Judgments
LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/syed-nasim-akhtar-alias-syed-naseem-akhtar-vs-the-state-of-jharkhand-20260813/ · Printed 19 Nov 2026
Civil

Syed Nasim Akhtar Alias Syed Naseem Akhtar vs The State of Jharkhand

Add to a compilation

Keep judgments in folders, mark the paragraphs you rely on, and print a compilation with an index. It comes with the Research and Advocate Pro judgment plans and with a campus licence. Sign in · See the plans

Court
Jharkhand High Court
Date
13 August 2026
Case No.
WPC 6302/2024
Result
Allowed
Bench
Deepak Roshan
Cite this judgment
Citation
Link for your website or blog
Cite the court's own record or the law report in court filings.

The court's order

The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.

15. Having regard to the aforesaid and the settled proposition of the law, the instant writ application stands allowed and the orders dated 09.10.2024 (Annexure-21 and 21/1), are hereby, quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to give all consequential benefits to these petitioners in accordance with law within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

2026:JHHC:24162 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 6302 of 2024 --------- 1. Syed Nasim Akhtar @ Syed Naseem Akhtar, aged about 60 years, son of Syed Akhtiyar Hussain, resident of Village-Pipra kala, P.O. & P.S.-Garhwa, District-Garhwa; 2. Ramashray Yadav, aged about 59 years, son of Sri Janki Yadav, resident of Village-Bharkur, P.O.-Pawai, P.S.-Aurangabad, District- Aurangabad, Bihar; Present address - Pipra kala, P.O. & P.S.-Garhwa, DistrictGarhwa. ......Petitioner(s) Versus 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. The State of Jharkhand; Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi; Secretary, Department of Forest, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal house, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi; Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Forest Department, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal house, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi; Divisional Commissioner, Palamau, P.O. & P.S.-Medininagar, Distt. Palamau. Dy. Commissioner, Garhwa, P.O., P.S. & Distt. - Garhwa. Conservator of Forest, Daltonganj Afforestation & Social Forestry Circle, P.O., P.S. & District - Daltonganj; Divisional Forest Officer, Social Forestry Division, P.O., P.S. & Distt. Garhwa; .....Respondent(s) --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, Advocate Mr. Amit Kr. Srivastava, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr.S.C.-II Mrs. Sunita Kumari, A.C. to Sr.S.C.-II 12/Dated:-13.08.2026 1. --------- Learned counsel for the respondents intends to file supplementary counter affidavit on behalf of the 8th respondent; the same is taken on record. 2. With the consent of both the parties, the matter has been taken up for hearing today itself. 3. The instant writ application has been preferred by the 2026:JHHC:24162 respective petitioners for quashing the impugned orders which are annexed as Annexures-21 and 21/1, whereby the claim of the respective petitioners for regularizing their services has been rejected by the respondent authorities. 4. The brief facts as it appears from the writ application are that the petitioner No. 1 had been continuously working since 10.01.1985 in the Social Forestry Division, Garhwa, as Clerkcum-Typist on daily wage basis and there has been no break of service. He was allowed to work on vacant sanctioned post vide order dated 28.03.1987. The petitioner No.2 has also been working continuously since 06.07.1985 on the post of peon on daily wage basis in the Social Forestry Division, Garhwa. Thereafter, there was regular need of the personnel on the post on which the petitioners were working and therefore correspondence was made for regular appointments or for regularization of the services of the petitioners. The respondent no. 8 wrote to the Conservator of Forest, Palamu giving the vacancy position vide letter no. 375 dated 22.03.1991 and letter no. 966 dated 13.10.1992. Thereafter also, several recommendations were made by the department for regularization of the services of the petitioners vide Annexures-4, 5, 6, 6/1, 7 and 7/1; however, respondents have not regularized the services of the petitioners. 5. Earlier also, the petitioner knocked the door of this Court thrice. In the last round of litigation i.e. in W.P.(S) No. 6204 of 2023, the same was disposed of by directing the petitioners to file a detailed representation. Pursuant thereto, impugned orders 2026:JHHC:24162 have been passed, whereby two grounds have been taken, firstly, that the petitioners were not appointed on sanctioned post and secondly, that they were not appointed by competent authority. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners draws attention of this Court towards Annexure-18 which is the report of the Regularization Committee and submits that the same is against the fact and the fact remains that they were appointed and worked continuously till the age of their retirement. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the issue, as to whether regularization is permissible if the initial appointment has been made by non-competent authority and on a non-sanctioned post, has also now been settled by a series of judgments, as such, the impugned orders which have been passed by rejecting the claim of the petitioners for regularization is against the settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Jaggo v. Union of India & Ors.1, Shripal & Another v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad2, Dharam Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.3 and Amarkant Rai v. State of Bihar & Ors.4; accordingly, the impugned orders may be quashed and set aside and respondents be directed to give all consequential benefits to these petitioners. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the supplementary counter affidavit submits that the petitioner No.1 was working as typist against the sanctioned post of clerk and petitioner No.2 was working as Dak Peon against the sanctioned 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735 (2015) 8 SCC 265 2026:JHHC:24162 post of peon and further, the appointment was not made by the competent authority, but learned counsel failed to demonstrate by any document that these petitioners were working on seasonal basis; in other words, that they did not work continuously since the date of initial appointment. 9. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, following points are culled out on perusal of the documents: (I) The petitioner No.1 was appointed as typist on the sanctioned post of clerk. (II) Petitioner No.2 was appointed as Dak Peon on the sanctioned post of peon. (III) Both worked regularly since the date of initial appointment and continuously worked till their age of retirement in the year 2024-25 and were regularly receiving the salary of casual employees. 10. Having regard to the admitted facts that the petitioners had worked regularly for almost four decades and further, there was a sanctioned post for clerk, but the petitioner No.1 was given the work of typist. Likewise, there was a sanctioned post of peon but the petitioner No.2 was taken work of Dak Peon. 11. This Court fails to understand, when the petitioners worked regularly for about four decades and the nature of job was perennial in nature, then on these flimsy grounds, the respondents should not have rejected the claim of the petitioners. 2026:JHHC:24162 Learned counsel for the petitioners has rightly cited various dictums of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo (supra), Shripal & Another (supra), Dharam Singh & Ors. (supra) and Amarkant Rai (supra). In the case of Jaggo (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways: • Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks. • Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service. • Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant. • Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment. • Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances. 26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments often 2026:JHHC:24162 cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is appropriate. This selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing it against employees who have rendered indispensable services over decades.” 12. Further, in the case of Shripal & Another (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.” 13. Further in the case of Dharam Singh & Ors. (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.” 14. Further in the case of Amarkant Rai (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “8. Insofar as contention of the respondent that the appointment of the appellant was made by the Principal who is not a competent authority to make such appointment and is in violation of the Bihar State Universities Act and hence the appointment is illegal appointment, it is pertinent to note that the appointment of the appellant as night guard was done out of necessity and concern for the College. As noticed earlier, the Principal of the College vide letters dated 11-3-1988, 7-10-1993, 8-1-2002 and 12-72004 recommended the case of the appellant for regularisation on the post of night guard and the University was thus well acquainted with the appointment of the appellant by the then Principal even though the Principal was not a competent authority to make such appointments and thus the appointment of the appellant and other employees was brought to 2026:JHHC:24162 the notice of the University in 1988. In spite of that, the process for termination was initiated only in the year 2001 and the appellant was reinstated w.e.f. 3-1-2002 and was removed from services finally in the year 2007. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, for a considerable time, the University never raised the issue that the appointment of the appellant by the Principal is ultra vires the rules of the BSU Act. Having regard to the various communications between the Principal and the University and also the educational authorities and the facts of the case, in our view, the appointment of the appellant cannot be termed to be illegal, but it can only be termed as irregular.” 15. Having regard to the aforesaid and the settled proposition of the law, the instant writ application stands allowed and the orders dated 09.10.2024 (Annexure-21 and 21/1), are hereby, quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to give all consequential benefits to these petitioners in accordance with law within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 16. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) AUGUST 13, 2026 vikas/uploaded 20/08/2026

This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.

Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong? Request a review

All Jharkhand HC judgments →
LegalFirms.in Directory
Find an advocate for this matter
Dealing with a similar case? Find an advocate who handles this kind of matter on LegalFirms.in.
Find an advocate →