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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.699 of 2025
Date of Decision: 08.04.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Sh. Tej Singh
……...Petitioner
Versus
Sanjay Kumar
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Bodh Raj Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. H.S. Rangra, Advocate.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 of the
Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment
dated 29.10.2025, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District
Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.20/2025, titled Tej Singh
Vs. Sanjay Kumar, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 21.05.2025, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Chachiot
at
Gohar,
District
Mandi,
Himachal
Pradesh,
in
case
No.204-I/2021, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the
petitioner-accused (hereinafter, “accused”) guilty of having committed
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in
short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of two months and pay compensation to the tune
of Rs.1,50,000/- to the respondent-complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that accused person is contractor and owner of JCB
machine and he had deployed him as its operator on monthly wages of
₹20,000/- w.e.f. 13.11.2019 to 17.12.2020. He alleged that during afore
period, he was deployed by accused on different places in Tehsil Chachiot
and Tehsil Thunag in different projects like making plots, road cuttings,
drainage etc., but he did not pay salary/cost of work, which had become
more than ₹2,60,000/- till December, 2020. He alleged that with a view to
discharge
his
liability,
accused
issued
Cheque
No.063589
dated
27.10.2020, amounting to ₹1,00,000/- drawn on his account, maintained
with PNB,
Branch Chail Chowk, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh.
However, fact remains that afore Cheque on its presentation to the Bank
concerned, was dishonoured with the remarks “Funds Insufficient”. After
receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant served accused with a legal
notice calling upon him to make the payment good well within stipulated
time. However, since accused failed to make the payment good within the
time stipulated in the legal notice, complainant was compelled to initiate
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, Himachal
Pradesh.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 21.05.2025, held the
accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act
and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the description given
hereinabove.
4.
Though, at the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in
the Court of
learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal
Pradesh, however, same was dismissed vide judgment dated 29.10.2025. In
the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court by way of
instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the
judgments of conviction recorded by the Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 15.12.2025, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below,
subject to petitioner/accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount
and furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/-,
however, fact
remains that despite repeated opportunities, aforesaid order was never
complied with.
6.
Today during proceedings of the case, learned counsel
representing the petitioner fairly stated that since petitioner/accused is not
coming forward to impart instructions and he has not complied with the
order dated 15.12.2025, this Court may proceed to decide the petition on
its own merits.
7.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with Mr. Bodh Raj Thakur,
learned counsel representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen
in grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that
both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect
of the matter and there is no scope left for interference.
8.
Interestingly, in the case at hand, accused while deposing
under Section 351 of the BNSS, claimed himself to be innocent and
attempted to set up a defence that Cheque in question has been tampered
by the complainant, as he manipulated the amount mentioned in the
Cheque from ₹10,000/- to ₹1,00,000/-. Though in defence he examined
himself as DW1, but he was unable to probabilise afore defence by leading
cogent and convincing evidence. Since factum with regard to issuance of
Cheque as well as his signatures thereupon never came to be disputed at
the behest of accused, no illegality can be said to have been committed by
both the Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act,
which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that
Cheque was issued towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt,
aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption,
accused either can refer to the documents and evidence led on record by
the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive
evidence, if any. However, in the case at hand, accused was unable to point
out from the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the
complainant that Cheque issued by him was not issued towards discharge
of lawful liability.
9.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been
included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered
that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose money is usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139,
the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it
is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however,
the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the
NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is
called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a
dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence
adduced
before
it
keeping
in
view
the
statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed
to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of
this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing
summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has
been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground
to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
10.
Complainant in the case at hand examined himself as CW1. In
his examination-in-chief, he tendered evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CA,
reiterating therein averments contained in the complaint. Apart from above,
he also tendered documentary evidence such as Cheque Ex.CW1/A,
dishonour memo Ex.CW1/B, legal notice Ex.CW1/C, postal receipt
Ex.CW1/D and acknowledgment Ex.CW1/E. If the cross-examination
conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it can be safely
concluded that accused was unable to extract anything contrary to what
this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination,
he stated that he is a JCB operator and he was engaged by the accused
from November 2019 to September 2020. He further stated that he did not
receive
any
amount
during
aforesaid
period.
He
stated
that
contractor/accused had issued the Cheque in his favour for the part
payment of his wages. While admitting that no written agreement was made
for his engagement, he feigned ignorance that the bank officials have taken
away the tipper and JCB of Tej Singh. While denying that he did not do the
work of Tej Singh honestly, as a result of which he suffered losses, he also
denied that he used to take diesel out of the JCB and sell it to others and
he was caught many times by the accused. He denied that due to his
dishonest conduct, accused suffered losses to the tune of ₹3,00,000/-. He
also denied that in Cheque Ex.CW1/A, name of Sanjay Kumar has been
written with different handwriting and ₹1,00,000/- has been written with
other handwriting. He denied that he had not sent any legal notice. He also
denied that he received entire salary from the accused during the period he
was engaged as a driver. He denied that Cheque Ex.CW1/A was originally
for ₹10,000/- and it was tampered with. He stated that if his monthly
payment was ₹20,000/-, then he is entitled to ₹2,60,000/- for the period of
engagement. He self-stated that said amount is due to him. Pattern of
cross-examination conducted upon the complainant clearly reveals that
attempt was made by the accused to prove the case that Cheque has been
issued for a sum of ₹10,000/-, but the same has been tampered by the
complainant and he presented the same for ₹1,00,000/-. It also emerges
from the cross-examination of complainant that factum with respect to
employment of the complainant as JCB operator is not in dispute. It is also
not in dispute that he worked w.e.f. November 2019 to September 2020.
Though accused attempted to put a suggestion that salary was received in
cash, but to probabilise afore defence, no receipt, if any, taken from the
complainant ever came to be adduced on record.
11.
Accused while examining himself as DW1 deposed that his
dealing with Sanjay Kumar was only for ₹10,000/- and he also issued a
Cheque of the said amount. He deposed that he issued the Cheque after
filling the amount and signing the same. He further deposed that
complainant had filed a false case of ₹1,00,000/- against him. He stated
that the complainant is working as Driver with him and only an amount of
₹10,000/- was due to the complainant. In his cross-examination, he
admitted that the complainant had worked with him as JCB operator from
13.11.2019 to 17.11.2020. He also admitted that he was engaged as a
Driver for the monthly salary of ₹20,000/- and as such, complainant was
entitled to an amount of ₹2,60,000/-. While denying that aforesaid amount
is liable to be paid, he admitted factum of his having issued the Cheque in
discharge of part liability. He deposed that he had issued the Cheque for an
amount of ₹10,000/-, but he was unable to produce any receipt qua any
payment made to the complainant. He admitted that Ex.CW1/A is the same
Cheque, which has been issued by him. While denying that notice
Ex.CW1/C was served upon him, he stated that the acknowledgment does
not bear his signature.
12.
Even statement made by the accused in his defence clearly
establishes factum with regard to issuance of Cheque as well as his
signatures thereupon and as such, presumption as available under Section
118 and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the case of the
petitioner that Cheque in question was issued in discharge of lawful
liability. Though accused attempted to rebut the presumption by setting up
a defence that Cheque issued by him for a sum of ₹10,000/- has been
tampered, but no cogent and convincing evidence ever came to be led on
record
to
prove
aforesaid
defence.
To
the
contrary,
complainant
successfully proved on record that Cheque in question was issued by the
accused towards the discharge of lawful liability, but the same was
dishonoured on account of ‘insufficient funds’ in the bank account of the
accused.
13.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
record by the respective parties.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction
is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross
miscarriage of justice.”
15.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
16.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity
committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as
such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned
judgments passed by the Courts below.
17.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
18.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by
the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner, if
any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 15.12.2025 stands vacated. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
April 08, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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