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Thakur Dutt Vs. Luder Mani
Cr. Appeal No. 289 of 2015
Reserved on: 8.7.2026
17.7.2026 Present:
Ms Anubhuti Sharma, Advocate, for the
appellant.
Mr Ranbir Singh, Advocate, vice Mr L.S. Mehta,
Advocate, for the respondent.
Cr.MP(M) No. 3024 of 2025
The applicant has filed the present application
for condonation of delay in filing the application under
Section 435 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sunita (BNSS),
read with Section 528 of BNSS, for bringing on record the
legal representative of deceased Thakur Dutt Sharma. It
was laid down by this Court in M/s Bajwa Plywood Industry
Vs. Baljinder Singh Cr.M.P. No. 2783 of 2024 decided on
30.10.2025 that there is no period of limitation for bringing
on record the legal representatives of the complainant.
Therefore, the application is dismissed as
infructuous.
Application stands disposed of.
Cr. MP No. 5839 of 2025
The present application has been filed under
Section 435, read with Section 528 of BNSS, for bringing on
record the legal representative of deceased Thakur Dutt
Sharma. It has been asserted that Thakur Dutt Sharma
expired on 19.09.2023 during the pendency of the
proceedings before this Court. He is survived by the legal
representative mentioned in para-3 of the application.
There are no other legal representatives of the late Thakur
Dutt Sharma, and the right to sue survives in favour of the
legal representatives. Hence, it was prayed that the present
application be allowed and the legal representatives of
Thakur Dutt Sharma be brought on record.
No reply to the application was filed.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Chand Devi Daga v. Manju K. Humatani, (2018) 1 SCC 71:
(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 264: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1282 that the
Court can permit the legal heirs to continue with the
prosecution. It was observed at page 74:
“8. Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 is contained in Chapter XX with the heading
“Trial of summons cases by Magistrates”. Section
256, on which reliance has been placed, provides as
follows:
“256. Non-appearance or death of the
complainant.—(1) If the summons has been
issued on complaint, and on the day
appointed for the appearance of the accused,
or any day subsequent thereto to which the
hearing may be adjourned, the complainant
does not appear, the Magistrate shall,
notwithstanding
anything
hereinbefore
contained, acquit the accused, unless for
some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn
the hearing of the case to some other day:
Provided that where the complainant is
represented by a pleader or by the officer
conducting the prosecution, or where the
Magistrate is of the opinion that the
personal attendance of the complainant is
not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense
with his attendance and proceed with the
case.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall,
so far as may be, apply also to cases where
the non-appearance of the complainant is
due to his death.”
9. Analogous provision to Section 256 of the 1973
Code was contained in Section 247 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1898. In Section 247, the proviso
was added in 1955 saying that “where the
Magistrate is of the opinion that personal
attendance is not necessary, he may dispense with
such attendance”. The said proviso took out the
rigour of the original rule, and the whole thing was
left to the discretion of the court. Sub-section (1) of
Section 256 contains the above proviso in a similar
manner. Thus, even in the case of a trial of summons
case, it is not necessary or mandatory that after the
death of the complainant, the complaint is to be
rejected; in exercise of the power under the proviso to
Section 256(1), the Magistrate can proceed with the
complaint. More so, the present is a case where
offence was alleged under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471, 120-B and 201 read with Section 34 IPC for
which procedure for trial of summons case was not
applicable and there is no provision in Chapter XIX
“Trial of warrant cases by Magistrates” containing
a provision that in the event of death of the
complainant the complaint is to be rejected. The
Magistrate, under Section 249, has the power to
discharge a case where the complainant is absent.
The discharge under Section 249, however, is
hedged with the condition that “the offence may be
lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable
offence”. Had the 1973 Code intended that in case
of the death of the complainant in a warrant case,
the complaint is to be rejected, the provision would
have indicated any such intention, which is clearly
absent.
10. In this context, a reference is made to the
judgment of this Court in Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v.
State of Maharashtra [Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State
of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983: 1967 Cri LJ 943]. In
the said case, this Court had the occasion to
consider the provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1898. The complainant had filed a complaint
against the appellants. The complaint was filed
under Sections 498 and 496 IPC. The accused was
summoned. However, during the pendency of the
complaint,
the
complainant
died.
The
complainant's mother applied for substituting her
to act as the complainant and continue the
proceedings. The Magistrate permitted the mother
of the complainant to pursue the complaint against
which a revision was filed before the High Court,
which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the
High Court, the appellant had come up before this
Court. In the above context, this Court considered
the pari materia provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1898, with regard to Section 247
(now Section 256), it was specifically held that said
provision does not furnish any valid analogy. In
para 4 of the judgment, the following was
observed: (AIR pp. 984-85)
“4. Mr Keswani for Vyas, in support of the
abatement of the case, relied upon the
analogy of Section 431 under which appeals
abate and Sections 247 and 259 under which,
on the complainant remaining absent, the
court can acquit or discharge the accused.
These analogies do not avail him because
they provide for special situations. Inquiries
and trials before the court are of several
kinds. Section 247 occurs in Chapter XX,
which deals with the trial of summons cases
by a Magistrate and Section 259 in Chapter
XXI, which deals with the trial of warrant
cases before Magistrates. Under the former,
if the summons is issued on a complaint and
the complainant on any day remains absent
from the court, unless it decides to proceed
with the trial, it must acquit the accused.
This can only happen in the trial of cases,
which are punishable with imprisonment of
less than one year. This not being the trial of
a summons case but a committal inquiry;
Section 247 neither applies nor can it furnish
any valid analogy. Similarly, Section 259,
which occurs in the Chapter on the trial of
warrant cases, that is to say, cases triable by
a
Magistrate
and
punishable
with
imprisonment exceeding one year, can
furnish no analogy. Under Section 259, if the
offence being tried as a warrant case is
compoundable or is not cognizable, the
Magistrate may discharge the accused before
the charge is framed if the complainant
remains absent. Once again, this section
cannot apply because the Presidency
Magistrate was not trying the case under
Chapter XXI.”
11. This Court further had occasion to consider
Section 495 of the 1898 Code (now Section 302 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) and this Court
laid down in para 7 as follows: (Ashwin Nanubhai
case [Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1967 SC 983: 1967 Cri LJ 943], AIR p. 985)
“7. Mr Keswani contends that the Presidency
Magistrate has made a “substitution” of a
new complainant, and there is nothing in the
Code which warrants the substitution of one
complainant for another. It is true that the
Presidency Magistrate has used the word
“substitute”, but that is not the effect of the
order. What the Presidency Magistrate has
done is to allow the mother to act as the
complainant to continue the prosecution.
This power was undoubtedly possessed by
the Presidency Magistrate because of Section
495 of the Code, by which courts are
empowered (with some exceptions) to
authorise the conduct of prosecution by any
person. The words “any person” would
indubitably include the mother of the
complainant in a case such as this. Section
198 itself contemplates that a complaint may
be made by a person other than the person
aggrieved, and there seems to us no valid
reason why in such a serious case we should
hold that the death of the complainant puts
an end to the prosecution.”
12. At this stage, reference to Section 302 of the
Criminal Procedure Code is necessary. Section 302
of the Criminal Procedure Code is contained in
Chapter XXIV with the heading “General provisions
as to inquiries and trials”. Section 302 relates to
permission to conduct prosecution, which is to the
following effect:
“302. Permission to conduct prosecution.—(1)
Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a
case may permit the prosecution to be
conducted by any person other than a police
officer below the rank of Inspector; but no
person, other than the Advocate General or
Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor
or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be
entitled to do so without such permission:
Provided that no police officer shall be
permitted to conduct the prosecution if he
has taken part in the investigation into the
offence with respect to which the accused is
being prosecuted.
(2) Any person conducting the prosecution
may do so personally or by a pleader.”
13. This Court had the occasion to consider Sections
256 and 302 in Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat
[Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat, (2006) 5 SCC 530:
(2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 630]. In the above case, a
complaint was filed under Section 500 read with
Section 34 IPC. A petition was filed under Section
482 of the 1973 Code against the order of issue of
process in the High Court, which was dismissed.
SLP was filed in this Court in which notice was
issued [Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat, SLP (Cri)
No. 4367 of 2003, order dated 31-10-2003 (SC),
wherein it was directed: “Issue notice. Mr Ravindra
Keshavrao Adsure, learned counsel, takes notice on
behalf of Respondent 1 and seeks two weeks' time
for filing the counter-affidavit. Time prayed for is
granted. One week's time thereafter is granted for
the
rejoinder-affidavit.
Stay
of
further
proceedings.”] and during the pendency of the
appeal, it was noted that the complainant had died.
It was contended that the complaint be dismissed
on the ground that the complainant is dead. This
Court, in the above context, referred to Sections
256 and 302. This Court repelled the argument of
the appellant that the complaint be dismissed on
the ground that the complainant had died. The
following was held in paras 3 to 6: (SCC pp. 531-32)
“3. The learned counsel for the appellants,
with reference to Section 256 of the Code,
submitted that the complaint was to be
dismissed on the ground of the death of the
complainant. As noted above, the learned
counsel for Respondent 1's legal heirs
submitted that the legal heirs of the
complainant shall file an application for
permission to prosecute and, therefore, the
complaint still survives consideration.
4. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note
of what has been stated by this Court earlier
on the principles applicable. In Ashwin
Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra
[Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983: 1967 Cri LJ
943], with reference to Section 495 of the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
(hereinafter referred to as “the old Code”) it
was held that the Magistrate had the power
to permit a relative to act as the complainant
to continue the prosecution. In Jimmy
Jahangir Madan v. Bolly Cariyappa Hindley
[Jimmy Jahangir Madan v. Bolly Cariyappa
Hindley, (2004) 12 SCC 509: 2004 SCC (Cri)
Supp 317] after referring to Ashwin case
[Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983: 1967 Cri LJ 943]
it was held that heir of the complainant can
be allowed to file a petition under Section
302 of the Code to continue the prosecution.
5. Section 302 of the Code reads as under:
‘302.
Permission
to
conduct
prosecution.—(1)
Any
Magistrate
inquiring into or trying a case may
permit the prosecution to be
conducted by any person other than a
police officer below the rank of
Inspector; but no person, other than
the Advocate General or Government
Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or
Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be
entitled to do so without such
permission:
Provided that no police officer shall be
permitted to conduct the prosecution
if he has taken part in the
investigation into the offence with
respect to which the accused is being
prosecuted.
(2) Any person conducting the
prosecution may do so personally or
by a pleader.’
6. To bring in the application of Section 302
of the Code, permission to conduct the
prosecution has to be obtained from the
Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case.
The Magistrate is empowered to permit the
prosecution to be conducted by any person
other than a police officer below the rank of
Inspector; but no person other than the
Advocate General or the Government
Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant
Public Prosecutor shall be entitled to do so
without such permission.”
14. Two-Judge Bench in Jimmy Jahangir Madan v.
Bolly Cariyappa Hindley [Jimmy Jahangir Madan v.
Bolly Cariyappa Hindley, (2004) 12 SCC 509: 2004
SCC (Cri) Supp 317] referring to this Court's
judgment in Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas [Ashwin
Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC
983: 1967 Cri LJ 943] had held that heirs of the
complainant can continue the prosecution. The
following was held in para 5: (SCC p. 512)
“5. The question as to whether the heirs of
the complainant can be allowed to file an
application under Section 302 of the Code to
continue the prosecution is no longer res
integra as the same has been concluded by a
decision of this Court in Ashwin Nanubhai
Vyas v. State of Maharashtra [Ashwin
Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1967 SC 983: 1967 Cri LJ 943] in which case the
Court was dealing with a case under Section
495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
which is corresponding to Section 302 of the
Code. In that case, it was laid down that upon
the death of the complainant, under the
provisions of Section 495 of the said Code,
the mother of the complainant could be
allowed to continue the prosecution. It was
further laid down that she could make the
application either herself or through a
pleader. Undisputedly, in the present case,
the heirs themselves have not filed the
applications to continue the prosecution;
rather, the same have been filed by their
power-of-attorney holders. …”
In the present case, the averments that late
Thakur
Dutt
Sharma
is
survived
by
the
legal
representatives mentioned in the application and no other
legal heir is alive, is duly supported by an affidavit, and
there is no reason to disbelieve this. Hence, the present
application is allowed, and the legal representatives
mentioned in paragraph-3 of the application are ordered to
be brought on record.
The present application stands disposed of.
Cr. Appeal No. 289 of 2025
Necessary entry be made in the memo of
parties. The amended memo of parties be filed within two
weeks, and the matter be listed thereafter.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
17th July, 2026
(Chander)
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