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2026:JHHC:24162
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 6302 of 2024
---------
1.
Syed Nasim Akhtar @ Syed Naseem Akhtar, aged about 60
years, son of Syed Akhtiyar Hussain, resident of Village-Pipra
kala, P.O. & P.S.-Garhwa, District-Garhwa;
2. Ramashray Yadav, aged about 59 years, son of Sri Janki Yadav,
resident of Village-Bharkur, P.O.-Pawai, P.S.-Aurangabad,
District- Aurangabad, Bihar;
Present address - Pipra kala, P.O. & P.S.-Garhwa, DistrictGarhwa.
......Petitioner(s)
Versus
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The State of Jharkhand;
Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. &
P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi;
Secretary, Department of Forest, Government of Jharkhand,
Nepal house, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi;
Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Forest Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Nepal house, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda,
District-Ranchi;
Divisional Commissioner, Palamau, P.O. & P.S.-Medininagar,
Distt. Palamau.
Dy. Commissioner, Garhwa, P.O., P.S. & Distt. - Garhwa.
Conservator of Forest, Daltonganj Afforestation & Social Forestry
Circle, P.O., P.S. & District - Daltonganj;
Divisional Forest Officer, Social Forestry Division, P.O., P.S. &
Distt. Garhwa;
.....Respondent(s)
---------
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
---------
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, Advocate
Mr. Amit Kr. Srivastava, Advocate
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr.S.C.-II
Mrs. Sunita Kumari, A.C. to Sr.S.C.-II
12/Dated:-13.08.2026
1.
---------
Learned counsel for the respondents intends to file
supplementary counter affidavit on behalf of the 8th respondent;
the same is taken on record.
2.
With the consent of both the parties, the matter has
been taken up for hearing today itself.
3.
The instant writ application has been preferred by the
2026:JHHC:24162
respective petitioners for quashing the impugned orders which are
annexed as Annexures-21 and 21/1, whereby the claim of the
respective petitioners for regularizing their services has been
rejected by the respondent authorities.
4.
The brief facts as it appears from the writ application
are that the petitioner No. 1 had been continuously working since
10.01.1985 in the Social Forestry Division, Garhwa, as Clerkcum-Typist on daily wage basis and there has been no break of
service. He was allowed to work on vacant sanctioned post vide
order dated 28.03.1987. The petitioner No.2 has also been
working continuously since 06.07.1985 on the post of peon on
daily wage basis in the Social Forestry Division, Garhwa.
Thereafter, there was regular need of the personnel on the post on
which the petitioners were working and therefore correspondence
was made for regular appointments or for regularization of the
services of the petitioners. The respondent no. 8 wrote to the
Conservator of Forest, Palamu giving the vacancy position vide
letter no. 375 dated 22.03.1991 and letter no. 966 dated
13.10.1992. Thereafter also, several recommendations were made
by the department for regularization of the services of the
petitioners vide Annexures-4, 5, 6, 6/1, 7 and 7/1; however,
respondents have not regularized the services of the petitioners.
5.
Earlier also, the petitioner knocked the door of this
Court thrice. In the last round of litigation i.e. in W.P.(S) No. 6204
of 2023, the same was disposed of by directing the petitioners to
file a detailed representation. Pursuant thereto, impugned orders
2026:JHHC:24162
have been passed, whereby two grounds have been taken, firstly,
that the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post and
secondly, that they were not appointed by competent authority.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioners draws attention of
this Court towards Annexure-18 which is the report of the
Regularization Committee and submits that the same is against
the fact and the fact remains that they were appointed and worked
continuously till the age of their retirement.
7.
Learned counsel further submits that the issue, as to
whether regularization is permissible if the initial appointment has
been made by non-competent authority and on a non-sanctioned
post, has also now been settled by a series of judgments, as such,
the impugned orders which have been passed by rejecting the
claim of the petitioners for regularization is against the settled law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Jaggo v.
Union of India & Ors.1, Shripal & Another v. Nagar Nigam,
Ghaziabad2, Dharam Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.3
and Amarkant Rai v. State of Bihar & Ors.4; accordingly, the
impugned orders may be quashed and set aside and respondents
be directed to give all consequential benefits to these petitioners.
8.
Learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the
supplementary counter affidavit submits that the petitioner No.1
was working as typist against the sanctioned post of clerk and
petitioner No.2 was working as Dak Peon against the sanctioned
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
2025 SCC OnLine SC 221
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735
(2015) 8 SCC 265
2026:JHHC:24162
post of peon and further, the appointment was not made by the
competent authority, but learned counsel failed to demonstrate by
any document that these petitioners were working on seasonal
basis; in other words, that they did not work continuously since
the date of initial appointment.
9.
Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances
of the case, following points are culled out on perusal of the
documents:
(I)
The petitioner No.1 was appointed as typist on the
sanctioned post of clerk.
(II) Petitioner No.2 was appointed as Dak Peon on the
sanctioned post of peon.
(III) Both worked regularly since the date of initial appointment
and continuously worked till their age of retirement in the
year 2024-25 and were regularly receiving the salary of
casual employees.
10.
Having
regard
to
the
admitted
facts
that
the
petitioners had worked regularly for almost four decades and
further, there was a sanctioned post for clerk, but the petitioner
No.1 was given the work of typist. Likewise, there was a
sanctioned post of peon but the petitioner No.2 was taken work of
Dak Peon.
11.
This Court fails to understand, when the petitioners
worked regularly for about four decades and the nature of job was
perennial
in
nature,
then
on
these
flimsy
grounds,
the
respondents should not have rejected the claim of the petitioners.
2026:JHHC:24162
Learned counsel for the petitioners has rightly cited various
dictums of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo (supra),
Shripal & Another (supra), Dharam Singh & Ors. (supra) and
Amarkant Rai (supra). In the case of Jaggo (supra), the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
“25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly
in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of
exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts
may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have
increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed
to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:
• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that
is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution
are often labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their
roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification
deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular
employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently
dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This
practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects
workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or
duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find
themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development,
promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their
roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular
counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to
outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not
only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort
to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are
often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund,
health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans
decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to
undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or
unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the
practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often
misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving
employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and
“irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in
irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts
and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be
considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the
laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions
rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even
in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack
adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments often
2026:JHHC:24162
cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to
regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking the
judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is
appropriate. This selective application distorts the judgment's spirit
and purpose, effectively weaponizing it against employees who have
rendered indispensable services over decades.”
12.
Further, in the case of Shripal & Another (supra) the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to
contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim
permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such
absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself
distinguishes between appointments that are “illegal” and those that
are “irregular,” the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet
certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield
to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the
Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which
shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a consistent need for
permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh
recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or
continued unfair practices.”
13.
Further in the case of Dharam Singh & Ors. (supra)
the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives
where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep
and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and
outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence,
why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where
the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should
show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed
workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns
with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to
the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not
sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform
every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.”
14.
Further in the case of Amarkant Rai (supra) the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“8. Insofar as contention of the respondent that the appointment of the
appellant was made by the Principal who is not a competent authority to
make such appointment and is in violation of the Bihar State Universities
Act and hence the appointment is illegal appointment, it is pertinent to note
that the appointment of the appellant as night guard was done out of
necessity and concern for the College. As noticed earlier, the Principal of
the College vide letters dated 11-3-1988, 7-10-1993, 8-1-2002 and 12-72004 recommended the case of the appellant for regularisation on the post
of night guard and the University was thus well acquainted with the
appointment of the appellant by the then Principal even though the
Principal was not a competent authority to make such appointments and
thus the appointment of the appellant and other employees was brought to
2026:JHHC:24162
the notice of the University in 1988. In spite of that, the process for
termination was initiated only in the year 2001 and the appellant was
reinstated w.e.f. 3-1-2002 and was removed from services finally in the
year 2007. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant,
for a considerable time, the University never raised the issue that the
appointment of the appellant by the Principal is ultra vires the rules of the
BSU Act. Having regard to the various communications between the
Principal and the University and also the educational authorities and the
facts of the case, in our view, the appointment of the appellant cannot be
termed to be illegal, but it can only be termed as irregular.”
15.
Having regard
to the
aforesaid and
the
settled
proposition of the law, the instant writ application stands allowed
and the orders dated 09.10.2024 (Annexure-21 and 21/1), are
hereby, quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to
give all consequential benefits to these petitioners in accordance
with law within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of
copy of this order.
16.
Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
AUGUST 13, 2026
vikas/uploaded
20/08/2026
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