The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
13. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has not passed speaking order. Therefore, without touching the merits of the averments as made in the application, the impugned order is set aside with direction to the learned trial Court to restore the application filed by the petitioners/defendants under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC to its original number and thereafter decide the same afresh by affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties, in accordance with law.
14. With the aforesaid observations, the instant petition stands disposed of, so also, the pending applications, if any. 21st May, 2026. (jai) (Romesh Verma) Judge
Full Judgment Text
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( 2026:HHC:19746 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 12 of 2026.
Decided on : 21st May, 2026.
Sushil Kumar & Ors.
....Petitioners.
Versus
Naiya Kumar & Anr.
....Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the Petitioners:
For the Respondents:
Mr. Vinod Sharma & Mr. Vidya Sagar,
Advocates.
Ex-parte.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral).
The present petition arises out of the order as passed by
the learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Kangra, on 29.10.2025 in
CMA No. 829 of 2025, whereby application filed by the present
petitioners/defendants under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of
the CPC has been rejected.
2.
The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/respondents
filed suit for grant of decree for declaration and permanent
prohibitory injunction against the defendants/petitioners
to the
effect that the land bearing Khata No. 215, Khatoni No. 365, Khasra
Nos. 234, 235, 240, 241, 242, Kita 5, area measuring 0-07-58 hectares
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
situated at Mohal and Mauza Kawari, Tehsil Nagrota Bagwan, District
Kangra, H.P. is in the exclusive ownership and possession of the
plaintiffs. Further, it has been averred that sale deed No.575 dated
05.06.2009 allegedly executed by Sh. Jagdish Chand, predecessor of
the plaintiffs in favour of Shri Gian Chand, predecessor of the
defendants is the result of fraud, fabrication, without any
consideration and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside
being null and void.
It has been averred in the plaint that the
plaintiffs are exclusive owners in possession of the suit land along
with house existing over the suit land and are residing there along
with their families and also getting all usufructs therefrom. It is also
averred that the sale deed No. 575, dated 05.06.2009 allegedly
executed by Sh. Jagdish Chand, predecessor of the plaintiffs in favour
of Shri Gian Chand, predecessor of the defendants is the result of
fraud, fabrication and the same is liable to be declared as null and
void.
3.
It has been averred in the plaint that the mutation
attested on the basis of the sale deed and the revenue entries being
reflected in favour of the defendants be declared as wrong, null and
void.
Therefore, the suit for declaration and injunction was
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
preferred by the plaintiffs/respondents in the Court of learned Senior
Civil Judge, Court No.1, Kangra, H.P.
4.
After the service before the learned trial Court, the
defendants filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC for
rejection of the plaint. It was averred in the application that the
partition case in the Revenue Court, Nagrota Bagwan, filed by the
defendants is pending for Fard Kabza report.
Another Civil Suit
No.215/2024 was filed by the defendants/petitioners, which is
pending before the very same court.
It was averred in the
application that the Court had granted partial stay to maintain status
quo qua the nature, possession and construction over the suit land
situated at Mohal and Mauza Kawari, Tehsil Nagrota Bagwan, District
Kangra, H.P. in the said suit. Plaintiff Naiya Kumari did not accept the
notice issued by the Court for her service in the said suit.
The
present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs/respondents to harass
the defendants/present petitioners.
That the suit is barred by
limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and that the
iron angles have been put by the petitioners/defendants on the suit
land after purchase of the suit land vide sale deed in the year 2009
with the knowledge of the predecessor of the plaintiffs/respondents.
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Therefore, it was prayed that the present suit instituted by the
plaintiffs/respondents is time barred. It was further prayed that no
cause of actions has arisen in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents
and against the defendants/petitioners. There is no new cause of
action in favour of the plaintiffs and the pleadings as made by the
plaintiffs in the plaint misrepresent the factual position besides being
scandalous, vexatious and misleading.
application
be
allowed
and
the
It was prayed that the
plaint
as
filed
by
the
respondents/plaintiffs be ordered to be dismissed.
5.
The said application was duly resisted and contested by
the plaintiffs/respondent by filing reply wherein various preliminary
objections with regard to maintainability etc., have been taken. All
the averments as made in the application have been refuted and
denied.
The plaintiffs/respondents prayed for dismissal of the
application which was filed by the present petitioners/defendants for
rejection of the plaint.
6.
Learned trial Court, vide its order dated 29.10.2025,
dismissed the application filed for rejection of plaint.
7.
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
Feeling aggrieved, the present petitioners/defendants
have approached this Court be invoking the provisions of Article 227
of the Constitution of India.
8.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the impugned order as passed by the learned trial Court is
erroneous and is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the
order which has been passed by the learned trial Court is a nonspeaking order as no reasons have been assigned by the learned
trial Court while rejecting the application.
9.
Notices were issued by this Court on 06.01.2026 for the
service of the respondents/plaintiffs.
As per the report of the
Registry, the said respondents stand duly served, however, non has
put in appearance on their behalf and they were proceeded against
ex-parte.
10.
for
In the present case, the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit
declaration
and
injunction
against
the
present
petitioners/respondents seeking declaration that the sale deed dated
05.06.2009 allegedly executed by Shri Jagdish Chand, predecessor-ininterest of the plaintiffs in favour of Gian Chand, predecessor-ininterest of the defendants, is the result of fraud, fabrication and the
same is liable to be declared as null and void.
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
Various averments
have been made in the application, however, this Court will confine
itself to the adjudication of the same. The perusal of the order dated
29.10.2025 demonstrates that the learned trial Court has not
assigned any reasons while rejecting the said application.
The
learned trial Court, after noting the facts of the case and relying upon
three judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, has rejected the
application without assigning any reason for the same. Neither the
averments as made in the application nor the submission as made by
the learned counsel for the parties have been taken care and in a slip
shod manner, the application has been dismissed.
11.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that while
passing any order, reasons are required to be assigned by the Court.
The said expositions of law is fortified by the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax
Department, Works Cntract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla &
Brothers, (2010) 4 SCC 785, the relevant paragraphs No. 24 and 30
thereof read as under:“24.
Reason is the very life of law. When the reason
of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases
(Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the
cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter
of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent.
Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces
an element of uncertainty, dis- satisfaction and give
entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised
before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court
should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting
claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e.
at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever
precise they may be.
30.
In light of the above principles, now we will
revert back to the facts of the present appeal. It cannot be
doubted that challenge was raised to the order of the
Board before the High Court on alleged questions of law
as well as mixed question of law and fact. The contention
that the respondent had not manufactured the shutters
from the tax paid raw material and also that the contract
in question was not impartible but a consequential item
for completion of the contract required examination by
the High Court. In light of the judgments referred to and
relied upon by the parties including the judgment of this
Court, it is true that requirement of stating reasons for
judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very detailed
or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning
recorded by the Court for declining or granting relief to
the petitioner. The purpose, as already noticed, is to make
the litigant aware of the reasons for which the relief is
declined as well as to help the higher Court in assessing
the correctness of the view taken by the High Court while
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
disposing off a matter. May be, while dealing with the
matter at the admission stage even recording of short
listening dealing with the merit of the contentions raised
before the High Court may suffice, in contrast, a detailed
judgment while matter is being disposed off after final
hearing, but in both events, in our view, it is imperative for
the High Court to record its own reasoning however short
it might be.”
12.
Similarly,
Hon’ble Apex Court in Kranti Associates
Private Limited and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others,
(2010)9 SCC 496 has held as under:
“22.
In
M/s. Woolcombers
of
India
Ltd.
vs.
Woolcombers Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC
2758, this Court while considering an award under Section
11 of Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving
reasons in support of conclusions in the Award. The Court
held that the very requirement of giving reason is to prevent
unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The
second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that
justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be
done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but
unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those
who read the same. Reasoned and just conclusion on the
other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The
third ground is that such awards are subject to Article
136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of reasons,
it is difficult for this Court to ascertain whether the decision
is right or wrong (See para 5 page 2761).
23.
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and
others, AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court while dealing with the
question
of
selection
under
Indian
Administrative
Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion
Regulation) held that the expression "reasons for the
proposed supersession" should not be mere rubber stamp
reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied
to the subject matter for a decision regardless of the fact
whether such a decision is purely administrative or quasijudicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context
would mean the link between materials which are
considered and the conclusions which are reached. Reasons
must reveal a rational nexus between the two (See para 28
page 98).
24.
In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co.
of India Ltd. vs. The Union of India and another, AIR 1976 SC
1785, this Court held that it is far too well settled that an
authority in making an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial
function, must record reasons in support of the order it
makes. The learned Judges emphatically said that every
quasi- judicial order must be supported by reasons. The rule
requiring reasons in support of a quasi- judicial order is, this
Court held, as basic as following the principles of natural
justice. And the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A
mere pretence of compliance would not satisfy the
requirement of law (See para 6 page 1789).
25 .
In Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and
Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597, which is a decision of great
jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional law, Chief
Justice Beg, in a concurring but different opinion held that
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
an order impounding a passport is a quasi-judicial decision
(Para 34, page612). The learned Chief Justice also held when
an administrative action involving any deprivation of or
restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the authorities
must see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears
to be done as well. This principle would obviously demand
disclosure of reasons for the decision.
26.
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then
was) in a concurring but a separate opinion also held that
refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a passport is an
exercise of an exceptional nature and is to be done very
sparingly and only when it is fully justified by the exigencies
of an uncommon situation.
37.
The learned Judge further held that law cannot
permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep the
reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing so is to keep
the reasons away from judicial scrutiny. (See para 39 page
613).
28.
In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State
of Kerala and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1918, Justice V.R. Krishna
Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the
functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One
of the attributes of quasi- judicial functioning is the
recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the
other requirement is following the principles of natural
justice. Learned Judge held that natural justice requires
reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See para 14
page 1922).
29.
In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and
Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service
( 2026:HHC:19746 )
matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held that
"rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted
the observation in Capoor (supra) to the extent that:
“28…. Reasons are the links between the materials on
which certain conclusions are based and the actual
conclusions." (See para 18 page 377).”
13.
Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the learned trial Court has not passed speaking order.
Therefore, without touching the merits of the averments as made in
the application, the impugned order is set aside with direction to the
learned trial Court to restore the application filed by the
petitioners/defendants under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of
the CPC to its original number and thereafter decide the same afresh
by
affording an opportunity of hearing to both the parties, in
accordance with law.
14.
With the aforesaid observations, the instant petition
stands disposed of, so also, the pending applications, if any.
21st May, 2026.
(jai)
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
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