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THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.619 of 2025
Date of Decision: 02.04.2026
_______________________________________________________
Smt. Sushma
…….Petitioner
Versus
Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd.
… Respondents
_______________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioner
:
Ms. Pooja Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, Advocate
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 438
read with Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
lays challenge to judgment dated 02.07.2025 passed by learned
Sessions Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal
Appeal No.13 of 2023, affirming the judgment of conviction dated
03.03.2023 and order of sentence dated 06.03.2023 passed by
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, Himachal
Pradesh in Complaint No.72-I/2014 titled Jammu & Kashmir Bank
Ltd versus Smt. Sushma, whereby learned trial Court, while holding
petitioner-accused ( hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) guilty
of her having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
the Negotiable Instruments Act(for short ‘Act’), convicted and
sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one
year and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.12,20,000/- to the
respondent-complainant
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
‘complainant’).
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the
pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the
respective parties, are that the respondent-complainant-bank filed a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that complainant-bank had sanctioned consumption
loan of Rs. 4, 75,000/- in favour of the accused on 10.10.2011 against
loan account No. 2653057 and an amount of Rs. 6, 10,000/- was due
against her till 17th April, 2014. Accused, with a view to discharge her
lawful liability, issued cheque bearing No.502483, dated 17.04.2014,
amounting to Rs. 6,10,000/-, drawn at Bank of Baroda, Branch Kullu,
Himachal Pradesh. However, facts remains that aforesaid cheque on
its presentation in the bank concerned was dishonoured vide return
memo dated 10.07.2014 for the reason No.20 i.e. “Payment stopped
by drawer”. After receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant-bank
served accused with legal notice, calling upon her to pay the
outstanding amount within a period of 15 days, but since she failed to
do the needful, it was compelled to initiate proceedings under Section
138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, which subsequently, on
the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties,
held the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
S. 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced her as
per description given herein above.
3.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial
Court, present petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of
learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, but
same also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 02.07.2025. In
the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has approached this
Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for her acquittal after
quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence recorded by Courts below.
4.
Vide order dated 28.10.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by Court below, subject to petitioneraccused depositing 20% of the compensation amount and furnishing
personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like
amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court within a period of four
weeks. However, fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be
complied with. Repeatedly matter was adjourned and time was
extended, enabling petitioner-accused to deposit the amount, but in
vain.
5.
Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned
counsel representing the petitioner fairly stated that since petitioner is
not coming forward to deposit the amount, this Court may proceed to
decide the petition on its own merit.
6.
Having heard learned counsel representing the parties
and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned
in the impugned judgments of conviction and order of sentence
recorded by Courts below, this Court is not persuaded to agree with
learned counsel for the petitioner-accused that both the Courts below
have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather
this Court finds that both the courts below have meticulously dealt
with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for
interference.
7.
Since in the case at hand, factum with regard to availing
of loan as well as issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon never
came to be refuted, courts below rightly invoked sections 118 and
139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder
of the cheque that cheque was issued towards discharge of lawful
liability. True it is that aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but a
person seeking to rebut such presumption either can refer to the
documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or
presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any.
However, in the instant case despite sufficient opportunity, accused
failed to lead any evidence.
8.
In her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C,
accused though stated that she had not given the cheque in question
to the complainant-bank and her cheque book was misplaced, qua
which she had lodged the FIR, but she was not able to probablize
aforesaid defence by leading cogent and convincing evidence.
9.
Complainant-bank, with a view to prove its case,
examined Sh. Mumtaj Ahmed Khan as CW-1, who tendered his
evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CW1/A, wherein he specifically
reiterated the averments contained in the complaint. He also tendered
cheque Ex. C-1, memo Ex. C-2, memo Ex. C-3, notice Ex. C-4, postal
receipt Ex. C-5, undelivered registered letter Ex. C-6 and copy of GPA
Ex. C-7 in evidence. Cross-examination conducted upon this witness,
if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests that accused was able to
extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his
examination-in-chief.
In his cross-examination, he admitted that
cheque Ext. C-1 was filled by the accused and except this cheque, no
other cheque of the accused is with the bank. He specifically denied
suggestion put to him that bank misused the cheque. While stating
that he is not aware that particulars written in the cheque are different,
he self stated that same is in the writing of the accused. He also
denied the suggestion that accused did not issue the cheque and no
notice was issued prior to filing complaint. He also stated that five
recovery cases have been filed against the accused, but denied that
he has no authority letter given by the bank to file this case.
10.
Though, accused denied factum of her having issued
cheque in question, but she categorically stated that cheque issued
by her has been misused. Though, accused attempted to set up a
case that she had misplaced her cheque and in that regard FIR was
also lodged, but such fact, if any, never came to be proved in
accordance with law.
11.
Evidence adduced on record clearly proves that accused
had issued cheque Ex. C-1, dated 17.04.2014, amounting to
Rs.6,10,000/- duly signed by her, but same was dishonoured vide
memo Ext. C-2 dated 18.04.2014 with the remarks ‘funds insufficient’
and again dishonoured vide memo Ext. C-3 dated 10.07.2014 with the
remarks ‘Payment Stopped by Drawer’. Factum with regard to
issuance of legal notice dated 18.07.2014 Ext. C-4 was also proved,
which is evident from postal receipt Ext. C-5 dated 18.07.2014. Since
accused refused to receive the notice and it was returned to the
sender with the report ‘refusal’ made by the Postman dated
19.07.2014 along with AD Ext. C-6 , coupled with the fact that
accused neither replied the notice nor paid the cheque amount, Court
below rightly allowed the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act.
12.
In the cross-examination of CW-1, a suggestion in the
shape of admission was put on behalf of the accused that the cheque
in question has been handed over by her duly filled. Similarly, defence
put to CW-1, by way of suggestions that the cheque in question is
given as security and was misused by the bank, further establishes
factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures
thereupon. In her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C
accused admitted
that she had
Rs.4,75,000/- on 10.10.2011
availed loan to the tune of
and an outstanding amount of
Rs. 6, 10,000/- was due against her till 17.04.2014.
13.
Once factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well
as signatures thereupon never came to be disputed, no illegality can
be said to have been committed by Courts below, while invoking
Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in
favour of the holder of the cheque that cheque was issued towards
discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to
the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or
presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any.
However, in the instant case, despite sufficient opportunities,
petitioner-accused failed to lead any evidence and as such, she
otherwise failed to probablize the defence, sought to be raised by her,
while deposing under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
14.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V.
State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that
if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates
doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the
accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into
play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of
the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective
of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the
cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139
is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of
litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable
by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the
nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually
confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an
unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section
139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish
a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability,
the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on
the materials submitted by the complainant in
order to raise such a defence and it is
inconceivable that in some cases the accused
may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her
own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque
in question neither raises a probable defence nor
able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the
same is not rebutted with regard to the materials
submitted by the complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of
cheques in order to qualify for prosecution
under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon
by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange
the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt
of such a notice and despite the opportunity to
make the payment within the time stipulated
under the statute does not pay the amount, that
the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for
discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would
be a matter that the trial court will have to
examine having regard to the evidence adduced
before it keeping in view the statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid
consideration. In view of this the responsibility of
the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been
instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient
ground to proceed in the matter, would be
extremely heavy.
15.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued
as “security” can also attract offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati
Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of
2021, decided on 28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the
state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited
or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to
repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque
as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not
repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer
the payment of amount,
the cheque which is issued as security would mature for
presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to
present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section
138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
16.
Needless to say, expression “security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act,
rather same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if
any, led on record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The
Negotiable Instruments Act does not per se carve out an exception in
respect of a “security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of
such a cheque would not be maintainable as there is a debt existing
in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, same would
attract provision of Section 138 of the Act in case of its dishonour.
17.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record
by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients
of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Similarly,
factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the
accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
18.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially,
in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the
courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs.
Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by
the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of
an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second
appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as
well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature
is brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
19.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as
fact, if any, committed by the courts below, while passing impugned
judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the
revisional power.
20.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme
Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a
failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure,
sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to
prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material
irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the
evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the
well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below.
21.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein
above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court
sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments
recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based
upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as
such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is
22.
dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to
surrender herself before the learned trial Court within a period of 15
days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if
not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner are cancelled. Interim
direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
April 02, 2026
(shankar)
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