Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET
ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 11354 of 2017
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
√
================================================
TAUSIF AYUB MIRZA & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
================================================
Appearance:
MR VISHAL B. VINCHI for MR HARDIK H DAVE(6295) for the
Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
MR ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 2
================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
Date : 29/09/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1.
Though served, none appears for the respondent No. 2 - de
facto complainant. The matter is old, of 2017 and hence, the Court
proceeded with the matter on merits, in accordance with law.
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
2.
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
This application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (the Code) is filed by the applicants praying to quash
and set aside the FIR being C.R. No. I-228 of 2015, dated
04.12.2015, registered with Kosamba Police Station, District: Surat
(Rural) for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 323, 504, and
506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(1)(x) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Atrocity Act), with all consequential
proceedings pursuant thereto.
3.
Brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 04.12.2015
when de facto complainant was returning home on his motorcycle
along with his mother in between 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., and while
passing through an STD shop belonging to Village Sarpanch –
namely Hanif Patel, near Kothva Dargah, the applicants herein got
stopped his motorcycle, started abusing the complainant of his
caste, gave fist and kick blows and upon intervention of uncle of
the de facto complainant, the accused, after threatening not to vote
for Kamal else their huts would be burnt, went away from the
spot.
Thus, on the said facts, the FIR in question came to be
registered against the accused.
4.
At the outset, the learned advocate for the applicants does
not press this application so far as offences under the IPC are
concerned and accordingly, the matter is heard only qua the
offence under the Atrocity Act.
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
5.
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
Heard, learned advocate for the applicants and the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent – State.
5.1
The learned advocate for the applicants would submit that
provisions of Section 3(1(x) of the Atrocity Act are at all not
attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. He submitted
that Charge-sheet in the case is already filed and from reading of
entire papers of Charge-sheet, though the alleged incident had
taken place near a Dargah, no independent witness who would
have heard the caste related utterances, was available at the place,
even though it falls in a public place but not in public view and
accordingly, in the submission of the learned advocate for the
applicants, the provisions of the offence under the Atrocity Act as
are not attracted, present FIR is required to be quashed qua the
said offence.
In support of his submission, he relied upon a
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State
of A.P. and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 531 = 2008 (0) AIJEL-SC 42194.
6.
Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the
respondent – State would submit that when the utterances related
to the caste of the de facto complainant were in the public place,
more particularly near a Dargah, and such place is even not
disputed by the applicants herein, the question of presence of
other independent witnesses does not arise and it would
ultimately a subject matter of trial and has, thus, argued that when
Charge-sheet in the case is already filed and when a prima facie
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
case is made out against the present applicants, this Court may not
interfere at this stage and eventually, it is urged that this
application may be rejected.
7.
Prior to assessing the factual matrix on the touchstone of
criminal jurisprudence, it is apposite to reinforce the settled legal
position governing the scope, ambit, and limits of the inherent
jurisdiction vested under Section 482 of the Code. The
jurisprudential
parameters
regulating
the
exercise
of
this
extraordinary power have been authoritatively catalogued by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a long line of precedents, chief among
them being the authoritative in the case of State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [AIR 1992 SC 604]. Therein, Hon’ble Supreme Court
crystallized seven distinct, illustrative categories of cases where
judicial intervention under Section 482 of the Code or Article 226
of the Constitution is necessitated to secure the ends of justice and
clip any abuse of the process of Court. The relevant portion of
Paragraph 102 of the said judgment is extracted below:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give
an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
7.1
Evaluating the present applications on the anvil of the
principles enunciated in Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court has to
determine whether the allegations in the FIR so far as offence
under the Atrocity Act is concerned, even when accepted at face
value, satisfy their essential statutory ingredients or not. This
Court must ensure that criminal machinery is not permitted to
degenerate into an engine of harassment where liability under
criminal law is completely absent.
8.
It is the case of the de facto complainant in the FIR that while
he was returning home along with his mother on a motorcycle and
when he reached near a Dargah, the applicants stopped them and
by giving abuses relating to the caste of the de facto complainant,
gave him fist and kick blows and also threatened him and
accordingly, the applicants are charged for the offence under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocity Act, which provides for intentional
insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public
view. A perusal of the section reveals that for implication of this
section, an act as defined in this section, has to be committed in a
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
public view. Now, adverting the case on hand, the incident in
question admittedly, had occurred while the de facto complainant
was returning home on his motorcycle along with his mother, and
near a Dargah and thus, the place in question can be said to be a
public place. Now, it is required to be seen as to whether the
incident in question had occurred within the public view or not.
On a bare perusal of the FIR as well as the investigation papers,
there appears nothing on record to suggest that any independent
witness was present when the incident in question had occurred
and there appears nothing from the Charge-sheet papers to
suggest that any independent witness has deposed to state such a
fact. In the circumstances, in the considered opinion of the Court,
though alleged offence might have occurred in a public place but it
was not within the public view and thus, ingredients of the offence
alleged under the Atrocity are not satisfied.
8.1
In the case of Gorige Pentaiah (supra), as relied on by the
learned advocate for the applicants, the Apex Court observed as
under:
“7. As far as Sec. 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads as
under: “3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe:(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe in any place within public view.”
8.
In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them
with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients
of Sec. 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have
alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No.
3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused
with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the
entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accusedappellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated
with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within
public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing
in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and
to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial
would be totally unjustied leading to abuse of process of law.”
8.2
Further, in the decision in Hutu Ansari @ Futu Ansar v.
State of Jharkhand, 2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 75033, the Apex Court
observed as under:
“11. We cannot but find that there are gross inconsistencies
insofar as the complaint and the oral evidence led by way of
deposition before the Court. The place of occurrence was stated
to be the house, in the complaint, while all the witnesses
spoke of the alleged incident having occurred in the field,
which was the disputed land. In any event, there is no scope
for finding either clause (r) or (s) of Section 3(1) of the SC &
ST Act since PW-1 has categorically stated that there was
no member of the public present at the time the incident
occurred. Insofar as the allegation under clause (f) of Section 3(1)
there is nothing to indicate that the complainant and her family
were forcefully evicted from the disputed land or that the accused
occupied it illegally after delivery was effected on 25.04.2005. As
far as the house trespass is concerned, the oral evidence does not
support it. On the above reasoning we find absolutely no reason to
sustain the conviction as entered into by the Magistrate’s Court
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
confirmed by the High Court. We set aside the order of the
Magistrate as confirmed by the High Court and acquit the
appellants herein.”
8.2.1 In the case on hand also in the entire complaint, nowhere it is
mentioned that the accused were not a member of the Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and they intentionally insulted or
intimidated with intent to humiliate the de facto complainant in a
place within public view.
8.3
Further in Hutu Ansari @ Futu Ansar (supra), though place
of incident was under cloud, as to whether it was in the house or
in the field, however, for want of presence of any independent
member of public, the Apex Court did not find any scope for
Section 3(1)(r) which is analogues to Section 3(1)(x) as invoked in
the case on hand. In the case on hand also, there appears no
presence of any independent member of public at the time when
alleged offence occurred
8.4
In view of above, in the considered opinion of the Court, the
case falls within Clause (1), (3) and (7) of Bhajan Lal’s case so far it
relates to offence under the Atrocity Act and accordingly, the
Court is inclined to exercise discretion in favour of the applicants.
9.
For the afore-stated discussion and reasons, this application
succeeds and is, accordingly allowed, in part. FIR being C.R. No. I228 of 2015, dated 04.12.2015, registered with Kosamba Police
R/CR.MA/11354/2017
(GJHC240619982017)
JUDGMENT DATED: 29/09/2026
Station, District: Surat (Rural) and all consequential proceeding
emanating pursuant thereto, so far they relate to offence under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are hereby quashed and set
aside qua the present applicants.
Rule is made absolute,
accordingly.
9.1
It goes without saying that the observations made herein
above are solely for deciding this application and accordingly, trial
Court shall proceed in accordance with law qua the rest offences
without being influenced by the same.
9.2
Direct service is permitted.
[ P. M. Raval, J. ]
hiren/SB/1/2tss29926
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review