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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision:01.10.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010726262025
+
FAO(OS) (COMM) 150/2025 & CM APPL. 60540/2025
TARSEM JAIN
.....Appellant
Through:
Mr. Challa Kodanda Ram, Senior
Adv. with Mr. Nikunj Dayal, Mr.
Pramod Dayal, Mr. Ashwani Kumar
Sharma, Mr. Prashant Joshi, Mr. Virat
Singhal, Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Mr.
Angad Mehta & Mr. Arsh, Advs.
versus
BHARAT FORGE LIMITED AND ANR.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Nakul Dewan, Senior Adv. with
Ms. Ashima Sharma, Mr. Parag
Khandhar, Mr. Krishan Kumar, Mr.
Satyender
&
Ms.
Ananya
Patwardhan, Advs. for R- 1 & 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)
1.
The present composite appeal is filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’) against the
common judgement dated 26.05.2025 (hereinafter ‘the impugned judgment’)
passed by the learned Single Judge.
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1.1
`
By the impugned judgement the learned Single Judge allowed the
petitions under Section 34 of the Act filed by Bharat Forge Limited (for
short ‘BFL’) and BF Infrastructure Limited (for short ‘BF Infra’)
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘the respondents’) and set aside the
award dated 10.05.2019. It was held that the sole arbitrator was appointed
unilaterally. The execution petition filed by Tarsem Jain (hereinafter ‘the
appellant’) was dismissed. The impugned judgement disposed of two
Section 34 petitions and an enforcement petition all arising out of the same
award and involving the same parties and hence, this composite appeal is
being entertained.
2.
The factual matrix is that the appellant entered into a Share Purchase
Agreement dated 18.12.2010 (for short ‘SPA’) with BF Infra, a subsidiary
company of BFL. 100% of the equity share capital of Coal Columbia SAS,
Mines and Minerals Company of Columbia SAS and Multitex Africa SA
(hereinafter ‘the companies’) was to be transferred to Aggressive Projects
Private Limited (for short ‘APPL’) and also 90% of the nominal value of the
equity shares of APPL was to be transferred to BF Infra. The transaction
was followed by an engagement letter dated 18.01.2011 whereunder the
appellant was appointed as the ‘Advisor- Global Mining’ by BFL.
2.1
Dispute arose between the parties and BF Infra on 16.08.2012
terminated the SPA consequent thereto BFL terminated the engagement of
the appellant. Clause 20 of the SPA provided for dispute resolution through
arbitration. The appellant invoked arbitration on 03.06.2013 calling upon BF
Infra to appoint a sole arbitrator with consent of the appellant. A reminder
dated 24.07.2014 was sent by the appellant for nomination of the arbitrator
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and stating that on failure the appellant would make the appointment. On
15.12.2014 the appellant nominated the sole arbitrator.
2.2
BF Infra vide reply dated 23.12.2014 raised a counter-claim of
Rs.51,28,423/-. The statement of claim (SOC) was filed before the arbitrator
on 12.08.2015. After the service of the SOC, BF Infra on 09.09.2015
objected to the unilateral appointment of the sole arbitrator and an affidavit
raising the objection was filed on 25.09.2015. On the same day BFL filed an
application under Section 16 of the Act contending that BFL was not a
signatory to the SPA and was not bound by the arbitration agreement. On
16.12.2015 the arbitrator rejected the objection raised by BF Infra and
dismissed the Section 16 application of BFL holding that prima facie BFL
was also a party to the dispute. BF Infra filed a memo on 09.01.2016 stating
that BF Infra is participating in the proceedings under protest and objects to
the to the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator.
2.3
The proceedings culminated in award dated 10.05.2019. The
arbitrator allowed the claim of the appellant and awarded compensation of
Rs.77,00,00,000/- and the counter claims were dismissed. The BF Infra and
BFL filed petitions under Section 34 of the Act challenging the award on
merits and the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator. The learned Single
Judge held the appointment of the sole arbitrator to be void ab-initio and the
proceedings a nullity, the award was set aside. Hence, the present appeal.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appointment of the
arbitrator cannot be termed unilateral. The respondents failed to respond to
the notices invoking arbitration and did not object to nomination of the sole
arbitrator. The objection against the appointment was raised for the first time
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on 09.09.2015 but was rejected by the arbitrator on 16.12.2015 yet the
respondent chose not to file petition under Section 11 of the Act for fresh
appointment.
3.1
It is contended that the objection to the unilateral appointment was
rightly rejected as no ground under Section 12(3) of the Act was made out.
3.2
It is submitted that the objections filed by BFL and BF Infra were
rightly rejected by the arbitrator. It is emphasised that Section 18 of the Act
has no application to the appointment of arbitrator and operates only during
the arbitral proceedings.
3.3
The argument is that the learned Single Judge ignored applicability of
Section 4 of the Act and the fact that the respondent failed to object to
appointment of arbitrator at the appropriate stage and having participated in
the proceedings waived right to object. It is argued that the learned Single
Judge wrongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Dharma
Prathisthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686
wherein Section 8 of Arbitration Act, 1940 Act was dealt with and not
Section 4 of Act.
3.4
The submission is that the amendment to Section 12 by the 2015
Amendment Act is inapplicable as the arbitration proceedings commenced
prior to the year 2015 i.e. in 2013. The contention is that the petitions filed
under the Section 34 of the Act were to be examined under the unamended
Act and the ground mentioned therein. Patent illegality and against public
policy of India were not the grounds available.
4.
Per contra the scope of interference under Section 37 of the Act is
narrow and circumscribed. The contention is that the appointment of the sole
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arbitrator is in violation of the procedure agreed between the parties under
Clause 20.4 of the SPA and the statutory procedure under Section 11 of the
Act. The respondents had not consented for the appointment of the sole
arbitrator and there was no question of respondent having waived the right
to object. The reliance of the learned counsel for the appellant on Section 12
and Section 13 of the Act is refuted stating that these provisions do not deal
with an appointment made unilaterally and contrary to the agreed procedure.
The learned counsel contends that after the award was set aside, the
appellant has already initiated fresh arbitration proceedings by issuing a
notice under Section 21 of the Act.
4.1
The plea made is that patent illegality and contravention of public
policy were the grounds available under the unamended Section 34 of the
Act, reliance in this regard is on the decision of the Supreme Court in
ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705. It is further argued that
the amended Section 34 of the Act applies to the petitions instituted on or
after 23 October 2015 even if the arbitration proceedings were initiated prior
to the appointment. Reliance is placed on the decision of BCCI v. Kochi
Cricket (P) Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287.
5.
Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. No other issue than
those noted above were pressed during the course of the arguments.
6.
Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to quote Section 11
and 18 of the Act and Clause 20 of SPA:
“Section 11. Appointment of arbitrators.—
(1) A person of any nationality may be an arbitrator, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties.
(2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree on a
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procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators.
(3) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an
arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one
arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the
third arbitrator who shall act as the presiding arbitrator.
(4) If the appointment procedure in sub-section (3) applies
and—
(a) a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within thirty days from
the receipt of a request to do so from the other party; or
(b) the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third
arbitrator within thirty days from the date of their
appointment,
the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the
Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him.
(5) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an
arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to agree on
the arbitrator within thirty days from receipt of a request by one
party from the other party to so agree, the appointment shall be
made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice or any
person or institution designated by him.
(6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the
parties—
(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or
(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an
agreement expected of them under that procedure; or
(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any
function entrusted to him or it under that procedure,
a party may request the Chief Justice or any person or
institution designated by him to take the necessary measure,
unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides
other means for securing the appointment.
(7) A decision on a matter entrusted by sub-section (4) or subsection (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief Justice or the person
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or institution designated by him is final.
(8) The Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by
him, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to—
(a) any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the
agreement of the parties; and
(b) other considerations as are likely to secure the appointment
of an independent and impartial arbitrator.
(9) In the case of appointment of sole or third arbitrator in an
international commercial arbitration, the Chief Justice of India
or the person or institution designated by him may appoint an
arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the
parties where the parties belong to different nationalities.
(10) The Chief Justice may make such scheme as he may deem
appropriate for dealing with matters entrusted by sub-section
(4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to him.
(11) Where more than one request has been made under subsection (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the Chief
Justices of different High Courts or their designates, the Chief
Justice or his designate to whom the request has been first made
under the relevant sub-section shall alone be competent to
decide on the request.
(12) (a) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in an international commercial
arbitration, the reference to “Chief Justice” in those subsections shall be construed as a reference to the “Chief Justice
of India”.
(b) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8) and (10) arise in any other arbitration, the reference to
“Chief Justice” in those sub-sections shall be construed as a
reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose
local limits the principal Civil Court referred to in clause (e) of
sub-section (1) of section 2 is situated and, where the High
Court itself is the Court referred to in that clause, to the Chief
Justice of that High Court.
Signed By:HONEY
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Section 18. Equal treatment of parties.—
The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall
be given a full opportunity to present his case.”
“Clause 20. GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION
20.1 This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of India.
20.2 If any dispute, controversy or claim arises out of or in
connection with this Agreement, including the breach,
termination or invalidity thereof ('Dispute"), any party may
serve formal written notice on the other parties that a Dispute
has arisen ('Notice of Dispute’).
20.3 The parties shall use all reasonable efforts for a period of
15 days from the date on which the Notice of Dispute is served
(or such longer period as may be agreed writing between the
parties) to resolve the Dispute on amicable basis.
20.4 If the parties are unable to resolve the Dispute by amicable
negotiation within the time period referred to in clause 20.3, the
Dispute shall be submitted to Arbitration before a single
arbitrator appointed in accordance with the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, upon the request of either party. Seat of
arbitration shall be New Delhi, India. The language to be used
in the arbitral proceedings shall be English. The award
delivered in such Arbitration shall be final and binding upon the
parties.
20.5 For all purposes in relation to this Agreement, the Courts
at New Delhi alone shall have exclusive jurisdiction. No other
Courts shall have jurisdiction to deal with any dispute or any
other matter between the Parties arising out of this Agreement.”
7.
The scope of interference under Section 37 of the Act is well settled.
The court has to satisfy that the impugned decision is within the parameters
provided under Section 34 of the Act. Albeit under Section 37 of the Act an
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appeal is provided but it cannot be equated with a regular appeal and the
limited scope of interference under Section 34 of the Act applies to Section
37 of the Act also. The issues not raised in Section 34 petitions cannot be
raised for the first time in the appeal under Section 37 of the Act. Reference
in this regard be made to the following decisions:
7.1
In Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Samir Narain
Bhojwani, (2024) 7 SCC 218 it was held:
“23. We need not dwell on the limited scope of interference in
the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. That
position is very well settled. However, as far as the appeal
under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act is concerned,
in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , in para 14, this
Court held thus : (SCC p. 167)
“14. As far as interference with an order made
under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned,
it cannot be disputed that such interference under
Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions
laid down under Section 34. In other words, the
court cannot undertake an independent assessment
of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain
that the exercise of power by the court under
Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the
provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an
arbitral award has been confirmed by the court
under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal
under Section 37, this Court must be extremely
cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent
findings.”
24. In another decision of this Court in UHL Power Co.
Ltd. v. State of H.P. [UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P.,
(2022) 4 SCC 116 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 401] , in para 16, it
was held thus : (SCC pp. 124-25)
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“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly
narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the
jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an
order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an
award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , the
reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on
the High Court in exercise of powers under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been
explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 16667, para 11)
***
26. The jurisdiction of the appellate court dealing with an
appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition
under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of
the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34. It is the duty
of the appellate court to consider whether Section 34 Court has
remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are
available in a petition under Section 34. The ultimate function
of the appellate court under Section 37 is to decide whether the
jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or
wrongly. While doing so, the appellate court can exercise the
same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses
with the same constraints.”
7.2
In Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632 it was held:
“16. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under
Section 37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same
grounds on which an award can be challenged under Section 34
of the Act. In other words, the powers under Section 37 vested
in the court of appeal are not beyond the scope of interference
provided under Section 34 of the Act.
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`
21. It must also be remembered that proceedings under Section
34 of the Act are summary in nature and are not like a fullfledged regular civil suit. Therefore, the scope of Section 37 of
the Act is much more summary in nature and not like an
ordinary civil appeal. The award as such cannot be touched
unless it is contrary to the substantive provision of law; any
provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement.”
7.3
In Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India,
(2023) 15 SCC 472 it was held:
“15. The limited and extremely circumscribed jurisdiction
of the court under Section 34 of the Act, permits the court to
interfere with an award, sans the grounds of patent illegality
i.e. that “illegality must go to the root of the matter and
cannot be of a trivial nature”; and that the Tribunal “must
decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if
an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a
reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be
set
aside
on
this
ground”
[ref
: Associate
Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , SCC p. 81, para 42]. The other
ground would be denial of natural justice. In appeal, Section
37 of the Act grants narrower scope to the appellate court to
review the findings in an award, if it has been upheld, or
substantially upheld under Section 34.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
The appellant during the Section 34 proceedings pressed only the
following objections: (i) that even after rejection of the request for termination of the
arbitration vide order dated 16.12.2015, no steps were taken by BF
Infra either under Section 11(6) or under Section 14 of the Act rather
BF Infra participated in the arbitration proceedings.
(ii) that the challenge to the appointment on the ground of want of
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proper notice was not sustainable as there was evidence to show that
notice was issued to BFL.
(iii) Other arguments were vis-à-vis the merits of the claim.
9.
From this it is evident that the issues now being argued in the present
appeal were never pressed before the learned Single Judge in the Section 34
petitions. It is not pleaded in the present appeal that these issues were raised
but remained unconsidered.
10.
Be that as it may, the procedure under Clause 20 of the SPA provided
for reasonable efforts to be made for amicable settlement. On failure to
resolve, the dispute was to be referred to a sole arbitrator to be appointed in
accordance with the Act upon the request of either party. The seat of
arbitration was Delhi. Section 11(2) of the Act provides that subject to subSection 6 parties are free to agree on the procedure for appointing the
arbitrator. Section 11(3) & (4) deals with a three member arbitral tribunal
and have no application to the present case. Under Section 11(5) on failure
of the parties to agree upon the sole arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of
the request from either of the parties, the Chief Justice or a person or a
institution designated by the Chief Justice shall make an appointment upon
the request of a party.
11.
It is not the case of the appellant that the respondents expressly
consented to the appointment of the arbitrator. It is an admitted fact that the
arbitrator was appointed by the appellant. The initial two notices dated
03.06.2013 and 24.07.2014 were issued by the appellant. In the latter notice
the procedure agreed between the parties under Clause 20 of SPA was
unilaterally altered by the appellant. It was stated in notice dated 24.07.2014
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that on failure of the respondents to appoint an arbitrator with the consent of
the appellant within fifteen days, the appellant would appoint the sole
arbitrator and eventually this was done so. This is contrary to the
unambiguous language of Clause 20.4 of SPA and the statutory procedure
prescribed under Section 11 of the Act. The learned Single Judge rightly
held the appointment of the arbitrator to be void.
12.
The participation of the respondents in the arbitral proceedings will
not ratify the unilateral appointment made contrary to Clause 20 of the SPA
and the statutory provisions of the Act. Moreover, the participation of the
respondents in arbitration was under protest. It would not be out of place to
mention that both BF Infra and BFL at the very first instance before the
arbitrator objected to unilateral appointment. The objections under Section
16 of the Act were rejected by the arbitrator and the remedy against orders
rejecting objections was under Section 34 of the Act after passing of the
final award.
13.
The argument that the respondent not resorted to the remedy under
Section 11(6) even after rejection of the objections, is noted to be rejected.
The arbitration was initiated at the instance of the appellant. As per the
Clause 20 of the SPA and Section 11 of the Act, in absence of consent
between the parties on appointment of arbitrator the court had to appoint the
arbitrator. The party invoking arbitration was the appellant and had to
approach the Court under Section 11 of the Act for appointment of the
arbitrator and not vice-versa.
14.
The contention the unilateral appointment does not violate Section
12(3) of the Act, deserves rejection. Section 12 of the Act casts an obligation
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on the arbitrator to disclose the circumstances likely to give rise to
justifiable doubts to the independence or impartiality of the arbitrator. SubSection 3(a), permits a challenge to an appointment of the arbitrator in case
the circumstances exist giving rise to justifiable doubts for the independence
and impartiality. The unilateral appointment of an arbitrator itself casts a
doubt on its independence and impartiality. The Supreme Court in Central
Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC $ SMO MCML (JV)
A Joint Venture Co., (2025) 4 SCC 641 held as under:
“170.3 A clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a
sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the
independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a
unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of
the other party in the appointment process of the arbitrators;”
15.
Even though the decision in Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (supra) deals with the post-2015 Amendment Act provisions
but the principle with regard to requirement of an independent and impartial
or a mutually appointed arbitrator shall remain unaffected by the amendment
of the provisions.
16.
The submission of the appellant that the equal treatment of the parties
as stipulated under Section 18 of the Act shall apply only during the
proceedings of the arbitration and not at the time of the appointment, is
against the spirit of the arbitration. Section 18 provides that equal treatment
and full opportunity be given to the parties to present their case. An
arbitrator appointed by one particular party may find it difficult to displease
or act against the appointing party and therefore may not treat both the
parties with equality resulting in violation of Section 18 of the Act.
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17.
`
There cannot be a quarrel with the proposition that Section 12(5) of
the 2015 Amendment Act shall not apply to the cases where arbitration
commenced prior to October, 2015 but this in itself shall not validate the
unilateral appointment of the arbitrator by the appellant in contravention to
Clause 20 of the SPA and Section 11 (6) of the Act.
18.
The plea of waiver under Section 4 of the Act that the respondent had
waived the right to object to the appointment of the arbitrator need not be
dilated upon as this plea was not pressed before the learned Single Judge.
Section 4 of the Act applies in case the party knowing that a requirement of
an arbitration agreement was not complied with, raises no timely objection
and proceeds with the arbitration. In the case in hand, the respondent
objected that on the receipt of the first notice by the arbitrator and thereafter
filed application under Section 16 of the Act raising objections. Even the
memo filed was under protest. No case of waiver is made out.
19.
The contention that against public policy of India and patent illegality
was not a ground available under the unamended Section 34 of the Act was
also not raised before the learned Single Judge. The case in hand is of void
appointment of arbitrator and the award passed is nullity. This was a ground
available both under amended and unamended Act.
20.
It would be apposite to note that the Supreme Court in BCCI V. Kochi
Cricket Association (supra) held that the amended Section 34 of the Act
applies to the Section 34 objections filed after the amendment even in cases
where the arbitration proceedings commenced before the amendment. The
relevant para is reproduced below:
“58. From a reading of Section 26 as interpreted by us, it thus
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becomes clear in all cases where the Section 34 petition is filed
after the commencement of the Amendment Act, and an
application for stay having been made under Section 36 therein,
will be governed by Section 34 as amended and Section 36 as
substituted. But, what is to happen to Section 34 petitions that
have been filed before the commencement of the Amendment
Act, which were governed by Section 36 of the old Act? Would
Section 36, as substituted, apply to such petitions? To answer
this question, we have necessarily to decide on what is meant
by “enforcement” in Section 36. On the one hand, it has been
argued that “enforcement” is nothing but “execution”, and on
the other hand, it has been argued that “enforcement” and
“execution’ are different concepts, “enforcement” being
substantive and “execution” being procedural in nature.
(emphasis supplied)
21.
In view of the above discussion, no case is made out for interference
in the judgement of the learned Single Judge. The appointment was rightly
held to be void being in violation of Clause 20 of SPA and Section 11 of the
Act.
22.
The appeal is dismissed.
23.
Pending application stands disposed of.
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J
SHAIL JAIN, J
OCTOBER 01, 2026
‘JK’
Reportable: Yes
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