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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 17.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 24.02.2026
O.M.P. (COMM) 69/2017
TDI INTERNATIONAL INDIA LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ashish Mohan, Senior
Advocate along with Mr.
Akshit Mago and Mr. Auritro
Mukherjee, Advocates.
versus
DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava
and Mr. Ankit Bhushan,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 19961, challenging the Award dated 19.02.20102 passed by the
learned Sole Arbitrator in the matter titled <M/s TDI International
India Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.=
2.
At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the challenge in the
present Petition is confined only to Claim Nos. 1 and 3. The findings
rendered by the learned Arbitrator in respect of the remaining claims
have attained finality and are not under challenge before this Court.
A&C Act
Impugned Award
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
O.M.P. (COMM) 69/2017
BRIEF FACTS:
3.
The Petitioner, who was the Claimant in the arbitral
proceedings, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor, indoor,
and transit advertising. In October 2006, the Respondent herein
(Respondent in the arbitral proceedings) invited tenders for the grant
of advertisement rights in Line 3 (East Extension) of MRTS Phase-I,
covering Mandi House, Pragati Maidan, and Indraprastha Metro
Stations.
4.
The Petitioner participated in the tender process and was
declared the successful bidder. Accordingly, a Letter of Acceptance
dated 09.11.2006 (revised on 15.11.2006)3 was issued in its favour.
Thereafter, a Licence Agreement dated 27.11.20064 was executed
between the parties.
5.
Under the terms of the Licence Agreement, the Respondent was
to provide prefabricated advertising panels inside Mandi House Metro
Station and bare advertising spaces inside Pragati Maidan and
Indraprastha Metro Stations. The bare spaces were to be identified and
developed by the Petitioner, subject to the Respondent’s approval. The
licence period was stipulated to be four years from the date of
handover or from the date of notice for takeover of the first panel,
whichever was earlier, subject to the provision of electricity to the
concerned panel.
6.
Pursuant to the LoA, the Petitioner submitted the required
location layout plans on 16.11.2006 and the electrical routing plans on
LoA
License Agreement
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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22.01.2007. The Respondent approved both the location layout plans
and the electrical plans on 03.03.2007.
7.
However, by letter dated 07.03.2007, the Respondent withdrew
its approval in respect of two advertising sites, namely Site Nos. 29
and 30, admeasuring 800 sq. ft. (74.50 sq. m.), situated on the Foot
Over Bridge at Indraprastha Metro Station.
8.
It is stated that the Petitioner objected to the withdrawal of the
aforesaid sites and sought their restoration, contending that the Foot
Over Bridge formed an integral part of the station premises and that
no viable alternate locations were available. The Respondent, on the
other hand, maintained that advertising was permissible only within
the station premises and called upon the Petitioner to propose alternate
sites.
9.
It is further stated that despite the withdrawal of the said sites,
the Respondent continued to raise invoices towards the licence fee,
including charges attributable to the withdrawn area. The Petitioner
disputed such billing and claimed remission of the licence fee
corresponding to the withdrawn advertising space. The Respondent,
however, asserted that the licence fee remained payable strictly in
terms of the Licence Agreement.
10.
At Mandi House Metro Station, twenty-four prefabricated
advertising panels were handed over to and taken over by the
Petitioner following a joint inspection conducted on 06.12.2006.
Approximately one year later, by letter dated 29.12.2007, the
Petitioner raised a grievance that eleven of these panels, admeasuring
352 sq. ft. (31.68 sq. m.), were not marketable, as they were allegedly
located beyond the normal train stopping limits and marked <out of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
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bounds= for passengers. The Respondent permitted relocation of these
panels only as an additional area, chargeable on a pro rata basis, an
arrangement disputed by the Petitioner.
11.
In view of the disputes that arose between the parties, the
Petitioner invoked the arbitration clause contained in the Licence
Agreement and sought the appointment of an arbitrator. Consequently,
the Respondent appointed a Sole Arbitrator by letter dated
05.09.2008.
12.
The Petitioner filed its Statement of Claims, inter alia, raising
Claim No. 1 concerning withdrawal of the advertising sites at
Indraprastha Metro Station and Claim No. 3 seeking remission of
licence fee in respect of the eleven panels at Mandi House Metro
Station. The Respondent filed its reply and counter-claims. Both
parties led evidence in support of their respective cases.
13.
Upon conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, the learned Sole
Arbitrator rendered the Impugned Award dated 19.02.2010. By the
said Award, Claim No. 1 was partly allowed with limited relief,
whereas Claim No. 3 was rejected.
14.
The findings of the learned Arbitrator in respect of the claims
raised by the Petitioner are summarised hereinbelow:
Claim
Claims before the Ld.
Conclusions of the learned
No.
Arbitrator
Arbitrator
1.
Non-availability of 800 Sq. a) In the case of the withdrawal
ft (74.50 sq.mt) Advertising
of the approval by DMRC for
Area at Indraprastha Metro
Site nos. 29 & 30 (total area=
Station
800 Sq. ft. or 74.50 sq.mt.) at
Indraprastha Metro station
and non-proposal of any
alternate sites by M/s TDI, on
an ad hoc basis, only 50% of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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2.
Non-availability of the
Thirteen (13) Prefabricated
Recessed
Advertising
Panels at Mandi House
Metro Station
3.
Not Marketable Eleven (11)
nos. prefabricated Recessed
advertising Panels of the
size of 2400 mm (8 ft)*1200
mm (4 ft) each lying in <Out
of Bounds= at Mandi House
Metro Station. Total area
352 sq. ft. (31.68 sq. mt)
4.
Depreciation in Marketable
Value Due to Delays
Caused by "DMRC" in
the normal rate of License
Fee may be charged w.e.f.
10.03.2007. Normal License
Fee may be charged from 7
days after the date an
alternative proposal (if any)
made by M/s TDI is approved
by DMRC.
b) M/s TDI's claim in respect of
Security
Deposit
being
governed by the advertising
area made available is
rejected. Security Deposit
shall remain payable as being
invoiced by DMRC as per CI.
16 and CI. 4.4 and CI. 4.6 of
License Agreement.
The claim that there was delay in
provision of electricity for the 24
pre-fabricated handed over/taken
inside Mandi House Metro
station and hence no License fee
should be payable for these
panels for the period 06.12.2006
to 31.10.2007 is rejected.
The Claim that no Licence fee
should
be
payable
from
06.12.2006 for the eleven (11)
nos. Prefabricated Recessed
Advertising Panels (total area
352 sa.ft = 31.68 sq.mt) inside
Mandi House Metro Station for
being not marketable because of
lying in 'Out of Bounds Area', is
rejected.
The Claim that there was delay
in provision of electricity by
DMRC for the advertising panels
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
13:58:07
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Facilitating" Claimant for
Carrying Out the Electrical
Cabling
Work
at
Indraprastha Metro station
inside
Indraprastha
Metro
station, and hence there should
be 75% remission in the License
fee payable for these panels for
the period 10.03.2006 to
31.07.2008, is rejected.
The Claim that M/s TDI are
entitled to any compensation on
account of the stated 'substantial
curtailment in the marketability
of the licensed advertising space
due
to
rampant
parallel
advertising resorted by the
Respondent', is rejected.
The Claim for extension of
license period by 18 months
beyond the four-year term of
06.12.2006 to 05.12.2010. or in
the alternate for compensation
"for the loss of business
opportunities on account of nonavailability of the contracted
advertisement
space", is rejected.
5.
Substantial Curtailment in
the Marketability of the
Licensed Advertising Space
Due to Rampant Parallel
Advertising Resorted by the
Respondents
6.
Original Contracted Period
of Four (4) Years should be
Redefined and Extended by
18 Months due to the
Respondent having failed to
make available full Quantity
of Licensed Advertising
Rights as detailed under
Claims 1.,2.,3., and 4., OR
IN THE ALTERNATE, the
Claimant
should
be
compensated’ for a sum of
Rs. One Crore for the
resultant loss of business'
opportunities on account of
non-availability
of
the
contracted
advertisement
space'.
Cost
of
Arbitration The Claim for 'Cost
Proceedings.
Arbitration
Proceedings'
rejected.
7.
15.
of
is
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, the Petitioner has instituted
the present petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act before this
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Court, challenging the Impugned Award only insofar as it relates to
Claim Nos. 1 and 3.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
16.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
rejection of Claim Nos. 1 and 3 by the learned Arbitrator is contrary to
the settled parameters governing interference under Section 34 of the
A&C Act.
17.
Insofar as Claim No. 1 is concerned, learned Senior Counsel
would contend that the Petitioner structured its bid and financial
commitments on the basis of the advertising sites approved under the
layout plans, including Site Nos. 29 and 30 admeasuring 800 sq. ft. on
the Foot Over Bridge at Indraprastha Metro Station. It is further
contended that the Respondent, having initially granted approval after
due examination of the layout and electrical plans, could not have
subsequently withdrawn such approval without assigning reasons, as
such withdrawal amounts to an arbitrary departure from the
contractual arrangement.
18.
It would further be submitted that the Foot Over Bridge forms
an integral part of the station premises and that similarly situated sites
on the same structure, as well as at other stations, was approved for
advertising, yet the Respondent insisted upon alternate sites despite
one platform at Indraprastha Metro Station being non-operational,
thereby
rendering
relocation
commercially
impracticable
and
disentitling the Respondent from levying licence fee for the
withdrawn area.
19.
Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the learned
Arbitrator erred in directing recovery of 50% of the licence fee for the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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withdrawn sites, as such determination is ad hoc in nature and
contrary to the express terms of the Licence Agreement, which does
not contemplate payment of the licence fee for advertising space
admittedly not made available.
20.
It would also be contended that the learned Arbitrator could not
have granted relief on equitable considerations in the absence of
express authorisation under Section 28(2) of the A&C Act, to decide
the dispute ex aequo et bono, and that in the absence of such consent,
the Arbitrator was bound to adjudicate strictly in accordance with the
contractual terms.
21.
In relation to Claim No. 3, learned Senior Counsel would
submit that eleven prefabricated advertising panels at Mandi House
Metro Station were rendered commercially unusable due to
restrictions on passenger movement, marking of the area as <out of
bounds=, erection of temporary barriers, and inadequate lighting, and
that such operational constraints were introduced subsequent to the
award of the tender without disclosure to the Petitioner at the time of
bidding.
22.
It would further be argued that although the panels were
physically handed over, their placement beyond the normal train
stopping limits deprived them of visibility and passenger footfall,
thereby frustrating the commercial purpose of the licence, yet the
learned Arbitrator erroneously relied upon Clause 14 of the Licence
Agreement to hold the Petitioner bound by acceptance of business
viability, even though such acceptance could only relate to
circumstances existing at the time of execution of the contract and not
to subsequent operational changes.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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23.
Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the Respondent,
by approving relocation of the said panels, effectively acknowledged
their non-viability, yet by treating the relocated panels as additional
area chargeable on a pro rata basis rather than as substitute sites in
lieu of the unusable panels, the Respondent has unjustly enriched
itself and acted contrary to a fair and reasonable interpretation of the
contractual framework.
24.
In support of these submissions concerning Claim Nos. 1 and 3,
learned Senior Counsel would place reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd.5, to contend that
an arbitral award that travels beyond the terms of the contract or
permits recovery contrary to the contractual framework is vitiated by
patent illegality and falls within the ambit of public policy, thereby
warranting interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
25.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent would submit that the present petition amounts to an
attempt to seek re-appreciation of evidence and re-interpretation of the
contractual terms, which is impermissible within the limited scope of
proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
26.
It would further be submitted that the learned Arbitrator
examined the tender conditions, the Licence Agreement, the
correspondence exchanged between the parties, and the oral as well as
documentary evidence adduced during the arbitral proceedings, and
thereafter has rendered a detailed and reasoned Award, and that the
(2003) 5 SCC 705
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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findings so returned is neither arbitrary nor perverse but is based on a
plausible and legally sustainable interpretation of the contract.
27.
Insofar as Claim No. 1 is concerned, learned counsel for the
Respondent would submit that the Licence Agreement expressly
reserves to the Respondent the right to reject any proposed advertising
site without assigning reasons and to treat the licensed advertising
area as a single indivisible lot, and that the learned Arbitrator, while
recognising this contractual position, nevertheless has granted a 50%
remission of the licence fee on an ad hoc basis so as to balance the
rival contentions of the parties, and therefore the Petitioner, having
already been granted partial relief, could not seek a further redetermination of the same claim under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
28.
With respect to Claim No. 3, it would be submitted that all
twenty-four prefabricated advertising panels at Mandi House Metro
Station were duly handed over to and accepted by the Petitioner on
06.12.2006 pursuant to a joint inspection conducted without any
contemporaneous objection, and that the issue of alleged nonmarketability of eleven panels was raised for the first time after more
than one year, which aspect has been specifically noticed and relied
upon by the learned Arbitrator while rejecting the claim.
29.
It would further be contended that the learned Arbitrator rightly
placed reliance upon the express undertaking contained in Clause 14
of the Licence Agreement, whereby the Petitioner acknowledged
having inspected the prefabricated panels and accepted their business
viability and unequivocally agreed not to raise any claim on that
account, and that the conclusion reached in the Impugned Award
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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flows directly from the contractual stipulations and the admitted
conduct of the Petitioner.
30.
Learned counsel for the Respondent would also submit that the
reliance placed by the Petitioner upon the judgment in ONGC v. Saw
Pipes Ltd. (supra) is misplaced, since the Impugned Award neither
rewrites the contract nor travels beyond its terms, and that the Award
discloses no patent illegality or conflict with public policy but
represents a possible and reasonable view based on the material on
record, and therefore warrants no interference under Section 34 of the
A&C Act.
ANALYSIS:
31.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties at length and, with their able assistance, has carefully
perused the paperbook and other material documents placed on record,
including the record of the Arbitral Tribunal, as well as the written
submissions filed by the respective parties.
32.
At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court is conscious
of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an objection
petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The contours of judicial
intervention in such proceedings have been authoritatively delineated
and settled by a consistent and evolving line of precedents of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
33.
In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
decisions, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.6, while dealing with the grounds of
conflict with the public policy of India and perversity, grounds which
have also been urged in the present case, made certain pertinent
observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
<Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2), (2-A)
and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section
34 has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five sub-clauses
which are not relevant to the issues raised before us. Insofar as
clause (b) is concerned, it has two sub-clauses, namely, (i) and (ii).
Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to the controversy in
hand. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides that if the Court finds
that the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India,
it may set aside the award.
Public policy
31. <Public policy= is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is
also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872
uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.
That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.
*****
35. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994
Supp (1) SCC 644, a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that the doctrine of public policy is somewhat open4textured and
flexible. By citing earlier decisions, it was observed that there are
two conflicting positions which are referred to as the <narrow
view= and the <broad view=. According to the narrow view, courts
cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the broad view
countenances judicial law making in these areas. In the field of
private international law, it was pointed out, courts refuse to apply
a rule of foreign law or recognise a foreign judgment or a foreign
arbitral award if it is found that the same is contrary to the public
policy of the country in which it is sought to be invoked or
enforced. However, it was clarified, a distinction is to be drawn
while applying the rule of public policy between a matter governed
by domestic law and a matter involving conflict of laws. It was
observed that the application of the doctrine of public policy in the
(2025) 2 SCC 417
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field of conflict of laws is more limited than that in the domestic
law and the courts are slower to invoke public policy in cases
involving a foreign element than when a purely municipal legal
issue is involved. It was held that contravention of law alone will
not attract the bar of public policy, and something more than
contravention of law is required.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
40. In ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9
SCC 263, paras 35, 38 & 39, which also related to the period prior
to the 2015 Amendment of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), a three-Judge
Bench of this Court, after considering the decision inONGC
Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, without exhaustively
enumerating the purport of the expression <fundamental policy of
Indian law=, observed that it would include all such fundamental
principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and
enforcement of law in this country. The Court thereafter
illustratively referred to three fundamental juristic principles,
namely:
(a) that in every determination that affects the rights of a
citizen or leads to any civil consequences, the court or
authority or quasi-judicial body must adopt a judicial
approach, that is, it must act bona fide and deal with the
subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and not
actuated by any extraneous consideration;
(b) that while determining the rights and obligations of parties
the court or Tribunal or authority must act in accordance with
the principles of natural justice and must apply its mind to the
attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way
or the other; and
(c) that its decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at the same.
41. InAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, held that audi alteram partem principle is
undoubtedly a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law and is
enshrined in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act. In
addition to the earlier recognised principles forming fundamental
policy of Indian law, it was held that disregarding:
(a) orders of superior courts in India; and
(b) the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court
would also be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental
policy of Indian law.
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BHATIA
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Further, elaborating upon the third juristic principle (i.e. qua
perversity), as laid down inONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263, it was observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such
decision would necessarily be perverse[Associate Builders
case, (2015) 3 SCC 49, para 31].
To this a caveat was added by observing that when a court applies
the <public policy test= to an arbitration award, it does not act as a
court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact cannot be
corrected; and a possible view by the arbitrator on facts has
necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of
the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he
delivers his arbitral award. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score. Thus, once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is
not arbitrary or capricious, it is to be taken as the last word on
facts.
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to
the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the
expression <in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law= was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or
Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its
Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing
with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly
substituted/added Explanations would apply [SsangyongEngg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in
place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it does
away with the use of words : (a) <without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)= in the opening part of the preamended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) <without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section= in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);
secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three
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specified categories by using the words <only if=.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall
not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application
under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996
Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section
34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court
may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,
however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
48.Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral
award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the
award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine
our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or
whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or
justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section
(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent
illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite
to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) <in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law=;
(b) <in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice=; and
(c) <patent illegality= have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
<in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law= was
not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase <contrary to the public policy=, this Court held that for a
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BHATIA
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foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of
law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is that after <the 2015 Amendments= in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase <in conflict with the
public policy of India= must be accorded a restricted meaning in
terms of Explanation 1. The expression <in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law= by use of the word
<fundamental= before the phrase <policy of Indian law= makes the
expression narrower in its application than the phrase <in
contravention with the policy of Indian law=, which means mere
contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of
justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the
binding effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public
interest, are considered contravention of the fundamental
policy of Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award
not arising out of international commercial arbitrations, may also
be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited
by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
to sub-section (2-A) states that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
66. InONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase <public policy of India= as used in Section
34, this Court took the view that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and public
interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest. Thus, an award
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could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was, however,
clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
67. InAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision
of this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
68. InSsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that <patent illegality appearing on the face
of the award= refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It
was also clarified that what is not subsumed within <the
fundamental policy of Indian law=, namely, the contravention of a
statute not linked to <public policy= or <public interest=, cannot be
brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award
on the ground of patent illegality [ See SsangyongEngg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it
was observed, reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under
this
category of
challenge
to
an
arbitral
award
[See SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised inONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral
decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an
award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. InAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such
decision would necessarily be perverse.
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However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a possible
view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the
arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of
evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score.
71. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the 2015
Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under <public policy of India=, would certainly amount
to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was
pointed out that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores
vital evidence, would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was
also observed that a finding based on documents taken behind the
back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision
based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on
evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be
characterised as perverse [ See SsangyongEngg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down inAssociate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed in SsangyongEngg.
& Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and later
approved by a three-Judge Bench of this Court inPatel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC
167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court inDMRC
Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
<39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of <patent illegality=.
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.=
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
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74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court does
not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with an
arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is to be
respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only when an arbitral
award could be categorised as perverse, that on an error of fact an
arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a mere erroneous
application of the law or wrong appreciation of evidence by itself is
not a ground to set aside an award as is clear from the provisions of
sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
75. InDyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
are not to be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless
the court concludes that the perversity of the award goes to the root
of the matter and there is no possibility of an alternative
interpretation that may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed
that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be equated with the
normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach ought to be to
respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party's autonomy
to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided
under the law.
*****
Scope of interference with the interpretation/construction of a
contract accorded in an arbitral award
84. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms
of the contract. In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal passes an
award against the terms of the contract, the award would be
patently illegal. However, an Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to
interpret a contract having regard to terms and conditions of the
contract, conduct of the parties including correspondences
exchanged, circumstances of the case and pleadings of the parties.
If the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the
matter, the Court should not intefere [See: SAIL v. Gupta Brother
Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63; Pure Helium India (P)
Ltd. v. ONGC, (2003) 8 SCC 593; McDermott International
Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181; MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163]. But where, on a full
reading of the contract, the view of the Arbitral Tribunal on the
terms of a contract is not a possible view, the award would be
considered perverse and as such amenable to interference [South
East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd.,
(2020) 5 SCC 164].
Whether unexpressed term can be read into a contract as an
implied condition
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85. Ordinarily, terms of the contract are to be understood in the
way the parties wanted and intended them to be. In agreements of
arbitration, where party autonomy is the grund norm, how the
parties worked out the agreement, is one of the indicators to
decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical
meaning of the expressions used [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2016) 4 SCC 126].
86. However, reading an unexpressed term in an agreement would
be justified on the basis that such a term was always and obviously
intended by the parties thereto. An unexpressed term can be
implied if, and only if, the court finds that the parties must have
intended that term to form part of their contract. It is not enough for
the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the
parties as reasonable men if it had been suggested to them. Rather,
it must have been a term that went without saying, a term necessary
to give business efficacy to the contract, a term which, although
tacit, forms part of the contract [Adani Power (Mundra)
Ltd. v. Gujarat ERC, (2019) 19 SCC 9].
87. But before an implied condition, not expressly found in the
contract, is read into a contract, by invoking the business efficacy
doctrine, it must satisfy the following five conditions:
(a) it must be reasonable and equitable;
(b) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract, that is, a term will not be implied if the contract is
effective without it;
(c) it must be obvious that <it goes without saying=;
(d) it must be capable of clear expression;
(e) it must not contradict any terms of the contract [Nabha
Power Ltd. v. Punjab SPCL, (2018) 11 SCC 508, followed
in Adani Power case, (2019) 19 SCC 9].
(emphasis supplied)
34.
A careful perusal of the Impugned Award, insofar as it relates
to Claim Nos. 1 and 3, which fall for consideration in the present
proceedings, reveals that the learned Arbitrator has duly examined the
entire factual matrix, the relevant contractual provisions, and the rival
submissions of the parties before rendering his findings. The Award
reflects a conscious consideration of the material placed on record and
cannot be said to have been rendered in disregard of the evidence or
the governing clauses of the Licence Agreement.
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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Claim 1
35.
In respect of Claim No. 1, this Court has considered the
challenge to the Impugned Award insofar as it relates to the
withdrawal of approval of Site Nos. 29 and 30 at Indraprastha Metro
Station. Before proceeding further, this Court considers it appropriate
to reproduce the relevant portion of the Award, which reads as
follows:
<Determination
MS TDI had submitted the location plans for Indraprastha Metro
station comprising Site nos. 1 to 30 (total area 2,125 sq.ft),
including Site nos. 26 to 30 (total area 1,000 sq.ft) located on the
FOB with their letter dt. 16.11.2006 and electrical plans with letter
dated 22.01.2007. DMRC had at first approved the Site plans as
proposed by M/s TDI vide their letter dated 03.03.2007, but had
conveyed later non-approval of Site nos. 29 & 30 (total area 800 sq.
ft/74.50 sq.mt) vide their letter dt. 07.03.2007.
On being requested to restore the approval of the two Sites, DMRC
advised that these being not 'inside' the station, were not approved
as per terms and conditions of License Agreement, and advised M/s
TDI to propose alternate sites in lieu of Site nos. 29 & 30. This was
followed by a protracted correspondence with both sides reiterating
their positions.
M/s TDI's main contentions are: (i) One of two platforms at
Indraprastha station being non-functional due to low number of
commuters, they could not find any alternate sites which may be
suitable as advertising spaces. No information about one platform
remaining non-functional was given at the tender stage. (ii) Site
nos. 29 and 30 were located similar to Site nos. 26 to 28 on the
FOB in Indraprastha station and Site nos. 33 to 35 at Pragati
Maidan station, both of which had been approved. They contested
the argument that Site nos. 29 and 30 would be installed, operated
and maintained from outside and had 'viewability' only from
outside, as neither was this suggested by M/s TDI at any stage nor
were they asked about this, and 'viewability' was not an issue
covered under the Agreement. And, (iii) The FOB at Indraprastha
station was accepted as an integral part of the station and was
included in the station layout plans provided to them, and at no
stage had the FOB structure been defined as "inside' and 'outside'.
(iv) Since DMRC could not 'provide' necessary advertising space
arca of 74.50 sq.mt, as required under the Agreement, M/s TDI
were not liable to pay license fee for the same. (v) On the same
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account, demand for Security Deposit too should be based on the
advertising area made available.
DMRC's main contentions are: (i) Site nos. 29 and 30 were visible
only from outside and hence could not be approved. These were
later given under a new Agreement to another Party for outside
advertising, (ii) Site nos. 26 to 28 on the FOB at Indraprastha
station and Site nos. 33 10 35 at Pragati Maidan station were in a
different category as these were visible from inside the stations.
(iii) As per terms and conditions of the Agreement, DMRC had the
right to reject any such proposals and also the right to indicate
alternate locations. (iv) M/s TDI could locate advertising spaces
even on the non-functional platform as these will be visible to
passengers on the opposite platform. (v) Since M/s TDI have not
made any proposals for the 74.50 sq.mt area that could be
approved, as per Agreement License fee for the full area of 469.12
sq.mt is being invoiced and should be paid by them. (vi) As per
Agreement, the amount of Security Deposit to be paid by M/s TDI
will not change on account of any change in the area of advertising
spaces.
Vide CL 2 (Lic. Agt.), "DMRC hereby agrees to provide pre
fabricated advertising panels Inside Mandi House Metro Station
and also bare advertising spaces inside balance 2 (two) stations ie.
Pragati Maidan MRTS station and Indraprastha station, to be
identified, panels fabricated, installed and commissioned after
approval of DMRC" Vide Cl. 4.1 (Lic. Agt.), "The licensee hereby
agrees to take up on license basis all the Advertisement spaces
specified in clause '2' and detailed in Table 1, and also agrees to
submit all plans as one lot for approval by DMRC within 7 days
from the date of issue of LOA." Under CI. 7 (Lic. Agt.), DMRC
"reserves the right to reject any or all of the said submissions,
without assigning any reason whatsoever. DMRC also has the right
to indicate alternate locations." Vide Cl. 9 (Lic. Agt.), "The
licensee will be charged License fee for a minimum of 469.12 Sq.m
advertisement areas even if not fully utilized. For all purposes this
total advertisement area of 469.12 Sq.m will be treated as one lot."
Vide Cl. 14 (Lic. Agt.), M/s TDI "confirms having seen the
prefabricated panels and their locations inside Mandi House MRTS
Station and also seen the potential of advertising inside the balance
2 stations i.e. Pragati Maidan MRTS Station and Indraprastha
MRTS Station also confirms full satisfaction as to the business
viability of licensing" the advertising inside the said stations.
M/s TDI had submitted location plans of proposed panels covering
approximately full area of 200 sq.mt at Indraprastha station as per
Agreement. This was approved at first but soon thereafter, approval
for Site nos. 29 & 30 was withdrawn and DMRC had asked for
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alternate proposals. M/s TDI did not submit alternate proposals for
their reasons as indicated above. The core issue is whether license
fee for this area (74.50 sq.mt) is payable or not under the
Agreement.
In normal circumstances, as per various clauses of the Agreement
referred above, DMRC has the right to reject the proposal for Site
nos. 29 & 30 and to "indicate alternate locations" and in case the
licensee fails to submit acceptable proposals, to charge license fee
for the full arca provided under the Agreement. Thus, DMRC had
"the right to reject any or all of the submissions, without assigning
any reasons whatsoever" and "to indicate alternate locations" [C1.7
of Lic. Agt.) and "The licensee will be charged License fee for a
minimum of 469.12 sq.mt advertisement areas even if not fully
utilized" [C1.9 of Lic. Agt.). However, following particular factors
too need to be taken into account in this case:
(i). Location plans were submitted on 16.11.2006 and electrical
plans on 22.01.2007. The plans were duly approved on
03.03.2007, and then on 07.03.2007 approval for Site nos. 29
& 30 was just withdrawn. If these Sites were clearly not within
the ambit of the Agreement, these should have been rejected at
least soon after submission of electrical plans and in any case
would not have been approved vide letter dt. 03.03.2007, by
which time DMRC had enough time to judge the issue.
(ii). The distinction being made by DMRC between different
sites on the FOB at Indraprastha station seems to be not so
clearcut as to be easily perceivable by the tenderers and should
have been clearly indicated at the Tender stage.
(iii). The advice for submission of 'alternate' sites in lieu of Site
nos. 29 and 30 was reiterated by DMRC but only in July 2008
the specific "alternate location" of the non-operational platform
was indicated. Hence, M/s TDI's contention that they could not
have had the idea that they would have to locate a large part of
the advertising panels at Indraprastha station on a nonoperational platform, a clearly unsuitable proposition from the
commercial view, cannot be overlooked.
Taking all factors into account, the Arbitration Tribunal considers
that in this case both DMRC and M/s TDI share the blame for the
area of 800 Sq.ft (74.50 Sq.m) at Indraprastha station having
remained unapproved and uninstalled. M/s DMRC's argument that
they had a right to reject any submission, as also that M/s TDI on
its own refused to suggest any alternate site, is valid. However, M/s
TDI's arguments that at Indraprastha station, the approval was
withdrawn after having been first approved and the reasons offered
for withdrawal of approval might not have been clearcut at the
tender stage and nor were any clearcut alternate sites proposed by
DMRC soon after the withdrawal of site Nos. 29 and 30, and they
too had difficulty in proposing a commercially viable alternate site,
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too cannot be ignored. Hence, it may be taken as a case of 74.50
"provided" by DMRC nor having been clearly "utilized" by Mis
T131 (wef 10.03.2007).
Hence, considering all factors, on an ad hoc basis, the Tribunal
considers that for the said 74.50 Sq.m area which has not been
installed, only 50% of the normal rate of License Fee may be
charged wef 10.03.2007. Normal License Fee will be leviable from
7 days after the date an alternative proposal (if any) made by M/s
TDI is approved by DMRC.
Regarding the issue of Security Deposit, in reply to DMRC's
position that vide Cl. 16 (Lic Agt.), "security deposit will not be
reduced in case of variation in the number of panels, their areas or
locations", M/s TDI have stated that this read with Cl.2 and Cl. 4.6
(Lic. Agt.) would show that "the amount of Security Deposit and its
escalation by 5% on annual basis would get governed by the
Advertising Area made available to "TDI' and the operative rate of
License Fee." However, Cl. 2 is only related to the advertising area
to be provided and has no reference to Security Deposit, while the
only relevant reference in Cl. 4.6 states: "The interest free security
deposit will also be increased by 5% after completion of every year
on compounding basis."
Therefore, based on terms and conditions of the Agreement, M/s
TDI's claim in respect of Security Deposit is rejected. Security
Deposit shall remain payable as being invoiced as per CI. 16 and
Cl. 4.4 and 4.6 of License Agreement
Award
a) In the case of the withdrawal of the approval by DMRC for Site
nos. 29 & 30 (total) area 800 sq.ft. or 74.50 sq.mt) at Indraprastha
Metro station and non-proposal of any alternate sites by M/s TDI,
on an ad hoc basis, only 50% of the normal rate of License Fee
may be charged wef 10.03.2007, Normal License Fee may be
charged from 7 days after the date an alternative proposal (if any)
made by M/s TDI is approved by DMRC.
b) M/s TDI's claim in respect of Security Deposit being governed
by the advertising area made available is rejected. Security Deposit
shall remain payable as being invoiced by DMRC as per CT. 16
and Cl. 4.4 and Cl. 4.6 of License Agreement.=
36.
Upon examination of the above extracted portion, it is evident
that the learned Arbitrator arrived at, inter alia, the following
conclusions, which, though not exhaustive, reflect the core findings
underpinning the Award concerning Claim No. 1:
Digitally Signed
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(a) The Petitioner submitted location and electrical plans for
Indraprastha Metro Station, including Site Nos. 29 and 30 (800
sq. ft.), which were initially approved by the Respondent but
subsequently withdrawn within a short span of time.
(b) The Respondent justified the withdrawal on the ground that the
said sites were not <inside= the station as contemplated under
the Licence Agreement and called upon the Petitioner to
propose alternate sites in lieu thereof.
(c) The Licence Agreement conferred upon the Respondent the
express right to reject any proposal without assigning reasons
(Clause 7) and to indicate alternate locations, while also treating
the total advertising area as a single indivisible lot with a
minimum licence fee payable irrespective of actual utilization
(Clause 9).
(d) The Agreement further stipulated that the Security Deposit
would not vary on account of changes in number, area, or
location of panels and would remain payable as per Clauses 4.4,
4.6, and 16.
(e) On a strict contractual reading, the Respondent possessed the
right to reject Site Nos. 29 and 30, to insist upon alternate
proposals, and to levy a licence fee for the full minimum area
contemplated under the Agreement.
(f) However, the learned Arbitral Tribunal noted that the sites had
first been approved and thereafter withdrawn, which suggested
inconsistency, particularly since sufficient time had elapsed for
scrutiny before the initial approval was granted.
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(g) The distinction sought to be drawn by the Respondent between
<inside= and <outside= locations on the Foot Over Bridge was
not clearly demarcated at the tender stage, thereby giving some
credence to the Petitioner’s grievance.
(h) Although the Respondent reiterated the requirement of alternate
sites, specific alternate locations, such as the non-operational
platform, were not clearly indicated at the earliest stage, and the
commercial viability of such alternatives was legitimately
questioned by the Petitioner.
(i) At the same time, the Petitioner did not submit any alternate
proposals after withdrawal of approval and declined to explore
available options, thereby contributing to the impasse.
(j) The learned Arbitral Tribunal concluded that both parties
shared responsibility for the 74.50 sq. m. area remaining
unapproved and uninstalled, as the area was neither clearly
<provided= by the Respondent nor effectively <utilized= by the
Petitioner.
(k) Taking an overall view of the matter, the Tribunal adopted an
ad hoc approach and directed that only 50% of the normal
licence fee would be payable for the uninstalled 74.50 sq. m.
area with effect from 10.03.2007. It was further directed that the
normal licence fee would become payable from seven days after
approval of any alternate proposal submitted by the Petitioner.
(l) Insofar as the Security Deposit was concerned, the learned
Arbitral Tribunal held that the contractual provisions clearly
disentitled the Petitioner from seeking reduction based on
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variation in advertising area, and accordingly rejected the
Petitioner’s claim on that count.
37.
Thus, it is evident that the learned Arbitrator has examined the
relevant clauses of the Licence Agreement, particularly those treating
the licensed advertising area as one composite lot and reserving to the
Respondent the right to reject proposed locations and seek alternative
sites. The learned Arbitrator has, prior to beginning the determination,
also taken note of the sequence of events leading to the withdrawal of
approval and the subsequent correspondence exchanged between the
parties.
38.
It is settled that the interpretation of contractual terms lies
primarily within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. As held in
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.7, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that construction of the contract is
for the arbitrator to decide, and that even if the court were to take a
different view, such difference by itself would not justify interference
under Section 34 of the A&C Acy. The relevant paragraph of the
judgment is reproduced hereunder for reference:
“112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or
implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor
in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the
contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators
having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration
agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves
in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of
the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the
parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose
of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter
for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination
of a question of law. (See Pure Helium India (P)
Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC 593] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of
India [(2004) 5 SCC 325].)=
(2006) 11 SCC 181
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39.
Similarly, in Associate Builders v. DDA8, it was held that
where two views are possible and the arbitrator adopts one such view,
the court cannot substitute its own interpretation. The relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder for
reference:
“33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the
<public policy= test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a
court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected.
A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass
muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral
award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence
which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would
not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the
arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the
last word on facts. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P)
Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. [(2012) 1 SCC 594], this Court
held: (SCC pp. 601-02, para 21)
<21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an
Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the
evidence. An award can be challenged only under the
grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The
Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that
both the second respondent and the appellant are liable.
The case as put forward by the first respondent has been
accepted. Even the minority view was that the second
respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent,
but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the
arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Byelaw 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no
jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The
finding of the majority is that the appellant did the
transaction in the name of the second respondent and is
therefore, liable along with the second respondent.
Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section
34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts
to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.=
*****
42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the <patent
illegality= principle which, in turn, contains three subheads:
42.1. (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would
result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must be
(2015) 3 SCC 49
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understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of
the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is really a
contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as under:
<28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.4(1)
Where the place of arbitration is situated in India4
(a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial
arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive
law for the time being in force in India;=
42.2. (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would be
regarded as a patent illegality 4 for example if an arbitrator gives
no reasons for an award in contravention of Section 31(3) of the
Act, such award will be liable to be set aside.
42.3. (c) Equally, the third subhead of patent illegality is really a
contravention of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads
as under:
<28.Rules applicable to substance of dispute.4(1)-(2)***
(3) In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in
accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take
into account the usages of the trade applicable to the
transaction.=
This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An
Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the
contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a
reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside
on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily
for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the
contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no
fair-minded or reasonable person could do.=
(emphasis supplied)
40.
Applying these principles, this Court finds that the learned
Arbitrator has neither ignored the contractual stipulation treating the
advertising area as one indivisible unit nor overlooked the
Respondent’s contractual right to reject locations. At the same time,
the Arbitrator has taken into account the fact that approval for the sites
was initially granted and subsequently withdrawn, and that no specific
alternative sites were indicated for a considerable period.
41.
In the present petition, an attempt was made by the Petitioner to
contend that the learned Arbitrator could not have granted equitable
relief in the absence of consent under Section 28(2) of the A&C Act.
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42.
This Court finds that the said contention does not advance the
Petitioner’s case, as the learned Arbitrator categorically found that
both parties had erred or were negligent in relation to the subject
matter and, on that basis, fashioned an appropriate remedy. This is not
a case where relief was granted solely on equitable considerations in
disregard of the contract; rather, partial relief was granted upon a
finding of shared responsibility. Such determination cannot be
characterised as an exercise of jurisdiction ex aequo et bono in
violation of Section 28(2) of the Act.
43.
Therefore, the grant of an ad hoc remission of 50% of the
licence fee for the uninstalled area represents an exercise of
contractual interpretation and factual appreciation. This Court is
unable to hold that such an approach is perverse or patently illegal, or
that it contravenes the public policy of India. As held in the
precedents, patent illegality does not encompass an erroneous
application of law or an alternative interpretation of contractual terms,
so long as the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible and
reasonable one.
Claim 3
44.
This Court now turns to the challenge laid by the Petitioner to
the Impugned Award insofar as it relates to Claim No. 3, whereby
remission of licence fee was sought in respect of eleven (11)
prefabricated advertising panels at Mandi House Metro Station, which
were alleged to be unmarketable on account of their location in an
area stated to be <out of bounds=.
45.
It is not in dispute that all twenty-four (24) prefabricated panels
at Mandi House Metro Station were handed over to the Petitioner
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pursuant to a joint inspection conducted on 06.12.2006. Significantly,
at the time of such handover and takeover, no objection whatsoever
was raised by the Petitioner regarding the location, visibility,
illumination, accessibility, or marketability of any of the said panels.
The absence of any contemporaneous protest assumes importance in
the context of the subsequent claim.
46.
Under Clause 14 of the Licence Agreement, the Petitioner
expressly confirmed that it had inspected the prefabricated panels and
their
respective
locations
and
unequivocally
acknowledged
satisfaction as to their commercial and business viability. The clause
further records a clear waiver of any future claim for compensation or
remission on that account. This contractual acknowledgment forms a
crucial part of the framework within which the dispute was
adjudicated.
47.
It is well settled that the interpretation of contractual clauses
and the assessment of their legal effect, particularly when considered
in light of the conduct of the parties, lie squarely within the domain of
the arbitral tribunal. In Associate Builders (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that where the view adopted by the arbitrator
is a plausible one, interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act is
not warranted merely because the court may have arrived at a different
conclusion. Similarly, in McDermott International Inc. (supra) and
OPG Power Generation (supra), it was held that construction of the
contract is primarily for the arbitrator to determine and that errors, if
any, within jurisdiction are not amenable to correction under Section
34 of the A&C Act.
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48.
In the present case, the learned Arbitrator has construed Clause
14 in conjunction with the admitted fact of joint inspection and
unconditional takeover of all twenty-four panels and has concluded
that the Petitioner, having expressly acknowledged their viability and
raised no objection at the relevant time, could not subsequently resile
and contend that eleven of the panels were inherently unmarketable.
This conclusion is based upon the express terms of the contract as
well as the admitted conduct of the parties.
49.
The learned Arbitrator has further considered the Petitioner’s
proposal seeking relocation of the said eleven panels and the
Respondent’s decision to treat such relocation as <additional area=.
chargeable on a pro-rata basis under Clauses 9 and 17 of the Licence
Agreement. The rejection of the Petitioner’s contention that such
relocation ought to have been treated as an <alternate= arrangement
within the originally licensed area is firmly rooted in the contractual
framework. The reasoning reflects an interpretation of the relevant
clauses and does not disclose any perversity, patent illegality, or
disregard of the contractual scheme.
50.
In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd9., the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has cautioned that Section 34 does not permit a court to undertake a
merits-based review under the guise of testing reasonableness. The
arbitrator’s evaluation of contractual stipulations and the factual
matrix must be accorded due deference, so long as the conclusions
reached do not shock the conscience of the court or fall foul of the
limited grounds specified under Section 34(2). Tested on this anvil,
the findings returned by the learned Arbitrator with respect to Claim
(2019) 4 SCC 163
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No. 3 cannot be said to be irrational, perverse, or in contravention of
the fundamental policy of Indian law.
51.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is not persuaded
to hold that the Impugned Award, insofar as it rejects Claim No. 3,
suffers from any infirmity so as to warrant interference under Section
34 of the A&C Act. The conclusions reached by the learned Arbitrator
represent a plausible and reasoned interpretation of the Licence
Agreement and the admitted factual position.
CONCLUSION:
52.
In light of the foregoing discussion on Claim Nos. 1 and 3, this
Court is of the considered view that the present petition fails to make
out any ground for interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act. It is
trite law that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
A&C Act, this Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award, nor
can it substitute its own view merely because an alternative
interpretation of the contract or appreciation of evidence may be
possible. So long as the view taken by the learned Arbitrator is a
plausible one, founded upon the contractual terms and the evidence on
record, judicial intervention is impermissible.
53.
Consequently, the Impugned Award does not suffer from any
infirmity contemplated under Section 34(2) of the A&C Act.
Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed, along with all pending
applications.
54.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 24, 2026/sm/jk
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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