace and was not voluntary.
6.2
The learned Senior Advocate further submits that the
learned Single Judge, having considered the above aspects,
rightly concluded that the reversal of ITC, the consequential
payment of interest and penalty, and the filing of the letter
under
Section
74(5)
of
the
Act
were
involuntary,
and
accordingly set aside the order of closure and directed refund
with applicable interest. In support of his submission, the
learned Senior Advocate relied on the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in Lovelesh Singhal vs. Commissioner, Delhi
Goods and Services Tax and others, (2024) 121 GSTR
422 (Delhi).
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7.
We have considered the submissions made by the learned
Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue and the learned
Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent–assessee.
8.
The dates and sequence of events are not in dispute. The
inspection was conducted on 03.06.2024 and concluded on
04.06.2024. It is undisputed that the reversal of ITC, alleged to
be ineligible, was made on 03.06.2024. At the time when the
reversal
was
made,
the
inspecting
authorities,
i.e.,
the
appellants, were present at the premises of the respondent,
and such reversal appears to have been made while the
inspection was in progress.
8.1
Upon conclusion of the inspection, summons under
Section 70 of the Act was issued on 04.06.2024. No doubt,
extension was granted on 05.06.2024. On 10.06.2024, the
respondent paid interest and penalty and also filed a letter on
the same day requesting closure of the proceedings, as is
permissible under Section 74(5) of the Act. Thereafter, on
11.06.2024, the statement was recorded, and the closure order
was passed only on 27.08.2024.
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8.2
The mere allegation of coercion and pressure for reversal
of ITC is not sufficient. Such allegation requires corroborative
evidence, and the surrounding circumstances must support the
same.
8.3
The Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-
tax vs. MAC Public Charitable Trust and others, (2022
SCC OnLine Mad 8835), observed as under:
"62. It is settled position of law that the
admission though important is not conclusive. It is
open to the assessee who made the admission to
show that it is incorrect as held by the hon'ble
Supreme Court in Pullangode Rubber Produce
Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1973] 91 ITR 18
(SC). The onus falls on the person who had earlier
admitted to prove it wrong. Therefore, the statements
could form the basis of assessment.
63. The statements given to the Assessing
Officer under section 132(4) have legal force. Unless
the retractions are made within a short span of time,
supported by affidavit swearing that the contents are
incorrect and it was obtained under force, coercion
and by lodging a complaint with higher officials, the
same cannot be treated as retracted."
8.4
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in K.T.M.S. Mohd. and
another vs. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 178, held as
under:
"34. We think it is not necessary to recapitulate
and recite all the decisions on this legal aspect. But
suffice to say that the core of all the decisions of this
Court is to the effect that the voluntary nature of any
statement made either before the Custom authorities
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or the officers of Enforcement under the relevant
provisions of the respective Acts is a sine qua non to
act on it for any purpose and if the statement
appears to have been obtained by any inducement,
threat, coercion or by any improper means that
statement must be rejected brevi manu. At the same
time, it is to be noted that merely because a
statement is retracted, it cannot be recorded as
involuntary or unlawfully obtained. It is only for the
maker of the statement who alleges inducement,
threat, promise etc. to establish that such improper
means has been adopted. However, even if the
maker of the statement fails to establish his
allegations of inducement, threat etc. against the
officer who recorded the statement, the authority
while acting on the inculpatory statement of the
maker is not completely relieved of his obligations in
at least subjectively applying its mind to the
subsequent retraction to hold that the inculpatory
statement was not extorted. It thus boils down that
the authority or any court intending to act upon the
inculpatory statement as a voluntary one should
apply its mind to the retraction and reject the same
in writing. It is only on this principle of law, this Court
in several decisions has ruled that even in passing a
detention order on the basis of an inculpatory
statement of a detenu who has violated the
provisions of the FERA or the Customs Act etc. the
detaining authority should consider the subsequent
retraction and record its opinion before accepting the
inculpatory statement lest the order will be vitiated.
Reference may be made to a decision of the Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Roshan Beevi v.
Joint Secretary to the Government of T.N., Public
Deptt. to which one of us (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.)
was a party."
8.5
It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the
Madras High Court that when coercion or force is alleged to
have been used in the course of search and inspection, the
least that is expected is that a complaint be lodged before the
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higher authorities. In the present case, no such complaint was
filed from 04.06.2024 to 10.06.2024. Such a course of action
was also available even prior to the order of closure dated
27.08.2024. The respondent has maintained silence regarding
the alleged coercion and involuntary declaration for more than
two and a half months. The conduct of the respondent raises a
serious doubt as to the genuineness of the allegation made.
8.6
mere
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that a
allegation
is
not
sufficient
unless
the
facts
and
circumstances, and the actions of the authorities or the
assessee, indicate the presence of such force or coercion. In
the light of the above judgments, we hold that a mere
allegation of coercion to admit liability is not sufficient to hold
that the declaration was involuntary. The existence of coercion
must be established by other attending circumstances. Such a
requirement is necessary to maintain the sanctity of the
declaration made under Section 74(5) of the Act. If due
importance is not accorded to a declaration made under Section
74(5), it may lead to unintended adverse consequences.
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8.7
If we may illustrate for the sake of understanding: where
the Proper Officer is entitled to initiate action under Section 74,
which provides an outer limit of five years, and the assessee
makes a declaration under Section 74(5) and the proceedings
are consequently closed under Section 74(6), if such disclosure
is later questioned as involuntary after the expiry of the time
limit prescribed under Sections 73/74 of the Act, it would lead
to absurdity and an abuse of process.
8.8
To avoid such unintended consequences, the Court should
exercise restraint in interfering with an order of closure unless
circumstances are demonstrated warranting such interference,
which must be examined on a case-to-case basis.
9.
Now we deal with the present case. The respondent had
the opportunity to raise the grievance of coercion before the
higher authorities after the conclusion of the inspection on
04.06.2024. Though the payment and declaration were made
on 10.06.2024, the order of closure was passed only on
27.08.2024, nearly two and a half months thereafter. Nothing
prevented the respondent from lodging such a complaint, as
held in the judgments referred to above. The justification
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alleging that the declaration was involuntary on the ground that
the admission was made to avoid the threat of arrest is, by
itself, not sufficient.
9.1
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Solanki
vs. Union of India and another [(2008) 16 SCC 537]
examining the consideration of confession recorded by force,
coercion and threat and retraction thereafter held as under:
"37. With a view to arrive at a finding as regards
the voluntary nature of statement or otherwise of a
confession which has since been retracted, the court
must bear in mind the attending circumstances which
would include the time of retraction, the nature thereof,
the manner in which such retraction has been made and
other relevant factors. Law does not say that the
accused has to prove that retraction of confession made
by him was because of threat, coercion, etc. but the
requirement is that it may appear to the court as such."
9.2
The presence of coercion, force or threat in filing the
declaration reversing ITC is to be examined applying the above
underlined test.
9.3
In the facts of the present case, we notice one aspect
which may indicate coercion and which cannot be rejected
outright. If the inspection was conducted on 03.06.2024 and
summons was issued on 04.06.2024, the Proper Officer
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conducting the inspection would ordinarily have granted some
breathing time to reverse the ITC availed.
9.4
The reversal made while the inspection was ongoing lends
some substance to the contention of the respondent. If the
reversal of ITC had already been made, the payment of interest
and penalty would follow as a consequence. Similarly, the filing
of the letter under Section 74(5) would also follow. Though, in
the case on hand, the payment of interest and penalty and the
filing of the letter under Section 74(5) may not, by themselves,
be said to be involuntary, the act of reversal of ITC in the
presence of the Proper Officer during the course of inspection
lends support to the statement of the respondent.
9.5
The Delhi High Court in Lovelesh Singhal (supra),
considering that the reversal of ITC was made in the course of
the inspection and when the authorities were present, held that
the same could not be regarded as voluntary. In the present
case also, the reversal of ITC was made during the ongoing
inspection and presumably in the presence of the inspecting
authorities.
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9.6
In that view of the matter, for the reasons assigned
hereinabove, we find no justification to interfere with the
finding of the learned Single Judge. For the reasons stated
above, we arrive at the same conclusion that the reversal of
ITC, alleged to be ineligible, was not voluntary.
10.
Another aspect that requires consideration by this Court
is the interest of the Revenue. The learned Single Judge has
observed that the adjudication proceedings pursuant to the
show-cause notice are kept open and that no opinion has been
expressed in that regard. In our view, this observation by itself
does not address the situation.
10.1
The inspection was conducted on 03.06.2024, summons
was issued on 04.06.2024, and the statement was recorded on
11.06.2024.
These
proceedings
would
ordinarily
have
culminated in the issuance of a notice under Section 74 of the
Act and further determination under sub-section (9) within the
time limit prescribed under sub-section (10) of Section 74. To
avoid such proceedings, sub-section (5) of Section 74 provides
a privileged/concessional opportunity to the defaulting assessee
to rectify the incorrectness, illegality, or irregularity. If payment
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of tax, interest, and penalty is made and a letter is filed,
Section 74(6) empowers the Proper Officer to close the
proceedings.
10.2 In
the
present
privileged/concessional
case,
the
remedy
respondent
under
Section
availed
the
74(5)
and
thereby compelled the Proper Officer to close the proceedings
under Section 74(6). By filing the letter under Section 74(5),
the respondent prevented the Proper Officer from invoking or
initiating
proceedings
under
Section
74(1),
which
was
otherwise available. After the lapse of a considerable length of
time, the declaration made under Section 74(5) has been
questioned as involuntary.
10.3 Once this Court accepts the case of the respondent that
the declaration was involuntary and sets aside the order of
closure made under Section 74(6), it becomes the duty of the
Court to restore the position or proceedings as they stood prior
to the filing of the declaration under Section 74(5). If such
restoration is not made, it would result in preventing the Proper
Officer from invoking Section 74 and would also permit the
lapse of time under sub-section (10). If such a course is not
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adopted by the Court, the sanctity attached to Sections 74(5)
and 74(6) would be liable to misuse and would act as a
deterrent to invoking Section 74 of the Act.
10.4 It is not in dispute that, but for the declaration made
under Section 74(5) and the closure order passed under
Section 74(6), the Proper Officer was entitled to invoke Section
73/74 of the Act and conclude the determination as provided
therein. Having regard to the discussion made hereinabove and
also in light of the finding that the reversal of ITC was not
voluntary, the proceedings as they stood up to the stage of
recording of the statement on 11.06.2024 is required to be
restored. Further, the period from 11.06.2024 till the date of
this order shall be excluded for the purpose of computing
limitation under Section 73/74 of the Act.
11.
Accordingly, we pass the following,
ORDER
(i)
Writ appeals are allowed-in-part.
(ii)
The orders of the learned Single Judge are
modified to the above extent.
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(iii)
The appellant-authorities/proper officer is at
liberty to proceed under Section 73 or 74 of
the Act.
(iv)
The period from 11.06.2024 till date of this
judgment is excluded for the purpose of
Section 73/74 of the Act as the case may
be.
We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the
case.
Pending I.A's stand disposed of.
Sd/(S.G.PANDIT)
JUDGE
Sd/(K. V. ARAVIND)
JUDGE
DDU
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4
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