Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
LPA 651/2013
TEJINDER KAUR
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Arvind Kumar, adv.
versus
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT OF GURU
HARKISHAN PUBLIC SCOOL THR
PRINCIPAL & MANAGER & ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Abinash K. Mishra and Mr.
Gaurav Kumar Pandey, Advs. for R-1 & 2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
12.03.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
This appeal assails order dated 16 April 2013 passed by a
learned Single Judge of this Court in WP (C) 8040/2011. In the said
proceedings, the appellant challenged an order dated 30 September
2011, suspending her from the services of Guru Harkishan Public
School1 as well as a communication dated 18 October 2011 issued by
the school initiating a fact-finding inquiry.
2.
Having failed in both the challenges before the learned Single
Judge, who has dismissed the writ petition by judgment dated 16 April
2013, the petitioner before the learned Single Judge has preferred the
present appeal.
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
3.
The sole ground on which the appellant assailed the order of
suspension before the learned Single Judge was that the suspension
had taken place without obtaining the prior approval of the Directorate
of Education2.
4.
The learned Single Judge has, in para 4 of the impugned
judgment, held that as the respondent was an unaided private school, it
was not required to obtain any prior approval of the DOE.
5.
In arriving at the said conclusion, the learned Single Judge has
inter alia relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
in Kathuria Public School v. Director of Education3.
6.
That aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in
various decisions, one of the most recent being a decision of a
Coordinate Bench of this Court, authored by one of us (C. Hari
Shankar, J.) in Ramjas School Anand Parvat Senior Wing v. Archna
Chugh4, in which, after considering the decision in Kathuria Public
School, we took the view that the matter was thereafter concluded by
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Director of
Education5.
7.
Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, points out that
Ramjas School was not a case of an unaided minority institution. On
1 “the School” hereinafter
2 “DOE” hereinafter
3 123 (2005) DLT 89 (DB)
4 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1360
5 (2016) 6 SCC 541
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
this aspect, too, the law stands settled against the respondent by the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School
Employees’ Association v. UOI6.
8.
Section 8 of the Delhi School Education Act7 occurs in Chapter
IV thereof, which is titled “terms and conditions of service and
employees of recognised private schools”. Section 8(4) does not, in
any manner, except its application to unaided minority schools and
covers, on its face, all “recognised private schools”.
However,
Section 12 of the DSE Act, which also occurs in Chapter IV, states
that nothing contained in Chapter IV would apply to an unaided
minority school.
9.
Section 12 of the DSE Act came up for consideration before the
Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School. In para 21 of the
said decision, the Supreme Court has, in unequivocal terms, held
Section 12 to be unconstitutional, save and except to the extent that it
excludes the applicability of Section 8(2) to unaided minority schools.
We reproduce, for ready reference, paras 19 to 21 of Frank Anthony
Public School, thus:
“19. Section 8(4) would be inapplicable to minority institutions
if it had conferred blanket power on the Director to grant or
withhold prior approval in every case where a management
proposed to suspend an employee but we see that it is not so. The
management has the right to order immediate suspension of an
employee in case of gross misconduct but in order to prevent an
abuse of power by the management a safeguard is provided to the
employee that approval should be obtained within 15 days. The
6 (1986) 4 SCC 707
7 “DSE Act” hereinafter
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
Director is also bound to accord his approval if there are adequate
and reasonable grounds for such suspension. The provision appears
to be eminently reasonable and sound and the answer to the
question in regard to this provision is directly covered by the
decision in All Saints High School where Chandrachud, C.J. and
Kailasam, J. upheld Section 3(3)(a) of the Act impugned therein.
We may also mention that in that case the right of appeal conferred
by Section 4 of the Act was also upheld. How necessary it is to
afford some measure of protection to employees, without
interfering with the management's right to take disciplinary action,
is illustrated by the action taken by the management in this very
case against some of the teachers. These teachers took part along
with others in a "silent march", first on April 9, 1986 and again on
April 10, 1986, despite warning by the principal. The march was
during the break when there were no classes. There were no
speeches, no chanting or shouting of slogans, no violence and no
disruption of studies. The behaviour of the teachers appears to have
been orderly and exemplary. One would have thought that the
teachers were, by their silent and dignified protest, setting an
example and the soundest of precedents to follow to all agitators
everywhere. But instead of sympathy and appreciation they were
served with orders of immediate suspension, something which
would have never happened if all the provisions of Section 8 were
applicable to the institution.
20.
Thus, Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) do not encroach
upon any right of minorities to administer their educational
institutions. Section 8(2), however, must, in view of the authorities,
be held to interfere with such right and, therefore, inapplicable to
minority institutions. Section 9 is again innocuous since Section 14
which applies to unaided minority schools is virtually on the same
lines as Section 9. We have already considered Section 11 while
dealing with Section 8(3). We must, therefore, hold that Section 12
which makes the provisions of Chapter IV inapplicable to unaided
minority schools is discriminatory not only because it makes
Section 10 inapplicable to minority institutions, but also because it
makes Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4), 8(5), 9 and 11 inapplicable to
unaided minority institutions. That the Parliament did not
understand Sections 8 to 11 as offending the fundamental right
guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30(1) is evident from the
fact that Chapter IV applies to aided minority institutions and it
cannot for a moment be suggested that surrender of the right under
Article 30(1) is the price which the aided minority institutions have
to pay to obtain aid from the Government.
21.
The result of our discussion is that Section 12 of the Delhi
School Education Act which makes the provisions of Chapter IV
inapplicable to unaided minority institutions is discriminatory and
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
void except to the extent that it makes Section 8(2) inapplicable to
unaided minority institutions. We, therefore, grant a declaration to
that effect and direct the Union of India and the Delhi
Administration and its officers, to enforce the provisions of
Chapter IV [except Section 8(2)] in the manner provided in the
chapter in the case of the Frank Anthony Public School. The
management of the school is directed not to give effect to the
orders of suspension passed against the members of the staff.”
10.
Though learned Counsel for the respondent sought to contend
that paras 19 to 21 of the judgment in Frank Anthony Public School
are obiter and would not, therefore, be binding, we are unable to
accept the argument for three reasons.
11.
Firstly, when we read Frank Anthony Public School in its
entirety, we cannot hold that the findings with respect to Section 12 of
the DSE Act are obiter. They are integral, to our mind, to
determination of the controversy in Frank Anthony Public School.
12.
The second reason why we cannot accept the submission is that,
when the Supreme Court strikes down a statutory provision, there is
no question of treating the said decision as obiter. A statutory
provision which is struck down by the Supreme Court ceases to be
enforceable in law. It would amount to folly, therefore, if the said
decision is either to be treated as obiter or restricted to the facts of the
case before the Supreme Court.
13.
The third reason why we cannot accept this submission is
because even obiter of the Supreme Court is binding on all courts
lower in the judicial hierarchy. We may refer, for this proposition, to
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. CIT8 and
Municipal Committee v. Hazara Singh9
14.
For the aforesaid reasons, it is clear that Section 12 of the DSE
Act would not render Section 8(4) inapplicable to unaided minority
schools. The sequitur would be that the order suspending the
petitioner from service, having been issued without the prior approval
of the DOE, would be rendered null and void to that extent as it
breaches Section 8(4) of the DSE Act.
15.
We may also note, in this context, that though Chapter V of the
DSE Act contains “provisions applicable to unaided minority
schools”, there is no provision in Chapter V which deals with
suspension, unlike Section 8(4) of the DSE Act. To the extent of the
requirement of obtaining prior approval of the DOE before suspending
an employee from service, it is clear that Section 8(4) would apply to
all recognised private schools aided or unaided, minority or nonminority.
16.
We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the learned
Single Judge to the extent that it has rejected the petitioner’s challenge
to the order dated 30 September 2011 suspending her from service.
Resultantly, the order of suspension would also stand quashed and set
aside and WP (C) 8040/2011 filed by the petitioner before the learned
Single Judge would stand allowed to that extent.
8 (2020) 18 SCC 625
9 (1975) 1 SCC 794
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
17.
We are, however, not inclined to interfere with the decision of
the learned Single Judge, insofar as he has not chosen to entertain the
challenge to the preliminary enquiry. The school had clearly stated
before the learned Single Judge that the preliminary enquiry was
merely fact finding in nature and that, if disciplinary proceedings were
to result, they would take place in accordance with the provisions of
the Act. Mr. Arvind Kumar, learned Counsel for the appellant has not
been able to show us any law or provision which could restrain the
respondent from holding such a preliminary fact finding authority. To
the extent that the writ petition challenged the holding of the fact
finding authority, therefore, we uphold the decision of the learned
Single Judge that the challenge was misconceived.
18.
We have also been informed that, after the passing of the
impugned order, disciplinary proceedings ensued, following which the
petitioner was terminated from service and that the challenge was,
thereafter, taken to the Delhi School Education Tribunal where, too,
the petitioner did not succeed and that a further challenge thereto is
pending before a learned Single Judge of this Court.
19.
Needless to say, though we have set aside the order of
suspension, any substantive relief could enure to the petitioner only if
she succeeds in her challenge before the learned Single Judge against
the order of termination.
20.
As such, our decision on the order of suspension would be
subject to the outcome of the challenge by the petitioner to her order
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
of termination from service.
21.
The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no orders
as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
MARCH 12, 2026
AR/SS
LPA 651/2013
KUMAR
17:28:44
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review