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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 24th April, 2026.
Uploaded on: 30th April, 2026
CRL.A. 759/2012
+
TAUQUEER HUSSAIN
Through:
versus
STATE & ORS
Through:
.....Appellant
None.
.....Respondents
Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP with
Ms. Divya Yadav, Adv. for the State
Mr. Shrikant Verma, Adv. (through
V/C) for R2 to R8
Insp. Ram Manohar, Div. North East,
Delhi
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
JUDGMENT
MADHU JAIN, J.
CRL.M.A. 2611/2014
1.
The Application already stands disposed of in view of the order dated
4th March, 2014. The same is not needed to be shown in the list.
CRL.A. 759/2012
2.
The present appeal has been filed under Section 372 of The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’) assailing the impugned
judgment dated 25th February, 2012 passed by ld. ASJ- 04, North-East
District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi whereby, the Respondents/Accused
herein have been acquitted in Sessions Case No. 136/2009 arising out of FIR
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No. 84/09 registered at P.S. Khajuri Khas, Delhi, for offences punishable
under Sections 302/201/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter,
‘IPC’) on the ground that the Prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt against any of the Respondents. The conclusion of the ld.
Trial Court is set out below:
“56. In view of the above discussion, the
prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the
guilt of accused persons beyond all shadow of
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the accused persons
namely (1) GAGAN SINGH @ GAGAN,
(2).RAKESH @ GUDIYA, (3) ROHTASH, (4)
SHAKTI UPADHYAY, (5) ROHIT @ SONU @
KALIYA and (6) RAJESH @ PINTU, are entitled to
benefit of doubt and acquittal and hence are
acquitted of the charge u/s 302 IPC, 120-B, 34 IPC.
Accused MaIti Devi is acquitted of the charge u/s
201 IPC.”
Factual Matrix
3.
The case of the Prosecution, in brief, is that one Kallu @ Arif, son of
Taufiq was allegedly given beatings by the Accused persons. On 11th April,
2009, at about 10:53 P.M., information was received at the P.S. Khajuri Khas
regarding certain boys who had forcibly entered into a house at Sonia Vihar,
Delhi pursuant to which DD Entry No. 30-A was recorded and was assigned
to S.I. K.P Singh for investigation. Upon reaching the spot, S.I. K.P. Singh
found that the injured Kallu @ Arif had already been removed by PCR to
GTB Hospital. Thereafter, he made inquiries and then proceeded to the
hospital. Upon reaching the hospital, the doctor reported that the injured
person was unfit for statement. While the said DD was pending, vide DD No.
52-B on 12th April, 2009, an information regarding death of injured Kallu was
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received.
4.
The MLC was prepared and post-mortem was conducted vide Ex.PW-
14/A post-mortem Report No. 421/09 dated 12th April, 2009. The postmortem revealed as many as 20 ante-mortem injures and PW14 Dr. Atul
Gupta, Sr. Resident Forensic Medicine, Safdarjung Hospital, proved postmortem report of deceased Kallu which is Ex. PW14/A. He opined the cause
of death as shock due to ante-mortem injury to head and due to hemorrhage
produced by multiple injuries to the body all injuries being ante-mortem in
nature and produced by blunt force impact. The relevant portion of the postmortem report and Examination in Chief of Dr. Atul Gupta is reproduced
hereinbelow for ease of reference:
Examination in Chief of Dr. Atul Gupta:
“Cause of death was shock due to antemortem
injury to heads and due to haemorrhage produced
by multiple injuries to the body. All injuries were
antemortem in nature and produced by blunt force
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impact. All the injuries were collectively sufficient
in ordinary course of nature to cause death.”
5.
Meanwhile, the deceased was identified by Sh. Aman Khan @ Khanu
(PW-19) and Sarver Hussain @ Soni vide their statements Ex. PW19/A and
Ex. PW25/E respectively on 12th April, 2009. Vide receipt Ex. PW 19/B,
Aman Abdullah Khan alongwith Wasim Haider had taken custody of body of
the deceased. Dr. Sumit, CMO PW6 has proved the MLC Ex.PW6/A in the
handwriting of Dr. Pawan who had examined the injured under his
supervision vide MLC No. A-1452/09 at 11:55 PM, and the patient was
brought with alleged history of assault. The said MLC shows that the injured
was admitted in GTB Hospital at about 11:55 PM, on 11th April, 2009 and
was given medical treatment. However, during medication, he became unfit
for statement at 2:15 A.M., and subsequently the injured died at the hospital.
The relevant portion of the MLC reads as under:
“Pt unfit for statement”
6.
On the next day i.e. 12th April, 2009, at about 9:05 AM, one Abbas
Mirza S/o Sh. Ghazanafar Ali. R/o B-4/89, Yamuna Vihar, Delhi-53, came to
the Police Station and got his statement recorded. Briefly stated, he deposed
that the deceased Arif @ Kallu was called from his restaurant by Accused
Gagan Singh on the pretext of visiting a house, and thereafter was taken
towards Sonia Vihar where he was assaulted by the Accused persons. On the
basis of this statement by Sh. Abbas Mirza, the present FIR under Section
302/34 IPC was registered. Eight persons were named as the Accused persons
and thereafter, vide order on Charge dated 12th October, 2009 charges were
framed by the ld. Trial Court for offences under Sections 302 /120B/201 of
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the IPC against Accused Gagan Singh @ Gagan, Rakesh @ Guria, Rohtash,
Shakti Upadhyay, Rohit @ Sonu and Rajesh @ Pintu. Out of the Accused
persons, Respondent/Accused Malti, however, was charged for offence under
Section 201 of the IPC.
7.
As per the Prosecution case, on 11th April, 2009, PW-4 Danish is stated
to have received an SMS from PW-1 Manju on his mobile phone. The relevant
portion of the testimony of PW-4 regarding the said SMS reads as under:
“Bhaiya Rohtash ne Sham, ko Sharab Pillai or usko
marte hue le gaya.”
8.
Upon receipt of the said information, PW-4 Danish further informed
the same to PW-3 Nazish telephonically. PW-3 then conveyed this
information to PW-2 Abbas Mirza. The Prosecution’s case substantially relies
upon the said chain of communication amongst the above stated witnesses.
9.
Upon registering of FIR, on 12th April, 2009, Accused Gagan Singh and
Rakesh @ Gudiya were arrested and their disclosure statements were
recorded. On the same day, Accused Malti Devi was also arrested, her
statement was recorded and she was produced before the Court and remanded
to judicial custody. Subsequently, on 17th April, 2009, Accused Rohtash was
interrogated and is stated to have made a disclosure to the effect that the iron
rod used in the commission of the offence had been thrown in a vacant plot
while fleeing from the spot. Pursuant thereto, the said iron rod was recovered
at his instance and seized, and the pointing out memo as well as site plan were
prepared.
10.
On the same date, Accused Rohit@Sonu@ Kaliya was also
interrogated, arrested and is stated to have made a disclosure, pursuant to
which the danda allegedly used in the commission of the offence was
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recovered at his instance.
11.
Thereafter, on 21st April, 2009, Accused Shakti Upadhyay, while in
custody, made a disclosure statement, was formally arrested, his mobile phone
was seized and he was remanded to judicial custody.
12.
Further
investigation
was
carried
out
by the
Investigating
Officer/Inspector Pankaj Sharma, and on 28th April, 2009, Accused Rajesh
@ Pintu joined the investigation, made a disclosure statement and was
arrested, and the pointing out memo was prepared, after which he was also
remanded to judicial custody.
13.
During the course of trial, the Prosecution examined as many as thirty
witnesses in support of its case.
14.
As previously stated, the Prosecution has relied upon a chain of
communication among certain witnesses. PW-1 Ms. Manju sent an SMS to
PW-4 Danish (brother of deceased Kallu), however, during her examination
in the court, she stated that she had not sent message No. 1 and 2 in Ex.PW1/A
but admitted to sending message No. 3.
15.
PW-2 Sh. Abbas Mirza who is the complainant, deposed that Accused
Gagan had taken Kallu (deceased) from a restaurant and subsequently he
received information from PW-3 Nazish regarding the incident. Upon receipt
of this information, the complainant along with PW-3 Nazish reached Sonia
Vihar and saw the accused persons beating Kallu with iron rod and danda.
16.
PW-3 Nazish in his testimony had deposed that he received information
through SMS from PW-1 Manju via PW-4 Danish.
17.
PW-4 Danish, who is the brother of the deceased has deposed that he
received the said SMS from PW-1 Manju informing that Kallu was being
beaten and thereafter he informed PW-3 Nazish.
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18.
PW-5 Sh. Bilal Ahmed stated that he received a message from the
deceased on 11th April, 2009, then he spoke to him over phone, and was
informed that he was being called by Manju’s father, however, he did not go
to the spot as he was in Ghaziabad.
19.
The Prosecution also examined formal and official witnesses,
including, PW-6 Dr. Sumit who proved the MLC of injured Kallu. PW-7 ASI
Sunita proved the registration of FIR. PW-10 SI Mukesh Jain inspected the
spot and prepared site plan. PW-14 Dr. Atul Gupta proved the post-mortem
report and opined that the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course. Other police witnesses proved arrest
memos, disclosure statements, seizure memos and recovery of weapons.
20.
After recording the prosecution evidence, the Accused/Respondents
were examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C, wherein incriminating evidence
against Accused persons were put to them, wherein they denied the
Prosecution evidence and claimed innocence. They stated that they were
being falsely implicated. They did not opt to lead any evidence in their
defence.
21.
After considering the evidence on record, the ld. Trial Court held that
the Prosecution has not established the guilt of the Accused persons beyond
reasonable doubt. Benefit of doubt was given to the Accused and they were
acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC, 120B/302 IPC. Accused Malti
Devi was acquitted of the charge under Section 201 IPC.
Proceedings before this Court
22.
The present appeal was filed by the victim’s father, who has since
expired, and the State has not challenged the impugned judgment. On 3th
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February, 2026, ld. Counsel for the Appellant sought time to file an
application for impleadment of the LRs of the deceased Appellant. Although
it was submitted on 18th February, 2026 that such application had been filed,
however, the same was not on record. Thereafter, on 9th March, 2026 and 18th
March, 2026, the ld. Joint Registrar (Judicial) noted that the application was
lying under objections and granted repeated opportunities, including a last and
final opportunity, to remove the objections and have it placed on record.
23.
On 1st April, 2009, it was recorded that despite the aforesaid
opportunities, no steps had been taken to implead the LRs, and it appeared
that they were not interested in pursuing the present appeal. It is also noted
that PW-3 and PW-4, being the brothers of the victim, had been issued notice
repeatedly, however, no one is appearing to pursue the appeal. Accordingly,
the matter was directed to be placed before this Court on 24th April, 2026,
with liberty granted to ld. Counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 to address
arguments.
Submissions on Behalf of the Respondent/State
24.
Mr. Bahri, ld. APP appearing for the State submits that the impugned
judgment of acquittal is not tenable inasmuch as the two brothers of the
deceased have supported the case of the Prosecution. Reliance is placed upon
the testimony of PW-4 to contend that he had reached the spot and had assisted
in shifting the injured, thereby establishing his presence at the relevant time.
The relevant portion is reproduced as under:
“I cannot tell the number of the rooms in the house
of Manju. It is wrong to suggest that I am not able
to tell the street number, number of rooms and name
of landlord of Manju as I have never visited her
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house. It is further wrong to suggest that I did not
visit her house on the day of incidence. I did not
receive any telephonic call from Manju on the date
of incident nor I made any call to her. It is correct
that Danish did not tell me the address of the house
and street number in front of which, the alleged
incident had taken place. I cannot tell whether the
restaurant of Kallu was vegetarian or nonvegetarian. Voluntarily, only snack and cold-drinks
were served there. It was a couple restaurant, again
said, family restaurant. I cannot tell the
measurement of the restaurant of Kallu. The
restaurant was the property of my partner. The
name of the partner is Amit Bassatta. I did not give
the partnership deed to the IO. Amit lives in street
No. 3, Bhajanpura but I cannot tell the house
number of Amit. The name of his father is probably
Sh. Om Prakash. I nor my partner nor Arif @ Kallu
had obtained the licence to run the restaurant from
MCD and Delhi Police. The restaurant is running
since last four years. Voluntarily, our stake has
come to an end after the death of Kallu. I cannot tell
address of the restaurant. Voluntarily, it is located
in gali No. 2 near Vev Narain Dharamshala. It is
wrong to suggest that there is no dharamshala in the
name of Vev Narain Dharamshala. I had lifted Kalu
at the sport in my lap and he remained in my lap for
about 1 or 2 minutes.
Kalu was put in PCR van by me with the help of PCR
van. Voluntarily, Kalu did not walk upto the PCR.”
25.
Further reliance is also placed upon the FSL Report which rules out
presence of any alcohol in the blood of the deceased. It is submitted that the
findings in the FSL Report cast doubt on the reliability of the alleged dying
declaration and the same could not have been relied upon in the manner done
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by the ld. Trial Court.
26.
The relevant portion of the FSL Report is reproduced hereinbelow for
ease of reference:
RESULTS OF EXAMINATION
“On Chemical and TLC examination, Metallic
poisons, ethyl and methyl alcohol, cyanide,
phosphide, alkaloids, barbiturates, tranquilizers
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and pesticides could not be detected in exhibits '1A',
'1B', '1C' & '1D'.”
27.
The alleged Dying Declaration which is stated to have been given by
the deceased to PW-4 has been discussed by PW-4 in his testimony before the
ld. Trial Court. The relevant portion of testimony of PW-4 in this regard reads
as under:
“Kallu called me by giving signal to me and told me
that I had gone to Soniya vihar where Rohtash made
me drink alcohol and. when he feeling intoxicated
Rohtash hit him with iron rod. Sonu@ Rohit hit him
with Danda.”
28.
Reliance is also placed on the post-mortem report to submit that the
deceased had sustained as many as 20 injuries, which are consistent with the
Prosecution case. It is further submitted that the recovery of the iron rod and
sticks at the instance of the Accused persons corroborates the Prosecution
version.
Analysis and Findings
29.
The Court has considered the matter.
30.
None appears for the Appellant despite repeated opportunities having
been afforded.
31.
At the outset, it is necessary to advert to the settled legal position
governing appeals against acquittal. It is well-established that while an
Appellate court has the power to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record,
it must bear in mind that an order of acquittal carries a presumption of
innocence in favour of the Accused. The Appellate court ought not to interfere
with an acquittal merely because another view is possible, interference is
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warranted only where the findings of the ld. Trial Court are perverse, based
on a misreading of evidence, or where the ld. Trial Court has ignored material
evidence going to the root of the matter.
32.
The Prosecution case, essentially rests upon, the alleged dying
declaration attributed to the deceased, as recorded by PW-4, the oral
testimony of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 regarding the alleged assault, the
recovery of weapons at the instance of the Accused, the post-mortem report
establishing the homicidal nature of the death.
33.
The law with respect to appreciating the evidence in the nature of dying
declaration has been the subject matter of various precedents and recently the
Supreme Court in Irfan @ Naka v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1060, while discussing the importance and value of dying
declaration has observed and held as under: “43. The juristic theory regarding the acceptability
of a dying declaration is that such declaration is
made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and when every hope of this world is gone,
when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the
man is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same,
great caution must be exercised in considering the
weight to be given to this species of evidence on
account of the existence of many circumstances
which may affect their truth. The situation in which
a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is
the reason in law to accept the veracity of his
statement. It is for this reason, the requirements of
oath and cross-examination are dispensed with.
Since the accused has no power of crossexamination, the courts insist that the dying
declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire
full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and
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correctness. The court, however, should always be
on guard to see that the statement of the deceased
was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting
or a product of imagination. [See : Laxman v. State
of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710]
xxx
48. The justification for the sanctity/presumption
attached to a dying declaration, is two fold; (i)
ethically and religiously it is presumed that a person
while at the brink of death will not lie, whereas (ii)
from a public policy perspective it is to tackle a
situation where the only witness to the crime is not
available.
Xxx
53. In India in the relevant provision of Section 32
of the Act, 1872, the first exception to the rule
against admissibility of hearsay evidence, is as
under:
“32(1). When it relates to cause of death.— When
the statement is made by a person as to the cause
of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of
the transaction which resulted in his death, in
cases in which the cause of that person's death
comes into question. Such statements are relevant
whether the person who made them was or was not,
at the time when they were made, under
expectation of death, and whatever may be the
nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his
death comes into question.”
54. Jon R. Waltz, American Jurist observed that, “It
has been thought, rightly or wrongly, that Dying
Declarations have intrinsic assurances of
trustworthiness, making cross examination
unnecessary. The notion is that a person who is in
the process of dying, and knows it, will be truthful
immediately before departing to meet his Maker. (Of
course, the validity of this hearsay exceptions is
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open to some debate. What about the person who is
not deeply religious? What of the person who, as his
last act, seeks revenge by falsely naming a life-long
enemy as his killer? How reliable is the perception
and memory of a person who is dying?)” [See :
Waltz, J.R. (1975) Criminal Evidence, Chicago :
Nelson-Hall. pp.75-76]
xxx
60. Since time immemorial, despite a general
consensus of presuming that the dying declaration
is true, they have not been stricto-sensu accepted,
rather the general course of action has been that
judge decides whether the essentials of a dying
declaration are met and if it can be admissible,
once done, it is upon the duty of the court to see the
extent to which the dying declaration is entitled to
credit.
61. In India too, a similar pattern is followed,
where the Courts are first required to satisfy
themselves that the dying declaration in question
is reliable and truthful before placing any reliance
upon it. Thus, dying declaration while carrying a
presumption of being true must be wholly reliable
and inspire confidence. Where there is any
suspicion over the veracity of the same or the
evidence on record shows that the dying
declaration is not true it will only be considered as
a piece of evidence but cannot be the basis for
conviction alone.
62. There is no hard and fast rule for determining
when a dying declaration should be accepted; the
duty of the Court is to decide this question in the
facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and
be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the same.
Certain factors below reproduced can be
considered to determine the same, however, they
will only affect the weight of the dying declaration
and not its admissibility:—
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(i) Whether the person making the statement was in
expectation of death?
(ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at the
earliest opportunity?
“Rule of First Opportunity”
(iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to
believe the dying declaration was put in the mouth
of the dying person?
(iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of
prompting, tutoring or leading at the instance of
police or any interested party?
(v) Whether the statement was not recorded
properly?
(vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to
clearly observe the incident?
(vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been
consistent throughout?
(viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a
manifestation/fiction of the dying person's
imagination of what he thinks transpired?
(ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself
voluntary?
(x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether,
the first one inspires truth and consistent with the
other dying declaration?
(xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been
impossible for the deceased to make a dying
declaration?
63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the
charge against the accused beyond the reasonable
doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in
favour of the accused. It is true that dying
declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be
relied on provided it is proved that the same was
voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit
state of mind. It is just not enough for the court to
say that the dying declaration is reliable as the
accused is named in the dying declaration as the
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assailant.
(emphasis supplied)
34.
In the present case, the alleged dying declaration which is said to have
been made by the deceased to PW-4 Danish at the gate of GTB Hospital does
not inspire confidence. First, the alleged dying declaration does not bear any
signature or thumb impression of the deceased. Second, there is nothing on
record to establish that the deceased was in a fit physical or mental condition
to make a coherent statement at that juncture, on the contrary, the MLC
records that the injured was declared unfit for statement at 02:15 AM. Third,
the MLC, being the earliest document prepared at the hospital, contains no
reference to any allegation against the Accused persons. Fourth, PW-4 has not
satisfactorily explained why this crucial disclosure was not brought to the
notice of the Investigating Officer at the earliest opportunity. In these
circumstances, the alleged dying declaration cannot be said to inspire
confidence, and the ld. Trial Court rightly did not place reliance upon it.
35.
The submission made by the ld. APP that the FSL Report itself casts
doubt on the dying declaration, inasmuch as the FSL Report does not support
the claim in the declaration that the deceased was in an intoxicated condition.
The alleged dying declaration is stated to have recorded that the deceased was
in an intoxicated condition. The FSL Report, however, does not corroborate
the presence of any intoxicant. This does not support the Prosecution story.
On the contrary, it is a material discrepancy between the oral account claimed
by PW-4 and the scientific evidence, which further casts a doubt surrounding
the reliability of the alleged declaration.
36.
The oral testimony of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 is built on an SMS chain
that begins with PW-1 Manju. PW-2 states that he received information from
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PW-3 Nazish, PW-3 states that he received information from PW-4 Danish
via PW-1’s SMS, PW-4 states that he received the SMS from PW-1 Manju.
This chain, however, collapses at its very foundation. PW-1 Manju, the stated
originator of the information, has admitted only to the third SMS message,
which reads: ‘Gagan ke papa or mere papa bhi thane me gaye hain, jab sab
theek ho jaye to message karke bata dena, please.’ This message makes no
reference to any assault, any Accused, or any place of occurrence. PW-1 has
disowned the first two messages entirely. She has not deposed that she
witnessed the occurrence or that she had any knowledge of the alleged assault.
It is thus inexplicable how PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 claim to have derived
knowledge of the assault and of the identity of the Accused from messages
whose originator herself had no such knowledge. The inconsistencies of these
witnesses are no less troubling. PW-2 stated that he called two boys from a
marriage function, but did not name them, PW-3, however, named them as
Bilal and Chhotu. No explanation has been offered for this discrepancy. PW4, who claims to have been present at the spot, was unable in crossexamination to disclose basic details, i.e., the address of the restaurant, the
name of the street, the number of rooms in Manju’s house, or the street in
front of which the alleged incident took place. These omissions, when seen
together, are unreliable with his claim of having been a witness to the events.
37.
There is no dispute that Kallu @ Arif met with a homicidal death. He
sustained 20 ante-mortem injuries caused by blunt force impact, all sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The death of Kallu @ Arif is
a tragic one. His father, the Appellant, fought to seek justice for his son, and
did so until his own death. That his legal representatives have not stepped
forward to continue this Appeal is a matter of regret. This Court must decide
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the matter on the basis of the evidence as it stands which unfortunately does
not support the case of the prosecution.
38.
After careful consideration, this Court is of the view that the
Prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Viewing the
evidence as a whole, none of the prosecution witnesses had direct and reliable
knowledge of the occurrence. The case rests substantially on hearsay, a
discredited SMS chain, and an undocumented oral dying declaration that is
contradicted by the MLC and the FSL Report. The evidence does not form a
complete and unbroken chain pointing exclusively to the guilt of the Accused
persons. The ld. Trial Court has rightly given benefit of doubt to the
Respondents. The view taken is reasonable and there is no perversity
warranting interference.
Conclusion
39.
In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment of acquittal is
hereby upheld and the Appeal is dismissed.
40.
The Bail Bonds and Surety Bonds of Respondents are cancelled.
41.
Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.
MADHU JAIN
JUDGE
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
APRIL 24, 2026/ys/Av
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